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Abstract	   	  
Climate	   change	   is	   the	  most	   important	   issue	  of	   our	   time	  due	   to	   its	  potential	   to	   very	  seriously	   disrupt	   the	   life	   sustaining	   systems	   of	   planet	   Earth	   as	  well	   as	   its	   intersec-­‐tions	  with	   other	   important	   challenges	   facing	   humanity.	   The	  United	  Nations	   Frame-­‐work	   Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change	   is	   the	   key	   platform	   upon	   which	   the	   political	  process	  of	  international	  climate	  change	  politics	  takes	  place.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  work	  is	  to	  produce	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  transnational	  climate	  change	  advocacy	  networks	  in	  this	  political	  process	  and	  their	  internal	  power	  dynamics	  and	  thus	  contributing	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  this	  political	  process.	  
To	   advance	   this	   aim,	   this	   thesis	   engages	   with	   two	   objectives.	   First,	   a	   detailed	  ethnography	   is	   developed	   which	   serves	   to	   illustrate	   the	   political	   work	   of	   the	  environmental	  advocacy	  NGOs	  involved	  within	  this	  process,	  especially	  those	  that	  are	  members	  of	  Climate	  Action	  Network	  International	  (CAN-­‐I).	  This	  approach	  is	  suitable	  to	  uncover	   the	   internal	  dynamics	  and	  structures	  of	   that	  NGO	  network	  as	  well	  as	   its	  complex	   and	  multi-­‐layered	   relationships	  within	   the	   larger	   political	   configuration	   of	  the	  UNFCCC	  treaty	  process.	  Secondly,	  the	  investigation	  is	  advanced	  by	  analysing	  this	  ethnography	  through	  the	   lens	  of	  a	  critical	   theory	  of	   the	  public	  sphere.	   In	  particular,	  this	   analysis	   features	   more	   contemporary	   conceptualisations	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	  which	  stress	   the	  multiplicity	  of	   the	  public	  sphere	  concept	   including	  notions	  such	  as	  internal	  and	  external	  public	  spheres,	  counterpublics,	  and	  nested	  public	  spheres.	  
Owing	  to	  this	  research	  design,	  the	  thesis	  has	  a	  degree	  of	  hybridity:	  it	  is	  expressly	  both	  an	  empirical	  thesis,	  with	  strong	  empirical	  flavour	  imparted	  by	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  detailed	   ethnographic	   account,	   as	   well	   a	   theoretical	   thesis	   offering	   an	   original	  contribution	  that	  is	  advanced	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  The	  main	  theoretical	  thesis	  and	  contribution	   is	   that	   the	   theory	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   is	   appropriate	   to	   analyse	   the	  political	   practice	   of	   civil	   society	   engagement	   on	   a	   transnational	   level	   if	   it	   is	   further	  developed	  to	  allow	  for	  greater	  degree	  of	  multiplicity	  and	  a	  broader	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  notions	  of	  the	  “centre	  of	  authority”	  and	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  public	  opinion.	  
Keywords:	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Chapter	  1 	  
	  
Introduction	  	  
Climate	   change	   is	   the	  most	   important	   challenge	  of	   our	   time.	  The	  prospect	   of	   large-­‐scale	   disruptive	   climate	   change	   would	   likely	   mean	   catastrophic	   consequences	   that	  would	   make	   all	   other	   issues	   that	   humanity	   faces	   pale	   in	   comparison.	   Indeed,	   in	   a	  world	  of	  advanced	  climate	  change,	  many	  of	  these	  other	  issues	  would	  be	  escalated	  to	  previously	  unknown	  severity,	  as	  changing	  climate	  places	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  more	  under	   severe	   water	   stress	   due	   to	   shrinking	   alpine	   glaciers	   and	   changes	   in	   rainfall	  pattern,	  causes	  densely	  populated	  coastal	  regions	  to	  become	  uninhabitable	  due	  to	  sea	  level	  rise,	  causes	  further	  destabilisation	  of	  unstable	  societies,	  leads	  to	  environmental	  refugees	  and	  causes	  further	  resource	  wars	  (IPCC	  2007a;	  Giddens	  2011;	  Zedillo	  2008).	  However,	  as	  it	  is	  also	  pointed	  out,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  to	  avert	  this	  doom	  scenario	  by	  taking	  decisive	  action	  (Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Baer	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Rogelj	  et	  al.	  2010).	  
Given	  the	  global	  character	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  consequently	  required	  global	  scale	  of	  the	  solution,	  particular	  attention	  and	  expectations	  are	  being	  given	   to	   the	   international	   political	   processes	   aimed	   at	   addressing	   climate	   change,	  especially	   the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC),	  which	   was	   created	   in	   1992	   for	   that	   purpose	   and	   was	   expanded	   in	   1997	   with	   the	  Kyoto	   Protocol	   which	   created	   legally	   binding	   greenhouse	   gas	   emission	   reduction	  targets	  for	  developed	  countries1.	  In	  these	  processes,	  participation	  of	  the	  voices	  of	  civil	  society	   is	   explicitly	   invited	   (UNFCCC	   1992:	   12).	   Accordingly,	   civil	   society	   –	   and	   in	  particular	  environmental	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (ENGOs)	  –	  has	  participat-­‐ed	   in	   this	   process	   from	   its	   inception	   and	   civil	   society	   delegates	   have	   long	   outnum-­‐bered	  government	  delegations.	  This	  participation	  of	  environmental	  advocacy	  groups	  in	  the	  international	  politics	  of	  climate	  change,	  then,	  constitutes	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	   History	  and	  institutional	  make-­‐up	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  will	  receive	  more	  attention	  in	  chapter	  4.	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  The	  international	  politics	  surrounding	  climate	  change	  is	  a	  particularly	  useful	  context	  in	  which	  to	  study	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (NGOs)	  and	  the	  wider	  civil	  society	  in	  global	  politics	  for	  three	  reasons.	  First,	  climate	  change	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  truly	  global	  problem:	  the	  limited	  capacity	  of	  the	  Earth’s	  atmosphere,	  oceans,	  and	  biosphere	  to	  absorb	  greenhouse	  gases	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  global	  commons,	  that	  is,	   as	   a	   good	   that	   can	   be	   used	   by	   everybody	   while	   being	   owned	   by	   nobody,	   thus	  making	   resource	   over-­‐use	   and	   depletion	   likely	   –	   the	   so-­‐called	   “tragedy	   of	   the	  commons”	   (Hardin	   1968)2.	   Since	   it	   has	   now	   been	   widely	   recognised	   that	   global	  climate	  change	  ought	  to	  be	  limited	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  most	  dire	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  human	  life	  and	  ecosystems	  (as,	  for	  example,	  described	  in	  IPCC	  2007a),	  the	  global	  commons	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  indicates	  that	  a	  global	  political	  response	  will	  have	  to	  be	  found	  to	  meet	  that	  goal;	  thus	  requiring	  a	  scale	  of	  international	  cooperation	  that	  is	  virtually	  unprecedented,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  environmental	  politics.	  	  
Secondly,	  climate	  change	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  as	  a	  subject	  of	  investigation	  as	  is	  has	  close	  links	  to	  many	  other,	  strongly	  contested	  international	  agendas	  and	  issues,	  such	   as	   conflicts	   over	   wealth	   distribution	   (both	   horizontally	   between	   geographic	  regions	   as	   well	   as	   vertically	   between	   social	   strata	   within	   the	   same	   country),	  production	   and	   consumption	   patterns,	   salient	   development	   and	   economic	   growth	  paradigms,	   but	   also	   questions	   of	   energy	   security	   and	   national	   security,	   and	   even	  topics	   such	   as	   intellectual	  property	   rights	   and	   foreign	   aid.	  The	   connection	  between	  climate	   change	   and	   security	   has	   been	  made,	   among	  others,	   by	  Al	  Gore	   (2008)	  who	  made	  explicit	   links	  between	   climate	   change,	   economic	   crisis	   (including	   the	   crisis	  of	  the	  US	  labour	  market),	  energy	  security	  and	  national	  security	  (the	  latter	  two	  of	  which	  being	  associated	  with	  “America’s	  addiction	  to	  foreign	  oil”)	  and	  suggested	  that	  solving	  the	  climate	  change	  problems	  would	  also	  massively	  contribute	  to	  solving	  all	  the	  others.	  Likewise,	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  issues	  are	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  “technology	   transfer”	   of	   green	   technology	   between	   countries,	   to	   help	   developing	  countries	   to	   develop	   along	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   development	   pathway,	   while	   foreign	   aid	  issues	  are	  touched	  upon	  when	  countries	  discuss	  the	  flow	  of	  finances	  from	  developed	  countries	  to	  developing	  countries3.	  Such	  financial	  flows	  are	  sought	  to	  aid	  the	  latter	  in	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  and	  in	  the	  adaptation	  to	  the	  already	  unavoidable	  affects	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	   Cf.	  the	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  concept	  in	  chapter	  2.	  3	  	   The	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  “developed”	  and	  “developing”	  countries	  will	  be	  problematised	  in	  chapter	  2.	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  climate	   change,	   whereby	   developing	   countries	   and	   NGOs	   often	   demand	   that	   these	  new	  financial	   flows	  must	  be	  additional	  to	  existing	  “Official	  Development	  Assistance”	  (ODA)	  (e.g.	  CAN	  2009a).	  
Third,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  number	  and	  breadth	  of	  issues	  and	  top-­‐ics	  considered	  in	  the	  climate	  change	  negotiations,	   in	  recent	  years	  these	  negotiations	  have	   matured	   to	   take	   a	   more	   central	   position	   in	   international	   politics.	   This	   is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  being	  taken	  up	  in	  most	  major	  international	  fora	  (such	  as	  the	  UN	  General	  assembly,	  G20	  meetings,	  various	  regional	  summits,	  but	  also	   dedicated	   international	   platforms	   such	   as	   the	   US-­‐sponsored	   “Major	   Emitters	  Meetings,”	  etc.),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  increased	  attendance	  of	  more	  senior	  politicians	  at	  the	  UN	  climate	  change	  conferences	  (the	  Copenhagen	  Climate	  Change	  Conference	  in	  2009	  witnessed	   the	   attendance	   of	   120	   Heads	   of	   State	   or	   Government,	   UNFCCC	   2009a).	  Furthermore	  the	  increased	  frequency	  and	  duration	  of	  these	  sessions	  are	  indication	  of	  this	  more	   central	   position,	   but	   also,	   for	   example,	   by	   the	   increasing	   size	   of	   financial	  figures	  dealt	  with	   in	   the	  process	  –	  negotiators	  now	  comfortably	   talk	  about	   financial	  transactions	  in	  the	  range	  of	  hundreds	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars	  annually	  (UNFCCC	  2008a;	  Harvey	  2008).	  As	  such,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  climate	  change	  politics	  “has	  a	  stronger	  scent	  of	   ‘high	   politics’	   than	   any	   other	   environmental	   issue”	   (Lunde	   1995:	   52),	  which	   has	  become	  even	  stronger	  in	  the	  15	  years	  since	  Lunde’s	  original	  observation.	  
Identifying	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  global	  problem	  with	  the	  need	  for	  a	  global	  solution	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  what	  sort	  of	  actors	  would	  be	  available	  to	  find	  such	  a	  solution	  on	  this	   scale.	   “Global	   civil	   society”	   (sometime	   the	   similar,	   though	   not	   identical,	   term	  “transnational	  civil	  society”	  is	  used,	  e.g.	  in	  Florini	  2000)	  has	  been	  suggested	  as	  one	  of	  the	   “forces”	   that	   has	   a	   role	   to	   play	   in	   this	   respect.	   “Global	   civil	   society”	   then	   is	   the	  global	   version	   of	   the	   “third	   force”	   (Florini	   2000),	   civil	   society,	   with	   the	   other	   two	  “forces”	   referring	   to	   the	   likewise	   globalising	   political	   power	   (which	   results	   in	   a	  emerging,	  albeit	  still	  state-­‐centred,	  international	  political	  order)	  as	  well	  as	  economic	  power	   (which	   gives	   rise	   to	   transnational	   corporations	   and	   increasingly	   global	  markets).	  	  
“Global	  civil	  society”	  as	  a	  concept	  is,	  however,	  not	  undisputed	  and	  it	  is	  acknowl-­‐edged	  that	  it	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  “fuzzy	  and	  contested	  concept”	  (Anheier	  et	  al.	  2001b:	  11).	  In	  fact,	   a	   number	   of	   potential	   conceptualisations	   are	   applied	   to	   the	   term	   and	   –	   most	  
1.	  Introduction	   	   13	  	  notably	  –	  it	  is	  stressed	  that	  both	  descriptive	  and	  normative	  uses	  exist,	  with	  the	  latter	  use	  hotly	  contested.	  In	  addition,	  some	  writers,	  e.g.	  Keane	  (2003),	  also	  point	  toward	  a	  third,	   political-­‐strategical	   dimension	   of	   the	   term,	   where	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   “Global	   Civil	  Society”	   is	   used	   as	   a	   campaign	   criterion	   to	   establish	   political	   strategies	   deemed	  promising	  for	  the	  political	  goal	  in	  question.	  Strong	  contestation,	  however	  exists	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  normative	  use	  of	  the	  term	  where,	  for	  example,	  Kenneth	  Anderson	  and	  David	  Rieff	   (2004:	  28)	  point	   to	   the	   “standard	  account	  of	  global	   civil	   society”	  as	  one	  that	   usually	   considers	   the	   term	   to	   embrace	   “a	   ‘progressive’	  movement,	   and	   thus	   it	  contains	   only	   certain	   politically	   progressive	   NGOs	   and	   social	   movements.”	   This	  indeed	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  widely	  shared	  view;	  David	  Held,	   for	  example,	  states	  that	  “civil	  society	   […]	   is	   indispensable	   to	  a	  robust	  programme	  of	  national	  development”	   (Held	  2004:	  6)	  and	  others	  express	   their	  hope	   that	   it	   “can	  be	  posed	  as	  a	   counterweight	   to	  [economic]	  ‘globalisation’”	  (Anheier	  et	  al.	  2001b:	  16).	  
Critics	  of	  this	  view	  object	  by	  countering	  that	  the	  actors	  of	  “Global	  Civil	  Society”	  do	  not	  have	  any	   form	  of	  democratic	   legitimation	  although	   they	  seem	  to	  claim	  to	  speak	  for	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  world	  (Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  2004:	  30).	  Others,	  like	  Ulrich	  Beck,	  retort	   that	   social	  movements	   in	   a	   global	  world	   do	   indeed	   have	   legitimatory	   power	  which,	  although	  not	  strictly	   speaking	  democratically	   legitimated	   through	   the	  ballot-­‐box,	  consists	  of	  an	  extension	  of	  Bourdieu’s	  formulation	  of	  different	  types	  of	  capital	  (cf.	  Bourdieu	  1983),	  which	  Beck	  calls	  “legitimatory	  power,”	  and	  which	  is	  bestowed	  upon	  the	   movements	   or	   NGOs	   by	   their	   members	   and	   supporters	   (Beck	   2005:	   240).	  Additionally,	  although	  it	  might	  be	  appropriate	  to	  point	  out	  difficulties	  with	  regards	  to	  democratic	   legitimation	  of	  “Global	  Civil	  Society”	  organisations,	  similar	  points	  can	  be	  raised	  with	  regards	  to	  Intergovernmental	  Organisations	  (such	  as	  the	  WTO	  or	  World	  Bank),	   transnational	   corporations	   and,	   indeed,	   national	   governments	   (even	   the	  democratically	  elected	  ones)	  once	  they	  transcend	  the	  realm	  of	  their	  national	  politics	  and	  become	  part	  of	  global	  governance	  processes.	  
Taking	  Beck’s	  thoughts	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  NGOs	  even	  further,	  Habermas	  (2003)	  suggests	   that	   civil	   society	   participation	   in	   international	   negotiating	   systems	   is	   a	  requirement	  for	  the	  democratic	  legitimation	  of	  these	  systems	  as	  NGOs	  could	  serve	  as	  links	  between	  these	  negotiating	  systems	  and	  national	  public	  spheres,	  thus	  making	  the	  former	  transparent	   for	   the	   latter.	  His	  conclusion	   is	  based	  on	  a	  discourse-­‐theoretical	  understanding	   of	   democratic	   legitimation,	  where,	  with	   reference	   to	   Kant’s	   elabora-­‐
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  tions	  regarding	  the	  public	  use	  of	  reason,	  “democratic	  procedure	  …	  draws	  [some	  of]	  its	  legitimizing	   force	   …	   from	   the	   general	   accessibility	   of	   a	   deliberative	   process	   whose	  structure	  grounds	  an	  expectation	  of	   rationally	  acceptable	   results”	   (Habermas	  2003:	  546).	   Although	   this	   discourse-­‐theoretical	   notion	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   bestow	   full	  democratic	  legitimation	  upon	  a	  given	  institution,	  it	  can	  “tip	  the	  balance,”	  particularly	  in	  cases	  with	  questionable	  legitimation	  such	  as	  “Global	  Civil	  Society”	  participation	  in	  various	   international	  negotiating	  processes,	   such	  as	  on	   climate	   change.	  Elements	  of	  this	   understanding	   of	   democratic	   legitimation	   are	   a	   “functioning	   public	   sphere,	   the	  quality	  of	  discussion,	  accessibility,	  and	  the	  discursive	  structure	  of	  opinion-­‐	  and	  will-­‐formation”	   (Habermas	   2003:	   546).	   Hence	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   examine	   how	   interna-­‐tional	  negotiating	  systems,	  such	  as	   the	  UNFCCC,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  “Global	  Civil	  Society”	  actors	   involved	   in	   such	   systems,	  perform	  with	   regards	   to	   these	  elements.	  Based	  on	  these	  considerations,	   the	  overall	  aim	  of	   this	   research	  as	  well	  as	  auxiliary	  objectives	  have	  been	  developed:	  
The	  overall	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  role	  of	  transnational	  climate	  change	   advocacy	   networks	   and	   their	   internal	   power	   dynamics	   within	   multilateral	  treaty	  processes.	  
Dual	  overarching	  and	  interlinked	  objectives	  were	  identified	  to	  advance	  this	  aim:	  The	   first	  objective	   is	   to	  produce	  an	  ethnography	  of	   environmental	  NGOs,	   especially	  those	   that	   are	  members	  of	  Climate	  Action	  Network	   International	   (CAN),	   during	   the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  United	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC).	  An	  ethnographic	   account	   is	   particularly	   well	   suited	   to	   uncover	   internal	   dynamics	   and	  structures	  of	   the	  NGO	  network	  under	  observation	  as	  well	  as	   its	  embeddedness	   into	  the	  larger	  political	  configuration	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  treaty	  process.	  The	  second	  objective	  is	  to	  generate	  an	  analysis	  of	  this	  ethnography	  utilising	  a	  critical	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  In	  particular,	  more	  contemporary	  conceptualisations	  of	  public	  sphere	  which	  embrace	   the	   notion	   of	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   public	   spheres	   are	   used	   as	   they	   allow	   for	   a	  more	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   the	   constellation	   of	   public	   sphere	   deliberations	  including	   notions	   such	   as	   internal	   and	   external	   public	   spheres,	   counterpublics,	   and	  nested	  public	  spheres.	  
These	  dual	  objectives	  contribute	  crucially	  to	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  overall	  aim	  and	  as	   a	   result	   this	   thesis	   features	   a	   degree	   of	   hybridity:	   on	   one	   hand,	   the	   intent	   is	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  expressly	   to	   offer	   an	   empirical	   thesis,	   primarily	   focussed	   on	   producing	   an	   ethno-­‐graphic	   account	   of	   the	   environmental	   advocacy	   organisations	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   this	  undertaking.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  ethnography	  is	  used	  to	  inform	  an	  advancement	  of	  critical	   theory	  of	   the	  public	  sphere,	   in	  particular	  as	   it	  relates	   to	   the	  transnational	  level.	  The	  integration	  of	  these	  two	  elements,	  then	  –	  the	  detailed	  ethnographic	  account	  and	   the	   theoretical	   analysis	   –	  helps	   to	  effectively	   conceptualise	   the	   role	  of	   transna-­‐tional	  climate	  change	  advocacy	  networks	  and	   their	   internal	  power	  dynamics	  within	  the	  multilateral	  treaty	  process.	  
The	   concept	   of	   public	   sphere	   has	   been	   characterised	   as	   referring	   to	   political	  deliberations	   of	   a	   common	   interest	   in	   a	   rational	   fashion	   (Habermas	   1989,	   1990).	  Habermas	  elaborates	  three	  conditions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  met	  for	  a	  political	  arena	  to	  be	  a	  public	  sphere.	  First,	  universal	  access	  to	  the	  public	  sphere	   is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  –	  “The	  public	  sphere	  of	  civil	  society	  stood	  or	  fell	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  universal	  access.	  A	  public	  sphere	  from	  which	  specific	  groups	  would	  be	  eo	  ipso	  excluded	  was	  less	  than	  merely	   incomplete;	   it	   was	   not	   a	   public	   sphere	   at	   all”	   (Habermas	   1989:	   85).	   This	  condition	   also	   calls	   for	   the	   deliberations	   to	   be	   among	   peers,	   in	   other	   words,	   for	  differences	   in	   social	  and	  economic	  status	  not	   to	  have	  any	   impact	  on	   the	  discussion.	  Second,	   the	  discussion	   in	  a	   functioning	  public	  sphere	  has	   to	   follow	  the	  principles	  of	  reason	  and	  rationality	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  public	  good,	  rather	  than	  the	  private	  interests	  of	  the	  participants.	  The	  third	  element	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  its	  orientation	  towards	  rationalisation	  of	  state	  power,	  a	  notion	  which	  Habermas	  borrows	  from	  Kant:	  “What	  is	  to	   be	   authoritative	   nowadays	   derives	   its	   authority,	   not	   at	   all	   from	   force,	   only	   to	   a	  small	  extent	   from	  habit	  and	  custom,	   really	   from	   insight	  and	  argument”	   (Kant	  cit.	   in	  Habermas	  1989:	  117).	  
Nancy	  Fraser’s	  recent	  work	  (e.g.	  Fraser	  2007,	  2008)	  occupies	   itself	  with	  the	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  sphere	  in	  an	  age	  of	  transnationalisation.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  thesis,	  she	  argues	  that	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  Habermas’	   idea	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   (and,	   to	   be	   sure,	   that	   of	   his	   critics	   including	  herself	   as	   well,	   e.g.	   in	   Fraser	   1990)	   always	   had	   a	   strong	   link	   to	   the	   Westphalian	  notion	   of	   state	   –	   a	   model	   of	   statehood	   that,	   in	   a	   nutshell,	   emphasises	   the	   sole	  authority	  of	  a	  sovereign	  (be	  it	  a	  monarch	  or	  a	  democratic	  state)	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  affairs	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  a	  state’s	  territory.	  According	  to	  Fraser,	  this	  includes	  largely	  equating	  the	  public	  in	  question	  with	  a	  citizenry	  of	  a	  territorially	  defined	  state	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  and	  conceptualising	  a	   sovereign	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  a	  Westphalian	  state	  as	   the	  ultimate	  target	  of	  the	  public	  opinion	  formation	  carried	  out	  within	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Noticing	  that	   there	   is	   increasing	   talk	   about	   transnational,	   or	   even	   global,	   public	   spheres	   –	  which	  she	  agrees	   “is	   intuitively	  plausible	   […]	  and	  seems	   to	  have	  purchase	  on	  social	  reality”	   (Fraser	   2007:	   7),	   this	   Westphalian	   focus	   becomes	   problematic	   as	   both	  features	  (a	  national	  citizenry	  and	  a	  state	  apparatus)	  are	  absent	   in	   the	   transnational	  case.	  
However,	  she	  contends	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  both	  as	  an	  empirical	  as	  well	  as	  a	  normative	  device,	  should	  not	  be	  “jettisoned”	  but	  rather	  attempts	  should	  be	   made	   to	   re-­‐think	   the	   concept	   on	   a	   transnational	   stage	   in	   order	   to	   retain	   the	  normative	  force	  of	  the	  concept	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  critical	  theory	  of	  the	  transnational	  and	  she	  refers	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  “transnational	  public	  sphere”	  as	  “indispensable	  […]	  to	  those	  who	  aim	  to	  reconstruct	  critical	  theory	  in	  the	  current	  ‘postnational	  constellation’”	  (Fraser	  2008:	  77).	  	  
Clearly,	  while	   this	  overall	   task	  must	   involve	  more	   theoretical	  work	   such	  as	  her	  own,	   it	   is	   also	   important	   to	   empirically	   analyse	   actually	   existing	   manifestations	   of	  social	   phenomena	   that	  might	   justify	   the	   label	   of	   “transnational	  public	   sphere,”	   thus	  advancing	   the	   project	   of	   democratic	   theory	   (and	   practice!)	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   the	  transnational	   and	   examining	   how	   the	   problems	   and	   questions	   raised	   by	   the	  theoretical	  work	  map	  onto	  real-­‐world	  political	  practice.	  Global	  environmental	  politics,	  and	  in	  particular	  climate	  change,	   is	  a	  suitable	  field	  for	  such	  endeavour:	   featuring	  an	  established	   transnational	   institution	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   and	   its	   related	   bodies	   and	  processes	  as	  well	  as	  a	  congregation	  of	  organisational	  and	  individual	  actors	  that	  can	  be	  (and,	   indeed,	   have	  been,	   e.g.	   in	  Pulver	  2004a,	   2005)	   characterised	   as	  having	  public	  sphere	   characteristics.	   Global	   environmental	   politics,	   as	   shall	   become	   clear	   in	   this	  thesis,	   is	   also	   a	   suitable	   case	   for	   such	   an	   undertaking	   as	   some	   of	   the	   features	   that	  require	  attention	  in	  such	  study	  have	  a	  particular	  relevance	  in	  this	  field.	  One	  of	  these	  elements	   is	   the	   “all-­‐affected	  principle,”	  which	   in	  brief	   suggests	   that	   everybody	  who	  might	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  particular	  decision	  should	  have	  equitable	  access	  to	  the	  process	  of	   public	   opinion	   formation	   relevant	   to	   that	   decision,	   and	   which	   offers	   a	   useful	  framework	  for	  critical	  analyses	  of	  democratic	  practices	  within	  global	  environmental	  politics.	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  In	   order	   to	   advance	   these	   analyses	   and	   in	   order	   to	   fulfil	   the	   research	   objectives	   as	  outlined	   above,	   this	   thesis	   follows	   an	   innovative	   research	   design	   which	   combines	  ethnography	   and	   public	   sphere	   theory	   in	   order	   to	   develop	   both	   a	   rich	   empirical	  account	  and	  a	  theoretically	  grounded	  analysis.	  To	  employ	  ethnography	  for	  the	  study	  of	  members	  of	   a	   transnational	   advocacy	  network	  as	   they	   involve	   themselves	   in	   the	  politics	  of	  global	  governance	  institutions	  is	  a	  novel	  approach	  which	  promises	  to	  yield	  a	   richer	   account	   of	   the	   interactions	   within	   the	   network	   and	   between	   the	   network	  members	   and	   the	   political	   negotiations	   they	   participate	   in.	   While	   ethnography	   is	  increasingly	  used	  to	  study	  organisations	  and	  professional	  contexts	  (for	  a	  collection	  of	  a	   number	   of	   such	   undertakings,	   cf.	   Gellner	   and	   Hirsch	   2001),	   it	   has	   not	   yet	   been	  employed	   to	   provide	   an	   in-­‐depth	   and	   detailed	   account	   of	   the	  work	   of	   professional	  environmental	  advocates.	  Other	  studies	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  CAN,	  respectively,	  (Pulver	  2004b,	  2005;	  Duwe	  2000;	  Westerlind-­‐Wigström	  2008;	  Depledge	  2005;	  Yamin	  2001)	  relied	  heavily	  on	  interviewing	  and	  content	  analysis	  of	  documents	  and	  some	  of	  these	  studies	  only	  covered	  very	  short	  periods	  of	  time.	  As	  such	  these	  studies	  were	  limited	  by	  their	   respondents’	   interpretation	   and	   limited	  or	   selective	   recall	   of	   events	   or,	   in	   the	  case	   of	   document	   analysis,	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   finished	   document	   does	   not	   readily	  reveal	  the	  story	  and	  power	  dynamics	  behind	  its	  genesis.	  	  
My	   own	   empirical	   research,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   involved	   a	   long	   term	   (over	   2.5	  years)	   ethnography	  with	   a	   strong	   component	   of	   participant	   observation	  where	   the	  level	   of	   my	   own	   involvement	   gradually	   increased	   over	   time	   until	   I	   was	   a	   fully	  participating	  member	  of	  the	  network.	  This	  design	  is	  more	  suitable	  than	  interviewing	  and	  document	  analysis	  for	  unearthing	  otherwise	  hidden	  structures	  and	  dynamics	  and	  allow	  to	  contrast	  the	  participants’	  own	  interpretations	  of	  events	  and	  structures	  with	  those	  of	  the	  researcher.	  Specifically,	  between	  August	  2007	  and	  spring	  2010	  (to	  cover	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Climate	  Change	  Conference	  in	  December	  2009),	   I	   participated	   as	   a	   delegate	   of	   a	   member	   organisation	   of	   Climate	   Action	  Network	   International	   (CAN)	   in	   seven	   international	   conference	   sessions	   of	   the	  UNFCCC.	   Additionally	   and	   during	   the	   same	   time	   period,	   I	   had	   continued	   access	   to	  internal	   discussions	   of	   the	   network	   even	   when	   the	   UNFCCC	   was	   not	   in	   session	  through	  subscriptions	  to	  the	  relevant	  CAN	  email	  lists,	  the	  principle	  location	  of	  CAN’s	  “intersessional”	  existence,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  participation	  in	  telephone	  conferences	  once	  the	  level	  of	  my	  involvement	  reached	  that	  of	  a	  fully	  participating	  member.	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  As	  such,	  the	  original	  empirical	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  providing	  a	   detailed	   ethnographic	   account	   of	   environmental	   advocacy	   professionals’	   work	  within	   and	   surrounding	   the	   climate	   change	   treaty	   negotiations	   as	   outlined	   above.	  Further,	   based	   on	   this	   account,	   the	   thesis	  will	  make	   a	   contribution	   to	   the	   develop-­‐ment	  of	   the	   theory	  of	  public	  spheres	  –	  especially	  as	   it	   relates	   to	  a	  concept	  of	  public	  sphere	  that	  embraces	  a	  notion	  of	  multiplicity	  and	  that	  conceptualises	  public	  spheres	  on	  a	  transnational	  level	  –	  by	  applying	  this	  theoretical	  approach	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  generated	  by	  the	  ethnographic	  research.	  
First,	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  reviewing	  the	  relevant	  literature	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  the	  necessary	  theoretical	  background	  for	  this	  study.	  The	  first	  major	  section	  of	   the	   chapter	  will	   review	   literature	   that	   concerns	   itself	  with	   “Global	   Civil	   Society”	  and	  related	  phenomena	  like	  transnational	  NGO	  networks.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  discuss	  conceptualisations	  of	  “Global	  Civil	  Society”	  by	  theorists	  like	  John	  Keane,	  Mary	  Kaldor	  and	  Paul	  Wapner	  and	  will	  consider	  the	  demarcations	  of	  “Global	  Civil	  Society”	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	   realms	   of	   politics	   and	   the	   state	   on	   one	   side	   and	   the	   realm	   of	   the	  markets	   and	  economy	  on	  the	  other.	  Based	  on	  these	  discussions,	   I	  will	  offer	  my	  own	  definition	  of	  “Global	   Civil	   Society”.	   The	   second	   major	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   is	   dedicated	   to	   the	  literature	   on	   public	   spheres,	   where	   I	   will,	   in	   particular,	   review	   Jürgen	   Habermas’	  work	   on	   the	   public	   sphere	   and	  will	   introduce	   the	  main	   strands	   of	   criticism	   of	   that	  work,	  especially	  the	  critique	  of	  Nancy	  Fraser.	  In	  this	  context,	  attempts	  to	  conceptual-­‐ise	  the	  public	  sphere	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  rather	  than,	  as	  implied	  by	  Habermas,	  singularity	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  will	  receive	  further	  attention.	  Finally,	  but	  crucially,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  recent	  attempts	  (mainly	  by	  Nancy	  Fraser)	  to	  unpack	  the	  public	  sphere	  concept	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  where	  it	  is	  intimately	  linked	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  nation-­‐state	  sovereignty	  and	  to	  then	  be	  able	  to	  re-­‐invent	  it	  for	  the	  study	  of	  “transna-­‐tional	  public	  spheres.”	  	  
In	  the	  next	  step,	  in	  chapter	  3,	  the	  methodology	  of	  the	  overall	  research	  project	  will	  be	   outlined,	   starting	  with	   a	   description	  of	   the	   scope	  of	   the	   fieldwork	   and	   the	   steps	  undertaken	   to	   gain	   initial	   access	   to	   the	   field.	   The	   chapter	   also	   contains	   some	  considerations	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  dual	  nature	  of	  the	  NGO	  network	  under	  focus,	  namely	   as	   “real	   world	   community”	   during	   the	   times	   of	   the	   formal	   session	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	  and	  as	  a	  “virtual	  community”	  in	  the	  time	  between	  these	  sessions,	  a	  topic	  area	  that	  is	  discussed	  here	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  resulting	  three	  distinct	  fieldwork	  settings	  –	  
1.	  Introduction	   	   19	  	  namely	   in-­‐session,	   virtual	   and	   hybrid	   settings	   –	   and	   will	   be	   subject	   to	   deeper	  examination	   in	   chapter	  5.	   The	   next	   section	  will	   discuss	   the	   gradual	   increase	   of	  my	  involvement	  with	   the	   advocacy	   of	   the	   network	   up	   to	   the	   point	  where	   I	  was	   a	   fully	  participating	   member	   and	   the	   issues	   related	   to	   this	   approach.	   In	   “Learning	   the	  Language”	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  become	  intimately	  acquainted	  with	  the	  political	   and	   technical	  details	  of	   the	   climate	   change	  negotiations	  both	   to	   enable	  the	   aforementioned	   participation	   in	   the	   network’s	   activities	   and	   also	   to	   be	   able	   to	  understand	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   processes	   observed.	   I	  will	   also	   discuss	   how	   this	  placed	  some	  strains	  on	  my	  role	  as	  a	  researcher,	  for	  example	  in	  relation	  to	  note	  taking.	  After	  discussing	  some	  important	  ethical	  considerations	  related	  to	  the	  research	  I	  will	  outline	  how	   I	  went	   about	   organising	   and	   analysing	   the	  data	   generated	   through	   the	  fieldwork	   and	   will	   present	   the	   preliminary	   theoretical	   model	   that	   had	   emerged	  during	  the	  data	  analysis	  process.	  
The	   following	   three	   chapters	   will	   be	   concerned	   with	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  data	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interpretation	  of	  these	  outcomes.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   chapters	   (chapter	   4)	   will	   introduce	   some	   essential	  background	  for	  this	  study	  by	  providing	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  international	  politics	  of	  climate	  change	  as	  well	  as	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  institutional	  settings	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  This	   includes	   a	   short	   overview	   over	   the	   specific	   politics	   during	   the	   time	   frame	   in	  which	   the	   fieldwork	  was	   conducted:	   the	  negotiation	  of	   a	   climate	   change	   accord	   for	  the	  time	  after	  2012,	  when	  the	  first	  commitment	  period	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  ends.	  It	  will	  also	  be	  necessary	  to	  introduce	  the	  reader	  to	  some	  of	  the	  more	  technical	  aspects	  of	   the	   discussions,	   particularly	   as	   related	   to	   carbon	   trading,	   since	   it	   is	   this	   area	   of	  discussion	  where	  much	  of	   the	  specific	  empirical	  material	   is	  drawn	  from	  and,	  hence,	  some	   specific	   knowledge	  will	   be	   helpful	   in	   following	   the	   examples	   in	   the	   empirical	  part	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
Following	  this,	  chapter	  5	  will	  consider	  questions	  of	  access	  to	  the	  multiple	  public	  spheres	  as	  understood	  both	  broadly	  as	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  in	  general	  as	  well	  as	  more	  specifically	  with	  respect	  to	  CAN	  internal	  deliberations.	  In	  this	  context	  I	  will	  also	  consider	  potential	  barriers	  that	  could	  restrict	  or	  limit	  that	  access	  or	  impact	  negatively	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  participation.	  This	  discussion	  will	  be	  structured	  around	  the	  three	  main	   settings	  of	  CAN	  activity	   (in-­‐session,	   virtual	   and	  hybrid),	  will	  discuss	   the	  specific	   activities	   of	   each	   of	   these	   settings	   as	  well	   as	   the	   different	   issues	   related	   to	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  these	   settings,	   for	   example,	   the	   importance	   of	   continued	   physical	   access	   to	   the	   in-­‐session	  setting.	  
Chapter	  6	  will	  be	  devoted	  to	  considering	  how	  hierarchy	  and	  inequalities	  as	  well	  as	   various	   discursive	   practices	   impact	   upon	   the	   internal	   deliberations	   of	   CAN.	   The	  chapter	   also	   advances	   the	   theme	   of	   multiple	   public	   spheres	   by	   discussing	   various	  constellations	   of	   counterpublicity	   observed.	   In	   particular,	   both	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  hierarchical	   ordering	   of	   parties	   on	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   themselves	   will	   be	  illuminated	  as	  well	  as	  how	  hierarchies	  within	  CAN	  play	  out	   in	  the	  internal	  delibera-­‐tions	  of	   the	  network.	  The	   theoretical	   analysis	  of	   a	  multiple	  public	   sphere	   is	   further	  advanced	  by	   considering	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   climate	   justice	  network	  CJN!	   within	   the	   climate	   change	   negotiations.	   The	   chapter	   also	   provides	   a	   detailed	  discussion	   of	   the	   tensions	   between	   different	   discursive	   approaches	   within	   the	  internal	  deliberations	  of	  CAN,	  in	  particular	  discursive	  practices	  emphasising	  scientific	  rationality,	  realpolitik	  and	  social	  justice,	  respectively.	  
A	   final	   chapter	  will	   recapitulate	   the	   theoretical	  model	   that	  had	  emerged	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  and	  data	  analysis	  process	  as	  outlined	  at	  the	  end	  of	  chapter	  3	  and	  will	  discuss	  how	  the	  presentation	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  ethnographic	  account	  contained	  in	  the	  previous	   chapters	   advanced	   the	  dual	   objectives	   of	   this	   research	  programme.	   In	  the	  final	  chapter,	  I	  will	  also	  offer	  additional	  reflections	  on	  the	  theoretical	  component	  of	   the	   research	   programme	   by	   discussing	   further	   considerations	   of	   such	   analysis.	  Finally,	   the	   chapter	   will	   summarise	   the	  main	   points	   of	   the	   thesis	   and	   conclude	   by	  reflecting	  upon	  possible	  directions	  for	  further	  research.	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Chapter	  2 	  
	  
Literature	  Review:	  
Global	  Civil	  Society	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  provide	  the	  theoretical	  foundation	  upon	  which	  the	  rest	  of	  the	   thesis	  will	   be	   grounded	  by	   reviewing	   relevant	   literature	  on	   important	   concepts	  associated	  with	   the	   topic	   of	   the	   thesis.	   The	  main	   ideas	   that	  will	   be	   covered	   in	   the	  following	  sections,	  are	   the	  related	  concepts	  of	   civil	   society	  and	  public	   sphere,	  along	  with	   their	   transnationally	   evolved	   cousins,	   global	   or	   transnational	   civil	   society	   and	  transnational	  public	  sphere.	  
Thus	  the	  first	  main	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  aspects	  related	  to	  global	  civil	  society,	  including	  its	  historical	  roots,	  the	  demarcation	  of	  civil	  society	  with	  regards	  to	  the	   realms	   of	   politics	   and	   the	   state	   on	   one	   side	   and	   the	   realm	   of	   economics,	   the	  market	  and	  the	  private	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  Further,	  we	  shall	  consider	  whether	  global	  civil	   society	   represents	   a	   categorically	   new	   phenomenon	   or	  whether	   it	   is	  merely	   a	  civil	  society	  that	  has,	  as	  it	  were,	  outgrown	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  to	  whose	  borders	   it	   was	   formerly	   confined	   (or,	   as	   some	   suggest,	   whether	   there	   is	   actually	  anything	  real	  or	  empirically	  tangible	  that	  can	  appropriately	  be	  labelled	  as	  a	  global	  or	  transnational	  civil	  society).	  
Having	   thus	   pondered	   the	   concepts	   of	   global,	   transnational	   and	   domestic	   civil	  society	   (and	   after	   a	   brief	   excursus	   into	   the	   related	   literature	   of	   social	   movement	  research)	  the	  closely	  associated	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  attention.	  Here	  we	  will	  first	  consider	  the	  relationship	  between	  public	  sphere	  and	  civil	  society,	   which	   some	   have	   suggested	   are,	   at	   least	   for	   some	   intents	   and	   purposes	  largely	  identical,	  while	  others	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  public	  sphere	  fulfils	  a	  certain	  limited	   function	  of	   civil	   society.	  Then,	  we	  will	   consider	   the	  elements	  and	  genesis	  of	  Habermas’	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   idea	   while,	   most	   crucially,	   also	   reviewing	   the	  arguments	  of	  some	  of	  his	  critics,	  in	  particular	  two	  distinct	  strands	  of	  Nancy	  Fraser’s	  work	  which	   both	   aim	   at	   improving	   the	   “critical	   edge	   and	   political	   point”	   of	   public	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  sphere	   theory	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   important	   endeavour	   of	   critical	   theory	   of	  democracy.	  Especially	  this	  latter	  section	  shall	  enable	  us	  to	  lay	  useful	  foundations	  with	  regard	   to	   the	   normative	   and	   empirical	   assessment	   of	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis;	   the	  involvement	  of	  environmentalists	  in	  climate	  change	  politics	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  the	  UN.	  
However,	  before	  we	  can	  embark	  on	  that	  task,	  a	  few	  points	  have	  to	  be	  made	  about	  the	   process	   that	   is,	   in	   a	   way,	   both	   underlying	   and	   uncovering	   all	   these	   processes,	  namely	  the	  process	  of	  globalisation.	  
2.1 Globalisation	  
Globalisation	  is	  a	  term	  that	  has	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  variety	  of	  processes	  over	  the	  last	  few	  decades.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  use	  as	  a	  “sociological	  buzzword”	  it	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  term	  was	  “largely	  emptied	  […]	  of	  analytical	  and	  explanatory	  value”	  (Scott	  and	  Marshall	  2009).	  Although	   this	  cautionary	  remark	  has	   to	  be	   taken	  seriously	  and	  thus	  the	  term	  used	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  restraint,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  largely	  undisputed	  that	  the	   various	   processes	   that	   are	   usually	   described	   by	   the	   term	   are	   taking	   place.	  Disagreement,	  however,	  exists	  with	  respect	   to	  whether	   these	  processes	  represent	  a	  significant	  historical	  development,	  and	  thus	  deserve	  serious	  attention	  by	  contempo-­‐rary	  social	  sciences,	  or	  –	  as	  David	  Held	  and	  Anthony	  McGrew	  paraphrase	  the	  position	  of	   the	   critics	   –whether	   it	   is	   “primarily	   [an]	   ideological	   or	   social	   construction	  which	  has	  marginal	  explanatory	  value”	  (2003a:	  2).	  While	  generally	  speaking,	  the	  concept	  of	  globalisation	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   many	   social,	   economic,	   cultural	   and	  political	  processes	   increasingly	  obtain	  an	   international	   and	  global	  dimension	  which	  create	   interdependences	   between	   geographically	   diverse	   actors,	   globalisation	   is	  typically	  linked	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  related	  processes	  that	  have	  been	  observed	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  and	  that	  are	  continuing	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first.	  
The	  first,	  which	  is	  often	  understood	  to	  be	  identical	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  globalisa-­‐tion,	  refers	  to	  the	  increasing	  integration	  of	  the	  world	  economic	  system	  related	  to	  the	  consolidation	   of	  market	   based	   capitalism,	  which	   received	   an	   additional	   boost	   after	  the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   centrally	   planned	   economies	   of	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  This	  process,	  which	  can	  be	  termed	  “economic	  globalisa-­‐
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  tion”	   was	   greatly	   aided	   by	   international	   political	   processes	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	  increasing	  reduction	  in	  barriers	  to	  international	  trade	  and	  investment,	  the	  establish-­‐ment	   of	   free	   trade	   regimes,	   international	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   regimes,	   and	  other	   measures	   aimed	   at	   providing	   a	   favourable	   environment	   for	   global	   economic	  expansion.	   The	   economic	   globalisation	   process	   was	   further	   aided	   by	   certain	  technological	   advancements	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   rapid	   development	   of	   relatively	  cheap	  information	  technology	  and	  relatively	  cheap	  fast	   international	  air	  travel,	  both	  making	   accessible	   even	   farther	   reaches	   of	   the	   globe	   for	   even	   more	   people	   and	  companies	  in	  even	  shorter	  periods	  of	  time	  (Castells	  2008).	  Further	  enabling	  support	  for	  economic	  globalisation	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  certain	  infrastructural	  features,	  such	  as	  the	  establishment	   of	   the	   US	   dollar	   as	   the	   de	   facto	   currency	   and	   English	   as	   the	   lingua	  franca	   of	   the	   globalised	   economic	   realm.	   This	   economic	   aspect	   of	   globalisation	   is	  mainly	   related	   to	   its	  material	   dimension,	   but	   has	   strong	   implications	   for	   the	   other	  aspects.	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  material	  aspect	  of	  globalisation,	  whole	  societies	  and	  states,	  but	  also	  smaller	  communities,	  families	  and	  individuals	  become	  increasingly	  connected	  in	  worldwide	   systems	   and	   networks	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   actions	   of	   geographically	   distant	  actors	   can	   have	   profound	   impact	   locally	   while	   in	   reverse,	   local	   activities	   can	   bear	  significant	  consequences	  at	  distant	  locales.	  Keane	  (2003)	  illustrates	  this	  by	  consider-­‐ing	   the	  different	   layers	  of	   transnational	   interconnectedness	  and	   interdependence	  of	  very	  different	  classes	  of	  actors	  through	  the	  –	  material	  as	  well	  as	  cultural	  –	  production	  and	   consumption	   of	   jeans.	   This	   represents	   a	   shift	   both	   in	   the	   spatial	   and	   temporal	  component	   of	   social	   relations	   and	   can	   thus	   be	   called	   the	   spatio-­‐temporal	   aspect	   of	  globalisation,	   which	   manifests	   itself	   as	   “time-­‐space	   compression,”	   where	   the	  perceived	  distance	  shrinks	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  relative	  speed	  of	  social	  interac-­‐tions	  increases,	  exemplified	  by	  how	  “crises	  and	  events	  in	  distant	  parts	  of	  the	  globe,	  […]	  [such	  as]	   the	  events	  of	  11	  September	  2001,	   come	   to	  have	  an	   immediate	  worldwide	  impact	  involving	  diminishing	  response	  times	  for	  decision-­‐makers”	  (Held	  and	  McGrew	  2003a:	  4).	  
Certainly	  related	  to	  the	  theme	  of	  economic	  globalisation	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  economic	  development	   with	   the	   associated	   notion	   of	   certain	   regions,	   countries	   or	   parts	   of	  countries	   possessing	  different	   levels	   of	   development.	  While	   the	  notion	  of	   economic	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  development	   based	   on	   a	   ideology	   of	   unlimited	   growth	   is	   problematic	   for	   a	   host	   of	  reasons	  –	  especially	   in	   the	  context	  of	  a	   thesis	   that	   focuses	  on	  environmental	   issues,	  since	   the	   environmentally	   destructive	   effects	   of	   unlimited	   economic	   growth	   have	  been	  known	  at	  least	  since	  the	  very	  influential	  1972	  Club	  of	  Rome	  report	  “The	  Limits	  of	  Growth”	  (Meadows	  et	  al.	  1972)	  –	  this	  cannot	  be	  treated	  here	  in	  detail.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  somewhat	  problematise	  the	  use,	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  of	  the	  phrases	  “developing	   country”	   and	   “developed	   country.”	   The	   decision	   to	   use	   these	   terms	  instead	  of	  better	  alternative	   terms	  proposed	   (e.g.	   “richer”	  vs.	   “poorer”	   countries,	  or	  “North”	  vs.	  “South”)	  has	  been	  made	  despite	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  substantial	  flaws	  of	  this	   terminology.	   For	   example,	   use	   of	   the	   past	   participle	   “developed”	   implies	   that	  these	   countries	  have	  obtained	   a	   final	   and	  desirable	   state	  which	   those	   labelled	  with	  the	  gerund	  “developing”	  still	  have	  to	  continue	  aspiring	  to.	  Among	  other	  things	  this	  is	  problematic	  since	  “developed”	  countries	  themselves	  generally	  speaking	  still	  aspire	  to	  continued,	  unlimited	  economic	  development	  (making	  them	  “developing	  countries”	  as	  well,	   in	   the	   literal	   meaning	   of	   the	   word)	   which	   also	   means	   that	   it	   is	   a	   constantly	  shifting	  goal	  post	  that	  developing	  countries	  are	  expected	  to	  aspire	  to.	  
However,	  the	  “developing”	  vs.	  ”developed”	  dichotomy	  is	  firmly	  established	  in	  the	  terminology	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   regime	   and	   since	   this	   regime	   represents	   the	   empirical	  focus	   of	   this	   thesis,	   the	   terminology	   has	   been	   adapted	   here	   as	   well	   despite	   its	  problematic	   background.	   Further,	   the	   use	   of	   these	   labels	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   (and	  wider	   UN	   system)	   does	   not	   adequately	   map	   onto	   possible	   alternative	   dichotomies	  such	  as	  “richer”	  vs.	   “poorer”	  which	  therefore	  could	  not	  have	  been	  used	  consistently	  throughout	   the	   thesis.	   To	   illustrate,	   the	   “developing”	   country	  Qatar	  has	   the	  world’s	  highest	  per	  capita	  GDP	  (PPP)	  of	  $90,950;	  while	  other	  “developing”	  countries	  such	  as	  South	  Korea	  ($27,133)	  or	  Saudi	  Arabia	  ($23,369)	  have	  a	  per	  capita	  GDP	  similar	  to	  the	  average	   of	   the	   “developed”	   countries	   of	   the	   European	   Union.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	  country	  like	  the	  Ukraine	  –	  considered	  a	  “developed”	  country	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  –	  has	   a	   per	   capital	   GDP	   (PPP)	   of	   $6,310,	  which	   is	   only	   about	   half	   the	   global	   average	  ($11,128)	   and	   in	   the	   immediate	   neighbourhood	   of	   African	   countries	   like	   Namibia	  ($6,387)	  or	  Angola	  ($6,029)	  and	  well	  below	  “developing	  countries”	  Brazil	  ($10,344)	  or	  Mexico	  ($14,439)	  (2009	  data	  from	  Worldbank	  2011).	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  It	   is	   important	  to	  point	  out,	  however,	   that	  the	  use	  of	  these	  terms	  in	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	   represent	   an	   endorsement	   of	   the	   often-­‐associated	   notion	   of	   desirability	   of	  economic	   development	   to	   the	   level	   of,	   or	   exceeding,	   current	   “developed”	   countries	  globally.	  
Although	   certainly	  used	   to	   refer	   to	   economic	   globalisation,	   the	   term	   “globalisa-­‐tion”	   usually	   also	   comprises	   related	   processes	   of	   globalisation	   of	   other	   spheres	   of	  human	  life.	  For	  example,	  both	  enabling	  and	  responding	  to	  economic	  globalisation,	  a	  process	  of	  what	  could	  be	  called	  “political	  globalisation”	  results	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  set	   of	   institutions	   that	   collectively	   constitute	   an	   emerging	   system	  of	   global	   govern-­‐ance.	   These	   “enabling”	   institutions	   include	   the	   aforementioned	   international	  agreements	  to	  reduce	  barriers	  to	  and	  promote	  measures	  to	  encourage	  international	  trade,	   including	   free	   trade	   agreements,	   international	   intellectual	   property	   rights	  regimes,	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  body	  of	  international	  law	  relating	  to	  trade	  disputes	  (such	  as	  those	  ruled	  over	  by	  the	  WTO)	  etc.	  Another	  set	  of	  international	  political	  institutions	  can	   be	   seen	   to	   respond	   to	   economic	   globalisation,	   aiming	   to	   set	   some	   limits	   to	   its	  operations	  in	  a	  global	  space	  not	  regulated	  by	  national	  laws.	  This	  relates,	  for	  example,	  to	   international	   agreements	   restricting	   the	   trade	   in	   endangered	   species,	   or	   setting	  minimum	   standards	   for	   working	   conditions	   through	   the	   International	   Labour	  Organisation,	   and	   so	   forth.	   In	   addition,	   “political	   globalisation”	   results	   in	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   number	   of	   institutions	   of	   global	   governance	   that	   are	   not	   or	   not	  directly	   related	   to	   economic	   globalisation,	   such	   as	   treaties	   to	   ban	   landmines,	   limit	  nuclear	  proliferation,	   advance	  human	   rights	  or	   the	   rights	   of	   Indigenous	  Peoples,	   or	  address	  environmental	  concerns	  such	  as	  damage	  to	  the	  ozone	  layer	  or	  climate	  change.	  
Another	  important	  aspect	  of	  globalisation	  is	  what	  could	  be	  termed	  “social	  global-­‐isation”	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  increasingly	  global	  dimension	  of	  and	  the	  increasing	  impact	  of	  the	  global	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  aspects	  of	  social	  life.	  Many	  of	  these	  aspects	  are	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  related	  to	  what	  has	  been	  called	  “economic	  globalisation’.	  This	  includes,	  for	  example,	  how	   links	  between	  previously	  unrelated	  people,	  societies	  and	  cultures	  are	  created	  by	  migrations	   for	  economic	  reasons	  (including	  push	   factors	  of,	   for	  example,	  economic	  hardship	  or	  violent	  conflict	  as	  well	  as	  pull	  factors	  of	  employment	  opportu-­‐nities	   associated	   with	   a	   globalising	   economy).	   Likewise,	   the	   shifting	   of	   production	  capacity	  of	  multinational	  companies	  between	  countries	  creates	  new	  opportunities	  in	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  one	   community	   while	   limiting	   them	   in	   another	   and	   this	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  example	  of	  economic	  globalisation	  having	  an	  impact	  on	  societies.	  This	  “social”	  part	  of	  the	  globalisation	  discourse	  also	  includes	  the	  often-­‐quoted	  resistance	  against	  what	  are	  perceived	   to	   be	   destructive	   forces	   of	   globalising	   capitalism,	   often	   called	   the	   anti-­‐globalisation	  movement.	  
This	   discussion	   is	   relevant	   for	   the	   thesis	   at	   hand	   since	   these	   globalisation	  pro-­‐cesses	  give,	  on	  one	  hand,	  rise	  to	  a	  new	  class	  of	  collective	  actors	  –	  including	  phenome-­‐na	  variously	  called	  transnational	  social	  movements,	  global	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  international	  non-­‐governmental	  organisation,	  transnational	  activist	  networks	  and	  the	  like.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  collective	  actors	  that	  are	  first	  and	  foremost	  active	  on	  “local”	  issues	   are	   required	   to	   examine	   these	   through	   a	   “global	   lens”	   since	   many	   of	   these	  “local”	   issues	   increasingly	   necessitate,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   properly	   understood	   and	  addressed,	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  larger	  global	  processes	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded.	  
Environmental	  degradation	  is	  commonly	  listed	  as	  a	  standard	  global	  issue	  in	  texts	  on	   globalisation	   (e.g.	   Beck	   2000;	  Held	   and	  McGrew	  2003b).	   Among	   other	   issues	   of	  environmental	  degradation,	   climate	  change	   is	  possibly	   the	   ideal	  example	   to	   investi-­‐gate:	  while	  other	  examples	  of	  environmental	  degradation,	  such	  as	  the	  deterioration	  of	  the	  ozone	  layer,	  acid	  rain	  or	  the	  depletion	  of	  global	  fish	  stocks	  have	  similar	  features,	  these	   features	   are	   stronger	   and	   more	   marked	   in	   the	   case	   of	   climate	   change.	   For	  example,	  the	  spatial,	  cultural,	  social	  and	  temporal	  distance	  between	  those	  causing	  and	  those	  suffering	  from	  the	  problem	  is	  indicative	  as	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  those	  who	  would	   have	   to	   carry	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   costs	   associated	  with	   solving	   the	   problem	  versus	  those	  who	  benefit	  from	  such	  a	  solution.	  
Further,	   the	   system	  of	   international	   institutions	   set	  up	   to	   address	   the	  problem,	  among	   them	   the	   UNFCCC,	   relevant	   EU	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   EU	   ETS,	   dedicated	  programs	  within	  other	  UN	  agencies,	  various	  bilateral	  dialogues	  and	  multilateral	  fora	  such	   as	   the	  MEF4	  etc.,	   represents	   a	   part	   of	  what	   has	   been	   called	   global	   governance	  and	   is	   thus	   also	   an	   important	   case	   to	   consider	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   globalisation	  debate.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	   Major	  Economies	  Forum;	  an	   initiative	  of	   the	  US	  government	  under	  George	  W.	  Bush	   to	   facilitate	  dialogue	  among	  major	  developed	  and	  developing	  economies	  with	  regards	  to	  international	  climate	  politics.	  Currently,	  17	  nations	  participate	  in	  this	  dialogue.	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2.2 Global	  Civil	  Society	  
NGOs	  operating	  within	  the	  field	  of	  international	  politics	  have	  often	  been	  described	  as	  constituting,	  or	  being	  a	  part	  of,	  a	   “global	  civil	   society”	   (Anheier	  et	  al.	  2001a;	  Kaldor	  2000,	   2003;	   Keane	   2003;	   e.g.	   Lipschutz	   1992;	   Wapner	   2000).	   However,	   strong	  disagreement	  exists	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  definition	  and	  scope	  of	  that	  society	  (or	  even	  whether	   it	   is,	   in	   fact,	  appropriate	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  question	  as	  “global	  civil	   society,”	   e.g.	   in	   Keck	   and	   Sikkink	   1998)	   as	  well	   as	   its	   relationships	   to	   related	  concepts	  such	  as	  NGOs,	  transnational	  social	  movements,	  activist	  networks	  etc.	  It	  thus	  appears	  to	  be	  appropriate	  to	  review	  different	  accounts	  of	  this	  concept.	  
2.2.1 Historical	  Roots	  of	  the	  Concept	  of	  Civil	  Society	  
Standard	  accounts	  of	  the	  history	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  trace	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  concept	  back	  to	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  or	  further	  back	  to	  the	  older	  concept	  of	  societas	  civilis.	  The	  term	  
societas	  civilis	  was	  used,	  up	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  17th	  century,	  to	  describe	  the	  state	  of	  a	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  as	  being	   “civil”	   (in	   the	  word’s	  sense	  of	   “civilised”)	  as	  opposed	   to	  barbaric.	  This	  use	  of	   the	  phrase	   “civil	   society”	   is	   fundamentally	  different	   from	   later	  uses	  of	  the	  phrase	  in	  that	  it	  describes	  a	  state	  (civil	  or	  civilised)	  of	  a	  society	  rather	  than	  a	   type	   of	   society	   or	   part	   thereof.	   The	  main	   feature	   that	   set	   these	   civilised	   societies	  apart	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  society,	  was	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  which	  was	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  state	   and	   which	   enabled	   the	   civilised	   coexistence	   of	   people	   in	   these	   societies.	  Therefore,	   some	   argue,	   civil	   society	   (or	   societas	   civilis)	   was	   not	   separate	   from	   the	  state	  in	  this	  early	  understanding	  of	  the	  term	  (Keane	  2003;	  Wapner	  2000)	  since	  it	  was	  the	  existence	  of	  state	  that	  guaranteed	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  and	  was	  thus	  the	  prerequisite	  for	  societas	  civilis.	  Others	  point	  out	  that	  this	  state	  of	  civilisation	  was	  not	  only	  based	  on	  the	  state’s	  guarantee	  of	   the	  rule	  of	   the	   law,	  but	  also	  dependent	  on	  “the	  existence	  of	  independent	  groups	  of	  citizens	  able	  to	  uphold	  and	  disseminate	  the	  values	  and	  norms	  which	  underpin	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  check	  abuses	  of	  power	  by	  the	  state”	  (Kaldor	  2000:	  106).	   The	   notion	   that	   this	   early	   understanding	   of	   civil	   society	   already	   contains	   an	  element	  of	  societies	  or	  groups	  of	  individuals	  independent	  from	  states,	  is	  also	  shared	  by	  Lipschutz,	  who	  understands	  the	  term	  to	  refer	   to	  communities	  who	  establish	  and	  share	  their	  own	  set	  of	  norms	  and	  behavioural	  codes,	  independent	  from	  –	  and	  indeed	  
2.	  Literature	  Review:	  Global	  Civil	  Society	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere	   28	  occasionally	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	  –	   the	   “legal	  or	  other	   socially	   constructed”	   (1992:	  398)	  settings	  of	  a	  given	  state	  system.	  
The	  other	  historical	  reference	  that	  is	  usually	  discussed	  when	  tracing	  the	  roots	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  that	  of	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  socialist	  countries	  of	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  “where	  the	  term	  was	  applied	   to	   those	   aspects	   of	   social	   and	   cultural	   life	   that	   had	   not	   been	   captured	   or	  colonised	   by	   the	   totalitarian	   state”	   (Lipschutz	   1992:	   392)	   and	   where	   civil	   society	  provided	  a	  niche	   for	   individuals	  and	  groups	   for	  association	  and	  eventually	  develop-­‐ment	  of	  shared	  values	  and	  norms.	  Notably,	  Lipschutz	  and	  Kaldor	  also	  talk	  about	  the	  application	  of	  this	  newer	  sense	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  “Western”	  societies.	  While	  Lipschutz	  (1992)	  points	  out	  how	   in	   these	  Western	   societies	   certain	  political	   realms	  have	  also	  been	  colonised	  by	  their	  states	  (most	  notably	  foreign	  policy),	  Kaldor	  (2000)	  remarks	  on	  how	  the	  notion	  of	   civil	   society	  and	   its	  gradual	   re-­‐establishment	   in	   the	  European	  socialist	  countries	  was	  used	  by	  Western	  political	  elites	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  victory	  of	   actually	   existing	   democracies	   over	   state-­‐socialism	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   “the	  inheritors	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  new	  social	  movements	  began	  to	  use	  the	  term	  to	  express	  a	  demand	  for	  a	  radical	  extension	  of	  democracy”	  (Kaldor	  2000:	  107).	  
Elsewhere,	  Kaldor	   (2003)	  expands	  more	  on	  her	  understanding	  of	   the	  historical	  roots	  of	  global	  civil	  society.	  According	  to	  her	  analysis,	  global	  civil	  society	  involves	  five	  distinct	   versions	   of	   understandings	   of	   territorially	   bound	   civil	   society	   as	   its	   roots,	  every	   one	   of	   which	   brings	   with	   it	   certain	   features	   that	   get	   incorporated	   into	   the	  academic	  concept	  of	  global	  civil	  society.	  The	  first	  two	  versions	  are	  historical	  uses	  of	  the	  term,	  while	  the	  remaining	  three	  refer	  to	  contemporary	  usage.	  The	  two	  historical	  usages	  are	  the	  already	  discussed	  societas	  civilis,	  from	  which	  the	  notions	  of	  civility	  and	  rule	  of	  law5	  are	  carried	  forward	  to	  global	  civil	  society,	  while	  the	  other	  one,	  Bürgerli-­‐
che	  Gesellschaft,	  or	  bourgeois	  society,	  as	  understood	  by	  Marx	  and	  Hegel,	  encompasses	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	   The	   application	   of	   the	   phrase	   “rule	   of	   law”	   to	   the	   transnational	   and	   global	   levels	  might	   appear	  counterintuitive,	   particularly	   in	   the	   light	   of	   regular	   reminders	   that	   the	   international	   arena	   is	   a	  characterised	   first	   and	   foremost	   by	   its	   anarchic	   character.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   it	   can	  certainly	  be	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  something	  like	  and	  embryonic	  “rule	  of	  law”	  on	  the	  transnational	  (and	   occasionally,	   global)	   level,	   characterised	   by	   and	   constituted	   of	   a	   myriad	   of	   international	  treaties	  and	  other	  legal	  instruments	  –	  from	  ozone	  depletion	  treaties	  to	  Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Rights	  to	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court	   –	  which,	   at	   least	   for	   their	   respective	   parties,	   create	   a	   legal	  situation	   that	   is	   probably	   appropriately	   described	   as	   “rule	   of	   law,”	   however	   embryonic	   and	  incomplete.	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  all	  associational	  actors	  between	   the	   levels	  of	   the	   family	  and	   the	  state,	   including,	   for	  example,	  the	  market	  economy,	  social	  classes,	  welfare	  organisations,	  or	  literary	  cricles,	  which,	   transposed	  to	  the	  global	   level,	  equate	  to	  the	   forces	  of	  economic,	  cultural	  and	  social	  globalisation.	  
The	   contemporary	  uses	  of	   the	   term	  civil	   society	   include	  activist,	  neoliberal	   and	  postmodern	   versions.	   The	   activist	   version,	  which	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	  civil	  society	  within	  the	  opposition	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  presupposes	   a	   system	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   demands	   “restraints	   on	  state	  power	  [and]	  […]	  a	  radicalisation	  of	  democracy	  and	  an	  extension	  of	  participation	  and	  autonomy”	  (Kaldor	  2003:	  8).	  Carrying	  over	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  activist	  version	  to	  the	   global	   level,	   global	   civil	   society	   so	   understood	  would	   take	   the	   form	   of	   a	   global	  public	   sphere	   of	   active	   citizens,	   “where	   non-­‐instrumental	   communication	   can	   take	  place,	  inhabited	  by	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  […],	  global	  social	  movements	  […]	  [and]	   new	   global	   ‘civil	   religions’	   like	   human	   rights	   or	   environmentalism”	   (Kaldor	  2003:	  8).	  The	  neoliberal	  version	  seeks	  to	  promote	  an	  understanding	  of	  “civil	  society”	  that	  restrains	  state	  power	  but	  more	  importantly	  also	  acts	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  functions	  that	  the	  state	  is	  not	  capable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  provide,	  that	  is,	  most	  importantly,	  all	  sorts	  of	  welfare	   services.	  The	   civil	   society	  of	   this	   flavour	   is	   the	   civil	   society	  of	  non-­‐profit	  organisations	  or	  “the	  third	  sector”	  and	  carried	  forward	  to	  the	  global	  scale	  would	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  “social	  counterpart	  of	  […]	  economic	  globalization,	  […]	  perform[ing]	  the	  functions	  necessary	  to	  smooth	  the	  path	  of	  economic	  globalization”	  (Kaldor	  2003:	  9)	  by	  providing	  humanitarian	  services	  as	  well	  as	  help	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  acceptance	  for	  human	  rights	  through	  the	  activities	  of	  democracy-­‐building	  or	  human	   rights	   NGOs.	   Finally,	   the	   postmodern	   version	   of	   civil	   society	   seeks	   to	  overcome	  the	  universalism	  of	  the	  first	  versions	  by	  stating	  that	  civil	  society	  is	  “an	  area	  of	   pluralism	   and	   contestation”	   which	   is	   not	   only	   inhabited	   by	   the	   “civil”	   but	   also	  “incivil”	   manifestations	   of	   associational	   life.	   As	   such,	   civil	   society	   covers	   both	   the	  groups	  and	  organisations	  that	  are	  contained	  in	  its	  activist	  and	  neoliberal	  version,	  but	  in	   addition	   to	   these	   also	   groups	   based	   around	   nationalist	   and	   religious	   identities,	  including	  those	  where	  these	  identities	  give	  rise	  to	  extremist	  or	  fundamentalist	  forms.	  
For	  Kaldor	   then,	   the	   current	  descriptive	  usage	  of	   the	   term	   “global	   civil	   society”	  comprises	   elements	   of	   all	   three	   contemporary	   versions	   of	   civil	   society,	   with	   the	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  various	   actors	   within	   that	   society	   ranging	   from	   social	   movements	   and	   activist	  networks	   over	   the	   charities	   and	   “tamed”	   NGOs	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   version	   to	   the	  religious	  and	  national	  fundamentalists	  of	  the	  postmodern	  version.	  The	  two	  historical	  versions	  of	  understanding	  the	  concept,	  however,	  provide	  a	  necessary	  basis	  for	  global	  civil	   society	   since	   the	   existence	   of	   global	   civil	   society	   is	   dependent	   on	   “at	   least	   the	  aspiration	  for	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  for	  economic	  autonomy”	  (Kaldor	  2003:	  10).	  
2.2.2 Extension	  of	  Domestic	  Civil	  Society	  or	  Something	  New?	  
One	  point	  of	  contention	  between	  proponents	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  global	  civil	  society	   is	  the	   question	   of	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   global	   civil	   society	   represents	   merely	   an	  extension	  of	  domestic	  or	  national	  civil	  societies	  where	  the	  concept	  of	  domestic	  civil	  society	   is	   used	   as	   a	  metaphor	   and	   applied	   to	   the	   global	   scale,	   or	  whether	   it	   rather	  represents	   a	   completely	  new	  phenomenon	  with	   fundamentally	  different	  properties.	  The	  former	  view	  (held	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Mary	  Kaldor	  and	  Paul	  Wapner)	  asserts	  that	  the	  parallels	  between	   the	  concept	  of	   civil	   society	  as	  applied	   to	   the	  domestic	   sphere	  and	   its	   application	   to	   the	   global	   level	   justify	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	   as	   a	   globalised	  equivalent	   of	   civil	   society.	   For	   Kaldor	   this	   parallel	   is	   found	   in	   the	   function	   of	   civil	  society	   to	   uphold	   and	   disseminate	   its	   values	   and	   norms	   and	   consequently	   provide	  checks	  on	  the	  abuse	  of	  power	  by	  the	  state.	  Global	  civil	  society,	  so	  understood,	  fulfils	  the	  same	  functions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  “range	  of	  interlocking	  institutions,	  including	  –	  but	  not	  only	  –	   states”	   (Kaldor	  2000:	  108),	   of	   global	   governance	  which	  would	   represent	   the	  metaphorical	  equivalent	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  on	  the	  global	  level.	  Wapner	  (2000),	  on	  the	  other	   hand,	   points	   out	   that	   transposing	   civil	   society	   to	   the	   global	   level	   is	   not	  unproblematic	  due	  to	  the	  contextually	  specific	  location	  within	  the	  Western	  tradition	  of	   political	   thought,	   but	   nonetheless	   uses	   the	   term	   “global	   civil	   society”	   as	   a	  meta-­‐phorical	   extension	   of	   “civil	   society”	   because	   of	   the	   observable	   similarities:	   “People	  communicate,	   collaborate,	   and	   build	   relationships	   across	   national	   boundaries.	   In	  doing	  so,	  they	  establish	  modes	  of	  interaction	  and	  generate	  affiliations	  that	  constitute	  rich	  transnational	  networks”	  (Wapner	  2000:	  267).	  And	  due	  to	  the	  similarities	  of	  these	  practices	  with	  domestic	  civil	  societies	   it	  makes	  sense	  to	  call	   this	  domain	  global	  civil	  society.	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  The	  other	  view,	  that	  global	  civil	  society	   is	  a	  completely	  new	  phenomenon	  with	  very	  distinct	   features	   –	   not	   just	   an	   extension	   in	   scope	   of	   the	   civil	   societies	   existing	  domestically	  –	  is	  held	  by	  John	  Keane,	  who	  rejects	  that	  latter	  idea	  by	  implying	  a	  two-­‐tier	  concept	  with	  global	  civil	  society	  and	  domestic	  civil	  society	  being	  binary	  opposites	  with	   a	   “strong	   presumption	   that	   politically	   defined	   territory	   remains	   the	   ultimate	  foundation	   of	   civil	   society	   institutions	   –	   as	   if	   ‘the	   global’	   was	   an	   add-­‐on	   extra,	   a	  homeless	   extra-­‐territorial	   phenomenon”	   (Keane	   2003:	   23).	   In	   his	   interpretation,	  other	  writers’	   accounts	   of	   global	   civil	   society	   (he	   quotes	   the	   definitions	   of	  Wapner	  and	   Anheier	   et	   al.6)	   stress	   civil	   society’s	   continuing	   attachment	   to	   the	   nation	   state	  level,	   a	  notion	  which	  he	  denies.	  However,	  he	   fails	   to	  make	   fully	   clear	  why	  he	   reads	  these	  accounts	  as	  proposing	  a	  two-­‐tier	  understanding	  of	  civil	  society	  with	  the	  global	  level	   being	   merely	   an	   “add-­‐on”	   and	   not	   –	   as	   my	   own	   reading	   of	   these	   accounts	  suggests	   –	   a	   use	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   domestic	   civil	   society	   as	   an	  analogy	   to	   describe	  phenomena	  at	  the	  global	   level.	   In	  that	  case,	  then,	  his	  view	  that	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  something	  fundamentally	  new	  does	  not	  contradict	  what	  could	  be	  called	  the	  “analogi-­‐cal	  extension”	  of	  domestic	  civil	  society	  to	  the	  global	  level.	  In	  fact,	  writers	  who	  suggest	  that	   civil	   society	   is	   a	  useful	   concept	   to	   transpose	   to	   the	  global	   level	   to	  describe	   the	  phenomena	   found	   there,	   explicitly	   acknowledge	   its	   newness	   and	   suggest	   that	  “because	  of	  conceptual	  similarities	  [with	  domestic	  civil	  societies],	  it	  makes	  analytical	  sense	   to	   understand	   this	   domain	   as	   global	   civil	   society”	   (Wapner	   2000:	   267).	   The	  fundamentally	  new	  feature	  of	  global	  civil	  society,	   then,	   is	   its	  radical	   interconnected-­‐ness	  of	  different	   locales	  (whether	  national,	  subnational	  or	  regional)	  with	  each	  other	  and	  with	  the	  global	   level	   itself,	   “[t]he	   ‘micro’	  and	  the	   ‘meso’	  and	  the	   ‘macro’	  dimen-­‐sions	  of	   this	   society	  are	  both	   interconnected	  and	  co-­‐determinant	  of	  each	  other;	   […]	  the	  domestic	  and	  the	  global	  are	  […]	  linked	  together	  in	  complex,	  cross-­‐border	  patterns	  of	   looped	  and	   re-­‐looped	   circuitry”	   and	   “[t]he	   tiniest	   and	   the	   largest	   operations	   and	  events	   are	   implicated	   in	   loops	   that	   produce	   feedback	   […]	   so	   adding	   to	   the	   overall	  heterogeneity	  and	  dynamism	  of	  the	  components	  of	  the	  global	  social	  system”	  (Keane	  2003:	  24).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	   “Global	  civil	  society	  […]	  is	  a	  transnational	  domain	  in	  which	  people	  form	  relationships	  and	  develop	  elements	  of	   identity	  outside	   their	   role	  as	  a	  citizen	  of	  a	  particular	  state”	   (cit.	   in	  Keane	  2003:	  23;	  Wapner	  2000).	  “Global	  civil	  society	  is	  ‘above	  and	  beyond	  national,	  regional,	  or	  local	  societies’,	  or	  ‘above	  the	  national	  level’”	  (Anheier	  et	  al.	  2001a;	  cit.	  in	  Keane	  2003:	  23).	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  A	   third	   way	   of	   relating	   the	   older	   understanding	   of	   civil	   society	   with	   the	   new	  phenomenon	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  to	  observe	  similarities	  in	  the	  conditions	  that	  are	  thought	  to	  have	  fostered	  the	  emergence	  of	  domestic	  civil	  societies	  with	  conditions	  of	  global	   civil	   society.	  For	  Ronnie	  Lipschutz	   (1992),	   leakage	  of	   sovereignty	  away	   from	  the	  state	  is	  a	  structural	  precondition	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  civil	  society,	  while	  another,	  functional,	   precondition	   is	   the	   decreasing	   ability	   or	   inclination	   of	   states	   to	   provide	  certain	   services	   (e.g.	  welfare,	   protection	   of	   public	   goods,	   security)	   to	   their	   citizens,	  triggering	  efforts	  on	  behalf	  of	  these	  citizens	  to	  organise	  these	  services	  through	  other,	  non-­‐state	  institutions	  and	  thus	  forming	  civil	  society.	  
Paul	  Wapner	  (2000)	  also	  observes	   that	  certain	  conditions	   for	   the	  emergence	  of	  civil	  society	  on	  a	  domestic	  scale	  can	  currently	  be	  observed	  on	  the	  global	  level,	  thus	  –	  he	  concludes	  –	  strengthening	  the	  case	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  “civil	  society”	  terminology	  to	  label	   this	   global	   phenomenon.	   For	   Wapner,	   the	   structural	   prerequisites	   for	   the	  formation	   of	   civil	   society	   (he	   explicitly	   restricts	   his	   analysis	   to	   civil	   societies	   that	  “evolved	  within	  the	  Western	  tradition	  of	  political	  thought”	  (Wapner	  2000:	  266))	  are,	  first,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  which	  has	  established	  itself	  as	  a	  separate	  entity	  from	  its	  citizens,	  thus	  encouraging	  “citizens	  to	  necessarily	  [organise]	  themselves	  in	  opposition	  to,	  and	  independent	  from,	  its	  prerogatives	  and	  directives”	  (Wapner	  2000:	  264)	  which,	  in	   turn,	   lead	   the	   liberal	   state	   to	   acknowledge	   (and	   formally	   codify)	   their	   freedom	  from	   state	   authority	   and	   their	   rights	   to	   hold	   state	   power	   accountable.	   The	   second	  prerequisite	   for	   the	   formation	  of	  civil	   societies	  was	   the	  emergence	  of	  market-­‐based	  economies,	   which	   led	   individuals	   to	   “concentrate	   their	   productive	   energies	   on	  genuinely	  personal,	   self-­‐interested	  enterprises	  and,	   in	  doing	  so,	  create	  and	  mobilize	  significant,	   autonomous	   sources	   of	   wealth”	   (Wapner	   2000:	   265).	   In	   other	   words,	  legally	   guaranteed	  private	   property	   fostered	   the	   creation	   of	   resources	   independent	  from	  state	  control	  which	   in	   turn	   laid	   the	  material	   foundations	   for	   the	  emergence	  of	  civil	  society.	  Wapner	  then	  recognises	  these	  same	  features	  currently	  being	  observable	  on	   the	   global	   level:	   first,	   “a	   state	   system	   [...]	   [which]	   legitimizes,	   and	   encourages	  transnational	  citizen	  interaction”	  (Wapner	  2000:	  267),	  which	  now	  controls	  virtually	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  which	  together	  with	  other	  institutions	  such	  as	  international	  treaties,	   intergovernmental	   organisations	   and	   regional	   integration	   organisations	  make	   up	   this	   (albeit)	   “partial,	   continually	   contested,	   and	   often	   ineffective	   […]	  structural	  component	  [of]	  global	  governance”	  (Wapner	  2000:	  267).	  And	  secondly,	  the	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  ever-­‐advancing	  global	   integration	  of	  markets	   is	   observed	   to	  be	   the	  other	   structural	  prerequisite	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   (global)	   civil	   society,	   establishing	   a	   domain	   in	  which	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  can	  engage	  in	  trans-­‐boundary	  interactions	  with	  one	  another	  and	  without	  being	  subjected	  to	  complete	  governmental	  control	  and	  thus	  providing	  the	  experience	  of	  trans-­‐national	  cooperation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  accumulation	  of	  resources	  independent	  from	  state	  control	  in	  that	  realm	  –	  much	  akin	  to	  the	  previously	  described	  processes	  on	  the	  domestic	  scale.	  Wapner,	  however,	  insists	  that	  “[w]hile	  the	  state	   system	   and	   the	   global	   economy	   provide	   a	   space	   for	   global	   civil	   society,	   as	   a	  phenomenon	   its	   existence	   rests	   on	   the	   activities	   of	   certain	   actors	   that	   actually	  constitute	   it	   [...	   –	   only	   their]	   activities	   actually	   establish	   horizontal	   transnational	  networks”	  (Wapner	  2000:	  268,	  emphasis	  added).	  
2.2.3 Keane’s	  Definition	  of	  Global	  Civil	  Society	  
John	  Keane	  (2003)	  distinguishes	  three	  main	  uses	  of	  the	  term	  global	  civil	  society.	  The	  analytical-­‐descriptive	   use	   of	   the	   term	   aims	   to	   provide	   explanations	   of	   the	   socio-­‐political	  realities	  of	  the	  world,	  while	  the	  strategic-­‐political	  use	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  strategic	  means	  of	  realising	  political	  goals	  that	  global	  civil	  society	  actors	  might	  have.	  Finally,	  the	  normative	  use	  presents	  global	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  “warranted	  and	  plausible	  and	  desirable”	  (Keane	  2003:	  4)	  element	  in	  the	  overall	  make	  up	  of	  global	  governance	  and	   can	   therefore	   be	   used	   to	   communicate	   actions	   that	   should	   be	   undertaken	   or	  avoided	  in	  order	  to	  expand	  or	  avoid	  weakening	  its	  ability	  to	  fulfil	  this	  role7.	  
Of	  these	  three	  usages,	  the	  analytical-­‐descriptive	  use	  appears	  most	  appropriate	  for	  empirical	  consideration.	  Within	  this	  usage,	  Keane	  submits,	  understanding	  global	  civil	  society	   as	   an	   “idealtypisches”	   (ideal-­‐typical)	   construct	   yields	   the	   more	   promising	  outcome.	  In	  that	  context,	  as	  an	  ideal-­‐type,	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  
dynamic	   nongovernmental	   system	   of	   interconnected	   socio-­‐economic	  
institutions	   that	  straddle	   the	  whole	  earth,	  and	  that	  have	  complex	  ef-­‐
fects	   that	   are	   felt	   in	   its	   four	   corners.	   Global	   civil	   society	   is	   neither	   a	  
static	  object	  nor	  a	   fait	  accompli.	   It	   is	  an	  unfinished	  project	   that	  con-­‐
sists	   of	   sometimes	   thick,	   sometimes	   thinly	   stretched	   networks,	   pyra-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	   Regarding	   the	   distinction	   between	   normative	   and	   descriptive	   use	   of	   the	   term,	   Mary	   Kaldor	  reminds	  us,	  that	  “[a]ll	  versions	  of	  civil	  society	  are	  both	  normative	  and	  descriptive.	  They	  describe	  a	  political	  project	  i.e.	  a	  goal,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  an	  actually	  existing	  reality,	  which	  may	  not	  meas-­‐ure	  up	  to	  the	  goal”	  (2003:	  11).	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mids	   and	   hub-­‐and-­‐spoke	   clusters	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   institutions	   and	  
actors	   who	   organise	   themselves	   across	   borders,	   with	   the	   deliberate	  
aim	   of	   drawing	   the	   world	   together	   in	   new	   ways.	   These	   non-­‐
governmental	   institutions	  and	  actors	   tend	   to	  pluralise	  power	  and	   to	  
problematise	   violence;	   consequently,	   their	   peaceful	   or	   “civil”	   effects	  
are	   felt	   everywhere,	   here	  and	   there,	   far	   and	  wide,	   to	   and	   from	   local	  
areas,	  through	  wider	  regions,	  to	  the	  planetary	  level	  itself.	  	   	  	  	   (Keane	  2003:	  8,	  original	  emphasis)	  This	   definition	   contains	   five	   main	   aspects	   of	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  global	   civil	   society	   as	   proposed	   by	   Keane.	   First,	   there	   is	   the	   non-­‐governmental	  character	   of	   global	   civil	   society’s	   members	   whereby	   everything	   that	   is	   not	   state	  belongs	   to	   the	   sphere	   of	   global	   civil	   society.	   Keane	   explicitly	  mentions	   individuals,	  corporations,	   religious	   organisations	   as	  well	   as	   NGOs	   of	   all	   different	   flavours.	   This	  huge	   variety	   of	   actors,	   then,	   forms	  global	   civil	   society	  by	   conducting	   their	   social	   or	  economic	   activities	   and	   associational	   life	   across	   national	   borders	   and	   outside	   the	  realm	   of	   government	   structures.	   Keane	   does,	   however,	   acknowledge	   that	   this	  understanding	  of	  the	  “non-­‐governmental”	  aspect	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  carries	  the	  risk	  of	  converting	  global	  civil	  society	  into	  a	  “dustbin	  category”	  which	  ends	  up	  containing	  everything	   that	   is	   not	   the	   state.	   This	   risk,	   however,	   has	   been	   overcome	   in	   his	  definition	  by	  using	  the	  other	  criteria	  of	  the	  definition	  to	  limit	  the	  so	  defined	  phenom-­‐enon	  to	  a	  specific	  subset	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  actors.	  One	  aspect	  of	  this	  first	  criterion	  that	  warrants	  further	  discussion	  is	  his	  treatment	  of	  corporations	  and	  other	  economic	  actors.	  This	   topic	  will	   receive	  more	   thorough	  attention	   later,	   but	   for	   the	  moment	   it	  should	   be	   noted	   that	   Keane	   very	   explicitly	   includes	   the	   entire	   realm	   of	   economic	  transactions	  and	  activity	  in	  his	  understanding	  of	  global	  civil	  society.	  
The	  second	  of	  the	  criteria	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  definition	  qualifies	  global	  civil	  socie-­‐ty	   as	   a	   “society.”	   As	   a	   society,	   it	   is	   “a	   dynamic	   ensemble	   of	   more	   or	   less	   tightly	  interlinked	   social	   processes	   […],	   a	   highly	   complex	   ensemble	   of	   differently	   sized,	  overlapping	  forms	  of	  structured	  social	  action"	  (Keane	  2003:	  10	  f.),	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  refers	  to	  an	  array	  of	  institutions,	  associations	  and	  networks	  within	  which	  individuals	  and	  collective	  actors	  are	   interdependent	  and	  interrelated.	  A	  noteworthy	   implication	  that	   this	   aspect	   indicates,	   is	   that	   –	   as	   a	   society	   –	   global	   civil	   society	   has	   some	  structural	   features	   (norms,	   rules	   and	   institutions)	   that	   have	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	  independence	  from	  its	  actual	  members.	  These	  features,	  on	  one	  hand,	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	   possible	   activity	  within	   that	   society	   (but	   also	   enable	   activity	  within	   these	   limits	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  which	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  without	   the	   institutional	   framework	  created	  by	  global	  civil	  society)	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  also	  predate	  and	  are	  set	   to	  outlive	  the	  current	  members	  of	  global	  civil	  society.	  
The	   third	   dimension	   of	   this	   definition	   of	   global	   civil	   society	   is	   “civility.”	   This	  notion	  borrows	  very	  strongly	  from	  the	  root	  of	  the	  concept	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  societas	  civilis	  in	   that	   for	   Keane,	   the	   notion	   of	   civility	   refers	   to	   the	   character	   of	   the	   interactions	  within	   global	   civil	   society	   being	   interactions	   that	   are	   characterised	   by	   a	   degree	   of	  “respect	   for	   others	   expressed	   as	   politeness	   towards	   and	   acceptance	   of	   strangers”	  (Keane	  2003:	  10)	  and	  a	  generally	  “strong	  and	  overriding	  tendency	  to	  both	  marginal-­‐ise	  or	  avoid	  the	  use	  of	  violence”	  (13).	  This	  characterisation	  describes	  a	  state	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  very	  much	  like	  the	  state	  of	  society	  that	  was	  described	  when	  referring	  to	  a	  society	  as	  a	  societas	  civilis,	  namely	  that	  of	  a	  society	  in	  which	  rules	  and	  norms	  create	  a	  state	  of	  absence	  of	  violence	  and	  barbarism8.	  This	  criterion,	  then,	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  provide	   the	   strongest	   demarcation	   feature	   of	   the	   definition	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   the	  definition	  does	  not	  include	  the	  actors	  of	  the	  “the	  dark	  side”	  of	  transnational	  associa-­‐tional	   life.	  To	  be	   sure,	  Keane	  underscores	   that	   “civility”	   is	  understood	  differently	   in	  the	  different	  cultures	  that	  individual	  members	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  might	  come	  from.	  However,	  all	  of	  these	  actors	  agree	  on	  a	  broad	  understanding	  of	  “norms	  of	  non-­‐violent	  politeness	   covering	   matters	   of	   indirection,	   self-­‐restraint	   and	   face-­‐saving”	   (Keane	  2003:	  12,	  original	  emphasis).	  
Another	  feature	  of	  global	  civil	  society,	  as	  defined	  in	  this	  way,	  is	  its	  “pluralism”	  and	  “strong	   conflict	   potential”	   (Keane	   2003:	   14,	   original	   emphasis).	   These	   features	   are	  strongly	  related	  to	  the	  understanding	  that	  most	  (if	  not	  all)	  trans-­‐boundary	  economic	  activity	  takes	  place	  between	  members	  of	  global	  civil	  society,	  which	  is	  conceptualised	  to	   include	   all	   sorts	   and	   sizes	   of	   businesses,	   provide	   the	   incomes	   of	   hundreds	   of	  millions	  of	  households,	  and	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  locus	  of	  production,	  distribution	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	   Of	  course,	  as	  explained	  above,	  the	  classical	  understanding	  of	  societas	  civilis	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  guaranteed	  by	  a	  state	  to	  ensure	  this	  condition	  of	  peacefulness;	  a	  notion	  that	  is	  not	  fully	  replicated	  in	  the	  case	  of	  global	  civil	  society.	  However,	  the	  less	  formalised	  norms	  and	  values	  that	  Keane	  does	  find	  in	  global	  civil	  society	  (openness	  towards	  the	  other	  and	  rejection	  of	  violence)	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  sufficiently	  take	  the	  place	  of	  guaranteed	  rule	  of	  law.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  remembering	  that	  some	  writers	  (Kaldor	  2000)	  stress	  that	  the	  entire	  set	  of	  values,	  norms,	  mores	  etc	  embedded	  in	  society	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  both	  the	  law	  implemented	  and	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  state	  to	  establish	  the	  state	  of	  societas	  civilis	  as	  well	  as	  the	  checks	  on	  power	  by	  the	  citizenry.	  In	  that	  sense	  then,	  as	  also	  identified	  by	  Lipschutz	  (1992),	  the	  values	  and	  norms	  of	  these	  societies	  exist	  both	  independ-­‐ent	  from	  and	  above	  and	  prior	  to	  their	  legal	  implementation	  by	  states.	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  and	  consumption,	  technological	  innovation	  and	  investment	  –	  all	  connecting	  individu-­‐al	  actors	  across	  borders	  and	  vast	  distances.	  This	  economic	  activity	  within	  global	  civil	  society,	   then,	   is	   only	   possible	   due	   to	   the	   non-­‐economic	   functions	   and	   structural	  components	  of	   global	   civil	   society:	  by	  having	  established	  a	   set	  of	  norms	  and	  values	  that	  members	  of	  this	  society	  can	  feel	  confident	  to	  share	  among	  themselves,	  economic	  activity	  can	  then	  be	  based	  on	  these	  norms	  and	  values.	  These	  cross-­‐border	  activities	  also	   serve	   to	   sub-­‐divide	   the	   world	   in	   two	   ways,	   horizontally	   and	   vertically.	   The	  horizontal	  boundaries	  are	  drawn	  by	  activities	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  various	  levels	  of	  state	  (i.e.	  national	  states	  and	  their	  sub-­‐national	  entities	  as	  well	  as	  international	   governmental	   bodies)	   when	   the	   civilian	   institutions	   of	   global	   civil	  society	  engage	   in	  activities	   that	  place	   limits	  upon	  governments	  and	  thus	  potentially	  provide	  “a	  brake	  or	  potential	  check	  upon	  various	  forms	  of	  government,	  and	  especially	  absolutist	   political	   rule.	   All	   governmental	   institutions,	   from	   local	   councils	   through	  territorial	  states	  and	  regional	  and	  supranational	   institutions	   like	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  the	  WTO,	  are	  now	  feeling	  the	  pinching	  effects	  of	  this	  civil	  society”	  (Keane	  2003:	  15,	   original	   emphasis).	   In	   contrast,	   the	   horizontal	   sub-­‐dividing	   of	   the	   world	   takes	  place	   within	   global	   civil	   society	   itself.	   Here,	   Keane	   refers	   to	   the	   “scuffles	   and	  skirmishes	   over	   the	   distribution	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   power,”	   which	   determine	   “who	  gets	   what,	   when	   and	   how”	   (Keane	   2003:	   15).	   It	   is	   worth	   noting,	   though,	   that	   this	  notion	  does	  not	  only	  apply	  to	  strictly	  economic	  activities.	  The	  same	  mechanism,	  the	  same	  “scuffles	  and	  skirmishes,”	  also	  helps	  elevate	  local	  concerns	  to	  global	  importance	  and	  translates	  global-­‐level	  problems	  to	  local	  issues.	  
Finally,	  but	  not	   least	   importantly,	  global	  civil	   society	   is	  obviously	  defined	  by	   its	  
global	   scope.	   In	  Keane’s	  understanding,	   this	  globality	  does	  not	  only	  refer	   to	   the	   fact	  that	  global	  civil	  society	  involves	  interactions	  which	  take	  place	  across	  state	  boundaries,	  but	   also	   “underneath”	   forms	   of	   state	   and	   sub-­‐state	   governance.	   He	   conceptualises	  global	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  “‘macro-­‐society’	  or	  ‘society	  of	  […]	  societies’	  [that]	  consists	  of	  […]	   a	   bewildering	   variety	   of	   interacting	   [actors]	   […]:	   INGOs,	   voluntary	   groups,	  businesses,	  civic	   initiatives,	   social	  movements,	  protest	  organisations,	  whole	  nations,	  ethnic	  and	  linguistic	  clusters,	  pyramids	  and	  networks”	  (Keane	  2003:	  17–18).	  
2.	  Literature	  Review:	  Global	  Civil	  Society	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere	   37	  
2.2.4 A	  Critique	  of	  Keane’s	  View	  of	  Global	  Civil	  Society	  
This	   last	   criterion	   illustrates	   most	   clearly	   one	   of	   the	   disadvantages	   of	   Keane’s	  definition.	  While	  explicitly	  stating	  that	  the	  definition	  is	  crafted	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  concept	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  becoming	  a	  “dustbin	  category,”	  which	  is	  only	  demarcat-­‐ed	  by	  its	  feature	  of	  not	  being	  “the	  state”	  and	  which	  thus	  ends	  up	  holding	  everything	  else,	   the	   list	   of	   an	   –	   indeed	   –	   “bewildering	   variety”	   of	   actors,	   including	   potentially	  rather	   large	   collective	   actors	   such	   as	   “whole	   nations,”	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  success	  of	   this	   endeavour	  was	   incomplete	  given	   that	   “whole	  nations”	  would	  almost	  certainly	  include	  the	  elements	  that	  he	  sought	  to	  exclude	  from	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  as	  understood	  through	  this	  definition.	  Furthermore,	  the	  relevance	  of	  an	  empirical	  category	  in	  the	  social	  science	  (which,	  after	  all,	  is	  the	  declared	  purpose	  of	  Keane’s	  definition	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  as	  an	  ideal	  type	  for	  analytical-­‐descriptive	  use)	   becomes	   questionable	   when	   the	   category	   becomes	   too	   broad	   and	   begins	   to	  contain	  too	  many	  heterogeneous	  members,	  whose	  common	  features	  are	  less	  marked,	  less	  obvious	  and	  less	  important	  than	  their	  differences.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  becoming	  too	  large	  and	  too	  broad	  a	  category,	  other	  aspects	  of	  this	  definitional	  delimitation	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  appear	  to	  have	  problems	  and	   internal	   contradictions	   as	  well.	  Many	  of	   these	   contradictions	   are	   related	   to	   the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  economic	  realm	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  global	  civil	  society.	  For	  example,	  Keane	  explicitly	  sets	  out	  to	  craft	  a	  definition	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  that	  excludes	   the	   “dark	   side”	   of	   civil	   society,	   in	   other	   words	   those	   aspects	   of	   trans-­‐boundary	  associational	  life	  that	  engage	  in	  criminal,	  terrorist	  or	  violent	  activities	  and	  thus	  argues	  that	  only	  actors	  should	  be	  considered	  part	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  that	  fulfil	  the	  criteria	  of	   “civility”	  which	   is	  detailed	   to	  mean	  a	  “tendency	  to	   […]	  marginalise	  or	  avoid	  the	  use	  of	  violence”	  (Keane	  2003:	  13).	  However,	  his	  seemingly	  indiscriminatory	  inclusion	   of	   the	   realm	   of	   global	   capitalism	   into	   the	   concept	   of	   global	   civil	   society	  would	   suggest	   that	   corporations	   which	   earn	   money	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   with	  violence	   (e.g.	   private	   military	   companies	   or	   arms	   producers)	   are	   equally	   part	   of	  global	   civil	   society	   as	   large	   transnational	   corporations	   with	   often	   considerable	  degrees	   of	   violence	   along	   their	   supply	   chain9.	   Conversely,	   this	   definition	   would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	   For	   example,	   the	   Dutch	   Shell	   Corporation	   has	   repeatedly	   been	   accused	   of	   being	   involved	   or	  complicit	   in	   human	   rights	   abuses	   associated	   with	   its	   operations	   in	   Nigeria.	   But	   even	   if	   these	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  exclude	   some	   individual	   and	   collective	   actors	   that	   are	   typically	   associated	   with	  (global)	   civil	   society	   and	   (transnational)	   activism,	   but	   that	   –	   to	   varying	   degrees	   –	  embrace	  the	  use	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  violence	  (as	  either	  source	  or	  target	  of	  that	  violence),	  ranging	   from	   acts	   of	   expressed	   non-­‐violent	   civil	   disobedience	   with,	   however,	   the	  associated	  acceptance	  of	  the	  chance	  of	  resulting	  violence	  on	  the	  part	  of,	  for	  example,	  police	  forces10	  to	  so-­‐called	  “direct	  action”	  protests	  that	  might	  include	  violence	  against	  objects.	   A	   classical	   example	   for	   the	   latter	   is	   the	   use	   of	   arson	   in	   the	   Suffragettes’	  movement	  of	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  in	  Britain	  (Pankhurst	  1931).	  
Another	  problem	  rests	  in	  the	  fourth	  criterion	  of	  his	  definition,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  “pluralism”	   and	   “strong	   conflict	   potential”	   of	   global	   civil	   society.	   As	   detailed	   above,	  these	   features	   are	   said	   to	   divide	   the	   world	   in	   two	   ways	   across	   which	   global	   civil	  society	   acts.	  Activities	   across	   the	  horizontal	   divide	  between	  global	   civil	   society	   and	  the	   various	   levels	   of	   state-­‐power	   are	   said	   to	   place	   limits	   upon	   every	   government’s	  actions,	  which	  are	  “now	  feeling	  the	  pinching	  effects	  of	  this	  civil	  society”	  (Keane	  2003:	  15).	  This	  limiting	  effect	  is	  suggested	  to	  be	  particularly	  strong	  in	  those	  countries	  with	  absolutist	  political	  rule.	  Failing	  to	  provide	  examples	  for	  these	  claims,	  the	  impression	  arises	  that	  Keane’s	  view	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  might	  be	  too	  optimistic;	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  plentiful	  examples	  to	  the	  contrary.	  Given	  the	  level	  of	  suppression	  of	  (domestic)	  civil	  society	  organisations	   in	  those	  countries	  that	  Keane	  considers	  under	  “absolutist	  political	  rule”	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  see	  how	  civil	  society	   institutions	  place	   limits	  on	   these	  governments.	  Even	  considering	  the	  possible	  effect	  of	  the	  large	  global	  civil	  society	  on	  “absolutists”	   governments,	   for	   example	   via	   the	   “boomerang	   pattern”	   (Keck	   and	  Sikkink	   1998:	   12)11,	   the	   often	   low	   level	   of	   concern	   over	   outside	   critique	   puts	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  accusations	  proved	  untrue,	   Shell’s	   and	  others	  practice	   of	   flaring	  natural	   gas	   associated	  with	   oil	  extraction	  in	  that	  area,	  which	  is	  both	  illegal	  under	  Nigerian	  law	  and	  a	  severe	  hazard	  for	  the	  health	  and	  lives	  of	  the	  communities	  in	  that	  area	  (FoE-­‐I	  2005),	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  activities	  from	  the	  “dark	  side”	  of	  globalised	  capitalism.	  10	  	   Examples	   are	   numerous	   and	   include	   the	   “Reclaim	   Power”	   march	   during	   the	   2009	   UN	   Climate	  Change	  Conference	  in	  Copenhagen,	  which	  was	  “committed	  to	  non-­‐violent	  civil	  disobedience,	  […]	  [e]ven	   if	   attacked	  by	  police”	   (Klein	  2009)	  but	   resulted	   in	   some	  violence	   after	  police	   aggression	  (Watts	  and	  van	  der	  Zee	  2009),	  including	  police	  violence	  directed	  at	  the	  author	  of	  this	  thesis	  (field	  note,	  Copenhagen,	  16	  Dec	  2009).	  Another	   famous	  example,	  are	  some	  of	   the	  events	  surrounding	  the	  1999	  WTO	  ministerial	  in	  Seattle	  (Danaher	  and	  Burbach	  2000)	  or	  the	  annual	  summit	  meetings	  of	  the	  G8.	  11	  	   The	  “boomerang	  pattern”	  describes	  how	  in	  cases	  where	  a	  country’s	  government	  is	  not	  accessible	  to	  civil	  society	  organisations	  in	  that	  country,	  these	  civil	  society	  organisations	  would	  then	  activate	  their	  trans-­‐boundary	  links	  to	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  another	  country	  with	  a	  more	  accessible	  gov-­‐ernments	  to	  raise	  the	  issue	  in	  question	  with	  the	  government	  of	  that	  second	  country	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  have	  this	  government	  pressure	  the	  first	  government	  directly	  or	  via	  intergovernmental	  organi-­‐	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  question	   how	   global	   civil	   society	   activity	   places	   limits	   upon	   these	   governments.	  Furthermore,	   even	   if	   global	   civil	   society	  were	   to	   successfully	  utilise	   the	  boomerang	  pattern,	   the	   actual	   limiting	   pressure	   upon	   the	   government	   in	   question	   would	  originate	   from	   another	   governmental	   or	   intergovernmental	   body	   and	   would,	   thus,	  come	  from	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  global	  civil	  society.	  	  
But	   even	   in	   countries	   that	   are	   usually	   considered	  democratically	   governed,	   the	  “pinching	   effect”	   of	   global	   civil	   society	   seems	   to	   be	   overestimated.	   Consider,	   for	  example,	  the	  2003	  anti-­‐war	  demonstrations,	  which	  involved	  10	  to	  12	  million	  people	  in	   approximately	   800	   cities	   worldwide	   (Bivens	   2005)	   –	   a	   level	   of	   trans-­‐boundary	  participation	  which	   could	   be	   considered	   a	   text-­‐book	   example	   of	   global	   civil	   society	  activity	   –	   before	   the	   Iraq	  War	   had	   even	   begun	   –	   compared	   to	   the	   1960s	   anti-­‐war	  movement	   against	   the	   Vietnam	   war,	   where	   eight	   years	   after	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  Vietnam	  War	  250,000	  to	  500,000	  people	  marched	  in	  Washington	  –,	  but	  which	  failed	  to	   sway	   the	   determination	   of	   the	   governments	   involved	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  war	   in	   Iraq	  (Bivens	   2005;	   Kaldor	   et	   al.	   2003).	   While	   the	   discussion	   of	   this	   example	   certainly	  provides	  enough	  material	  for	  many	  other	  theses,	  it	  shall	  suffice	  for	  now	  to	  note	  that	  Nancy	  Fraser	  suggests	  that	  this	  failure	  can	  be	  partially	  explained	  with	  a	  phenomenon	  she	  calls	  the	  deficit	  of	  political	  efficiacy,	  and	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  a	   later	   section	  of	   this	   chapter:	   “Although	   this	  outpouring	  of	  opinion	   could	  not	  have	  been	  more	  forceful	  or	  clear,	   it	   lacked	  an	  addressee	  capable	  of	  restraining	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  and	  so,	  in	  a	  sense,	  remained	  powerless”	  (Fraser	  2008:	  156).	  
Moreover,	  Keane’s	  characterisation	  of	  the	  conflicts	  arising	  from	  the	  vertical	  divi-­‐sion	  of	  the	  world	  by	  the	  activities	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  defined	  as	  mere	  “scuffles	  and	  skirmishes	   over	   the	   distribution	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   power”	   (Keane	   2003:	   15)	  indicates	   an	   underestimation	   of	   the	   seriousness	   and	   severity	   of	   these	   conflicts.	  Although	  acknowledging,	   that	   these	   conflicts	   can	   result	   in	  processes	  wherein	   “local	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  sations	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998).	  An	  example	  is	  the	  demands	  of	  Tibetan	  independence	  organisa-­‐tions	   in	   Tibet	   whose	   demands	   are	   routinely	   ignored	   by	   the	   government	   of	   the	   PRC.	   However,	  through	  international	  contacts	  to	  other	  human	  rights	  organisations	  in	  other	  countries,	  the	  expec-­‐tations	  have	  been	  created	  that	  Tibet	  and,	  more	  generally,	  “the	  human	  rights	  record”	  of	  China,	  are	  raised	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  most	  high	   level	  meetings	  between	  Chinese	  and	  other	  countries’	  politi-­‐cians,	  who	  are	  expected	  to	  exert	  pressure	  on	  their	  Chinese	  colleagues.	  While	  this	  example	  serves	  to	  describe	   the	  mechanism	  of	   the	  boomerang	  pattern,	   it	  also	   illustrates	   that	   this	  approach	  does	  not	  increase	  global	  civil	  society’s	  ability	  to	  “place	  limits”	  upon	  those	  governments	  that	  have	  little	  susceptibility	  to	  outside	  critique.	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  matters	   […]	   can	   assume	   global	   importance”	   (Keane	   2003:	   15)	   and	   thus	   raise	   their	  level	  of	  severity,	   it	   is	   left	  unacknowledged	  that	   the	  “local	  matters”	   themselves	  often	  constitute	   much	   more	   than	   just	   “scuffles	   and	   skirmishes”	   but	   rather	   fundamental	  conflicts	  over	  access	  to	  resources,	  health	  issues,	  environmental	  degradation,	  poverty,	  human	  rights,	  etc.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  vertical	  division	  described	  here,	  is	  to	  some	  degree	   identical	   with	   the	   division	   between	   capital	   and	   people	   and	   describing	   this	  fundamental	  antagonism	  as	  a	  mere	  internal	  conflict	  of	  civil	  society	  is	  understating	  its	  severity	  and	  importance.	  
2.2.5 Is	  Economic	  Activity	  Part	  of	  Civil	  Society?	  	  
This	   discussion	   already	   shows	   how	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   economic	   realm	   can	   pose	  problems	   of	   the	   understanding	   of	   civil	   society,	   and	   global	   civil	   society,	   and	   in	   fact	  writers	  on	  global	  civil	  society	  differ	  in	  their	  support	  or	  rejection	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  economic	  realm.	  Summarising	  different	  approaches	  to	  describing	  the	  scope	  of	  global	  civil	   society,	   Mary	   Kaldor	   suggests	   that	   the	   term	   is	   used	   within	   the	   discussion	   to	  describe	   three	   different	   views	   of	  what	   should	   or	   should	   not	   be	   included	  within	   its	  boundaries.	   The	   distinction	   between	   the	   first	   and	   second	   versions	   refers	   to	   the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  economy:	  “Global	  civil	  society	  […]	  can	  refer	  to	  everything	  between	  the	  state	  and	   the	   family,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   it	   can	   include	   the	  market”	   (Kaldor	  2000:	  107)12.	  This	   view	  mirrors	   John	   Keane’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   global	   civil	   society,	  where	   his	   criterion	   of	   actors	   being	   “non-­‐governmental”	   would	   equate	   to	   Kaldor’s	  description	  of	  them	  being	  “below”	  the	  state,	  while	  she	  also	  adds	  the	  useful	  distinction	  of	  those	  actors	  also	  being	  “above”	  the	  family,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  excluding	  the	  private	  sphere;	  a	  criterion	  that	  Keane	  does	  not	  explicate	  but	  which	  appears	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  his	  understanding13.	  Alternatively,	   the	   term	   “may	  be	  used	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  	   Elsewhere,	  Kaldor	   (2003)	  points	  out	   that	   some	  recent	   interpretations	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  women’s	  movement	  now	  no	  longer	  exclude	  the	  family	  from	  civil	  society	  as	  this	  exclu-­‐sion	  historically	  merely	  reflected	  the	  male	  nature	  of	  citizenship	  which	  became	  obsolete	  since.	  13	  	   Cf.,	  for	  example,	  his	  description	  of	  the	  “empirical	  contours”	  of	  global	  civil	  society,	  in	  which	  he	  lists	  a	   number	   of	   classes	   of	   collective	   actors	   (corporations,	   international	   NGOs	   and	   so	   forth)	   and	  individual	  figures	  of	  the	  public	  life	  (he	  mentions,	  among	  others,	  Mahatma	  Ghandi	  and	  Bill	  Gates);	  thus	  suggesting	  that	  the	  private	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  global	  civil	  society.	  To	  be	  sure,	  among	  the	  actors	   that	   he	   perceives	   global	   civil	   society	   to	   be	   composed	   of,	   he	   also	   lists	   “individuals”	   and	  “households”	   (Keane	  2003:	   8),	   but	   the	   context	   suggests	   that	   “households”	   are	   included	   in	   their	  capacity	  as	  actors	  within	  the	  economic	  realm	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  overlapping	  concept	  of	  “family”	  as	  an	  entity	  of	   the	  private	   life)	  and	   “individuals”	   insofar	   they	  become	  visible	  as	  actors	   in	   trans-­‐boundary	  activities,	  e.g.	  as	  activists	  or	  business	  people.	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  profit	  sector:	  everything	  that	  operates	  across	  national	  borders	  and	  between	  the	  state,	  the	   market,	   and	   the	   family”	   (Kaldor	   2000:	   107).	   In	   this	   case,	   global	   civil	   society	  excludes	  any	  primarily	  profit-­‐seeking	  entities	  or	  behaviours.	  This	  view	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  mirrors	   Jean	   Cohen	   and	   Andrew	   Arato’s	   characterisation	   of	   civil	   society	   as	  involving	  “the	  self-­‐defense	  of	  ‘society	  against	  the	  state’	  (and	  the	  unregulated	  capitalist	  market	   economy)”	   (Cohen	   and	   Arato	   1992:	   492),	   wherein	   the	   conflicts	   of	   the	   so-­‐understood	   civil	   society	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   governmental	   realm	   but	   also	   the	   economic	  realm	   is	  emphasised.	  According	   to	   this	  view,	  global	   civil	   society	  becomes	   the	   “third	  force”	   (Florini	   2000)	   on	   the	   global	   stage	   besides	   the	   globalising	   economy	   and	   the	  emerging	  international	  political	  order	  of	  global	  governance.	  
A	   third	  distinct	   understanding	  of	   the	   scope	  of	   global	   civil	   society	   further	   limits	  the	   range	   of	   the	   non-­‐economic	   collective	   actors	   considered	   to	   be	   part	   thereof	   by	  restricting	   its	   membership	   to	   advocacy	   networks,	   which	   would,	   however,	   include	  “both	  those	  that	  advocate	  a	  global	   ‘civilising	  process’	  and	  those	  that	  take	  fundamen-­‐talist	   positions”14	  (Kaldor	   2000:	   107;	   also	   cf.	   Keck	   and	   Sikkink	   1998).	   This	   under-­‐standing	  of	  the	  term	  is	  also	  shared	  by	  Kenneth	  Anderson	  and	  David	  Rieff,	  who	  reject	  the	   idea	   that	  global	  civil	   society	   is	  a	  valid	  concept	  but	  who	  nonetheless	   identify	   the	  “standard	   account”	   of	   global	   civil	   society	   as	   one	   that	   refers	   to	   “a	   ‘progressive’	  movement,	  and	   thus	   it	  contains	  only	  certain	  politically	  progressive	  NGOs	  and	  social	  movements”	  (Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  2004:	  29)15.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  	   In	  talking	  about	  a	  “civilising	  process’,	  Kaldor	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  the	  ideas	  of	  Norbert	  Elias	  from	  his	  book	  of	   the	  same	  name	  (Elias	  1939)	  and	  which	  describe	   the	  process	  of	   the	  removal	  of	  violence	  from	   everyday	   life	   by	   concentrating,	   centralising	   and	   eventually	   monopolising	   violence	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  process	  and	  thus	  moving	  from	  a	  barbaric	  to	  a	  civilised	  society.	  Kaldor,	  however,	  stresses	  that	  in	  a	  globalised	  world	  this	  civilising	  process	  cannot	  anymore	  rely	  on	  the	  concentration	  of	  power	  and	  violence	  through	  “the	  establishment	  of	  a	  world	  state	  because	  this	  would	  imply	  an	  unimaginable	  concentration	  of	  power”	  (Kaldor	  2000:	  108),	  but	  rather	   an	   interlocking	   system	   of	   intergovernmental	   institutions,	   individual	   states,	   multilateral	  treaties	  and	  so	  on,	  which	  collectively	  would	  expand	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  to	  the	  international	  or	  global	  sphere.	  15	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  that	  their	  rejection	  of	  the	  theoretical	  construct	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  not	  related	  to	  this	  description	  of	  the	  “standard	  account”.	  Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  reject	  global	  civil	  society	  (regardless	  of	  the	  definition	  used	  and	  the	  scope	  applied)	  because	  of	  their	  disagreement	  about	  the	  appropriateness	  of	   the	   “two	  alleged	  analogies”	  upon	  which,	   in	   their	   view,	   the	   concept	  of	   global	  civil	   society	   rest.	  Namely	   the	   analogies	   “between	   ‘civil	   society’	   and	   ‘global	   civil	   society’	   and	  be-­‐tween	  a	  settled	  domestic	  democratic	  society	  (in	  which	  civil	  society	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  fabric	  of	  domes-­‐tic	   society)	   and	   an	   ‘international	   society’	   or,	   if	   one	   likes,	   ‘international	   community’”	   (Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  2004:	  29).	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  The	  first	  question	  (whether	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  should	  include	  or	  exclude	  the	  economy)	   has	   been	   identified	   by	   Cohen	   and	   Arato	   to	   be	   a	   dichotomy	   between	   the	  Hegelian	   and	   the	   Gramscian	   model	   of	   civil	   society.	   They	   further	   observe,	   that,	  although	   for	   different	   reasons,	   neoliberal	   and	   “residually	   neo-­‐Marxist”16	  scholars	  usually	   argue	   in	   favour	   of	   inclusion	   of	   the	   economic	   realm.	   According	   to	   their	  observation,	   the	   reason	   that	   this	   is	   the	   case	   for	   the	   neoliberals	   lies	   in	   their	   under-­‐standing	  of	  the	  concepts	  “civil”	  and	  “bourgeois”	  as	  identical,	  the	  importance	  that	  they	  attach	  to	  property	  rights	   in	  the	  overall	  hierarchy	  of	  rights	  and	  their	  rejection	  of	   the	  idea	   of	   significant	   economic	   redistribution	   by	   the	   state	   (Cohen	   and	   Arato	   1992).	  Consequently,	   their	   conceptualisation	   of	   civil	   society	   thus	   avoids	   giving	   social	  movements	   or	   activist	   networks	   a	   strong	   position	   of	   legitimation	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  economic	   realm	   (which	   might	   explain	   why	   the	   conflicts	   between	   these	   forces	   get	  characterised,	   for	   example,	   as	   “scuffles	   and	   skirmishes”	  within	   the	   civil	   society,	   i.e.	  among	  relative	  equals)17.	  
Besides	  Keane,	  who,	  as	  has	  already	  been	  shown,	  perceives	  the	  economic	  realm	  as	  an	   integral	  and	   important	  part	  of	  civil	   society,	  Ronnie	  Lipschutz	  (although	  certainly	  not	  arguing	  from	  a	  neoliberal	  position)	  also	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  economic	  activity	  is	   encompassed	  within	   civil	   society.	   He	   conceptualises	   global	   civil	   society	   as	   being	  constituted	   by	   “the	   social,	   cultural,	   economic	   and	   ethical	   arrangements	   of	   modern	  industrial	   society,”	   which	   are	   “somewhat	   autonomous	   of	   state	   control”	   (Lipschutz	  1992:	   398,	   emphasis	   added).	   Lipschutz	   also	   observes	   the	   dominance	   of	   “liberalism	  with	  the	  individual	  at	  its	  core”	  (Lipschutz	  1992:	  407)	  as	  the	  “operating	  system”	  of	  the	  global	   system.	   “Operating	   system”	  understood	   in	   that	  way	  describes	  a	   set	  of	  norms	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  	   Habermas	   points	   out	   that	   the	   Marx’	   understanding	   of	   civil	   society	  matches	   that	   of	   Hegel	   with	  respect	   to	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   economy.	  Given	   this	   similarity,	   it	   does	   not	   surprise	   that	  Marxist	  writers	   also	  employ	   the	  Hegelian	  understanding	  of	   civil	   society.	  Habermas	  points	  out	   that	  both	  Marx	  and	  Hegel	  would	  have	  translated	  the	  concept	  of	  “societas	  civilis”	  to	  mean	  “bourgeois	  society”	  rather	   than	   “civil	   society”:	   “the	   nowadays	   established	  meaning	   of	   the	   expression	   ‘civil	   society’,	  which,	  contrary	  to	  the	  modern	  translation	  of	  ‘societas	  civilis’	  as	  ‘bourgeois	  society’	  –	  the	  common	  translation	   since	  Hegel	   and	  Marx	   –	  does	  not	  anymore	   include	   the	   sphere	   […]	   [of	   the]	   economy”	  (Habermas	  1990:	  46,	  original	  emphasis;	  own	  translation	  –	  from	  the	  preface	  to	  the	  1990	  German	  reissue	  edition	  of	  The	  Structural	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Public	  Sphere,	  which	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  English	  edition	  of	  the	  book).	  17	  	   For	   the	   other	   group	   of	  writers	   that	   include	   the	   economic	   realm	   in	   their	   conceptualisation,	   the	  “residually	  neo-­‐Marxist	  writers”	  (Cohen	  and	  Arato	  1992:	  75),	  conceptualisation	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  that	  way	  refer	   to	   future,	  or	  postcapitalist,	   civil	   societies.	  For	   that	   reason	   these	   thoughts	  are	  not	  particularly	   relevant	   here,	   since	   the	   concern	   here	   is	   with	   the	   contemporary	   phenomenon.	   For	  completeness,	   “[w]hile	   neoliberals	   reduce	   the	   civil	   society	   to	   economic	   society,	   neo-­‐Marxists	  either	  reduce	  the	  future	  (postcapitalist)	  economy	  to	  political	  society	  or	  propose,	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  utopian	  socialists,	  some	  kind	  of	  socially	  reembedded	  economy”	  (Cohen	  and	  Arato	  1992:	  75).	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  that	  are	  universally	  or	  near	  universally	  shared	  within	  the	  system	  and	  thus	  outline	  the	  basis	   on	   which	   all	   interactions	   within	   this	   system	   are	   based18:	   “[t]he	   principle	   of	  economic	   and	   political	   liberalism	   thus	   come	   to	   represent	   […]	   new	   social	   construc-­‐tions.	  It	  is	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  these	  emerging	  social	  constructions	  that	  new	  forms	  of	  non-­‐state	  global	  political	  activity	  –	  global	  civil	  society	  –	  are	  emerging”	  (Lipschutz	  1992:	   407).	   Clearly,	   global	   civil	   society	   understood	   in	   this	   way	   would	   imply	   the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  economic	  realm	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society.	  
Paul	  Wapner,	  as	  detailed	  above,	  identifies	  as	  preconditions	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  both	  the	  Western	  “domestic”	  civil	  society	  as	  well	  as	  global	  civil	  society,	  first,	  the	  rise	  of	   the	   liberal	   state	   (or,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   global	   civil	   society,	   the	   rise	   of	   an	   –	   albeit	  rudimentary	  –	  system	  of	  global	  governance)	  and,	  second,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  globalised	  market	   place	   that	   creates	   resources	   independent	   of	   the	   state	   system	   and	   fosters	  “experience[s	   of]	   free	   association	   across	   state	   boundaries;	   [and	   of]	   individual	   and	  corporate	   action	   based	   on	   prerogative	   rather	   than	   coercion	   or	   necessity"	   (Wapner	  2000:	  268).	  However,	  although	  he	  describes	  how	  the	  economic	  sphere	  provides	  one	  of	   the	   necessary	   conditions	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   global	   civil	   society,	   he	   does	   not	  consider	   this	  sphere	  a	  part	  of	  civil	   society.	  The	  central	   reason	   for	   that	   is	  his	  under-­‐standing	   of	   the	   term	   “civil”	   in	   civil	   society:	   "civil	   refers	   simply	   to	   the	   bonds	   and	  allegiances	   that	   arise	   through	   sustained,	   voluntary,	   noncommercial	   interaction"	  (Wapner	  2000:	  266).	  This	  definition	  demarcates	  civil	   society	  against	  both	  state	  and	  market,	   as	   activities	   that	   are	   part	   of	   the	   governmental	   realm	   cannot	   be	   considered	  civil	   in	   this	   sense	   as	   “they	   follow	   preordained	   patterns	   emanating	   from	   official	  authority”	  while	   activities	   associated	  with	   economic	   interactions	   are	  not	   civil	   given	  their	   nature	   as	   being	   “purely	   instrumental	   [for]	   […]	   enhancing	   monetary	   gain”	  (Wapner	  2000:	  266).	  Having	  so	  established	  the	  boundaries	  of	  global	  civil	  society,	  the	  advantages	  of	  the	  concept	  understood	  as	  being	  in	  opposition	  to	  both	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market	  become	  clear:	  	  Global	  civil	  society,	  as	  a	  transnational	  domain	  in	  which	  people	  form	  relationships	  and	  develop	  elements	  of	  identity	  outside	  their	  role	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  	   The	  “operating	  system”	  terminology	  is	  a	  metaphor	  that	  is	  explicitly	  borrowed	  from	  the	  computer	  world.	   Just	   like	  a	  computer	  operating	  system	  enables	  and	   limits	   the	  sort	  of	   functions	   that	  hard-­‐ware	  and	  software	  can	  offer	  and	  the	  interactions	  between	  individual	  programs	  or	  peripherals,	  an	  “operating	  system”	  of	  shared	  norms	  enables	  and	  limits	  the	  sort	  of	  interactions	  that	  can	  legitimate-­‐ly	  happen.	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  a	   citizen	  of	   a	   particular	   state,	   represents	   a	   sphere	   that	   thus	   trans-­‐cends	  the	  self-­‐regarding	  character	  of	  the	  state	  system	  and	  can	  work	  in	  the	  service	  of	  a	  genuinely	  transnational,	  public	  interest.	  […]	  Aside	  from	  developing	  an	  identity	  outside	  one's	  role	  of	  a	  citizen	  of	  a	  par-­‐ticular	  state,	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  also	  a	  sphere	  in	  which	  one	  thinks	  and	  acts	  independently	  of	  one's	  role	  as	  a	  consumer	  and	  producer.	  It	  thus	  represents	  a	  sphere	  of	  collective	  life	  that	  is	  free	  from	  the	  struc-­‐tural	  impediments	  not	  only	  of	  the	  state	  system	  but	  also	  of	  the	  world	  economy.	  	   (Wapner	  2000:	  261)	  According	   to	   Kaldor’s	   analysis,	   too,	   the	   economy	   is	   not	   part	   of	   global	   civil	   society.	  Among	  the	  five	  versions	  of	  the	  concept	  “civil	  society”	  previously	  discussed,	  only	  the	  three	  contemporary	  versions	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  global	   civil	   society.	   Since	   all	   of	   these	   versions	   exclude	   the	   economic	   sphere,	   global	  civil	   society	   understood	   in	   this	   way	   would	   accordingly	   also	   exclude	   the	   economic	  sphere.	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   her	   different	   interpretation	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   version	  compared	  to	  Cohen	  and	  Arato.	  While	  the	  latter	  equate	  the	  Hegelian	  understanding	  of	  civil	   society	   as	   Bürgerliche	   Gesellschaft	   with	   the	   neoliberal	   account	   (and	   thus	  conclude	   that	   the	  neoliberal	  account	  would	   include	   the	  economic	  sphere	  within	   the	  scope	  of	  civil	  society),	  Kaldor	  differentiates	  between	  the	  two	  and	  conceptualises	  the	  neoliberal	   version	   as	   one	   that	   is	   closely	   related	   to	  Western	  market	   liberalism,	   but	  which	  is	  not	  inhabited	  by	  economic	  actors	  themselves	  but	  rather	  “third	  sector”	  non-­‐profit	   organisations	   which	   fulfil	   the	   function	   of	   “smoothing	   the	   path	   of	   economic	  globalization.”	  
Her	  suggestion,	  that	  “for	  civil	  society	  to	  exist	  there	  has	  to	  be	  a	  relationship	  with	  markets,	   which	   secure	   economic	   autonomy,	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   which	   provides	  security”	  (Kaldor	  2003:	  11),	  provides	  for	  an	  interesting	  dynamic	  between	  the	  “three	  forces”	  of	  state,	  market	  and	  civil	  society.	  In	  this	  context	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  Cohen	   and	  Arato’s	   reminder	   that	   an	   adequate	   analysis	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  market	  economy	  and	  civil	  society	  “is	  a	  precondition	  for	  any	  really	  serious	  conceptual	  alternative	   to	   the	  dangers	  of	  economic	   liberalism	  and	   the	   false	  promises	  of	  utopian	  socialism”	  (Cohen	  and	  Arato	  1992:	  77).	  In	  their	  view,	  civil	  society	  is	  “a	  program	  that	  seeks	   to	   represent	   the	   values	   and	   interests	   of	   social	   autonomy	   in	   face	   of	   both	   the	  modern	  state	  and	  the	  capitalist	  economy”	  (Cohen	  and	  Arato	  1992:	  30)	  and	  is	  in	  this	  way	  different	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  the	  wider	  project	  of	  “society	  against	  the	  state,”	   in	  particular	   the	   antimodern	   stream	   that	  wishes	   to	   return	   to	   a	   time	  before	   the	   estab-­‐
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  lishment	   of	   the	  modern	   state	   itself	   and	   the	   procapitalist	   stream,	   in	  which	   “various	  neoconservative,	   neoliberal,	   and	   libertarian	   initiatives	   (rarely	  movements,	   but	  with	  significant	  force	  behind	  them)”	  (Cohen	  and	  Arato	  1992:	  30)	  attempt	  to	  return	  to	  the	  “already	  failed”	  experiment	  of	  unregulated	  capitalist	  market	  economy.	  The	  main	  aim	  then,	  of	  this	  third	  stream	  of	  civil	  society	  is	  both	  the	  defence	  and	  further	  democratisa-­‐tion	   of	   civil	   society	   by	   connecting	   the	   concept	   of	   civil	   society	   with	   the	   idea	   of	  discourse	   ethics	   with	   its	   strong	   democratic	   values	   of	   equal	   participation	   in	   the	  formulation	  of	  political	  norms.	  
An	   interesting	  perspective	  on	   the	  dynamic	  between	   the	   governmental,	   the	   eco-­‐nomic	   and	   the	   non-­‐governmental,	   non-­‐economic	   realms	   can	   be	   developed	   from	  Polanyi’s	  historical	  description	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  modern	  state19.	  According	  to	  Polanyi,	  the	  emerging	  capitalist	  forces	  that	  promoted	  unregulated	  market	  economy	  were	  a	  driving	  force	  during	  the	  emancipation	  of	  the	  liberal	  state	  from	  absolutist	  rule	  during	   the	   19th	   century	   and	  were,	   in	   fact,	   claimed	   to	   be	   largely	   identical	  with	   this	  project	   of	   liberal	   governance.	  However,	   during	   the	   late	   19th	   and	  much	   of	   the	   20th	  century,	   other	   political	   forces	   challenged	   and	   resisted	   the	   increasingly	   obvious	  socially	   and	   environmentally	   destructive	   tendencies	   of	   an	   unregulated	   capitalist	  market	   economy.	   These	   forces	  were	   emergent	   political	   elites,	   who	  were	   no	   longer	  merely	   representing	   the	  goals	  and	   logic	  of	   the	  economic	   realm	  but	   rather	   the	  goals	  and	  logic	  of	  the	  liberal	  state	  project	  itself	  and	  thus	  were	  able	  to	  successfully	  claim	  to	  be	   representing	   the	   interests	   of	   broader	   and	  more	   heterogeneous	   social	   groups.	   A	  result	  of	  this	  reversal	  is	  the	  transformation	  of	  capitalism	  into	  welfare	  state	  capitalism	  with	   all	   its	   attempts	   to	   reconcile	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   capitalist	   economy	   with	   the	  interests	   of	   the	   general	   public	   to	   be	   protected	   from	   its	   most	   destructive	   effects	  through	   a	   series	   of	   worker	   protection	   measures,	   market	   regulation,	   welfare	   state	  institutions	  and	  so	  forth.	  Thus	  the	  state	  can	  be	  seen	  (at	  least	  at	  the	  historical	  juncture	  described	  here)	  as	  a	  mediating	  force	  between	  the	  economic	  and	  non-­‐economic	  realms	  with	  both	  sides	  attempting	  to	   influence	  it	   in	  their	   interest.	  Considering	  the	  dynamic	  between	   the	   “three	   forces”	   in	   this	   manner,	   illustrates	   in	   yet	   another	   way	   how	   the	  economic	  and	  non-­‐economic	  spheres	  of	  the	  private	  realm	  are	  located	  in	  fundamental-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	   This	  summary	  of	  Polanyi’s	  history	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  is	  mainly	  owed	  to	  Cohen	  and	  Arato’s	  (1992:	  29)	  account	  of	  his	  writing.	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  ly	  different	  positions	  and	  with	  fundamentally	  different	  objectives	  that	  position	  them	  as	  adversaries	  against	  each	  other,	  rather	  than	  as	  each	  one	  of	  them	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  state.	  
In	   addition	   to	   these	   theoretical	   considerations	   regarding	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	  sphere	  of	  economics	  into	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society,	  there	  are	  more	  practical	  aspects	  of	  demarcation.	  For	  example,	  under	  an	  understanding	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  sphere	  that	  should	   exclude	   the	   economy,	   there	   are	   issues	   of	   deciding	   whether	   a	   given	   type	   of	  collective	   actor	   or	   individual	   organisation	   is	   part	   of	   the	   economy	  or	   the	   so	  defined	  civil	  society.	  This	  is,	   for	  example,	  the	  case	  for	  non-­‐profit	  organisations	  set	  up	  by	  the	  corporate	  sector	  to	  represent	  its	  interests	  in	  fora	  where	  access	  is	  formally	  limited	  to	  non-­‐profit	   organisations	   or	   where	   direct,	   unmediated	   participation	   of	   economic	  interest	   would	   be	   considered	   inappropriate.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   in	   many	   UN	   fora,	  including	   the	   UNFCCC,	   where	   a	   formal	   requirement	   for	   participation	   as	   observer	  organisation	   is	   the	   registration	   as	   a	   non-­‐profit	   organisation	   (UNFCCC	   2006a).	   As	   a	  result,	   non-­‐profit	   business	   front	   groups	   are	   set	   up	   and	   attend	   as	   NGOs	   under	   the	  formal	  label	  “civil	  society”20.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  empirical	  work	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  concerned,	  the	   formal	  distinction	  of	  non-­‐state	   interest	   into	  “constituencies”	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  (cf.	   chapter	   4	   for	  more	   details),	   such	   as	   environmental	   business	   groups,	   is	   used	   to	  demarcate	  the	  principal	  area	  of	  focus	  of	  the	  research:	  while	  some	  attention	  was	  paid	  the	  activities	  of	  other	  constituencies,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  research	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  non-­‐state	   actors	   that	   associated	   themselves	   with	   the	   environmental	   NGO	   constituency	  within	  the	  UNFCCC.	  
Similarly,	   the	   demarcation	   between	   economic	   interest	   and	   the	   non-­‐economic	  sphere	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  define	  decisively	  from	  “the	  other	  side”	  as	  well.	  Here,	  NGOs	  can	  be	  observed	  who	  would	  quite	  clearly	  appear	   to	  belong	  to	   the	  non-­‐economic	  core	  of	  civil	   society,	   yet	   who	   are	   engaging	   in	   their	   own	   economic	   activity.	   As	   an	   example	  consider	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   American	   conservation	   organisation	   The	   Nature	  Conservancy	  in	  the	  carbon	  market	  by	  creating	  its	  own	  carbon	  offsetting	  projects.	  Or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	   Examples	  include	  the	  now	  defunct	  Global	  Climate	  Alliance,	  which	  included	  most	  major	  players	  in	  the	  oil,	  gas	  and	  coal	  industry,	  including	  among	  others	  Exxon	  Mobile,	  Shell	  and	  BP,	  and	  which	  was	  infamously	   active	   in	   particular	   in	   the	   lead	   up	   to	   and	   during	   the	   1997	  Kyoto	   Conference	   of	   the	  UNCCC	   (Leggett	  1999)	  or	   the	   International	  Emissions	  Trading	  Association	   (IETA),	  which	  unites	  corporations	   from	  a	  variety	  of	  polluting	   industries	   and	   financial	   institutions	  with	  an	   interest	   in	  carbon	  markets,	  and	  which	  has	  earned	  the	  distinction	  of	  being	  the	  non-­‐governmental	  group	  with	  the	   largest	   delegation	   at	   the	   2007	  UN	  Climate	   Change	   Conference	   in	  Bali	   (Hardstaff	   2007)	   and	  repeated	  that	  in	  2008	  in	  Poznań	  and	  2009	  in	  Copenhagen.	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  consider	  other	  NGOs	  that	  are	  promoting	  goals	  that	  are	  more	  typically	  associated	  with	  corporate	   interest,	   for	   example	   when	   development	   organisations	   actively	   or	  indirectly	  promote	  development	  agendas	  that	  are	  rooted	  in	  neoliberal	  conceptions	  of	  economy.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   grassroots	   peasants’	   organisation	   that	   sets	   up	   a	  cooperative	   business	   in	   order	   to	   structure	   its	   efforts	   to,	   say,	   operate	   a	   small	   scale	  electricity	   generation	   scheme	   or	   communal	   agricultural	   cooperative,	   would	   strictly	  speaking	   “cross	   over”	   into	   the	   economic	   realm,	   while	   arguably	   still	   primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  theme	  of	  poverty	  relief	  associated	  with	  their	  grassroots	  activism.	  In	  general,	  it	  could	  then	  be	  argued	  that	  any	  efforts	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  situation	  of	   disadvantaged	   populations	   would	   have	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   belonging	   to	   the	  economic	  realm.	  	  
To	   be	   sure,	   both	   cases	   (corporate	   interest	   appearing	   in	   a	   non-­‐profit	   guise	   and	  “genuine”	   non-­‐profits	   concerning	   themselves	   directly	   with	   economic	   issues)	   also	  have	   their	   analogous	   manifestations	   along	   the	   governmental	   –	   non-­‐governmental	  divide.	   In	   a	   similar	   manner	   to	   corporations	   setting	   up	   NGOs	   to	   be	   represented	   at	  international	  fora	  such	  as	  the	  UNFCCC,	  governmental	  bodies	  below	  the	  state	  level,	  i.e.	  cities	  and	  municipalities	  as	  well	  as	  local	  and	  regional	  governments,	  establish	  formally	  non-­‐governmental	  bodies	  to	  be	  admitted	  as	  observers	  to	  the	  fora.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	   the	   largest	  of	   these	  organisations	   is	   called	   “ICLEI	   -­‐	  Local	  Governments	   for	  Sustainability”	   and	   tends	   to	   have	   a	   relatively	   strong	   presence	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	  conferences.	  For	  example,	  Hardstaff	  (2007)	  identifies	  them	  as	  the	  second	  largest	  NGO	  after	  the	  emission	  trading	  lobbyists	  at	  the	  2007	  UN	  Climate	  Change	  Conference	  in	  Bali.	  Similarly,	  there	  are	  a	  great	  number	  of	  NGOs	  (in	  particular	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  foreign	  aid	  and	  development)	  that	  provide	  services	  that	  would	  “traditionally”	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  i.e.	  with	  the	  governmental	  realm.	  
This	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  how	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  economic	  and	  the	  non-­‐economic	   realm	   are	   fuzzy	   and	   continuous	   and	  membership	   vs.	   non-­‐membership	   to	  either	  of	   them	  cannot	   always	  be	  understood	   in	   a	  binary	  manner.	  Particularly	   along	  the	  fuzzy	  divide	  between	  the	  economic	  and	  non-­‐economic	  realm	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  organisations	  that	  belong,	  to	  differing	  degrees,	  to	  both	  of	  these	  spheres.	  Nonethe-­‐less,	   there	   are	   a	   large	   number	   of	   cases	   that	   are	   ideal-­‐typical	   for	   either	   class	   (i.e.	  corporations	  without	  an	  NGO	  guise	  and	  NGOs	  that	  do	  not	  engage	  in	  economic	  activity)	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  and	   therefore	   the	   distinction	   between	   economic	   and	   non-­‐economic	   can	   be	   used	   to	  define	   the	   scope	   of	   civil	   society	   although	   one	   has	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   at	   the	  periphery	   of	   that	   so	   defined	   civil	   society	   there	   will	   be	   cases	   whose	   membership	  cannot	  clearly	  be	  established.	  
For	  a	  demarcation	  with	   the	  purpose	  of	  defining	   the	   scope	  of	   civil	   society,	   then,	  the	   primary	   concern	   of	   a	   class	   of	   collective	   actors	   should	   be	   considered	   central	   to	  illustrate	  the	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  the	  “three	  forces.”	   In	  this	  context,	   the	  primary	   purpose	   of	   the	   governmental	   realm	   could	   be	   considered	   to	   be,	   as	   Charles	  Tilly	   suggests,	   defence:	   “governments	   are	   in	   the	   business	   of	   selling	   protection	   ...	  whether	   people	   want	   it	   or	   not”	   (Tilly	   cit.	   in	   Lipschutz	   1992:	   407),	   which	   includes	  defence	  against	  external	  threads	  but	  also,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  protection	  from	   internal	   forces	   and	   some	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   being	   in	   socially	   disadvantaged	  situations.	   In	   the	   economic	   realm,	   the	  main	   concern	   is	   with	   profit	   making	   and,	   by	  extension,	  the	  concern	  with	  creating	  and/or	  preserving	  conditions	  that	  are	  beneficial	  for	  continuously	  being	  able	  to	  make	  profits21.	  
In	  contrast,	  civil	  society	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  “a	  program	  that	  seeks	  to	  represent	  the	  values	  and	  interests	  of	  social	  autonomy	  in	  face	  of	  both	  the	  modern	  state	  and	  the	  capitalist	  economy”	  and	  which	  is	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  “the	  idea	  of	  the	  defense	  and	  the	  democratization	  of	  civil	  society”	  (Cohen	  and	  Arato	  1992:	  30,	  original	  emphasis).	  Civil	  society,	  so	  perceived,	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  	  a	  societal	  realm	  different	  from	  the	  state	  and	  the	  economy	  and	  hav-­‐ing	   the	   following	   components:	   (1)	   Plurality:	   families,	   informal	  groups,	   and	   voluntary	   associations	  whose	   plurality	   and	   autonomy	  allows	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  forms	  of	  life;	  (2)	  Publicity:	  institutions	  of	  cul-­‐ture	   and	   communication;	   (3)	   Privacy:	   a	   domain	   of	   individual	   self-­‐development	  and	  moral	  choice;	  and	  (4)	  Legality:	  structures	  of	  gen-­‐eral	   laws	   and	   basic	   rights	   needed	   to	   demarcate	   plurality,	   privacy,	  and	  publicity	  from	  at	  least	  the	  state	  and,	  tendentially,	  the	  economy.	  Together,	   these	   structures	   secure	   the	   institutional	   existence	   of	   a	  modern	  differentiated	  civil	  society.	   (Cohen	  and	  Arato	  1992:	  346)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  	   Also	  note	   the	  different	   time	  scales	  under	  consideration	  by	  the	  different	  actors	  which	  add	  to	   the	  notion	   that	   these	   classes	   of	   actors	   act	   under	   fundamentally	   different	   logic:	  while	   the	   economic	  sub-­‐system	  of	  a	  society	  is	  said	  to	  be	  motivated	  by	  the	  profit-­‐making	  and	  risk-­‐reducing	  considera-­‐tions	  and	  operating	  on	  a	  time	  scale	  of	  fractions	  of	  one	  up	  to	  few	  years,	  the	  political	  sub-­‐system	  is	  motivated	   by	   power	   and	   subject	   to	   a	   time	   horizon	   of	   the	   electoral	   cycle,	   while	   civil	   society	   is	  concerned	  with	  moral	   and	   ethic	   rightness	   on	   a	  much	   longer	   time	   horizon	   that	   includes	   future	  generations	  (Harmeling	  2008).	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  a	  global	  or	  transnational	  civil	  society,	  then,	  a	  fifth	  criterion	  would	  need	  to	  be	  added:	  (5)	  Transboundary	  Connectedness:	  which	  expands	  the	  original	  four	  criteria	  beyond	   territorial	   bounds:	  plurality	  by	   including	  a	   variety	  of	   forms	  of	   associational	  life	   from	   all	   (global)	   or	  many	   (transnational)	   geographical	   loci;	   publicity	   by	   having	  established	  institutions	  of	  communication	  and	  culture	  that	   link	  these	  geographically	  diverse	  forms	  of	  associational	  life;	  privacy	  by	  embracing	  considerations	  for	  others	  in	  distant	   locations	   (both,	   geographically	   and	   culturally)	   in	   one’s	   own	  moral	   choices;	  and	  legality	  by	  requiring	  a	  set	  of	  international	  (in	  addition	  to,	  not	  replacing	  those	  on	  the	   national	   level)	   legal	   and	   moral	   norms	   and	   institutions	   to	   protect	   these	   other	  elements	  of	  global	  or	  transnational	  civil	  society.	  
2.3 Social	  Movements	  
Since	   this	   research	   focuses	   on	   parts	   of	   the	   environmental	   movement,	   which	   is	  routinely	   considered	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   “new	   social	   movements”	   given	   its	   focus	   on	  “post-­‐materialist”	   concerns	   and	   also	   because	   social	   movements	   have	   been	   widely	  identified	   as	   key	   forces	   in	   generating	   and	   constituting	   global	   civil	   society,	   it	   is	  appropriate	  to	  briefly	  explore	  the	  notion	  and	  concept	  of	  “new	  social	  movement”	  (NSM)	  and	   to	   differentiate	   the	   NSM	   theories	   from	   other	   theories	   that	   deal	   with	   social	  movements.	  
Summaries	   of	   the	  main	   strands	   of	   social	   movement	   theory	   usually	   distinguish	  between	  Resource	  Mobilisation	  Theories	  (RMT)	  and	  NSM	  theories	  (e.g.	  McNeish	  1999)	  while	   some	   authors	   also	   include	   the	   “Collective	   Behaviour”	   and	   “Political	   Process”	  perspectives	  (Diani	  1992)	  with	  the	  latter	  sometimes	  named	  after	  its	  central	  concept	  “political	  opportunity	  structure”	  (POS)	  (Edelman	  2001;	  Mamadouh	  2004).	  
Typically,	  NSM	  theories	  are	  associated	  with	  European	  writers	  such	  as	  Alain	  Tou-­‐raine	  and	  Alberto	  Melucci	  while	   the	  other	   three	   strands	  are	  mainly	   represented	  by	  American	  scholars	  (e.g.	  Jenkins	  1983;	  Zald	  1992;	  McCarthy	  and	  Zald	  1977;	  Tilly	  1985).	  The	   geographical	   concentration	   of	   proponents	   of	   either	   theory	   appears	   so	  marked	  that	  some	  feel	   inclined	  to	  speak	  of	  “European”	  and	  “American”	  approaches	  to	  social	  movement	   research	   (Klandermans	   and	   Tarrow	   cit.	   in	   Diani	   1992:	   3)	   while	   others	  identify	  an	  “Atlantic	  divide”	  in	  social	  movement	  theory	  (McNeish	  1999:	  47).	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  However,	  according	  to	  Mario	  Diani	  all	  four	  main	  strands	  exhibit	  a	  number	  of	  common	  features	   that	  he	   forges	   into	   this	  “consensual”	  definition,	  despite	  acknowledging	  that	  some	   of	   the	   authors	   discussed	   might	   disagree	   with	   some	   of	   his	   interpretations	   of	  their	  work:	  
A	  social	  movement	  is	  a	  network	  of	  informal	  interactions	  between	  a	  plurality	  of	  individuals,	  groups	  and/or	  organizations,	  engaged	  in	  po-­‐litical	  or	  cultural	  conflict,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  shared	  collective	  identity.	  	   (Diani	  1992:	  3)	  	  This	  definition	  is	  quite	  a	  useful	  device	  for	  thinking	  about	  social	  movements	  and	  thus	  it	   is	  worth	   considering	   its	   three	  main	   elements	   and	   their	   relationship	   to	   the	   afore-­‐mentioned	   four	   main	   areas	   of	   social	   movement	   theory.	   The	   first	   element	   of	   this	  definition	   is	   the	   characterisation	   of	   social	   movements	   as	   “networks	   of	   informal	  interactions”	  involving	  “individuals,	  groups	  and/or	  organizations.”	  Despite	  intending	  to	  present	  a	  consensual	  definition,	  the	  main	  social	  movement	  theories	  agree	  to	  quite	  differing	   degrees	   with	   this	   aspect.	   For	   example,	   the	   focus	   of	   RMT	   on	   the	   ways	   in	  which	   social	   movement	   mobilisation	   occurs	   places	   a	   large	   emphasis	   on	   the	   im-­‐portance	   of	   strong	   organisations	   with	   skilled	   leaders.	   In	   fact,	   the	   presence	   of	  organisations	  is	  arguably	  a	  necessary	  condition	  in	  what	  is	  called	  the	  “micro	  mobilisa-­‐tion	  contexts”	  (Tarrow	  1994)	  within	  RMT.	  Hence,	  RM	  theorists	  might	  disagree	  with	  the	  implicit	  claim	  of	  Diani’s	  definition	  that	  social	  movements	  could	  exist	  without	  any	  formal	   organisations	   involved.	   In	   contrast,	   collective	   behaviour	   theorists	   stress	   the	  difference	   between	   social	   movement	   and	   social	   movement	   organisation	   (SMO)	  despite	   acknowledging	   that	   the	   latter	   “carry	   out	  much	   of	   the	  movement	  work	   and	  frequently	   attempt	   to	   […]	   speak	   for	   the	  movement”	   (Turner	   1981:	   5).	   In	   the	   early	  NSM	   theory	   of	   Alain	   Touraine,	   social	   movements	   represent	   the	   organised	   and	  collective	   struggle	   of	   a	   “class	   actor”	   (Touraine	   1981:	   77;	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	  Touraine	   employs	   a	   rather	   broad	   class	   concept),	   with	   no	   particular	   reference	   to	  whether	  or	  not	   the	   internal	   structure	  of	   this	   collective	   actor	  would	  be	   “individuals,	  groups	  and/or	  organizations”22.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Touraine	  did	  not	  explicitly	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  NSM	  in	  his	  early	  work,	  but	  has	  rather	  been	  grouped	  together	  with	  Melucci	  as	  an	  NSM	  theorist	  in	  subsequent	  discussions	  of	   his	   work	   due	   to	   the	   characteristics	   his	   analysis	   shares	  with	  Melucci’s	   approach	   (cf.	   Delanty	  1999).	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   to	   Diani’s	   characterisation	   of	   social	   movements	   as	   networks	   of	   “informal	  interactions”	   it	   again	   appears	   questionable	   if	   RM	   theorists	   with	   their	   emphasis	   on	  organisation	   and	   skilled	   leaders,	   with	   the	   latter	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   “movement	  entrepreneurs”	   (McCarthy	   and	   Zald	   1977),	   would	   agree	   with	   identifying	   the	  interactions	  within	   the	  movement	   as	  primarily	   informal.	   Similar	  might	  hold	   for	   the	  Collective	   Behaviour	   approach	   which,	   although	   conceiving	   of	   social	   movements	   as	  contrasted	   to	   “organisational”	   and	   “institutional”	   behaviour,	   stresses	   that	   this	   does	  not	  equate	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  organisation	  (Diani	  1992:	  4).	  
Although	  all	   four	  main	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  social	  movements	  contain	  some	  notion	  of	  conflict,	  the	  degree	  of	  conflict	  differs	  strongly	  between	  them,	  the	  strongest	  variant	  of	  conflict	  probably	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Melucci’s	  definition	  of	  social	  movement	   as	   taking	   conflict	   so	   far	   that	   it	   “breaks	   the	   limits	   of	   compatibility	   of	   the	  system	   that	   it	   can	   tolerate	   without	   altering	   its	   structure”	   (Melucci	   1989:	   29).	   This	  view	   of	   a	   conflict	   that	   can	   only	   be	   resolved	   by	   “wholesale	   social	   transformation”	  (McNeish	   1999:	   92)	   is	   a	   general	   feature	   of	   New	   Social	   Movement	   theories.	   Thus	  Touraine	   reserves	   the	   term	   “social	   movement”	   only	   for	   those	  movements	   that	   are	  dealing	  with	  the	  central	  conflict	  over	  the	  “social	  control	  of	  the	  main	  cultural	  patterns”	  (Touraine	   1985:	   754,	   original	   emphasis),	   which	   principally	   is	   the	   endless	   conflict	  between	   the	   “masses”	   or	   “people”	   and	   the	   elites23.	   All	   other	   types	   of	   conflicts	   that	  might	   occur	   are	   sub-­‐types	   of	   this	   conflict	   and	   do	   not	   (at	   least	   in	   Touraine’s	   own	  writing)	  merit	  the	  term	  social	  movement.	  
The	  social	  movements	  as	  described	  by	  the	  “American”	  approaches	  do	  not	  neces-­‐sarily	   aim	   for	   a	   complete	   change	   of	   all	   aspects	   of	   society:	   although	   Collective	  Behaviour	   theorists,	   for	   example,	   acknowledge	   that	   social	  movements	   “promote	   or	  resist	  a	  change	  in	  the	  society”	  (Turner	  and	  Killian	  1987	  cit.	  in	  Diani	  1992:	  4),	  they	  do	  not	   explicitly	   suggest	   that	   this	   change	   necessitates	   a	   “wholesale	   transformation”	   of	  the	  society.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Tilly’s	  definition	  of	  social	  movement	  mainly	  emphasises	  their	   function	   “to	   speak	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   constituency	   lacking	   formal	   representation”	  (Tilly	   1984	   cit.	   in	   Diani	   1992:	   5).	   In	   RMT,	   finally,	   the	   type	   of	   change	   that	   social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	   emphasis	   of	  Touraine’s	   later	   analysis	   (e.g.,	   notably,	   Touraine	  2000)	  shifted	  somewhat	  away	   from	  his	  earlier	  work	  as	  described	  here.	  The	  discussion	  here,	  however,	  was	  limited	  to	  this	  early	  work	  as	  it	  had	  been	  very	  influential	  for	  the	  social	  movement	  literature	  of	  the	  late	  20th	  century.	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  movements	  are	  said	  to	  aim	  for	   is	  not	  about	  changing	  the	  whole	  system	  but	  “merely	  [about]	  aiming	  for	  inclusion	  so	  as	  to	  participate	  more	  fully	  [and]	  do	  not	  however	  pose	  a	   challenge	   to	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   liberal	   democratic	   political	   system”	   (McNeish	  1999:	  54).	  
An	   important	   feature	  of	   the	  definition	  above	   is	   the	  mentioning	  of	  both	  political	  and	   cultural	   conflict.	  As	  with	   conflict	   in	   general,	   the	   four	   approaches	  differ	   in	   their	  respective	  emphasis	  on	  cultural	  over	  political	  conflict.	  While	  the	  “American”	  theories	  mainly	   stress	   the	   political	   facet,	   the	   NSM	   theorists	   place	   great	   emphasis	   on	   the	  cultural	   aspect,	   with	   both	   sometimes	  merging	   into	   an	   interdependent	   relation:	   for	  Touraine,	   for	   example,	   the	   fundamental	   struggle	   of	   social	   movements	   is	   first	   and	  foremost	  about	  the	  “social	  control	  of	  the	  main	  cultural	  pattern”	  (Touraine	  1985:	  760)	  which	  has	   in	   turn	  political	   implications.	  Besides	  political	  struggle,	  Melucci	   identifies	  cultural	  (re-­‐)production	  as	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  social	  movements.	  Besides	  –	  as	  the	  name	   suggests	   –	   being	   important	   for	  maintaining	   the	   latent	   structure	   of	   the	  move-­‐ment	   between	   periods	   of	   political	   activity,	   latency	   “allows	   people	   to	   experience	  directly	   new	   cultural	   models	   …	   which	   are	   often	   opposed	   to	   the	   dominant	   social	  codes	  …	  [and]	  makes	  individuals	  practice	  them”	  (Melucci	  1985:	  800).	  In	  the	  contem-­‐porary	  environmental	  movement	  in	  Britain	  this	  would	  be,	   for	  example,	  the	  CRAGs	  –	  Carbon	  Rationing	  Action	  Groups	  –	  whose	  members,	  besides	  typically	  being	  involved	  in	   campaigns	   to	   promote	   the	   idea	   of	   carbon	   rationing	   as	   a	  means	   to	   overcome	   the	  perceived	   crisis,	   live	   the	   proposed	   rationing	   scheme	   within	   their	   group	   including	  rewards	  and	  penalties	  for	  members	  who	  under-­‐	  or	  over-­‐emit	  respectively	  (CRAGs	  UK	  2006).	  
It	   has	   been	   established	   above	   that	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   think	   of	   social	  movements	   as	  “networks	   of	   …	   individuals,	   groups	   and/or	   organizations.”	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  organisation	  differs	  between	  specific	  movements	  in	   different	   localities	   and	   points	   in	   time.	   For	   the	   environmental	   movement,	   for	  example,	   this	   can	   be	   illustrated	   by	   the	   emergence	   over	   time	   of	   Green	   parties	   from	  within	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  growth	  (in	  size	  and	  numbers)	  of	  environmental	  NGOs.	  It	   can,	   thus,	   be	   argued	   that	   NGOs	   play	   a	   particular	   role	   in	   social	   movements	   for	  different	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  is	  often	  not	  easy	  to	  establish	  whether	  specific	  NGOs	  belong	  to	  a	  social	  movement,	  since	  often	  NGOs	  fulfil	  a	  dual	  role	  as	  agents	  of	  social	  change	  and	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  welfare	  service	  providers.	  Second,	  however,	  especially	  in	  areas	  where	  social	  change	  is	  sought	  using	  (solely	  or	  additionally)	  “conventional”	  political	  practices,	  NGOs	  have	  an	  advantage	   over	   other	   social	   movement	   actors	   in	   gaining	   institutional	   access	   to	  decision-­‐making	   in	   certain	   governmental	   or	   inter-­‐governmental	   settings.	   So,	   for	  example,	   “being	   a	   formal	   organisation”	   and	   having	   non-­‐profit	   or	   tax-­‐exempt	   status	  are	  criteria	   for	   the	  access	  as	  observers	   to	   the	  negotiations	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  (UNFCCC	  2006a),	  a	  rule	  which	  favours	  formally	  established	  NGOs	  over	  informal	  groups	  or	  loose	  associations	  of	  individual	  activists.	  
Having	  this	  particular	  role	  makes	  NGOs	  that	  are	  part	  of	  social	  movements	  (sub-­‐sequently	   the	   term	  SMO	  –	  Social	  Movement	  Organisation	  –	  will	   be	   applied	   to	   these	  organisations	   to	   distinguish	   from	   other	   types	   of	   NGOs)	   an	   important	   focus	   for	  research:	   the	   fact	   that	   SMOs	   have	   some	   access	   to	   decision	  making	   institutions	   and	  thus	  have	  some	  opportunity	  to	  represent	  movement	  interests	  in	  these	  settings,	  serves	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  other	  actors	  within	  the	  movement	  to	  influence	  the	  SMOs’	  positions,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  SMOs	  are	  prone	  to	  be	  utilised	  by	  governments	  to	   influence	  the	  movement	  as	  it	  has,	  for	  example,	  been	  noted	  before	  that	  “NGO	  networks	  […]	  have	  an	   extraordinary	   capacity	   to	   absorb	   and	   tame	   challenges	   from	   the	   radical	   left”	  (DeMars	  2005:	  37,	  emphasis	  added).	  
In	  his	  structural	  theory	  of	  NGOs,	  DeMars	  (2005)	  points	  to	  a	  number	  of	  important	  aspects	  that	  research	  on	  NGOs	  should	  take	  into	  account.	  In	  thinking	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  NGOs,	   for	  example,	  he	  defines	   them	  as	   “private	  actors	  pursuing	  public	  purposes”	  (DeMars	   2005:	   41)	   and	   claiming	   to	   have	   the	   normative	   mandate	   to	   represent	   a	  certain	  constituency.	  Further,	  he	  points	  towards	  GONGOs	  and	  BONGOs	  –	  government-­‐	  and	  business-­‐organised	  NGOs	  respectively	  –	   that	  use	   the	  mask	  of	  an	  NGO	   to	   falsely	  make	  those	  representative	  claims.	  
A	  more	  substantial	  part	  of	   the	  structural	   theory	  deals	  with	  networking	  of	  NGOs	  and	  the	   latent	  agendas	  of	  partners	   that	  become	  attached	  to	   the	  organisation	  during	  the	  networking.	  Networking	  partners	  are	  as	  diverse	  as	  other	  NGOs,	  UN	  organisations,	  businesses	   and	   governments	   but	   might	   also	   include	   rivalling	   warlords	   or	   private	  security	   companies,	   in	   the	   case,	   for	   example,	   of	   humanitarian	   organisations	   in	  war	  zones.	  Through	  this	  partnering,	  the	  latent	  agendas	  of	  the	  partners	  become	  attached	  to	  NGO	   operations,	   making	   “[e]ach	  NGO	  …	   an	   institutional	   site	   of	   dynamic	   cooperation	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and	  conflict	  among	  its	  partners”	  (DeMars	  2005:	  45,	  original	  emphasis)	  and	  necessitat-­‐ing	  the	  negotiation	  within	  the	  NGO	  of	   this	  multitude	  of	  potentially	  conflicting	   latent	  agendas	   and	  while	   preserving	   its	   own	   salient	   agenda.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   aforemen-­‐tioned	   SMOs	   at	   the	   interface	   between	   social	   movement	   and	   governmental	   or	  intergovernmental	  decision-­‐making	  institutions,	  this	  notion	  can	  be	  utilised	  to	  explore	  the	   tension	   between	   the	   latent	   agendas	   that	   allies	   in	   both	  movement	   and	   govern-­‐ments	  attach	  to	  the	  organisation.	  
2.4 Public	  Sphere	  
Related	  to	  the	  previously	  discussed	  concepts	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  social	  movement	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  which	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  following	  section.	  As	  we	  shall	   see,	   one	   of	   the	  main	   functions	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   is	   the	   formation	   of	   public	  opinion	   geared	   at	   influencing	   decision	  making	   by	   state	   power	   and	   it	   thus	   overlaps	  partially	   with	   the	   notions	   employed	   above	   when	   explicating	   the	   meaning	   of	   civil	  society.	   In	   fact,	   the	   relationship	  between	  public	   sphere	  and	  civil	   society	   is	  not	   seen	  consistently	  between	  theorists.	  Jürgen	  Habermas	  (1989),	  for	  example,	  when	  speaking	  about	  civil	  society	  points	  out	  that	  activities	  within	  civil	  society	  map	  onto	  two	  different	  spheres:	   the	   public	   sphere	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   the	   private	   sphere	   of	   civil	   society,	  whereby	  the	  former	  refers	  mainly	  to	  the	  political	  public	  sphere	  wherein	  the	  political	  activity	   of	   civil	   society	   takes	   place24	  and	   the	   latter	   refers	   to	   the	   private	   sphere	   of	  economic	  activity	  (the	  market)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  “intimate”	  sphere	  of	   the	   family,	  which	  represents	   the	   core	   of	   the	   private	   sphere	   of	   civil	   society.	   Hence,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  Habermas	  originally	  uses	  the	  term	  “civil	  society”	  in	  a	  fashion	  that	  is	  different	  from	  the	  one	  favoured	  above	  and	  explicitly	  includes	  both	  the	  economic	  realm	  and	  family	  life	  of	  the	   private	   sphere	   and	   is	   principally	   defined	   by	   being	   “contrasted	   with	   public	  authority	  or	  government	  as	  a	  sphere	  that	   is	  private	   in	  its	  entirety”	  (Habermas	  1992:	  433,	  original	  emphasis).	  
In	  later	  reflections	  on	  his	  original	  work,	  he	  refers	  to	  “the	  now	  current	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘civil	  society,’	  which	  no	  longer	  includes	  a	  sphere	  of	  an	  economy	  regulated	  via	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  	   Since	  Habermas,	   as	  we	   shall	   see,	   traces	   the	   development	   of	   a	   political	   public	   sphere	   back	   to	   a	  literary	   public	   sphere	   (or	   a	   “public	   sphere	   of	   letters”),	   the	   public	   sphere	   of	   civil	   society	   also	  includes	  this	  type	  of	  public	  sphere.	  However,	  since	  the	  political	  public	  sphere	  (as	  the	  locus	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  political	  public	  opinion)	  is	  of	  greater	  relevance	  here,	  this	  aspect	  can	  be	  omitted.	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  labor,	  capital,	  and	  commodity	  markets”	  but	  rather	  “is	  constituted	  by	  voluntary	  unions	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  economy”	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  “opinion-­‐forming	  associations”	  (Habermas	  1992:	  454)	  –	  in	  other	  words	  institutional	  actors	  engaged	  in	  what,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  core	  functions	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
Elsewhere,	   John	   Downey	   and	   Natalie	   Fenton	   suggest	   another	   relationship	   be-­‐tween	  the	  concepts	  of	  public	  sphere	  and	  civil	  society:	  according	  to	  their	  understand-­‐ing,	  civil	  society	  is	  the	  “mediating	  space	  between	  the	  private	  and	  public	  spheres	  in	  a	  pluralist	  democracy,”	   translating	   the	   “individual	  passion”	  of	  private	   individuals	   into	  “public	  concerns”	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  (2003:	  190),	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  public	  opinion.	  Mary	  Kaldor,	  restating	  her	  own	  definition	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  “the	  medium	  through	  which	   individuals	  negotiate	  and	  struggle	   for	  a	  social	  contract	  with	  the	  centres	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  authority”	   (2007:	  299)	  notes	   that	  civil	   society	  thus	  understood	  is	  very	  close	  in	  meaning	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  public	  sphere	  but	  places	  a	  stronger	  emphasis	  on	  the	  agency	  of	  the	   individual	  and	  that	  both	  have	  changed	  over	  time	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  composition,	  exclusions,	  the	  specific	  “centre	  of	  authority”	  they	  are	  targeted	  at	  and	  so	  forth.	  At	  any	  rate,	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  sphere	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  that	  of	  civil	  society,	  being	  conceptualised,	  for	  example,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  enabled	  to	  influence	  policy	  making,	  and	  thus	  deserves	  more	  detailed	  discussion.	  
2.4.1 Habermas	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere	  
As	  mentioned,	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  most	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  work	  of	   Jürgen	   Habermas.	   A	   central	   part	   of	   his	   work	   on	   the	   theory	   of	   democracy	   and	  related	   to	  his	  ambition	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  completion	  of	   the	  project	  of	  modernity,	  which	  was	   begun	   in	   the	   Enlightenment	   (Lechte	   2008:	   243;	   cf.	   also	   Staats	   2004	   on	  Habermas’	  concept	  of	   “discourse	   theory”	  as	  a	  comprehensive	   theory	  of	  democracy),	  his	  inquiries	  into	  the	  public	  sphere	  as	  a	  category	  of	  bourgeois	  society	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  useful	   starting	   point,	   but	   due	   to	   their	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   restriction	   to	   the	  bourgeois	  society	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  they	  must	  be	  read	  in	  association	  with	  his	  later	  work	  as	  well	  as	  related	  work	  of	  his	  critics.	  It	  is	  worthwhile	  pointing	  out	  that	  some	  of	  the	   criticism	  might	  be	   related	   to	   the	   timing	  of	   the	  English	   translation	  of	  Habermas’	  major	  work	  on	  the	  public	  sphere	  (Habermas	  1989),	  which	  was	  published	  nearly	  three	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  decades	   after	   the	   original	   German	   version	   first	   appeared	   in	   1962.	   In	   fact,	   one	   year	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  his	  book	  in	  English,	  in	  the	  preface	  to	  the	  1990	  re-­‐issue	  of	  the	  German	  edition,	  Habermas	  already	  addresses	  many	  of	  the	  criticism	  that	  has	  emerged	  between	   the	   first	   publication	   of	   the	   German	   and	   English	   versions	   and	   also	   details	  further	  developments	  of	  his	  thinking	  on	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
In	   his	   early	   book	  The	  Structural	  Transformation	  of	   the	  Public	  Sphere,	   Habermas	  describes	  his	   concept	   of	   the	  public	   sphere	   as	   an	   establishing	   element	   of	   the	   rise	   of	  democracy	  in	  the	  Europe	  of	  the	  18th	  and	  into	  the	  19th	  century.	  His	  main	  interest	  is	  in	  how	  rational-­‐critical	  deliberations	  among	  private	  individuals	  might	  become	  the	  basis	  for	   political	   activity.	   The	   resulting	   conceptualisation	   of	   public	   sphere	   is	   closely	  related	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  male	  bourgeoisie	  of	  that	  time,	  conducting	  frequent	  and	  continuing	   public	   discussions	   which	   were	   concerned	   with	   the	   issues	   of	   the	   time	  including	   the	   development	   of	   democracy	   itself.	   This	   limited	   focus	   on	   the	   public	  discussions	   of	   the	   male	   bourgeois	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   much	   of	   later	   criticism	  (Fraser	  1990;	  Negt	  and	  Kluge	  1972,	  1993),	  but	  has	  enabled	  him	  to	  establish	  an	  ideal-­‐typical	   model	   of	   public	   sphere	   (albeit	   limited	   to	   the	   specific	   time	   of	   the	   late	   18th	  century	  and	  social	  stratum	  of	  the	  male	  bourgeois)	  and	  thus	  enabled	  considerations	  of	  how	   this	   public	   sphere	   might	   have	   transformed	   over	   time	   and	   what	   might	   be	   the	  implications	  of	  this	  transformation	  for	  democracy	  and	  how	  “actually	  existing”	  public	  spheres	  differ	  from	  the	  ideal	  type.	  	  
Somewhat	  in	  Habermas’	  defence,	  Craig	  Calhoun	  reminds	  us	  that	  he	  specifies	  the	  focus	   of	   his	   book	   as	   “bourgeois	   public	   sphere”	   not	   simply	   because	   of	   “the	   class	  composition	  of	  its	  members.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  society	  [i.e.	  society	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  18th	  century	   in	   Europe]	   that	   was	   bourgeois,	   and	   bourgeois	   society	   produced	   a	   certain	  form	  of	  public	  sphere”	  (Calhoun	  1992:	  7).	  In	  either	  case,	  though,	  it	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  that	  Habermas’	  version	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  public	  sphere	  of	  the	  late	  18th	  century	  is	  not	   even	   an	   accurate	   description	   of	   the	   bourgeois	   practice	   of	   that	   time,	   and	   rather	  represents	   a	   romanticised	   version	   of	   the	   actual	   phenomenon	   (e.g.	   Fraser	   1990:	   61	  suggests	   that	   “he	   ends	   up	   idealizing	   the	   liberal	   public	   sphere”),	   but	   as	   a	   heuristic	  device,	  the	  ideal	  type	  can	  still	  be	  considered	  useful.	  He	  has	  also	  been	  criticised	  (e.g.	  by	  Negt	  and	  Kluge	  1993)	   for	   failing	  to	  make	  clear	  the	  distinction	  between	  describing	  a	  generalisable	  ideal-­‐type	  versus	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  a	  bourgeois	  public	  sphere.	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  In	   Habermas’	   ideal-­‐typical	   notion,	   then,	   the	   public	   sphere	   exibits	   three	   main	  characteristics.	   First,	   the	   discussions	   in	   the	   public	   sphere	   are	   conducted	   among	  relative	   peers.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   discussants	   does	   not	   bear	   any	  impact	   on	   the	   discussion	   and	   its	   outcome.	   In	   Habermas’	   words,	   this	   made	   the	  interactions	   in	   the	  public	  sphere	  “a	  kind	  of	  social	   intercourse	  that,	   far	   from	  presup-­‐posing	   the	   equality	   of	   status,	   disregarded	   status	   altogether”	   (1989:	   36).	   The	   status	  disregarded	  here	  did	  not	  only	  refer	  to	  the	  “power	  and	  prestige	  of	  public	  office”	  that	  a	  participant	  might	  possess	  outside	  of	  the	  debate,	  but	  also	  economic	  relationships	  and	  dependencies	   that	  participants	  had	  with	  each	  other	  did	  not	   impact	  on	   the	  delibera-­‐tions,	  so	  that	  in	  the	  end	  “alone	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  better	  argument	  could	  assert	  itself	  […].	  Not	  that	  this	  idea	  of	  the	  public	  was	  actually	  realized	  in	  earnest	  […];	  but	  as	  an	  idea	  it	  had	  become	  institutionalized	  and	  thereby	  stated	  as	  an	  objective	  claim”	  (Habermas	  1989:	   36).	   An	   important	   feature	   of	   this	   ideal-­‐typical	   public	   sphere,	   that	   is	   derived	  from	  this	  characteristic,	  is	  the	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  the	  use	  of	  reason	  as	  the	  dominant	  mode	   of	   deliberation.	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   rational	   quality	   of	   an	   argument	   and	   not	   the	  quality	  (e.g.	  social	  or	  political	  status	  or	  economic	  wealth)	  nor	  quantity	  of	  its	  support-­‐ers	   were	   supposed	   to	   be	   the	   decisive	   component	   of	   opinion	   formation	   within	   the	  sphere.	   In	  Habermas’	  own	  words,	  “[i]ntrinsic	  to	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  public	  opinion	  born	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  better	  argument	  was	  the	  claim	  to	  that	  morally	  pretentious	  rationali-­‐ty	   that	   strove	   to	   discover	   what	   was	   at	   once	   just	   and	   right”	   (Habermas	   1989:	   54).	  Related	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  deliberations	  among	  peers	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  general	  access	  to	   the	   discussions	  within	   the	   public	   sphere.	   Habermas	   takes	   this	   demand	   as	   far	   as	  stating	  that	  a	  “public	  sphere	  from	  which	  specific	  groups	  would	  be	  eo	  ipso	  excluded	  [is]	  less	  than	  merely	  incomplete;	   it	  [is]	  not	  a	  public	  sphere	  at	  all”	  (Habermas	  1989:	  85).	  Specifically,	   this	   notion	   is	   expressed	   in	   what	   was	   later	   called	   the	   “all-­‐affected”	  principle,	  which	  means	  that	  everybody	  who	  might	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  political	  position	  should	  be	  able	  to	  participation	  in	  the	  deliberations	  of	  a	  public	  sphere	  (Fraser	  2008).	  
The	  second	  characteristic	  refers	   to	   the	  content	  of	   the	  deliberations.	  Tracing	   the	  genesis	   of	   the	   bourgeois	   public	   sphere	   from	   literary	   public	   spheres25	  of	   the	   earlier	  18th	   century,	  Habermas	   defines	   the	   type	   of	   content	   under	   discussion	   in	   the	   public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  	   Cf.	   the	   note	   of	   Habermas’	   translator,	   who	   points	   to	   the	   difficulties	   of	   translating	   literarische	  
Öffentlichkeit	  and	  mentions	  the	  two	  phrases	  employed	  as	  approximation:	  “literary	  public	  sphere”	  and	  “public	  sphere	  in	  the	  world	  of	  letters”	  (Habermas	  1989:	  xv).	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  sphere	   as	   relating	   to	   issues	   of	   “common	   concern”	   or	   of	   “common	   interest.”	   In	   the	  beginning,	   these	   issues	   related	   to	   the	   areas	   of	   philosophy,	   literature	   and	   art,	   and	  specifically	   themes	   that	  had	  previously	  been	   the	  exclusive	  domain	  of	   interpretation	  by	   Church	   or	   state	   authority	   since	   they	   were	   elements	   of	   the	   “representative	  publicness”	   (representative	  Öffentlichkeit)	   of	   these	   entities.	  During	   the	   genesis	   from	  literary	   public	   sphere	   to	   political	   public	   sphere,	   this	   set	   of	   topical	   areas	   under	  consideration	  eventually	  expanded	  to	   include	  the	  political	  realm,	  at	  which	  point	  the	  public	   sphere	   could	   continue	   to	  make	  use	   of	   the	   already	   established	   institutions	   of	  relative	  equality	  of	  discussants,	  inclusiveness	  in	  principle,	  the	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  the	  use	  of	  reason	  and	  the	  focus	  on	  matters	  of	  common	  concern26.	  According	  to	  Habermas,	  the	   commodification	   of	   cultural	   goods	   (and	   the	   profaning	   of	   the	   previously	   sacred	  associated	   with	   this	   commodification	   through	   its	   removal	   from	   the	   representative	  publicness	   of	   the	   monarch	   and	   church	   and	   the	   now	   required	   determination	   of	  meaning	  for	  and	  by	  this	  new	  non-­‐sacred	  public)	  was	  a	  precondition	  of	  this	  focus	  on	  literature,	   philosophy	   and	   arts.	   Through	   this	   commodification,	   the	   cultural	   goods	  were	   now	   accessible	   to	   the	   (educated	   and	   reasonably	   wealthy)	   bourgeois	   public.	  Associated	   with	   this	   commodification	   of	   cultural	   goods	   is	   the	   notion	   that	   public	  sphere	  was,	  at	   least	   in	  principle	  though	  often	  not	   in	  practice,	   inclusive	  –	   to	  those	  at	  least	  who	  could	  acquire	  the	  goods	  in	  question27.	  
The	   third	   important	   feature	  of	  public	   sphere	  understood	   in	  Habermas’	   sense	   is	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  formulation	  of	  strong	  public	  opinion	  which	  has	  the	  explicit	  purpose	  of	  setting	  limits	  or	  providing	  checks	  to	  state	  authority.	  In	  the	  historical	  context	  in	  which	  the	   public	   sphere	   formed	   according	   to	   Habermas,	   this	   process	   was	   primarily	  concerned	  with	  challenging	  the	  (potentially,	  and	  often	  factually,	  arbitrary)	  rule	  of	  the	  sovereign	  monarch,	  gradually	  replacing	  it	  with	  a	  set	  of	  general,	  objective	  and	  abstract	  laws,	  which	  thus	  inhere	  “a	  rationality	  in	  which	  what	  is	  right	  converges	  with	  what	  is	  just”;	   “Hobbes's	   theory	   of	   the	   state	   is	   prepared:	   Veritas	   non	   auctoritas	   facit	   legem	  (truth	  not	  authority	  makes	  law)”	  (Habermas	  1989:	  53,	  original	  emphasis).	  Critically,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  	   Cf.	   the	  detailed	  account	  of	   the	   relation	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	   in	   the	  world	  of	   letters	   to	   the	  public	  sphere	  in	  the	  political	  realm	  in	  Habermas	  1989:	  51-­‐56.	  27	  	   Habermas	  describes	  this	   inclusiveness-­‐in-­‐principle	  as	  relating	  to	   the	  understanding	  of	   the	  word	  “public”.	  The	  understanding	  here	  was	   that	   the	   “issues	  discussed	  became	   ‘general’	  not	  merely	   in	  their	  significance,	  but	  also	   in	   their	  accessibility:	  everyone	  had	   to	  be	  able	   to	  participate”.	  He	  also	  describes	  how,	  whenever	  a	  part	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  development	  more	  into	  a	  closed	  clique	  “it	  did	  not	  equate	   itself	  with	  the	  public	  but	  at	  most	  claimed	   to	  act	  as	   its	  mouthpiece,	   in	   its	  name”	   (Ha-­‐bermas	  1989:	  37,	  his	  emphases).	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  the	  members	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  ultimately	  came	  to	  perceive	  of	  public	  opinion	  (i.e.	  the	  public	   sphere’s	  own	  “output’)	  as	   the	  only	   legitimate	  source	   for	   this	   type	  of	   law,	  since	  the	  values	  of	  generality	  and	  abstractness	  had	  been	  deeply	  internalised	  into	  its	  discursive	  practice	  throughout	  its	  own	  genesis	  from	  literary	  to	  political	  public:	  The	  bourgeois	  public's	  critical	  public	  debate	  took	  place	  in	  principle	  without	  regard	  to	  all	  preexisting	  social	  and	  political	  rank	  and	  in	  ac-­‐cord	  with	  universal	  rules.	  […]	  These	  rules,	  because	  universally	  valid,	  secured	  a	  space	  for	  the	  individuated	  person;	  because	  they	  were	  ob-­‐jective,	  they	  secured	  a	  space	  for	  what	  was	  most	  subjective;	  because	  they	  were	  abstract,	  for	  what	  was	  most	  concrete	  (Habermas	  1989:	  54)	  Stemming	  from	  this	  history	  of	  gradually	  introducing	  reason	  (and	  with	  it	  universality	  and	  abstraction)	  into	  the	  political	  realm	  by	  instituting	  public	  opinion	  as	  the	  source	  of	  legitimation	  for	  state	  activity,	  the	  formation	  of	  such	  public	  opinion,	  strong	  enough	  to	  impact	   on	   state	   decision-­‐making,	   has	   become	   one	   of	   the	   main	   features	   of	   public	  sphere.	  
2.4.2 Re-­‐Thinking	  the	  Public	  Sphere:	  	  
Fraser’s	  Critique	  of	  the	  Masculinist	  Bourgeois	  Public	  
This	   original	   concept	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   received	   criticism	   from	   a	   number	   of	  directions,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  collated	  during	  a	  conference	  and	  a	  subsequent	  edited	  volume	  (Calhoun	  1992)	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  English	  translation	  of	  Habermas’	  The	  Structural	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Public	  Sphere	  (1989).	  For	  example,	  his	   failure	   to	   examine	   other	   “subaltern	   counterpublics”	   (Fraser	   1990)	   leads	   to	   a	  conceptualisation	   of	   the	   liberal	   or	   bourgeois	   public	   sphere	   that	   is	   characterised	   by	  the	   exclusion	   of	   certain	   groups	   based	   on	   criteria	   such	   as	   gender	   or	   class28.	   Fraser,	  summarising	   the	   historical	   work	   of	   Mary	   Ryan,	   points	   out	   that,	   even	   though	   not	  formally	   politically	   recognised	   through	   suffrage,	   women	   in	   different	   positions	   of	  social	  class	  successfully	  organised	  counterpublics	  such	  as	  “counter	  civil	  societies”	  of	  the	  alternative	  voluntary	  associations	  of	  elite	  bourgeois	  women	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  less	  privileged	   women,	   through	   “participation	   in	   supporting	   roles	   in	   male-­‐dominated	  working	   class	   protest	   activities”	   or	   even	   specifically	   the	   work	   of	   “women's	   rights	  advocates	   [who]	   publicly	   contested	   […]	   women's	   exclusion	   from	   the	   official	   public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  	   Both,	   the	   title	  of	   this	  and	   the	  next	   section	  allude	   to	   titles	  used	   in	  Fraser’s	  work:	   the	   title	  of	  her	  1990	  essay	  (Fraser	  1990)	  and	  a	  subtitle	  used	  in	  a	  later	  article	  (Fraser	  2007),	  respectively.	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  sphere”	   (Fraser	   1990:	   61)	   –	   all	   of	   which	   Habermas	   misses	   due	   to	   the	   conceptual	  limitations	  of	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
In	  that	  sense	  then,	  Habermas’	  class-­‐	  and	  gender-­‐based	  bias	  which	  manifests	  itself	  in	  the	  exclusion	  of	  women	  and	  non-­‐bourgeois	  from	  his	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  become	   more	   than	   a	   simple	   omission	   of	   historical	   fact	   –	   it	   rather	   points	   toward	  fundamental	  flaws	  in	  his	  theory.	  As	  Fraser	  and	  others	  (e.g.	  Negt	  and	  Kluge	  1972;	  Eley	  1992)	  have	  pointed	  out	  convincingly,	   rather	   than	  Habermas’	  characterisation	  of	   the	  bourgeois	  public	  as	  the	  public,	  there	  have	  always	  been	  alternative	  and	  counterpublics:	  “virtually	  contemporaneous	  with	  the	  bourgeois	  public	  there	  arose	  a	  host	  of	  compet-­‐ing	   counterpublics,	   including	   nationalist	   publics,	   popular	   peasant	   publics,	   elite	  women's	   publics,	   and	   working	   class	   publics”	   (Fraser	   1990:	   61).	   Thus,	   her	   initial	  conclusions	   are	   that	  Habermas’	   conception	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	  was	   not	   simply	   an	  ideal	   typical	   representation	   of	   a	   generic	   model	   of	   public	   sphere	   from	   which	   the	  actually	  discussed	  case	  of	   the	  bourgeois	  public	   sphere	  deviated	   to	  a	   certain	  degree,	  but	   rather	   that	   Habermas’	   discussion	   elevated	   to	   the	   status	   of	   the	   ideal	   type	   one	  particular	  –	  specifically,	  the	  masculinist	  bourgeois	  –	  public	  sphere	  and	  thus	  contrib-­‐uted	   to	   the	   legitimisation	   of	   an	   emerging	   vehicle	   for	   class	   based	   rule.	   Here,	   she	  invokes	  Geoff	  Eley’s	  (1992)	  conclusions,	  who	  claims	  that	  the	  historical	  processes	  that	  Habermas	  seeks	  to	  unpack	  do	  not,	  as	  suggested,	  represent	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  rule	  based	  on	   force	  by	  an	  absolute	  monarch	   to	  one	  of	   the	  public	  by	  virtue	  of	   reason	  and	  good	  argument	   but	   rather	   merely	   represent	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   mode	   of	   political	   domination	  from	   the	   repressive	   force	   of	   the	  monarch	   to	   a	  new	  hegemonic	   form	  of	   domination.	  Crucially,	   though,	   both	   the	   starting	   point	   and	   the	   result	   of	   this	   transformation	   are	  characterised	   by	   the	   ability	   of	   one	   specific	   (albeit	   different)	   stratum	   of	   society	   to	  dominate,	   and	   rule	   over,	   all	   the	   other	   strata,	  with	   the	  masculinist	   bourgeois	   public	  sphere,	  as	  described	  by	  Habermas,	  representing	  the	  principle	  institutional	  vehicle	  for	  this	  shift.	  
This	  critical	  analysis	  highlights	  the	  fundamental	  flaws	  in	  Habermas’	  analysis	  and	  especially	  points	  out	  that	  the	  public	  sphere	  theory	  as	  presented	  by	  him	  glosses	  over	  power	   differentials	   between	   and	   domination	   over	   substantial	   parts	   of	   society	   and	  their	  exclusion	  from	  the	  democratic	  project	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of.	  However,	   Fraser	   –	   recognising	   its	   potential	   for	   critical	   and	   democratic	   theory	   –	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  decides	  against	  abandoning	  the	  concept	  altogether	  and	  instead	  embarks	  on	  “rethink-­‐ing”	   the	   public	   sphere	   theory	   with	   an	   aim	   to	   salvaging	   it	   and	   improving	   both	   its	  analytical	   and	  normative	  potential.	   Specifically,	   she	   contends	   that	   four	  assumptions	  central	   to	  Habermas	  need	   to	  be	   revisited:	   the	  assumption	   that	   it	   is	  possible	   for	   the	  participants	   of	   the	   deliberations	   in	   the	   public	   sphere	   to	   bracket	   social	   inequalities	  and	   pursue	   their	   deliberations	   as	   if	   those	   inequalities	   did	   not	   exist,	   or	   have	   any	  bearing	  on	  the	  discussions;	  the	  assumption	  that	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  publics	  is	  obstructive	  to	   the	   promise	   of	   better	   democratic	   participation	   and	   a	   single,	   unified	   public	   is	  preferable	   to	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   publics;	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   deliberations	   of	   the	  public	   should	  be	  restricted	   to	  matters	  of	   the	   “common	  good”	  and	   therefore	  exclude	  matters	   of	   “private	   interest”;	   and,	   finally,	   the	   assumption	   that	   a	   clear	   separation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
For	   the	   advancement	   of	   the	   theoretical	   framework	  used	   in	   this	   thesis,	   the	   first	  three	   of	   these	   points	   are	   the	   most	   relevant	   and	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   turn.	   First,	  consider	  Habermas’	  contention	  that	  the	  interlocutors	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  should	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  able	  to	  bracket	  their	  differences	  in	  social	  status	  and	  should	  expect	  that	  only	  the	  rational	  quality	  of	  an	  argument	  (and	  not	  the	  social	  quality	  of	  its	  proponents)	  has	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   final	   outcome	   of	   a	   deliberative	   process.	   Here,	   Fraser	   uses	  findings	   from	   feminist	   research	   to	   show	   that	   even	  where	   formal	   political	   exclusion	  based	  on	  class,	  gender,	  race	  and	  so	  forth	  are	  overcome,	  Habermas’	  principle	  of	  open	  access	   appears	   violated	   when	   investigated	   based	   on	   the	   practice	   of	   discursive	  interaction	  within	  a	  public	  sphere.	  This	  is	  because	  “discursive	  interaction	  within	  the	  bourgeois	  public	  sphere	  was	  governed	  by	  protocols	  of	  style	  and	  decorum	  that	  were	  themselves	   correlates	   and	   markers	   of	   status	   inequality	   [and	   that]	   […]	   functioned	  informally	  to	  marginalize	  women	  and	  members	  of	  the	  plebeian	  classes	  and	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  participating	  as	  peers”	  (Fraser	  1990:	  63).	  In	  that	  sense,	  “bracketing”	  social	  inequalities,	   as	  Habermas	   demands,	   and	   thus	   pretending	   they	   do	   not	   exist	   (even	   if	  done	  with	  the	  noble	  goal	  of	  excluding	  possible	  bias	  of	  socially	  advantaged	  interlocu-­‐tors	  from	  rational	  discussion)	  helps	  to	  mask	  their	  very	  real	  domination	  of	  disadvan-­‐taged	   groups	   even	   if	   they	   are	   formally	   admitted	   to	   the	   public	   sphere.	   Therefore,	  “unbracketing”	   the	   inequalities,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   explicitly	   problematise	   them	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  and	  uncover	  their	  potential	  to	  dominate	  specific	  participants	  in	  the	  public	  discourse,	  better	  serves	  the	  advancement	  of	  participatory	  parity	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
Secondly,	   according	   to	   Fraser,	   Habermas’	   original	   characterisation29	  suggests	  that	   a	   single	   public	   sphere	   is	   preferable	   to	   a	   situation	   where	   multiple	   competing	  public	   spheres	   exist	   as	   the	   latter	   case	   is	   a	   move	   away	   from,	   as	   opposed	   towards,	  adequate	   democratic	   participation30.	   Based	   on	   her	   previous	   conclusion	   that	   the	  “bracketing”	   of	   social	   inequality	   in	   the	   context	   of	   public	   opinion	   formation	   in	   the	  public	  sphere	  is	  –	  at	  least	  in	  the	  stratified	  society	  of	  the	  “actually	  existing	  democracies”	  –	   neither	   achievable	   nor	   desirable,	   she	   sets	   out	   to	   argue	   that	   in	   such	   societies	  “arrangements	   that	   accommodate	   contestation	   among	   a	   plurality	   of	   competing	  publics	  better	  promote	   the	   ideal	  of	  participatory	  parity	   than	  does	  a	   single,	   compre-­‐hensive,	  overarching	  public”	  (1990:	  66):	   if,	  so	  goes	  the	  argument,	  social	   inequalities	  are	   not	   bracketed	   but	   it	   is	   accepted	   that	   they	   result	   in	   structures	   of	   power	   and	  domination,	   then	   the	   members	   of	   the	   dominated	   groups	   would	   –	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	  singular,	  unified	  public	  sphere	  –	  have	  no	  communicative	  arenas	  wherein	  to	  undertake	  “deliberation	   among	   themselves	   about	   their	   needs,	   objectives,	   and	   strategies.	   They	  would	  have	  no	  venues	  in	  which	  to	  undertake	  communicative	  processes	  that	  were	  not,	  as	  it	  were,	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  dominant	  groups”	  (1990:	  66).	  This	  would	  further	  consolidate	   the	   hegemony	   of	   the	   dominant	   group	   and	   the	   subordinated	   position	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  	   To	  be	  fair,	  Habermas	  later	  (e.g.	  in	  Habermas	  1992),	  referring	  to	  the	  work	  of	  E.P.	  Thomson,	  Günter	  Lottes	  and	  Mikhail	  Bakhtin,	  acknowledges	  that	  although	  he	  had	  originally	  considered	  his	  neglect	  of	   “additional	   subcultural	   or	   class-­‐specific	   public	   spheres”	   justifiable	   given	   his	   impression	   that	  they	  represented	  “merely	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  public	  sphere	  that	  remained	  supressed	  [sic]	  in	   the	   historical	   process”	   (1992:	   425),	   the	   insights	   provided	   by	   the	   works	   of	   the	   mentioned	  authors	  helped	  him	  understand	  their	  specific	  historical	  places	  and	  roles	  and	  their	  different	  inner	  dynamics.	  Having	  thus	  been	  able	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  substantial	  differences	  between	  a	  bourgeois	  public	   sphere	   (which	   in	   this	   context	   he	   calls	   the	   “hegemonic	   bourgeois	   public	   sphere”)	   and	   a	  proletarian	  or	  plebeian	  one,	  he	   is	  also	  able	   to	  better	  understand	  counterpublics	  based	  on	  other	  dimensions	  of	   exclusion:	   “If	  we	   apply	   the	   same	  perspective	   to	   the	  bourgeois	  public	   sphere,	   the	  exclusion	  of	  women	  from	  this	  world	  dominated	  by	  men	  now	  looks	  different	  than	  it	  appeared	  to	  me	  at	  the	  time”	  (Habermas	  1992:	  427).	  30	  	   Again,	  to	  be	  fair,	  it	  is	  not	  fully	  clear	  to	  me,	  where	  Habermas	  makes	  this	  point.	  To	  be	  sure,	  he	  does	  discuss	   very	   briefly	   (in	   the	   foreword	   to	   The	   Structural	   Transformation)	   the	   very	   short-­‐lived	  existence	   of	   a	   “plebeian	  public	   sphere	   as	   a	   variant	   [of	   the	   bourgeois	   one]	   that	   in	   a	   sense	   was	  suppressed	  in	  the	  historical	  process.	  In	  the	  stage	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution	  associated	  with	  Robes-­‐pierre,	  for	  just	  one	  moment,	  a	  public	  sphere	  […]	  [associated]	  no	  longer	  [with]	  the	  ‘educated	  strata’	  but	   the	   uneducated	   ‘people’”	   (Habermas	   1989:	   xviii,	   original	   emphasis)	   briefly	   emerged	   and	  disappeared	  again.	  This	  characterisation,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  talking	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  the	  singular	  that	  Fraser	  points	  out	  (1990),	  suggests	  that	  he	  certainly	  does	  not	  discuss	  a	  social	  world	  of	  multi-­‐ple	   publics,	   but	   it	   might	   be	   unfair	   to	   imply	   a	   preference	   for	   a	   singularity	   of	   publics	   from	   that	  omission.	  Either	  way,	  Habermas’	  thoughts	  regarding	  the	  question	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  vs.	  singularity	  of	  public(s)	  are	  not	  relevant	  for	  the	  argument	  that	  Fraser	  makes	  in	  favour	  of	  multiplicity.	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  the	  less	  powerful,	  thus	  making	  it	   less	  and	  less	  likely	  for	  them	  to	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  their	  grievances	  as	  issues	  worthy	  of	  consideration	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  therefore	  further	  reducing	  the	  chances	  of	  resolving	  the	  issues	  relevant	  to	  these	  groups	  through	  the	  venue	  of	  public	  opinion	  formation	  by	  their	  own	  initiative.	  
Fraser	  refers	  to	  the	  historical	  record	  to	  suggest	  that	  groups	  disadvantaged	  due	  to	  a	   variety	   of	   characteristics	   –	   gender,	   colour,	   class,	   sexuality	   etc.	   –	   have	   found	   it	  advantageous	  for	  their	  cause	  to	  form	  alternative	  publics,	  which	  she	  proposes	  to	  call	  “subaltern	  counterpublics”	  –	   in	  order	   to	  define	   the	   terms	  of	   their	  grievances	   (or,	  as	  Fraser	   puts	   it,	   “formulate	   oppositional	   interpretations	   of	   their	   identities,	   interests,	  and	   needs”,	   Fraser	   1990:	   67)	   in	   discursive	   isolation	   from	   the	   dominating	   and	  restricting	  forces	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  public	  sphere.	  This	  relative,	  and	  ideally	  temporary,	  discursive	   isolation	   allows	   this	   “counterpublic”	   to	   argue	   out	   issues	   that	   were	  previously	   not	   on	   the	   radar	   of	   public	   deliberation.	   Thus,	   proliferation	   of	   subaltern	  counterpublics	  can	  be	  equated	  with	  a	  widening	  of	  the	  discursive	  space	  in	  the	  society.	  Furthermore,	   the	   relative	   (and	   temporary)	   isolation	   of	   the	   subaltern	   counterpublic	  allows	   this	   quasi	   internal	   arguing	   out	   and	  development	   of	   new	   issues	   before	   being	  subjected	   to	   the	  scrutiny	  of	   the	   “official”	  public	   sphere;	   they	   “function	  as	  bases	  and	  training	   grounds	   for	   agitational	   activities	   directed	   toward	   wider	   publics”	   (Fraser	  1990:	  68).	  
As	  a	  powerful	  support	  for	  her	  point,	  Fraser	  invokes	  the	  example	  of	  the	  subaltern	  counterpublic	   of	   US	   feminism	   of	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	   which,	   in	   its	  vibrant	  counterpublic	  of	  "journals,	  bookstores,	  publishing	  companies,	  film	  and	  video	  distribution	   networks,	   lecture	   series,	   research	   centers,	   academic	   programs,	   confer-­‐ences,	  conventions,	  festivals,	  and	  local	  meeting	  places”	  managed	  to	  invent	  and	  define	  new	   terms	   to	   describe	   the	   social	   reality	   of	   a	   deeply	   sexist	   society	   including	   terms	  such	   as	   "sexism,"	   "the	   double	   shift,"	   sexual	   harassment,"	   and	   "marital,	   date,	   and	  acquaintance	   rape"	   (Fraser	   1990:	   67).	   Thus	   enabled	   (“armed”)	   to	   express	   relevant	  grievances	   in	   a	   language	   and	   terminology	   different	   from	   that	   of	   the	   dominating,	  “official”	   public	   sphere,	   feminists	   were	   able	   to	   resist	   the	   dominant	   public	   sphere’s	  definitions	  of	  the	  issues	  relevant	  to	  their	  struggle,	  such	  as	  defining	  marital	  rape	  as	  a	  domestic,	   or	   “private,”	   issue	   thus	   not	   admissible	   for	   consideration	   in	   the	   public	  
2.	  Literature	  Review:	  Global	  Civil	  Society	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere	   64	  sphere	  (which	  is	  concerned	  only	  with	  matters	  of	  “public”	  relevance	  as	  relating	  to	  the	  “common	  good”).	  
Likewise,	  the	  notion	  of	  counter-­‐publics	  promises	  to	  be	  a	  useful	  tool	  in	  analysing	  different	  approaches	   to	   thinking	  about	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  political	  and	  societal	  solutions	  that	  might	  be	  available	  or	  desirable	  in	  regard	  to	  it.	  For	  example,	  Lohmann	  (2006)	   charges	   that,	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   process,	   the	   mainstream	   environmental	  NGOs	  and	  more	  progressive	  government	  delegations	  were	  co-­‐opted	  into	  a	  framework	  which	   seeks	   to	   solve	   climate	   change	   predominantly	   by	   employing	   market-­‐based	  mechanisms.	   He	   suggests	   that	   this	   has	   been	   achieved	   by	   a	   few	   actors	   within	   the	  negotiations	  (he	  singles	  out	  the	  US	  delegation	  and	  the	  lobby	  of	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry)	  by	   “impos[ing]	   a	   language	   on	   the	   climate	   talks	   in	   which	   objections	   to	   neoliberal	  policies	  could	  not	  be	  effectively	  made”	  (Lohmann	  2006:	  50),	  which	  effectively	  sets	  the	  boundaries	   for	   admissible	   topics	   and	   arguments	   within	   the	   public	   sphere	   of	   these	  negotiations:	  As	   IPCC	   member	   Wolfgang	   Sachs	   notes,	   orthodox	   economics	   and	  public	  policy	  methodology	  prevented	  the	  question	  even	  being	  raised	  as	   to	   what	   type	   of	   changes	   would	   be	   necessary	   to	   reduce	   green-­‐	  house	   gas	   concentrations	   to	   a	   safer	   level	   or	   allocate	   atmospheric	  rights	   equitably.	   […]	   [The	   character	   of	   this	   dominant	   discourse	  combined	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  climate	  negotia-­‐tions]	   handicap	   activist	   Southern	   diplomats	   by	   automatically	   rele-­‐gating	   talk	   of	   structural	   change	   to	   the	   category	   of	   the	   “merely	  rhetorical”	  or	  “irrelevant”	  	   (Lohmann	  2006:	  51)	  This	  then,	  following	  Fraser’s	  logic,	  is	  a	  conducive	  environment	  for	  a	  counterpublic	  to	  emerge	   in	   order	   to	   create	   a	   discursive	   space	   in	   which	   arguments,	   language	   and	  solutions	  which	   are	   not	   currently	   admissible	   to	   the	   dominant	   public	   due	   to	   the	   its	  hegemonic	   discourse	   can	   be	   invented,	   refined	   and	   rehearsed	   before	   being	   brought	  back	  into	  the	  “official”	  public	  sphere.	  And,	  indeed,	  there	  are	  hints	  that	  this	  is	  actually	  taking	   place,	   with	   a	   section	   of	   the	   climate	   movement	   which	   self-­‐identifies	   as	   the	  “climate	   justice	  movement”	  engaging	   in	  such	  exercises	  and	  brandishing	  some	  of	   the	  institutions	  developed	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  as	  “false	  solutions.”	  However,	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	   that	  phenomena	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  present	  chapter	  but	  will	  be	  taken	  up	  again	  in	  chapter	  5.	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  The	  last	  concern	  mentioned	  from	  Fraser’s	  work	  relates	  to	  the	  next	  point	  of	  contention	  with	   Habermas	   –	   the	   suggestion	   that	   only	   certain	   topics,	   namely	   issues	   of	   “public	  concern”	   and	   the	   “common	   good”	   and	   certainly	   not	   those	   that	   merely	   represent	  “private	  matters,”	  are	  admissible	  for	  consideration	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  On	  first	  sight,	  this	  problem	  on	   its	  own	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐issue	  –	  after	  all,	   the	  boundaries	  of	  what	  constitutes	   a	  matter	   of	   public	   concern	   can	   be	   recast	   to	   include	  what	   formerly	  was	  regarded	  merely	  a	  private	  trouble.	  In	  fact,	  this	  process	  has	  been	  described,	  by	  Charles	  Wright	  Mills,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  functions	  of	  a	  public	  sociology	  and	  a	  central	  part	  of	  the	  “promise	  of	  social	  science”	  (and	  crucially	   informs	  my	  own	  understanding	  of	   the	  role	   of	   sociology	   in	   society):	   the	   translation	   of	   “personal	   troubles	   of	   milieu”	   into	  “public	   issues	  of	   social	   structure”	   (1959:	  8)31.	  However,	   although	  Fraser	  appears	   to	  agree	   that	   public	   concerns	   can	   be	   defined	   and	   re-­‐defined	   to	   include	   virtually	   any	  issue,	   she	   reminds	   us	   of	   the	   power	   relations	   within	   society	   and	   within	   the	   public	  sphere	  that	  have	  informed	  her	  critique	  thus	  far	  and	  that	  also	  play	  into	  the	  question	  of	  defining	   the	   boundaries	   of	   private	   and	   public	   in	   this	   sense:	   as	   the	   relevant	   public	  sphere	   (who	   else?)	   defines	   these	  boundaries	   itself,	   so	   goes	   Fraser’s	   argument,	   how	  can	  we	  expect	  that	  a	  hegemonic	  public	  sphere	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  defining	  what	  constitutes	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  concern	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  specific	  grievances	  of	  the	  dominated	  are	   considered,	   especially	   since	  at	   least	   some	  of	   these	  grievances	  would	  likely	  be	  directed	  against	  the	  latter?	  We	  can’t	  –	  concludes	  Fraser	  and	  therefore	  there	  should	   not	   be	   any	   topics	   that	   are	  a	  priori	   excluded	   from	   the	   considerations	   of	   the	  public	  sphere32.	  
However,	  this	  issue	  has	  an	  important	  converse:	  not	  only	  are	  there	  relevant	  con-­‐cerns,	   as	   described	   above,	   that	   the	   boundaries	   of	  what	   constitutes	   a	   public	  matter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  	   For	  example,	  by	  uncovering	  the	  social	  processes	  that	  underpin	  issues	  of	  structural	  unemployment	  (with	  each	  individual	  unemployment	  being	  a	  “private	  trouble”	  of	  the	  person	  thus	  affected)	  sociol-­‐ogy	  turns	  this	  collection	  of	  private	  troubles	  into	  a	  “public	  issues”	  thus	  elevating	  it	  to	  the	  appropri-­‐ate	   level	   on	   which	   a	   solution	   can	   be	   found:	   “When,	   in	   a	   city	   of	   100,000,	   only	   one	   man	   is	  unemployed,	  that	  is	  his	  personal	  trouble,	  and	  for	  its	  relief	  we	  properly	  look	  to	  the	  character	  of	  the	  man,	  his	  skills,	  and	  his	  immediate	  opportunities.	  But	  when	  in	  a	  nation	  of	  50	  million	  employees,	  15	  million	  men	  are	  unemployed,	  that	  is	  an	  issue,	  and	  we	  may	  not	  hope	  to	  find	  its	  solution	  within	  the	  range	  of	   opportunities	   open	   to	   any	  one	   individual.	   The	  very	   structure	  of	   opportunities	  has	   col-­‐lapsed.	  Both	  the	  correct	  statement	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  solutions	  require	  us	  to	   consider	   the	   economic	   and	   political	   institutions	   of	   the	   society,	   and	   not	  merely	   the	   personal	  situation	  and	  character	  of	  a	  scatter	  of	  individuals”	  (Mills	  1959:	  9).	  32	  	   As	  evidence,	  she	  uses	  an	  example	  from	  feminism	  already	  referred	  to	  above:	  history	  shows	  that	  for	  the	  longest	  time	  “wife	  battering”	  was	  considered	  a	  domestic,	  and	  thus	  private,	  issue	  not	  suitable	  for	   public	   consideration	   and	   certainly	   no	   concern	   of	   public	   interest,	   which	   in	   turn	   served	   to	  perpetuate	  pattern	  of	  dominance	  based	  on	  sexism	  and	  gender	  subordination.	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  might	  not	  be	  cast	  wide	  enough	  to	  include	  certain	  (possibly	  new)	  thus	  private	  matters,	  there	   is	   also	   the	   risk	   that	   the	   boundaries	  might	   be	   redefined	   to	   exclude	   as	   private	  issues	   formerly	   considered	   public	   and	   –	   in	   an	   understanding	   of	   public	   sphere	   that	  finds	   private	   issues	   inadmissible	   –	   this	   consequently	   leads	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	  matters	   so	   redefined	   from	  public	   discussion.	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   in	  Habermas’	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   public/private	   distinction	   the	   private	   realm	  refers	   to	  both	   the	  economic	  sphere	  of	   the	  markets	  and	  well	  as,	   separate	   from	  it	  yet	  thoroughly	  linked	  to	  it,	  the	  intimate	  sphere	  of	  the	  family.	  Therefore,	  the	  re-­‐defining	  of	  public	   issues	   as	   private	   troubles,	   as	   it	   were,	   can	   place	   these	   issues	   either	   in	   the	  domestic	  realm	  of	  the	  family	  or	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  economy.	  An	  example	  of	  the	  latter	  has	  been	  given	  by	  Simone	  Pulver	  from	  an	  area	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis:	  according	  to	  her	  interpretation,	  over	  time	  a	  redefinition	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  crisis	  as	  not	  merely	  an	  environmental	  problem	  but	   also	   (or	   even	  mainly)	   a	  problem	   “at	   the	   intersection	  of	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  economy”	  (2004a:	  9)	  took	  place.	  This	  redefinition	  gave	  rise	  to	   the	   idea	  of	  mandating	   the	  markets	  with	  solving	   the	  question	  of	  where	  and	  when	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  should	  be	  reduced	  by	  introducing	  markets	   in	  greenhouse	  gas	   emission	   rights.	   Pulver	   then	  argues	   that	   this	   represents	   a	   removal	   of	   some	  key	  aspects	   of	   the	   climate	   change	   debate	   from	   the	   public	   political	   realm	   and	   onto	   the	  private	   realm	   of	   the	   economy	   to	   be	   solved	   by	  managers	   and	   technocrats.	   It	   is	   not	  surprising,	   then,	   that	   there	   are	   efforts33	  to	   re-­‐redefine	   issues	   relating	   to	   carbon	  markets	  as	  one	  of	  public	  concern	  by	  various	  means:	  for	  example,	  by	  highlighting	  that	  –	   despite	   the	   explicit	   purpose	   of	   carbon	   market	   related	   projects	   to	   contribute	   to	  greenhouse	   gas	   reductions	   –	   the	   opposite	   is	   often	   the	   case	   (Haya	   2007;	   Schneider	  2007;	  McCully	   2008),	   or	   by	   lobbying	   to	   improve	   the	   public	   consultation	   processes	  associated	  with	  the	  projects	  (CDM	  Watch	  2009).	   Interestingly,	  some	  of	   these	  efforts	  explicitly	  problematise	  this	  move	  towards	  an	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  markets	  for	  the	  resolution	   of	   the	   climate	   crisis	   as	   an	   issue	   of	   power	   and	   domination	   between	   the	  hegemonic	  interests	  of	  globalised	  capital	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  subordinate	  and	  disadvan-­‐taged	  groups	  such	  as	  women,	  farmers,	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  etc.	  on	  the	  other.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  these	  voices	  declare	  the	  various	  market	  based	  attempts	  “false	  solutions”	  as	  well	  as	  vowing	  to	  reclaim	  the	  public	  political	  process	  (CJN!	  2008).	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   Those	   efforts	   are	   not	   covered	   by	   Pulver,	   presumably	   since	   her	   work	   largely	   predates	   these	  manifestations.	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  The	   public	   sphere	   theory,	   at	   this	   point,	   has	   seen	   a	   few	   improvements:	   most	   im-­‐portantly,	  Fraser’s	  critique	  serves	  to	  sharpen	  our	  awareness	  of	  the	  various	  important	  impacts	  that	  social	  inequalities	  and	  exclusions	  have	  on	  the	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  observations	  that	  the	  bracketing	  out	  of	  such	  inequalities	  as	  advocated	  by	   Habermas	   would	   obscure,	   which	   renders	   such	   bracketing	   undesirable.	   While	  primarily	  appearing	  to	  be	  a	  contribution	  to	  a	  normative	  evolution	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  her	   remarks	   also	   provide	   for	   useful	   improvements	   to	   the	   use	   of	   the	   concept	   as	   an	  empirical	  device.	  First,	  her	  critique	  has	  sensitised	  us	  to	  be	  vigilant	  towards	  processes	  of	  domination	  between	  the	  main	  tenants	  of	  the	  dominant	  public	  sphere	  and	  excluded	  or	  subordinate	  groups.	  Secondly,	  and	  related	  to	  the	  first	  point,	  her	  work	  prepared	  us	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  social	  phenomena	  associated	  with	  the	  public	  sphere	  not	  as	  one	  public	   sphere	   with	   a	   multitude	   of	   competing	   interests,	   but	   to	   recognise	   that,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  pattern	  of	  hegemony	  and	  domination,	  a	  multitude	  of	  competing	  publics	  might	  exist.	  Lastly,	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  problematise	  the	  casting	  of	  the	  bounda-­‐ries	   between	   private	   trouble	   and	   public	   issues	   and	   therefore	   the	   problem	   of	  admissibility	  of	  issues	  for	  consideration	  by	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
2.4.3 On	  Counter-­‐Publics	  and	  Nested	  Public	  Spheres	  –	  	  
Conceptualising	  Multiplicity	  in	  the	  Public	  Sphere	  
Departing	   from	   the	   work	   of	   Nancy	   Fraser	   and	   others	   (cf.	   Calhoun	   1992	   for	   a	  collection	  of	  examples	  of	  such	  work,	  or	  Squires	  2002	  for	  a	  more	  thorough	  review	  of	  that	  literature)	  the	  literature	  shows	  increasing	  agreement	  that	  the	  “public	  sphere”	  is	  not	  to	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  single	  monolithic	  social	  phenomenon,	  but	  rather	  that	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  such	  public	  spheres	  exists.	  These	  publics	  then	  are	  in	  a	  various	  degrees	  of	  flux,	  as,	  for	  example,	  demonstrated	  by	  Fraser’s	  example	  of	  the	  feminist	  counterpub-­‐lic,	   as	   they	   separate	   themselves	   from	   the	   dominant	   public	   in	   order	   to	   create	   a	  sheltered	   discursive	   space,	   and	   later	   re-­‐engage	   within	   the	   mainstream	   of	   the	  dominant	  public.	  While,	  as	  mentioned,	  agreement	  exists	  that	  public	  sphere	  theory	  has	  to	   embrace	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   publics,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   points	   of	  contestation	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  enumeration	  and	  demarcation	  of	   these	   multiple	   publics	   –	   how	   many	   there	   might	   be	   and	   how	   to	   define	   their	  membership	   (and	  who	   decides	   how	   the	  membership	   is	   defined)	   –	   as	  well	   as	   their	  function	  and	  interactions	  with	  each	  other.	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  For	   example,	  Michael	  Warner	   elaborates	   a	  model	   of	   public	   spheres	  which	   sets	   out	  from	   the	   observation	   that	   there	   is	   a	   crucial	   difference	   between	   the	   public	   and	   a	  public.	   ”The	  public	   is	   a	   kind	  of	   social	   totality.	   Its	  most	   common	   sense	   is	   that	   of	   the	  people	   in	   general”	   (Warner	   2002:	   49),	   which	   “is	   understood	   to	   encompass	   their	  members	  all	   the	   time,	  no	  matter	  what.	  A	  nation,	   for	  example,	   includes	   its	  members	  whether	   they	   are	   awake	   or	   asleep,	   sober	   or	   drunk,	   sane	   or	   deranged,	   alert	   or	  comatose”	  (Warner	  2002:	  60).	  A	  public,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  not	  such	  a	  fixed	  concept	  but	  is	   in	  permanent	  flux	  and,	  as	  “a	  space	  of	  discourse	  [that	  is]	  organized	  by	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	  discourse	   itself”	   it	  comes	  to	  existence	  by	  the	  act	  of	  “being	  addressed”	  (Warner	  2002:	  50,	  original	   emphasis)	   and	  as	   such,	   and	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  public,	  “it	  must	   predicate	   some	   degree	   of	   attention,	   however	   notional,	   from	   its	   members”	  (Warner	  2002:	  61).	  This	  distinction	  is	  important	  since	  only	  the	  latter	  definition	  would	  be	   suitable	   to	   define	   a	   public	   of	   the	   type	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   as	   synonymous	   with	  “public	  sphere”.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  his	  conceptualisation,	  Warner	  ends	  up	  with	  a	  model	  of	  public	  which	   supports	   a	  potentially	   infinite	  number	  of	   publics	   that	   are	  overlapping	  and	   in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	   flux	  as	   individuals’	  status	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  given	  public	  changes	  from	  stranger	  to	  member	  and	  back	  again	  depending	  on	  their	  degree	  of	  engagement	  with	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  public.	  	  
This	   surely	   is	   an	   intriguing	  way	  of	   conceptualising	  publics	   and	   certainly	   drives	  home	  the	  point	  that	  publics	  cannot	  be	  understood	  or	  studied	  without	  also	  focussing	  on	   the	   public’s	   discourse	   about	   itself.	   After	   all,	   discourse	   is	   what	   defines,	   or	   even	  more	  so,	  creates,	  a	  public	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  notion	  of	  an	  extremely	  fluid	  public	  is	  particularly	   useful	   when	   contrasted	   with	   other	   idea	   of	   publics	   as	   it	   can	   help	   to	  highlight	  the	  limits	  of	  such	  other	  notions.	  For	  example,	  Warner	  himself	  points	  out	  that	  this	  feature	  of	  a	  public	  condemns	  empirical	  endeavours	  of	  “pollsters	  and	  some	  social	  scientists	   [who]	   think	   that	   their	  method	   is	  a	  way	   to	  define	  a	  public	  as	  a	  group	   that	  could	   be	   studied	   […]	   independently	   from	   its	   own	   discourse	   about	   itself”	   (Warner	  2002:	  53)	   to	   failure	   as	   the	   shifts	   in	   shape	   and	   size	  of	   that	   given	  public	  will	   remain	  opaque	  to	  such	  study.	  Likewise,	  Kate	  Burningham,	  Julie	  Barnett	  and	  their	  colleagues	  (Barnett	   et	   al.	   2010;	  Burningham	  et	   al.	   2007)	  observed	   that	   actors	   from	  renewable	  energy	   technology	   and	   chemicals	   industries,	   respectively,	   imagined	   a	   similar	   static	  and	  monolithic	   public	  when	  describing	   their	   “public	   engagement”	  where	   the	  public	  was	  primarily	  defined	  by	  their	  “lack	  of	  knowledge	  and	  presence	  of	  concern”	  (Barnett	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  et	  al.	  2010:	  11).	  Interaction	  with	  the	  public	  was	  therefore	  centred	  around	  provision	  of	  information	  and	  suggestions	  that	  “their	  concerns	  are	  being	  allayed”	  (Burningham	  et	  al.	  2007:	  36).	  
Having	  described	  such	  a	  liquid	  form	  of	  public,	  Warner	  criticises	  Fraser’s	  notion	  of	  the	   counterpublic.	  What,	   he	   asks,	  makes	   the	   feminist	   counterpublic	   in	   her	   example	  “counter”	  other	  then	  its	  reform	  program	  and	  why	  would	  counterpublics	  be	  restricted	  to	   progressive	   “subalterns”	   and	   not	   for	   example	   also	   refer	   to	   “the	   publics	   of	   U.S.	  Christian	  fundamentalism,	  or	  youth	  culture,	  or	  artistic	  bohemianism?”	  (Warner	  2002:	  86).	  In	  answering	  his	  own	  questions,	  he	  confirms	  that	  Fraser’s	  counterpublic	  remains	  indeed	  a	  counterpublic	  according	  to	  his	  own	  definition	  as	  well,	  however,	  he	  proposes	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  counterpublic.	  Crucial	   to	   this	  notion	   is	   the	  continued	  awareness	  (whether	  conscious	  or	  not)	  of	   the	  counterpublic	  of	   its	  subordinate	  status	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  wider,	  and	  crucially,	  dominant	  public.	  	  
To	   contrast	   and	   complement	   this	   understanding	   of	   counterpublic,	   Robert	   Asen	  (2000)	   provides	   the	   view	   that	   the	   “counter”	   in	   counterpublics	   can	   be	   found	  when	  examining	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  agents	  within	  such	  counterpublics	  express	  their	  views	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  exclusion	  that	  places	  them	  in	  a	  subordinate	  position	  compared	  to	  the	  dominant	  public:	   “counterpublics	   […]	   [take]	  up	  exclusion	  and	   the	  practices	   that	  sustain	   it	   as	   explicit	   themes	   of	   discourse	   or	   imagine	   themselves	   explicitly	   as	  alternative	  collectives”	  (2000:	  441).	  Likewise,	  in	  her	  review	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Black	  public	  sphere	   in	   the	  USA,	  Catherine	  Squires	   (2002)	   identifies	  counterpublics	  as	  one	  among	  three	  modes	  in	  which,	  over	  time,	  the	  Black	  public	  has	  positioned	  itself	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  dominant	  public.	  Accordingly,	  she	  describes	  counterpublics	  mainly	  in	  compari-­‐son	  to	  these	  other	  two	  forms	  (enclaves	  and	  satellite	  publics)	  as	  a	  form	  which	  actively	  engages	  the	  dominant	  public	  in	  order	  to	  challenge,	  and	  eventually	  alter,	  the	  dominant	  public’s	   perceptions,	   opinions	   and	   actions	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   issues	  most	   relevant	  for	  the	  counterpublic	  in	  question.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	  notion	  of	   counter	  publics,	  multiplicity	   in	   the	  public	   sphere	   is	  expressed	   through	  other	  concepts	  as	  well.	  As	  mentioned,	  Squires	  distinguished	   two	  other	   forms	  of	  dominated	  publics	   (enclaves	   and	   satellite	  publics)	  which	  both	   share	  the	  characteristic	  that	  interactions	  with	  the	  dominant	  public	  or	  the	  state	  as	  centre	  of	  authority	  are	  held	  to	  a	  minimum.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  enclave	  is	  a	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  desire	  to	  remain	  safe	  in	  a	  hostile	  and	  violent	  environment	  (she	  evokes	  the	  example	  of	  African	  American	  publics	   in	  the	  American	  South	  prior	  to	  the	  Civil	  War)	  while	   in	  the	  case	  of	  satellite	  publics	   the	   isolation	   is	  a	  self-­‐chosen	  configuration.	  However,	  Fraser	  questions	  whether	  such	  phenomena	  can	  accurately	  be	  described	  as	  publics:	  “Insofar	  as	   these	   arenas	   are	   publics	   they	   are	   by	   definition	   not	   enclaves”	   (Fraser	   1990:	   67).	  Here,	  the	  issue	  lies	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  word	  “public”	  –	  while	  Fraser	  appears	  to	   imagine	   an	   “external”	   publicity,	   where	   a	   public	   is	   only	   a	   public	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	  visible	   to	   non-­‐members	   as	  well,	  while	   Squires	   clearly	   perceives	   of	   publicity	   as	   also	  including	  internal	  publicness,	  where	  discourse	  is	  only	  public	  to	  members	  and	  not	  to	  outsiders:	  “The	  enclave	  is	  signified	  by	  the	  utilization	  of	  spaces	  and	  discourses	  that	  are	  hidden	  from	  the	  view	  of	  the	  dominant	  public	  and	  state”	  (Squires	  2002:	  458).	  	  
While	  all	  these	  conceptualisations	  of	  specific	  manifestations	  of	  multiplicity	  in	  the	  public	   sphere	   assume	   a	   antithetic	   relationship	   of	   dominance	   and	   subordination,	  multiplicity	   can	   also	   be	   conceptualised	   in	   less	   conflicted	   terms.	   To	   be	   sure,	   most	  accounts	  of	  multiplicity	  take	  the	  case	  for	  granted	  wherein	  multiple	  publics	  can	  exist	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  without	  relationships	  of	  direct	  opposition	  (after	  all,	  Warner’s	  account	  of	  a	  multiple	  public	  sphere,	  for	  example,	  assumes	  such	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  multiplicity	  that	  this	   coexistence	   of	   various	   publics	   goes,	   literally,	   without	   saying).	   One	   explicit	  example	   of	   a	   possible	   relationship	  within	   a	  multiple	   public	   sphere,	  which	   does	   not	  necessarily	  relate	  to	  pattern	  of	  domination,	  is	  found	  in	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  description	  of	  “nested	  public	  spheres”.	  According	  to	  Taylor’s	  understanding,	  nested	  public	  spheres	  can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   configuration	   wherein	   “smaller	   public	   spheres	   are	   nested	  within	  larger	  ones,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  what	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  smaller	  ones	  feeds	  into	  and	  has	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   agenda	   of	   the	   national	   sphere”	   (Taylor	   1995:	   208).	   In	   this	  characterisation	   there	   is	   a	   smaller	  public	   (for	   example,	   a	  public	   sphere	  of	   a	   certain	  locality	  within	  a	  country	  or	  that	  of	  a	  political	  party)	  within	  which	  separate	  processes	  of	  public	  opinion	   formation	   take	  place.	  However,	   since	   the	  members	  of	   this	  smaller	  public	  are	  also	  at	  the	  same	  time	  members	  of	  the	  larger	  public	  (hence	  “nested”),	  in	  his	  case	   conceptualised	   as	   “the	   national	   public”,	   these	   processes	   then	   feed	   into	   the	  deliberations	  with	  the	  larger	  public	  as	  one	  of	  many	  streams	  of	  input.	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2.4.4 Re-­‐Thinking	  the	  Public	  Sphere	  Yet	  Again	  –	  Transnationalisation	  
After	  having	  discussed	  possible	  conceptualisations	  of	  multiplicity	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  Nancy	   Fraser	   invites	   us,	   with	   the	   distance	   of	   nearly	   two	   decades,	   to	   re-­‐think	   the	  public	   sphere	   yet	   again	   (Fraser	   2007,	   2008;	   but	   also	   Bell	   2007;	   or	   Nash	   and	   Bell	  2008).	  This	   time	  –	  highly	  relevant	   for	   the	  subject	  matter	  under	   investigation	   in	   this	  thesis	  –	  Fraser	  confronts	  the	  public	  sphere	  theory	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  transnationali-­‐sation;	  namely	  with	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  from	  its	  –	  as	  we	   shall	   see,	   implicit	   –	   foundation	   in	   the	   Westphalian	   state	   concept.	   The	   term	  “Westphalian”	  historically	  refers	  to	  the	  Peace	  of	  Westphalia	  of	  1648,	  which	  ended	  the	  Thirty	  Years	  War	  from	  1618-­‐1648.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  war	  was	  the	  opposition	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  allowing	  individual	  rulers	  to	  adopt	  the	  newly	  established	   Protestantism	   or	   Calvinism	   as	   their	   personal	   and	   state	   religions.	   The	  Treaties	  of	  Westphalia	  resolved	  this	  issue	  by	  reaffirming	  the	  formula	  “cuius	  regio,	  eius	  
religio”	   (“whose	   land,	   his	   religion”)	   which	   has	   been	   formulated	   in	   the	   Peace	   of	  Augsburg	   of	   1555	   and	  which	   allowed	   the	   sovereign	   of	   a	   realm	   alone	   to	   decide	   the	  state	  religion	  (and	  by	  extension	  any	  other	  domestic	  affairs)	  without	  any	  intervention	  of	  external	  forces	  such	  as	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  Reference	  to	  a	  “Westphalian	  system,”	  then,	   –	   as	   it	   is	   used	   here	   –	   refers	   to	   this	   feature:	   that	   the	   sovereign	   (regardless	   of	  whether	   this	   might	   be	   a	   democratic,	   monarchist	   or	   other	   sovereign)	   has	   the	   sole	  authority	  to	  decide	  upon	  domestic	  matters	  of	  the	  realm	  in	  question	  (including	  holding	  the	  monopoly	  of	  force)	  without	  any	  external	  influence.	  The	  Westphalian	  system	  thus	  also	   includes	  the	  existence	  of	  mutually	  recognised	  borders	  to	  demarcate	  the	  area	  of	  sole	  authority	  of	  each	  sovereign	  as	  well	  as	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  right	  and	  power	  of	  these	   sovereigns	   to	   enter	   in	  mutual	   contractual	   and	   legal	   relationship	   by	  means	   of	  mutually	   binding	   bi-­‐	   or	  multilateral	   treaties	   (with	   the	  Treaties	   of	  Westphalia	   being	  the	  first)	  (c.f.	  also	  McLean	  and	  McMillan	  2009)	  
To	  return	  to	  Fraser’s	  invitation	  to	  rethink	  the	  public	  sphere	  beyond	  its	  Westpha-­‐lian	  foundation	  and	  within	  a	  transnational	  context,	  two	  observations	  suggest	  that	  the	  phenomenon	   of	   a	   transnational	   public	   sphere	   has	   empirical	   relevance.	   First,	   the	  transnationalisation	   of	   public	   issues:	   while	   previously	   private	   troubles	   were	  appropriately	  translated	  to	  public	  issues	  on	  the	  national	  or	  sub-­‐national	  level,	  for	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  issues	  only	  some	  sort	  of	  transnational	  level	  can	  be	  imagined	  as	  the	  appropriate	  level	  for	  problem	  resolution,	  with	  climate	  change	  being	  a	  strong	  case	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  in	  point	   for	   this	  argument.	  Second,	   the	   term	  “transnational	  public	   sphere”	  seems	   to	  describe	   an	   actually	   existing	   phenomenon,	   mirrored	   by	   a	   “growing	   body	   of	   […]	  literature	  [that]	   is	  documenting	  the	  existence	  of	  discursive	  arenas	  that	  overflow	  the	  bounds	  of	  both	  nations	  and	  states”	  (Fraser	  2008:	  76).	  These	  observations,	  however,	  represent	  a	  problem	  for	   the	   theory	  of	   the	  public	  sphere	  as	  both	  Habermas’	  original	  description	  as	  well	  as	  later	  improvements	  to	  the	  concept,	  including	  the	  one	  discussed	  above,	  implicitly	  assume	  an	  (at	  least	  approximate)	  mapping	  of	  the	  public	  onto	  a	  state	  in	  the	  Westphalian	  sense.	  
This	   is	   the	   case	  due	   to	   two	  criteria	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	   that	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  discussed.	   According	   to	   Fraser’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   critical	   theory	   of	   the	   public	  sphere,	  a	  public	  sphere	  can	  only	  fulfil	  its	  democratising	  function	  when	  it	  features	  both	  
normative	   legitimacy	   and	   political	   efficacy.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   a	   public	   sphere	   has	   full	  normative	   legitimacy	   if	   (and	   only	   if)	   is	   it	   fully	   inclusive	   of	   all	   citizens	   in	   a	   country,	  who	  are	  also	  enabled	  to	  participate	  as	  real	  equals	  in	  the	  public	  opinion	  formation	  of	  the	   public	   sphere	   (but	   without	   merely	   bracketing	   and	   thus	   hiding	   inequalities).	  Recalling	   her	   own	   critique,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   –	   save	   the	   sudden	   (and	   unlikely)	  disappearance	  of	  stratified	  societies	  –	   the	  criteria	  of	   legitimacy	   is	   thus	  expressed	  as	  an	  ideal	  typical,	  normative	  yard	  stick	  against	  which	  the	  actual	   legitimacy	  of	  actually	  existing	  publics	  can	  be	  assessed.	  Likewise,	  political	  efficacy,	  refers	  to	  a	  process,	  or	  the	  result	  of	  that	  process,	  whereby	  the	  public	  opinion	  generated	  within	  the	  public	  sphere	  gains	  political	  gravitas	  sufficient	  to	  actually	  influence	  political	  decision	  making	  to	  –	  in	  the	   case	   of	   the	   ideal	   type	   –	  match	   the	   public	   opinion,	   thus	   the	   public	   opinion	   has	  become	   politically	   efficacious.	   Again,	   far	   from	   being	   a	   description	   of	   an	   empirical	  reality,	  political	  efficacy	  so	  understood	  was	  rather	  intended	  as	  a	  normative	  device	  of	  the	   critical	   theory	   of	   democracy.	   Collectively,	   both	   concepts	   “are	   essential	   to	   the	  concept	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   in	   critical	   theory.	  Without	   them,	   the	   concept	   loses	   its	  critical	  force	  and	  its	  political	  point”	  (Fraser	  2008:	  77).	  
When	  considering	  these	  two	  criteria	  on	  a	  level	  above	  the	  nation	  state,	  it	  becomes	  quickly	   clear	   that	   this	   introduces	   both	   empirical	   as	   well	   as	   normative	   difficulties.	  Clearly,	   there	   are	   obvious	   empirical	   problems	   of	   demarcation:	   demarcation	   with	  regards	   to	   the	  boundaries	  of	   the	  social	  phenomenon	   in	  question	  (the	   transnational-­‐ised	  public	   sphere)	   as	  well	   as	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   corresponding	   centre	  of	   political	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  authority	   that	   becomes	   the	   focus	   of	   scrutiny	   by	   the	   public	   sphere	   and	   further	   the	  demarcation	  of	  the	  subject	  area	  considered	  in	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  two.	  Fraser,	  however,	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	  normative	  aspect	  of	   the	  problem:	   she	  distinguishes	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  deficit	  of	  political	  efficacy	  and	  the	  deficit	  of	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  with	   the	   latter	  having	   two	  different	  possible	  manifestations:	   first,	   as	   for	  example	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  a	  deficit	  of	  democratic	  legitimacy	  is	  created	  because	  the	   progressing	   transnationalisation	   of	   legislative	   and	   administrative	   bodies	  within	  the	  Union	  is	  not	  matched	  by	  a	  parallel	  European	  public	  sphere	  to	  hold	  these	  bodies	  accountable34.	   In	   the	   reverse	   case,	   on	   the	   global	   level,	   transnational	   publics	   are	  already	   in	   existence	   but	   are	   not	   matched	   up	   by	   comparable	   administrative	   and	  legislative	  centres	  of	  power.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  deficit	  of	  political	  efficacy,	  she	  invokes	  the	   example	   which	   has	   already	   been	   referred	   to	   above:	   “the	   worldwide	   anti-­‐war	  demonstrations	   of	   February	   15,	   2003,	   which	   mobilized	   an	   enormous	   body	   of	  transnational	  public	  opinion	  against	  the	  impending	  US	  invasion	  of	  Iraq.	  Although	  this	  outpouring	   of	   opinion	   could	   not	   have	   been	   more	   forceful	   or	   clear,	   it	   lacked	   an	  addressee	   capable	   of	   restraining	   George	   W.	   Bush,	   and	   so,	   in	   a	   sense,	   remained	  powerless”	  (cit.	  in	  Nash	  and	  Bell	  2008:	  156).	  
The	  question	  then,	  becomes	  whether	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  can	  be	  sal-­‐vaged	   for	   the	   empirical	   and	   normative	   analysis	   of	   a	   level	   beyond	   the	  Westphalian	  state	   or	  whether	   is	   has	   to	   be	   abandoned.	   Fraser	   suggests	   that	   such	   a	   concept	   of	   a	  transnational	   public	   sphere	   “is	   indispensable	   […]	   to	   those	   who	   aim	   to	   reconstruct	  critical	   theory	   in	   the	   current	   ‘postnational	   constellation’”	   (Fraser	   2008:	   77).	   This	  endeavour	  requires	  a	  comprehensive	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  a	  dismantling	  of	  the	  concept	  in	  its	  nation-­‐state-­‐based	  incarnation	  and	  its	  subsequent	  re-­‐assembling	   on	   the	   transnational	   level.	   Given	   the	   deep	   embeddedness	   of	   the	  Westphalian	  understanding	  in	  the	  theory	  and	  critique	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  however,	  this	  presents	  itself	  as	  a	  rather	  difficult	  undertaking.	  Without	  wanting	  to	  elaborate	  in	  detail	  Fraser’s	  convincing	  discussion	  of	  both	  the	  implicit	  and	  explicit	  entanglement	  of	  Westphalian	  system	  and	  public	  sphere	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  Westphali-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  	   Habermas	  would	   likely	   disagree	  with	   this	   characterisation.	  As	  Boutang	   summarises,	  Habermas,	  together	  with	  Derrida,	  argues	  that	  “even	  if	  one	  cannot	  at	  the	  moment	  find	  something	  approaching	  a	  European	  demos,	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  European	  public	  opinion	  is	  henceforth	  effective	  and	  opens	  the	  way	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  federal	  state	  which	  will	  in	  time	  replace	  the	  nation-­‐states”	  (Boutang	  2007:	  72,	  original	  emphasis).	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  an	  underpinnings	  represent	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  re-­‐imagining	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  on	  a	  transnational	  scale,	  it	  is	  worth	  quotinh	  her	  interim	  conclusions	  about	  this	  challenge	  in	  full:	   In	   general,	   then,	   public	   spheres	   are	   increasingly	   transnational	   or	  postnational	   with	   respect	   to	   each	   of	   the	   constitutive	   elements	   of	  public	   opinion.	   The	   "who"	   of	   communication,	   previously	   theorized	  as	  a	  Westphalian-­‐national	  citizenry,	  is	  often	  now	  a	  collection	  of	  dis-­‐persed	  interlocutors,	  who	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  demos.	  The	  "what"	  of	  communication,	  previously	   theorized	  as	  a	  Westphalian-­‐national	   in-­‐terest	   rooted	   in	   a	   Westphalian-­‐national	   economy,	   now	   stretches	  across	   vast	   reaches	   of	   the	   globe,	   in	   a	   transnational	   community	   of	  risk,	   which	   is	   not,	   however,	   reflected	   in	   concomitantly	   expansive	  solidarities	  and	  identities.	  The	  "where"	  of	  communication,	  once	  the-­‐orized	   as	   the	  Westphalian-­‐national	   territory,	   now	   increasingly	   oc-­‐cupies	   deterritorialized	   cyberspace.	   The	   "how"	   of	   communication,	  once	   theorized	   as	   Westphalian-­‐national	   print	   media,	   now	   encom-­‐passes	  a	  vast	  translinguistic	  nexus	  of	  disjoint	  and	  overlapping	  visual	  cultures.	   Finally,	   the	   "to	   whom"	   or	   addressee	   of	   communication,	  once	   theorized	   as	   a	   sovereign	   territorial	   state,	   which	   should	   be	  made	   answerable	   to	   public	   opinion,	   is	   now	   an	   amorphous	  mix	   of	  public	  and	  private	  transnational	  powers	  that	  is	  neither	  easily	  identi-­‐fiable	  nor	  rendered	  accountable.	   (Fraser	  2008:	  92)	  Given	   all	   these	   problems	   with	   separating	   the	   public	   sphere	   from	   its	   Westphalian	  frame	  of	  reference,	  and	  explicitly	  stating	  that	  she	  “shall	  not	  pretend	  to	  answer	  them,”	  Fraser	  suggests	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  two	  features	  that	  have	  been	  briefly	  introduced	  above	  and	  which,	  in	  her	  analysis,	  represent	  the	  main	  value	  of	  public	  sphere	  theory	  to	  critical	  theorising:	   the	   normative	   legitimacy	   and	   the	   political	   efficacy	   of	   public	   opinion.	   In	  further	   abstracting	   these	   principles	   to	   a	   level	  where	   they	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   both	   a	  public	   that	  matches	   up	  with	   a	   territorially	   bounded	   state	   in	   the	  Westphalian	   sense	  (although	  she	  would	  probably	  assert	  that	  this	   is	  an	   increasingly	  problematic	  way	  of	  thinking	   about	   publicity)	   as	  well	   as	   one	   that	   is	   transnational	   in	   nature,	   the	   critical	  theory	  of	  publicity	  is	  further	  enriched.	  
Specifically,	  she	  identifies	  two	  conditions	  that	  have	  always	  underpinned	  the	  norm	  of	   normative	   legitimacy:	   the	   inclusiveness	   condition	   and	   the	   parity	   condition,	  with	  the	  former	  being	  concerned	  with	  the	  requirement	  that	  everybody	  who	  has	  a	  stake	  in	  the	   matters	   under	   consideration	   by	   the	   public	   sphere	   should	   have	   the	   chance	   to	  participate	  and	  the	  latter	  being	  concerned	  about	  the	  communicative	  practices	  of	  the	  public,	   where	   participants	   must	   have	   approximately	   equal	   chances	   to	   effectively	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  “state	   their	   views,	   place	   issues	   on	   the	   agenda,	   question	   the	   tacit	   and	   explicit	  assumptions	  of	  others,	  switch	  levels	  as	  needed,	  and	  generally	  receive	  a	  fair	  hearing”	  (Fraser	   2008:	   93).	  While	   political	   citizenship	   offered	   a	   suitable	  model	   to	  meet	   the	  inclusiveness	  condition	  within	  the	  Westphalian	  frame35	  and	  thus	  the	  parity	  condition	  received	   most	   attention	   of	   critical	   theory	   of	   the	   public	   sphere,	   the	   inclusiveness	  condition	  must	  now	  be	  reformulated.	  Fraser	  suggests	  that	  the	  “all-­‐affected	  principle”	  (everybody	  who	   is	   affected	   by	   a	   certain	   issue	   should	   have	   a	   say	   in	   formation	   of	   a	  public	   opinion	   on	   this	   issue)	   already	   formulated	   for	   the	   public	   sphere	   of	   the	  Westphalian	   frame	   should	   be	   abandoned	   for	   the	   more	   appropriate	   “all-­‐subjected	  principle,”	  which,	  in	  a	  nutshell	  states	  	  that	  what	  turns	  a	  collection	  of	  people	  into	  fellow	  members	  of	  a	  pub-­‐lic	  is	  not	  shared	  citizenship,	  or	  co-­‐imbrication	  in	  a	  causal	  matrix,	  but	  rather	  their	  joint	  subjection	  to	  a	  structure	  of	  governance	  that	  set	  the	  ground	  rules	  for	  their	  interaction.	  For	  any	  given	  problem,	  according-­‐ly,	   the	   relevant	   public	   should	   match	   the	   reach	   of	   the	   governance	  structure	   that	   regulates	   the	   relevant	   swath	   of	   social	   interaction.	  Where	   such	   structures	   transgress	   the	   borders	   of	   states,	   the	   corre-­‐sponding	   public	   spheres	   must	   be	   transnational.	   Failing	   that,	   the	  opinion	  that	  they	  generate	  cannot	  be	  considered	  legitimate.	   	  	   (Fraser	  2008:	  96)	  The	   inclusiveness	   condition	   so	   redefined	   certainly	   already	   represents	   a	   demanding	  component	  for	  assessing	  the	  normative	  legitimacy	  of	  actually	  existing	  public	  spheres.	  However,	   this	   assessment	   becomes	   even	  more	   demanding	  when	   this	   inclusiveness	  condition	   is	   combined	  with	   the	   parity	   condition,	   i.e.	   when	   demanding	   that	   at	   least	  rough	   communicative	   parity	   exists	   between	   the	   individuals	   thus	   combined	   into	   a	  public.	   However	   demanding,	   though,	   this	   definition	   does	   represent	   a	   sufficiently	  specific	  and	  thus	  usable	  normative	  yardstick	  that	  can	  be	  employed	  to	  think	  about	  the	  normative	   legitimacy	   of	   actually	   existing	   publics	   (and	   therefore	   it	   certainly	   fulfils	  Fraser’s	  self-­‐imposed	  aim	  of	  maintaining	  the	  “critical	  edge”	  of	  a	  critical	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  	   Fraser	  submits	  that	  this,	  the	  convenient	  matching	  of	  the	  citizenship	  of	  a	  Westphalian	  state	  to	  the	  maximum	  extent	  of	   a	  public	   sphere,	   truncated	   the	  discussion	  of	   legitimacy	  as	   the	   inclusiveness	  condition	   was	   removed	   from	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   critical	   theorist.	   Thus,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   re-­‐thinking	   this	   condition	   for	   the	   transnational	   level	   also	   improves	   critical	   theory	   within	   the	   old	  Westphalian	  frame.	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  With	  regards	  to	  the	  second	  feature	  with	  which	  the	  critical	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	   concerned	   –	   political	   efficacy	   –	   Fraser	   further	   separates	   this	   criterion	   into	   the	  translation	   condition	   and	   the	   capacity	   condition,	   where	   the	   former	   refers	   to	   the	  translation	  of	  the	  public	  opinion	  first	  into	  binding	  laws	  and	  secondly	  into	  administra-­‐tive	  power	  (hence,	  it	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  “flow	  of	  communicative	  power	  from	  civil	  society	   to	   an	   instituted	  public	   power”	   (Fraser	  2008:	   97)),	  while	   the	   latter	   refers	   to	  sufficient	   capacity	   or	   ability	   of	   the	   relevant	   centre	   of	   authority	   (e.g.	   a	   state,	   in	   the	  Westphalian	  case)	  to	  implement	  the	  collective	  will	  of	  the	  public,	  “both	  negatively,	  by	  reining	   in	   private	   powers,	   and	   positively,	   by	   solving	   its	   problems	   and	   organizing	  common	   life	   in	   accord	  with	   its	  wishes”	   (ibid).	  While	   having	   been	   able	   to	   present	   a	  workable	  solution	  for	  the	  problem	  of	  normative	   legitimacy,	  Fraser	   is	   less	  successful	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   aspect	   of	   political	   efficacy.	   She	   concedes	   that	   existing	   public	  sphere	   theory	   is	  not	  helpful	   in	   this	   regard	  and	   that	   this	  question	  will	   require	  more	  work.	  However,	   she	   nonetheless	   provides	   some	   important	   clues	   toward	   that	  work,	  including	  conclusions	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  work	  that	  will	  need	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  by,	  so	  we	   need	   to	   assume,	   a	   transnational	   civil	   society:	   specifically,	   “it	  must	   consider	   the	  need	   to	   construct	   new	   addressees	   for	   public	   opinion,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   new,	   transna-­‐tional	  public	  powers	   that	  possess	   the	  administrative	  capacity	   to	  solve	   transnational	  problems”	  (Fraser	  2008:	  98,	  emphasis	  added)	  and	  subsequently	  subject	  them	  to	  the	  accountability	  of	  the	  new	  transnational	  public	  sphere.	  
This	  last	  point,	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  addressees,	  seems	  a	  bit	  unfortunate	  as	  it	  introduces	   an	   element	   of	   circularity	   to	   an	   otherwise	   very	   convincing	   endeavour.	  Granted,	  Fraser	  admits	  that	  she	  does	  not	  currently	  have	  an	  answer	  to	  offer	  for	  the	  re-­‐conceptualisation	   of	   the	   political	   efficacy	   problem	   on	   the	   transnational	   level.	  Furthermore,	  her	  empirical	  observations	  that	  there	   is	  an	  actually	  existing	  phenome-­‐non	  that	  can	  be	  adequately	  described	  as	  a	   transnational	  public	  sphere	  and	  that	   this	  phenomenon	   is	   characterised	   by	   a	   lack	   of	   political	   efficacy	   (recall	   her	   anti-­‐Iraq	  example)	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   matching	   centres	   of	   political	   authority,	   the	  need	   to	   create	   transnational	   institutions	   that	   could	  become,	  as	   it	  were,	   the	   focus	  of	  the	   transnational	   publics’	   deliberations	   seem	   understandable.	   However,	   since	   her	  definition	   of	   the	   boundaries	   of	   any	   given	   public	   requires	   as	   a	   prerequisite	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  transnational	  governance	  structure	  (per	  “all-­‐subjected	  principle”),	  this	  issue	  presents	   itself	  as	  the	  proverbial	  chicken-­‐and-­‐egg	  problem.	  Clearly,	   this	  merely	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  indicates,	  as	  Fraser	  is	  the	  first	  to	  acknowledge,	  that	  more	  theorising	  is	  required	  in	  this	  respect.	   Perhaps,	   the	   “all-­‐affected	   principle”	   –	   which	   states	   that	   the	   inclusiveness	  condition	   is	  met	   if	   (and	  only	   if)	  all	   individuals	  who	  are	  affected	  by	  a	  given	  problem	  are	  in	  principle	  able	  to	  participate	  adequately	  in	  the	  relevant	  public,	  and	  which	  Fraser	  had	  abandoned	   in	   favour	   for	   the	   “all-­‐subjected	  principle”	  –	   is	   the	  more	  appropriate	  mode	  of	  demarcation	  of	  any	  given	  public	  after	  all?	  Or	  is	  this	  issue	  in	  fact	  a	  non-­‐issue	  given	  that,	  over	  time,	  the	  discursive	  actions	  within	  the	  new,	  transnational	  publics	  will	  give	   rise	   to	   transnational	   governance	   institutions	   akin	   to	   the	   structural	   transfor-­‐mation	  of	  the	  weak	  publics	  of	  mere	  public	  discourse	  into	  strong	  publics	  of	  the	  “public	  spheres-­‐cum-­‐decision-­‐making-­‐bodies”	   that	   characterise	   the	   double	   function	   of	  parliaments	  in	  parliamentary	  democracies	  (c.f.	  her	  earlier	  work	  on	  strong	  and	  weak	  publics	   in	  Fraser	  1990)?	  Or	  possibly,	  as	  suggested	  elsewhere	   (Cassegard	  2011),	   the	  task	  of	  constructing	  transnational	  governance	  structures	  is	  merely	  to	  then	  be	  able	  to	  hold	   them	   accountable	   is	   not	   at	   all	   a	   task	   for	   civil	   society	   itself	   and	   that	   therefore,	  efficacy	  should	  be	  considered	  secondary	  to	  legitimacy	  and	  should	  thus	  not	  preoccupy	  a	  critical	  theory	  of	  transnational	  publics	  too	  much?	  
Clearly	  these	  questions	  point	  toward	  a	  need	  to	  further	  elaborate	  these	  problems,	  but	   can	   also	   serve	   as	   important	   markers	   to	   inform	   this	   theorising	   as	   well	   as	   the	  empirical	  work	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  inform	  the	  critical	  theory	  so	  developed.	  
2.5 Climate	  Action	  Network	  in	  the	  Literature	  
Although	  quite	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  exist	  –	  too	  many	  to	  review	  here	  comprehensively	  –	   that	   deal	   with	   the	   UNFCCC	   system	   from	   varying	   angles	   or	   specific	   policy	   areas	  within	  that	  system,	  a	  few	  works	  are	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  this	  research	  and	  should	  therefore	  receive	  some	  focused	  attention.	  	  
In	  particular,	  the	  case	  study	  work	  of	  Simone	  Pulver	  (2004a,	  2004b,	  2005)	  relates	  well	  to	  the	  thesis	  unfolding	  here,	  as	  she	  concludes	  in	  her	  own	  study	  that	  the	  UNFCCC	  system	   represents	   a	   political	   space	   that	   can	   be	   described	   as	   a	   Habermasian	   public	  sphere.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  based	  on	  her	  observation	  that,	  at	  least	  initially,	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	   was	   “a	   forum	   for	   rational	   deliberation	   about	   the	   shared	   global	   interest	   in	  protecting	   the	   planet’s	   climate	   system,”	   (Pulver	   2004a:	   276)	   thus	   fulfilling	   at	   least	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  two	   of	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   criteria	   of	   a	   functioning	   public	   sphere	   as	   described	   above.	   She	  largely	   gives	   credit	   for	   the	   prevalence	   of	   rational	   deliberation	   based	   on	   scientific	  information	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  to	  the	  environmental	  organizations	  involved	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  from	  the	  beginning.	  This	  view	  is	  also	  echoed	  by	  Peter	  Newell	  (2000),	  who	  explains	  how	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  framework	  from	  scientifically-­‐oriented	  conferences	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Climate	  Conferences	  in	  Geneva	  in	  1979	  and	  1990	  contributed	  to	  the	  strong	  standing	  of	  scientific	  argument	  within	  the	  regime.	  	  
Before	  that	  backdrop,	  Pulver’s	  main	  contribution	  is	  her	  conclusion	  that	  ENGOs	  –	  with	  CAN	  and	  some	  of	  its	  member	  organisations	  representing	  her	  central	  case	  studies	  –	  were	  much	  better	  positioned	  to	  “leverage	  the	  power	  in	  the	  public	  sphere”	  (Pulver	  2004a:	  70)	  since	  they	  managed	  to	  align	  their	  arguments	  with	  the	  discursive	  terrain	  of	  the	  UN	  climate	  negotiations,	  which	   is	  based	  on	   “a	  global	  outlook	  and	  science-­‐based	  environmental	  stewardship	  as	  normative	  elements	  of	  the	  public	  good”	  (Pulver	  2004a:	  259).	   In	  contrast,	  oil	   companies	  –	   the	  other	  group	   from	  which	  Pulver’s	  case	  studies	  are	  drawn	  –	  were	  not	  successfully	  navigating	  this	  discursive	  terrain.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  were	  not	  generally	  persuasive	  when	  arguing	  that	  their	  private	  interests	  were,	  in	  fact,	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   all.	   This	   failure,	   as	   Pulver	   suggests,	   is	   the	   reason	   for	   the	  dissolution	   of	   the	   Global	   Climate	   Coalition,	   an	   association	   of	   the	  world’s	   largest	   oil	  companies	  that	  was	  led	  by	  Exxon	  and	  which	  was	  very	  active	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  UN	  climate	  negotiations.	  	  
Interestingly,	  Pulver	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  UNFCCC	  after	  the	  Kyoto	  COP	  in	  1997	  no	  longer	  represents	  a	  Habermasian	  public	  sphere.	  This	  was	  due	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  highly	  technically	  complex	  mechanisms	  through	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  such	  as	  carbon	  trading	  and	  the	  CDM,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  negotiations	  moved	  to	  a	  very	  technical	  level	  to	   spell	   out	   all	   the	   details	   of	   these	   mechanisms.	   These	   more	   technically-­‐oriented	  negotiations,	  then,	  lacked	  the	  clear	  focus	  on	  the	  common	  good	  that	  characterised	  the	  pre-­‐Kyoto	   negotiations	   as	   Habermasian:	   “After	   the	   Kyoto	   conference,	   the	   public	  sphere	   of	   the	   UN	   climate	   negotiations	   lost	   some	   of	   its	   critical	   power.	   As	   expert	  deliberation	   over	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   trading	   came	   to	   dominate	   the	   work	  programme	   of	   the	   COPs,	   their	   role	   as	   a	   forum	   for	   public	   debate	   declined”	   (Pulver	  2004a:	   278).	   Given	   the	   historical	   character	   of	   Pulver’s	   work	   (covering	   the	   period	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  from	  1991	  to	  2003),	  and	  the	  empirical	  focus	  of	  this	  research,	  a	  comparison	  between	  her	   findings	   and	   the	   findings	   of	   this	   research	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   public	   sphere	  character	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  during	  my	  own	  field	  work	  promises	  to	  be	  enlightening.	  	  
Another	   study	   that	   should	   receive	   some	   targeted	  discussion	   is	   that	   of	  Matthias	  Duwe	  (2000).	  His	  research	  into	  the	  internal	  power	  dynamics	  of	  CAN,	  largely	  based	  on	  fieldwork	  during	  and	  around	  the	  July	  2000	  UNFCCC	  session	  in	  Bonn,	  focused	  on	  the	  dynamic	   relationship	   between	   CAN	   members	   from	   developing	   and	   developed	  countries.	   He	   provides	   a	   useful	   account	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   dynamics	   between	  Northern	  and	  Southern	  CAN	  member	  organisations	  at	  that	  time	  and	  offers	  a	  typology	  to	   aid	  more	   systematic	   understanding	   of	   the	  different	   perspectives	  with	   regards	   to	  two	  dimensions	   that	  he	  perceives	  as	  crucially	   impacting	   these	  dynamics:	   first,	  what	  he	   calls	   the	   ‘priority-­‐paradigm	   dimension’	   identifies	   different	   approaches	   of	  prioritising	   between	   equity	   and	   environment	   within	   the	   international	   response	   to	  climate	  change,	  and	  secondly,	  a	  dimension	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  member	  organizations’	  own	  analyses	  of	  CAN’s	  structure	  and	  performance	  (i.e.	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  perceive	  the	  network	  as	  functioning	  as	  a	  single	  voice	  and	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  impact	  that	  they	  perceive	   the	  North-­‐South	   divide	   to	   have	   on	   the	   internal	   dynamics	   of	   the	   network).	  Using	  this	  typology,	  he	  is	  able	  to	  systematically	  assess	  the	  power	  differentials	  within	  the	   network	   and	   how	   certain	   shared	   experiences	   can	   act	   either	   as	   empowering	   or	  frustrating	  depending	  on	  a	  member	  organisation’s	  position	  within	  the	  typology.	  
His	  overall	  assessment	  is	  that,	  generally	  speaking,	  CAN	  members	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  power	   dynamics	   between	   member	   organisations	   from	   developing	   and	   developed	  countries,	   and	   that	   “CAN	   has	   institutionalised	   the	   inclusion	   of	   underrepresented	  views	  to	  some	  extent	  and	  that	  there	  are	  valuable	  initiatives	  to	  facilitate	  co-­‐operation”	  (Duwe	   2000:	   43).	   He	   further	   agues	   that	   “the	   degree	   to	   which	   co-­‐operation	   and	  support	   have	   been	   happening	   so	   far	   is	   quite	   an	   achievement,	   which	   stands	   out	   in	  comparison	  to	  other	  [NGO]	  networks”	  in	  similar	  political	  settings	  (Duwe	  2000:	  43).	  
A	   very	   striking	   parallel	   between	  Duwe’s	  work	   and	   the	   conclusions	   of	   Pulver	   is	  that	   both	   point	   toward	   the	   increased	   technical	   complexity	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotia-­‐tions	   after	  Kyoto	   as	   a	   fact	   that	   is	   negatively	   impacting	   the	  discursive	  quality	   of	   the	  public	   sphere.	   Pulver	   refers	   to	   the	   entire	   UNFCCC	   public	   while	   Duwe,	   without	  explicitly	   referring	   to	   it	   as	   a	   public	   sphere,	   focuses	   on	   the	   CAN-­‐internal	   public	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  wherein	   he	   perceives	   a	   decline	   in	   a	   chance	   for	   discursive	   equity	   as	   a	   result	   of	   this	  increased	   technical	   complexity	   within	   the	   negotiations,	   which	   “alienates	   certain	  [Southern]	  parts”	  of	  CAN	  (Duwe	  2000:	  43).	  As	  mentioned	  before,	   this	  assessment	   is	  important	   for	   this	   research,	   as	   the	   fieldwork	   period,	   which	   is	   described	   in	   greater	  detail	   in	  chapter	  4,	   featured	  both	  the	  high-­‐level	  political	  deliberations	  characteristic	  of	  the	  pre-­‐Kyoto	  era	  as	  well	  as	  an	  on-­‐going	  focus	  on	  the	  technically-­‐implementation-­‐oriented	  negotiations	  that	  started	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  	  
Furthermore,	   also	   writing	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   millennium	   is	   Peter	   Newell	   who	  offers	   a	   very	   thorough	   and	   complete	   (and	   possibly	   the	   first	   of	   this	   level	   of	   detail)	  account	   of	   the	   role	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	   international	   climate	   change	   politics.	  Grounded	   initially	   in	   an	   International	   Relations	   (IR)	   perspective,	   Newell	   highlights	  the	   shortcomings	   of	   that	   perspective	   –	   especially	   those	   of	   the	   regime-­‐focused	  approaches	  within	   IR	  –	   to	   satisfactorily	  explain	   the	  actually	  observable	   influence	  of	  non-­‐state	   actors	   on	   international	   regimes.	  His	   analysis	   then	   goes	   in	   turn	   through	   a	  variety	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  (the	  scientific	  community,	  the	  media,	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  lobbies	  and	  environmental	  NGOs,	  with	  CAN	  representing	  one	  central	  case	  study	  for	  the	  latter)	  and	  analyses	   in	  detail	   the	  mechanics	  of	   their	   influence.	  Using	  elements	   from	  regime	  approaches	   within	   IR	   theory,	   Newell	   considers	   their	   impact	   at	   the	   agenda-­‐setting,	  negotiating/bargaining	   and	   implementation	   stages	   of	   the	   overall	   political	   process.	  While	   his	   chapter	   on	   environmental	   NGOs	   provides	   some	   useful	   insight	   into	   the	  dynamics	   within	   the	   ENGO	   community	   (including	   CAN)	   during	   the	   time	   period	  covered	  by	  his	   research	   (pre-­‐2000),	  his	   conclusions	  offer	  a	   theoretical	   contribution	  about	  the	  role	  that	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can	  play	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  states	  in	  international	  regimes	  that	   is	  useful	   for	  this	  research.	  His	  research	  aims	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  following	  observa-­‐tion:	  “if	  [non-­‐state	  actors]	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  perform	  traditional	  regime	  functions,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  they	  can	  significantly	  determine	  the	  prospects	  of	  cooperation.	  Key	  issues	  such	   as	   free-­‐riding,	   iterative	   decision-­‐making,	   information	   exchange	   and	   the	  stabilisation	  of	  states'	  expectations,	  which	  are	  so	  prevalent	   in	   the	  regime	   literature,	  are	   strongly	   affected	   by	   the	   participation	   of	   [non-­‐state	   actors]”	   (Newell	   2000:	   25).	  The	   conclusion,	   then,	   is	   that	   there	   is	   a	   strong	   "case	   that	   state	   preferences	   can	   be	  conditioned	  by	  NGOs,	   [and	   that]	   […]	  many	  of	   the	   functions	   that	   have	   thus	   far	   been	  attributed	   to	   regimes	  may	   be	   shown	   to	   be	   the	   product	   of	  NGO	   influences"	   (Newell	  2000:	  26).	  Although	  coming	   from	  a	  different	   theoretical	  background,	  Newell’s	  work	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  shares	   the	  specific	  empirical	   focus	  of	  my	  own	  research	  to	  some	  degree	  and	   for	   that	  reason	   these	   conclusions	   are	   important	   as	   they	   support	   the	   argument	   that	   is	  unfolding	  here:	  that	  non-­‐state	  actors	  play	  an	  important	  role	   in	   international	  politics	  and	   international	   political	   regimes	   (for	   example,	   through	   their	   participation	   in	   or	  formation	  of	   various	  public	   spheres,	   or	  by	  being	  part	  of	  Global	  Civil	   Society)	  which	  can	  only	  be	  fully	  understood	  if	  substantial	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  literature	  discussed	  here	  in	  detail,	  there	  are	  a	  growing	  number	  of	   works	   that	   report	   on	   research	   into	   various	   aspects	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   regime	   (e.g.	  Depledge	   2005;	   Gulbrandsen	   and	   Andresen	   2004;	   McGregor	   2010;	   Westerlind-­‐Wigström	  2008;	  Yamin	  and	  Depledge	  2004;	  Yamin	  2001),	  the	  international	  environ-­‐mental	  movement	  (Alcock	  2008;	  Carter	  2007;	  Pellow	  et	  al.	  2001;	  Perron	  et	  al.	  2001;	  Waddell	  2001,	  2003;	  Walk	  and	  Brunnengräber	  2000)	  or	  international	  climate	  politics	  more	   generally	   (Brunnengräber	   et	   al.	   2008;	   Giddens	   2011).	   Many	   of	   these	   works	  routinely	  include	  discussions	  of	  CAN	  and	  its	  history,	  including	  acknowledgment	  of	  its	  central	   role	  within	   the	  overall	   group	  of	   environmental	  NGOs	   that	  participate	   in	   the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations.	  While	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  these	  works	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	   this	  section,	   insights	  drawn	  from	  this	   literature	  base	  will	  be	   included	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  where	  appropriate.	  
2.6 Conclusions	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   aimed	   to	   provide	   a	   theoretical	   background	   for	   this	   thesis	   by	  reviewing	  a	  number	  of	  distinct,	  yet	  related,	  bodies	  of	   literature	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  subject	  matter	  dealt	  with	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
First,	  I	  provided	  a	  very	  brief	  introduction	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  globalisation	  which	  has	  been	   used	   to	   portray	   the	   processes,	   actors,	   dynamics	   and	   institutions	   of	   an	   ever	  increasing	   global	   interconnectedness	   and	   interdependence	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  political,	  the	   economic	   and	   the	   social.	   In	   particular,	   in	   a	   nutshell,	   globalisation	   has	   been	  characterised	   as	   the	   process	   in	  which	   economic	   processes	   are	   becoming	  more	   and	  more	   integrated,	   creating	   inter	   alia	   global	   markets,	   international	   competition	   and	  transnational	  corporations,	  and	  as	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  global	  economic	  processes	  (as	   they	   moved	   into	   a	   “political	   vacuum”)	   have	   created	   the	   need	   for	   matching	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  globalisation	   of	   political	   institutions	   variably	   enabling	   and	   regulating	   the	   economic	  globalisation.	   In	  addition	   these	  globalisations	  gave	  rise	   to	  alternative	  globalisations,	  including	   the	   development	   of	   a	   transnational	   (or	   global)	   civil	   society	   as	   a	   counter-­‐force	   to	   both	  political	   and	   economic	   globalisation,	   including	   the	  development	   of	   an	  anti-­‐globalisation	  movement.	  
As	   one	  of	   the	  developments	   associated	  with	   globalisation	   (and	   certainly	   one	  of	  the	  most	   relevant	   for	   this	   thesis),	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   global	   civil	   society	   received	  further	   consideration.	   In	   particular,	   I	   discussed	   the	   historical	   development	   of	   the	  concept	   of	   (territorially	   bounded)	   civil	   society	   from	   the	   early	   understanding	   as	  simply	  a	  society	  that	  is	  characterised	  by	  its	  being	  civilised	  (as	  opposed	  to	  barbarian)	  via	  an	  emphasis	  on	  a	  society	  established	  through	  and	  expecting	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  to	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  the	  realm	  that	  is	  not	  the	  state	  and	  further	  as	  a	  civil	  society	  of	  voluntary	  associations.	  Turning	  to	  the	  question	  of	  a	  global	  or	  transna-­‐tional	   civil	   society	   the	   problem	   arose	   to	   what	   degree	   this	   phenomenon	   should	   be	  understood	  merely	  as	  an	  extension	  (by	  metaphor)	  of	  the	  already	  familiar,	  territorially	  bounded	   civil	   society	   or	   a	   civil	   society	   that	   gradually	   transcended	   its	   former	  territorial	   fixation	   or	   a	   completely	   new	   phenomenon.	   In	   this	   context,	   attempts	   to	  define	   global	   civil	   society	   have	   been	   discussed	   and	   a	   number	   of	   criticisms	   of	   the	  concept	   have	   been	   heard.	   Finally,	   the	   important	   question	   whether	   the	   realm	   of	  economic	   activity	   should	   be	   considered	   part	   of	   the	   (both	   domestic	   as	   well	   as	  transnational)	   civil	   society	   has	   been	   discussed	   including	   the	   development	   of	   this	  question	   over	   time,	   and	   a	   preference	   for	   a	   conceptualisation	   of	   civil	   society	   that	  excludes	   the	  economic	  realm	  and	  thus	  poises	  civil	   society	  against	  both	   the	  realm	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  market	  has	  been	  defended.	  
Subsequently,	  I	  provided	  a	  brief	  excursus	  into	  social	  movement	  literature	  in	  the	  middle	   section	   of	   the	   chapter.	   After	   which,	   the	   focus	   moved	   onto	   the	   body	   of	  literature	  that	  discusses	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  The	  concept	  of	  public	  sphere	  was	  identified	  as	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  chapter,	  global	  civil	  society.	   In	  particular,	   the	  public	   sphere	   is	   said	   to	  be	   the	   locus	  of	   the	   formulation	  of	  public	  opinion	  with	  the	  aim	  of	   influencing	  (or	  supporting)	  political	  decision-­‐making	  within	   the	   realm	   of	   the	   state,	   an	   activity	   that	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   functions	   of	   civil	  society.	   Indeed,	  Habermas	  has	  differentiated	   the	  public	   and	  private	   spheres	   of	   civil	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  society	   (with	   the	   latter	   including	   the	   economic	   sphere	   of	   the	   market	   place	   and	  domestic	  sphere	  of	  the	  family)	  and	  given	  the	  preference	  developed	  earlier	  to	  exclude	  the	  economic	  realm	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society,	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  sphere	  and	  that	  of	  a	  civil	  society	  as	  thus	  understood	  map	  onto	  each	  other	  relatively	  closely.	  
The	  discussion	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  then,	  was	  divided	  in	  four	  sections:	  the	  first	  of	  which	  was	  reserved	   to	  clarifying	   the	  original	   formulation	  of	  a	  public	  sphere	   theory,	  while	  the	  other	  sections	  focused	  on	  different	  ways	  of	  expanding	  and	  improving	  upon	  this	   concept.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   endeavours,	   following	  Nancy	   Fraser,	   had	   the	   aim	  of	  improving	   a	   critical	   theory	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   in	   light	   of	   the	   empirical	   lessons	  learned	   from	   “actually	   existing	   democracies”	   and	   the	   stratified	   society	   associated	  with	   these	   democracies.	   Secondly,	   starting	   from	   an	   emerging	   agreement	   in	   the	  literature	   that	   public	   sphere	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   a	   multiplicity	   rather	   than	   a	  monolithic	   singularity,	   a	  number	  of	  different	   conceptualisations	  of	   such	  multiplicity	  were	   discussed,	   most	   notably	   the	   ideas	   of	   “counterpublics”	   and	   “nested	   public	  spheres”.	   Thirdly,	   again	   focussing	   on	   Fraser’s	   work,	   I	   noted	   the	   observed	   rise	   of	  “transnationalised	   public	   spheres”	   and	   the	   realisation	   that	   previous	   public	   sphere	  theory	  fails	  to	  adapt	  to	  this	  new	  situation	  due	  to	  its	  inextricable	  association	  with	  the	  Westphalian	   frame	   that	   was	   implicitly	   the	   foundation	   of	   Habermas’	   original	  formulation	   as	   well	   as	   all	   previous	   critique.	   This	   requires	   a	   re-­‐think	   of	   the	   public	  sphere	  on	  a	  transnational	  level.	  
While	   the	   latter	   of	   these	   critiques	   (which	   provides	   some	   guidance	   toward	   the	  application	   of	   a	   critical	   theory	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   at	   the	   transnational	   level)	   is	  clearly	   of	   particular	   relevance	   to	   the	   thesis	   unfolding	   here,	   the	   first	   critique	   (and,	  indeed,	  Habermas’	   own	   contribution)	   likewise	   offers	   valuable	   lessons.	   In	   particular	  Fraser’s	   work	   sensitises	   the	   analyst	   of	   public	   spheres	   to	   issues	   of	   domination,	  exclusion	  and	  power	  differentials	  between	  actual	  and	  potential	  participants	  in	  public	  spheres	  as	  well	  as	  in	  matters	  of	  communicative	  practice	  and	  admission	  or	  exclusion	  of	  issues	  from	  consideration	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  She	  also	  offers	  a	  conceptualisation	  (as	   well	   as	   a	   normative	   justification	   for	   the	   preference)	   of	   a	   structure	   of	  multiple,	  competing	   public	   spheres,	   where	   she	   distinguishes	   between	   the	   hegemonic	   public	  and	   additional	   subaltern	   counterpublics	  which	   can	   provide	   temporary	   isolation	   for	  subordinate	  groups	  to	  establish	  alternative	  language	  to	  be	  able	  to	  describe	  and	  define	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  their	  grievances	  before	  re-­‐entering	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  general	  public	  thus	  equipped.	  Expanding	   her	   critique	   to	   the	   transnational	   level,	   Fraser	   contributes	   to	   a	   critical	  theory	   of	   transnational	   public	   spheres	   by	   further	   abstracting	   the	  main	   criteria	   of	   a	  functioning	  public	  sphere,	  the	  principle	  of	  normative	  legitimacy	  and	  political	  efficacy	  by	   establishing	   two	   conditions	   for	   the	   former	   (the	   inclusiveness	   condition,	   either	  realised	   through	   the	   “all-­‐affected”	   or	   “all-­‐subjected”	   principles,	   and	   the	   equity	  condition)	  and	  providing	  a	  number	  of	  useful	  pointers	   toward	   further	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  work	  on	  the	  latter.	  
This	   chapter,	   by	  means	   of	   reviewing	   and	   engaging	  with	   the	   relevant	   literature,	  has	  thus	   laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  further	  development	  of	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Therefore,	  after	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  methodological	  underpinnings	  of	  this	  research	  as	  well	   as	   an	   introduction	   to	   the	   preliminary	   theoretical	   model	   as	   it	   emerged	   during	  fieldwork	  and	  data	  analysis,	  I	  will	  proceed	  to	  the	  main	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  –	  wherein	  I	  will	  present	  the	  empirical	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  advance	  the	  development	  of	  the	  theoretical	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  the	  critical	  theory	  of	  the	  transnational	   public	   sphere	   –	   before,	   in	   the	   last	   chapter,	   drawing	   together	   main	  themes	  of	  these	  empirical	  findings	  and	  the	  literature	  here	  presented	  and	  presenting	  conclusions.	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Chapter	  3 	  
	  
Methodology,	  Research	  Design	  and	  Preliminary	  Theoretical	  Model	  
The	   following	   chapter	   begins	  with	   a	   short	   introduction,	  which	   recalls	   the	   research	  aims	  and	  objectives	  and	   introduces	   the	  general	  methodological	  approach	  employed.	  This	  will	   also	   include	   a	   brief	   description	   of	  my	   own	  political	   identity	   and	   highlight	  why	  this	  identity	  enabled	  me	  to	  employ	  an	  innovative	  methodological	  approach	  to	  my	  specific	   field.	   Following	   this,	   I	   will	   outline	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   and	   briefly	  describe	   the	   organisations	   that	   have	   been	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   fieldwork	   and	   during	  which	  time	  periods	  the	  fieldwork	  was	  carried	  out.	  In	  the	  next	  step,	  I	  will	  outline	  the	  two-­‐step	   approach	   taken	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   the	   field,	   whereby	   a	   first	   step	   secured	  access	   to	   the	   general	   negotiation	   sessions	   within	   the	   United	   Nations	   Framework	  Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change	   (UNFCCC)	   and	   a	   second	   step	   was	   required	   to	   gain	  access	   to	   the	   environmental	   NGO	   network	   Climate	   Action	   Network	   International	  (CAN).	   This	   section	   also	   discusses	   the	   practical	   implications	   of	   formally	   “being	   a	  delegate”	  of	  an	  NGO	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions.	  
Then,	   I	  will	  discuss	   the	   three	  different,	  distinct	   fieldwork	  settings	  within	  which	  the	  research	  has	  been	  carried	  out,	  namely	  the	  “in-­‐session”	  setting	  where	  my	  research	  took	   place	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiation	   sessions,	   the	   “virtual”	   setting	   between	   the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  and	  a	   “hybrid”	   setting	  which	  carried	   features	  of	  both	  of	   the	  other	  settings.	   Following	   the	   discussion	   of	   these	   settings,	   I	   will	   explain	   my	   growing	  involvement	   in	   the	   work	   of	   CAN	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   period	   and	   the	   implications	  thereof.	  This	  will	   also	   include	   the	   consideration	  of	   the	  notion	  of	   “going	  native”	   and	  will	   examine	   the	   shifts	   in	   perception	   among	   social	   scientists	   that	   have	   occurred	  within	  the	   last	   few	  decades.	   In	  this	  context	   I	  will	  discuss	  what	  risk	  “going	  native”	   is	  perceived	  to	  represent	  by	  some	  authors	  and	  will	  explore	  the	  potential	  associated	  with	  
being	   “native.”	   In	   “Learning	   the	   Language”	   I	  will	   discuss	   how	  gaining	   some	   level	   of	  proficiency	  in	  understanding	  international	  climate	  change	  policy	  and	  climate	  science	  was	  necessary	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	   inadequate	   interpretations	  of	  events,	  by	  discussing	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  an	  example	  of	  such	  an	  inadequate	  interpretation	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  period.	  Finally,	  ethical	  considerations	  of	  the	  research	  project	  will	  be	  discussed	  with	  a	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  negotiating	  access	  and	  consent	  and	  the	  use	  of	  data	  gathered	  in	  confidential	  or	  semi-­‐confidential	  settings.	  
3.1 Research	  Aims,	  Objectives	  and	  Ethnography	  
The	   overall	   aim	   of	   the	   empirical	   research	   upon	   which	   this	   thesis	   is	   based,	   is	   to	  investigate	   the	   role	   of	   transnational	   climate	   change	   advocacy	   networks	   and	   their	  internal	  power	  dynamics	  within	  multilateral	  treaty	  processes,	  in	  particular	  within	  the	  multilateral	   climate	   change	  negotiations	  under	   the	  UNFCCC.	   Specifically,	   the	   first	  of	  two	   interrelated	   objectives	   focuses	   on	   the	   production	   of	   a	   detailed	   ethnography	   of	  environmental	   NGOs,	   especially	   those	   that	   are	   members	   of	   CAN,	   during	   these	  negotiations.	   The	   second	   objective	   is	   to	   generate	   an	   analysis	   of	   this	   ethnography	  utilising	   a	   critical	   theory	   of	   the	   public	   sphere,	   in	   particular,	   more	   contemporary	  conceptualisations	  of	  this	  theory,	  which	  embrace	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  public	  spheres.	   In	  order	   to	  address	   these	  research	  objectives,	  a	  close	  understanding	  of	   the	  structure	  and	  culture	  of	   the	   internal	  discourse	  among	   the	  environmental	  NGOs	  was	  required.	   As	   the	   empirical	   method	   used	   for	   this	   investigation,	   I	   identified	   the	  ethnographic	  approach	  as	  the	  most	  appropriate	  tool.	  Ethnographic	  research	  has	  been	  described	  as	  “grounded	  in	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  first-­‐hand	  experience	  and	  exploration	  of	   a	  particular	   social	  or	   cultural	   setting	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   […]	  participant	  observation.	  Observation	   and	   participation	   […]	   remain	   the	   characteristic	   features	   of	   the	   ethno-­‐graphic	  approach”	  (Atkinson	  et	  al.	  2001:	  4).	  	  
The	   choice	   of	   ethnography	   for	   this	   research	   project	   also	   constitutes	   one	   of	   its	  most	   innovative	   features.	  While	  ethnography	  has	  been	  used	  widely	   to	  study	  a	   large	  variety	  of	  different	  societies	  and	  groups,	  its	  use	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  work	  of	  environ-­‐mental	  advocacy	  professionals	  at	  international	  treaty	  negotiations	  –	  which	  places	  it	  in	  an	  area	  of	  social	  scientific	   inquiry	  which	  is	  related	  to,	   if	  not	  part	  of,	  the	  field	  of	  elite	  studies	   (Higley	   and	   Moore	   2001)	   –	   must	   be	   considered	   a	   unique	   feature	   of	   this	  research	  project.	  
Alternative	  methodological	  approaches	  to	  the	  same	  field,	  for	  example	  the	  analysis	  of	  published	  documents,	  would	  not	  have	  been	  sufficient	  to	  address	  the	  research	  aim	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  and	  objectives	  as	  the	  internal	  discourse	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  documents	  cannot	   be	   inferred	   from	   the	   finished	   product.	   Likewise,	   qualitative	   interviewing,	  although	  proven	  to	  be	  able	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  internal	  structures	  and	  conflicts	  of	   NGO	   networks	   active	   at	   UNFCCC	   conferences	   (e.g.,	   Gulbrandsen	   and	   Andresen	  2004;	   Pulver	   2004a;	   Duwe	   2000;	   Westerlind-­‐Wigström	   2008),	   must	   rely	   on	  respondents’	   interpretations	   and	   selective	   recall	   of	   events	   and	   represents,	   thus,	  inevitably	  a	  mediated	  version	  of	  these	  events.	  Ethnography,	  especially	  through	  its	  use	  of	  participant	  observation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  promises	  a	  much	  more	  complete	  image	  of	  the	  social	  setting	  researched	  through	  immersion	  in	  the	  social	  setting	  for	  extended	  periods	  of	  time.	  Furthermore,	  exclusive	  use	  of	  interview	  data	  would	  limit	  the	  type	  of	  questions	   that	   can	   be	   asked	   about	   the	   social	   phenomenon	   researched:	   while	   my	  research	   is	   largely	  concerned	  with	  the	   internal	  quality	  of	   the	  discourse	  and	   interac-­‐tion	  between	  ENGOs	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  their	  networks,	  previous,	  interview	  based	  research	   had	   to	   be	   limited	   to	   investigating	   structural	   aspects	   of	   CAN	   (Duwe	   2000;	  Westerlind-­‐Wigström	  2008).	  
In	  addition	  to	  participant	  observation,	  ethnographic	  approaches	  usually	  employ	  other	  data	  collection	  techniques,	  for	  example	  more	  formal	  interviews	  with	  members	  of	   the	   researched	   group,	   analysis	   of	   written	   documents	   or	   spoken	   discourse,	   the	  collection	  and	  interpretation	  of	  visual	  data	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  my	  own	  research,	  participant	   observation	   was	   mainly	   complemented	   by	   analysis	   of	   published	  documents	  (and	  unpublished	  drafts	  and	  working	  documents)	  from	  NGOs,	  UNFCCC,	  or	  party	  governments,	  email	  conversations	  from	  within	  the	  NGO	  community	  and	  video	  webcasts	   from	  UNFCCC	  negotiation	   sessions	  as	  well	   as	   “informal	   interviews”	   in	   the	  form	  of	  conversations	  with	  NGO	  representatives	  on	  the	  side	  lines	  of	  the	  conferences,	  for	   example,	   in	   order	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   their	   own	   interpretation	   of	   events	   or	   to	   test	  their	  agreement	  with	  mine.	  The	  fieldwork	  also	  resulted	  in	  some	  on-­‐going	  friendships	  with	  some	  of	  these	  NGO	  representatives,	  which	  allowed	  me	  to	  solicit	  further	  feedback	  on	  my	  interpretations	  of	  my	  data	  after	  the	  analysis	  and	  write-­‐up	  stage	  of	  my	  research	  began.	  
Furthermore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  describe	  my	  own	  political	  identity	  with	  respect	  to	  climate	   change	   as	   this	   has	   crucial	   importance	   for	   my	   role	   as	   both	   researcher	   and	  participant	   within	   the	   environmental	   advocacy	   networks	   and	   the	   wider	   UNFCCC	  system.	  Long	  before	  developing	   the	   initial	   ideas	  and	  programme	  for	   this	  research,	   I	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  self-­‐identified	  as	  an	  environmentalist	  and	  as	  such	  was	  already	  very	  aware	  of	  the	  great	  danger	  that	  climate	  change	  posed	  for	  the	  future	  environmental	  health	  of	  this	  planet.	  In	   fact,	   this	   understanding	   was	   the	   main	   motivator	   in	   developing	   a	   research	  programme	  in	  this	  area	  as	  I	  had	  the	  desire	  to	  pursue	  my	  PhD	  research	  in	  an	  area	  with	  importance	  to	  me.	  As	  a	  result,	  my	  political	  identity	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  (further	  shaped	  and	  solidified	  by	  targeted	  reading	  in	  the	  pre-­‐fieldwork	  period	  of	  my	  PhD)	  already	   included	  a	  general	  agreement	  with	   the	  mainstream	  scientific	  work	  on	  climate	  change,	  an	  agreement	  that	  urgent	  steps	  to	  reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  were	  needed	  and	  that,	  while	  an	  international	  process	  was	  in	  place	  to	  advance	  those	  steps,	  these	  efforts	  were	  not	  yet	  sufficient.	  In	  addition,	  my	  political	  identity	  included	  a	  strong	   scepticism	   regarding	   growth-­‐centred	   and	   consumption-­‐oriented	   economic	  development	  paradigms	  as	  well	  as	  a	  deep	  concern	  with	  social	  injustices,	  in	  particular	  those	  created	  by	   the	  effects	  of	   colonial	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  processes	  as	  well	  as	  other	  economic	  exploitations.	  
This	  political	  background	  placed	  me	   in	  a	  position	  wherein	   I	  broadly	  shared	   the	  analyses,	  perspectives	  and	  objectives	  of	   the	  NGOs	   I	  was	  studying.	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note,	   that	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	   this	  general	  agreement,	  was	   it	  possible	   to	  engage	   in	   the	  participatory	  research	  that	  I	  conducted.	  This	  is	  because	  this	  agreement	  enabled	  me	  to	  effectively	   assume	   the	   role	   of	   an	   increasingly	   active	   participant	  within	   the	   political	  activism	  without	   conflicts	   between	   this	   participation	   and	  my	  own	   genuine	   political	  identity.	  This	  absence	  of	  conflict	  between	  my	  “genuine”	  self	  and	  my	  participant	  role	  also	  made	  it	  easier	  to	  reconcile	  my	  simultaneous	  roles	  of	  participant	  and	  researcher.	  The	  relationship	  (and	  its	  changes	  over	  time)	  between	  my	  role	  as	  researcher	  and	  my	  role	  as	  delegate	  of	  the	  NGO	  network	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  much	  more	  detail	  in	  a	  later	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  (starting	  on	  page	  101	  below).	  
3.2 Scope	  of	  fieldwork	  
The	   fieldwork	   is	   mainly	   concerned	   with	   participant	   observation	   of	   Climate	   Action	  Network	   International	   (CAN-­‐I	  or	  CAN),	  which	   “is	   a	  worldwide	  network	  of	  over	  500	  Non-­‐Governmental	   Organizations	   (NGOs)	   working	   to	   promote	   government	   and	  individual	   action	   to	   limit	   human-­‐induced	   climate	   change	   to	   ecologically	   sustainable	  levels”	   (CAN	   2010a).	   Historically,	   the	   member	   organisations	   of	   CAN	   were	   mainly	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  environmental	   NGOs,	   but	   in	   recent	   years	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   development	  organisations	  joined	  the	  network	  as	  well.	  Although	  my	  initial,	  pre-­‐fieldwork,	  plan	  was	  to	  focus	  my	  participant	  observation	  on	  all	  the	  environmental	  NGOs	  active	  within	  the	  UNFCCC,	  I	  quickly	  identified	  CAN	  as	  the	  most	  appropriate	  context	  for	  the	  research	  as	  its	  membership	   includes	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	  environmental	  NGOs	  that	  are	  continu-­‐ously	   involved	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   and	   it	   serves	   as	   the	   “constituency	   focal	  point”	  of	  all	  environmental	  NGOs	  for	  the	  liaison	  with	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat.	  While	  I	  was	  unaware	  of	  this	  central	  role	  of	  CAN	  before	  starting	  my	  fieldwork,	  this	  role	  (which	  made	  CAN	  virtually	  the	  only	  relevant	  focus	  for	  observation)	  became	  very	  clear	  during	  the	  attendance	  at	  my	  first	  UNFCCC	  negotiation	  session.	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   point	   out	   that	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   ENGOs	   that	   are	   active	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  but	  are	  not	  members	  of	  CAN.	  At	   the	  beginning	  of	  my	   fieldwork,	  however,	   those	   were	   only	   a	   very	   few	   and	   their	   attendance	   mainly	   limited	   to	   the	  annual	  COPs.	  During	  the	  fieldwork	  period,	  however,	  and	  particularly	  towards	  the	  end	  of	   it,	   Climate	   Justice	  Now!	   (CJN!),	   a	   second	   ENGO	   network	   began	   to	   emerge.	   As	   its	  name	   suggests,	   CJN!	   particularly	   focuses	   on	   the	   social	   justice	   aspect	   of	   the	   climate	  change	  discourse	  which	  its	  members	  feel	  is	  largely	  ignored	  in	  the	  mainstream	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	   negotiations.	   Details	   of	   CJN!’s	   platform	   and	  main	   differences	   and	   relation-­‐ships	   between	   CAN	   and	   CJN!	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   greater	   detail	   in	   a	   later	   chapter.	  However,	   since	   much	   of	   my	   participant	   observation	   of	   CAN	   had	   already	   been	  undertaken	  by	   the	   point	   of	   CJN!’s	   consolidation,	   I	   decided	   to	   keep	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  fieldwork	  focused	  on	  CAN,	  but	  to	  pay	  some	  attention	  to	  this	  emerging	  network	  as	  well.	  
The	  fieldwork	  covered	  the	  time	  from	  just	  before	  the	  landmark	  2007	  Bali	  Climate	  Conference	   up	   to	   and	   including	   the	   2009	   Climate	   Conference	   in	   Copenhagen.	   This	  represents	   a	   distinct	   period	   in	   international	   climate	   change	   policy	   which	   was	  concerned	  with	   the	  attempt	   to	  negotiate	  an	  agreement	   that	  would	  cover	   the	  period	  after	  2012	  (the	  end	  of	   the	  first	  commitment	  period	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol),	  with	  the	  Bali	  Action	  Plan	  agreed	  in	  Bali	   in	  2007	  providing	  the	  framework	  and	  work	  plan	  for	  the	  following	  two	  years	  with	  a	  view	  to	  concluding	  work	  in	  Copenhagen	  in	  2009.	  In	  total,	  74	  days	  of	  negotiation	  meetings	  were	  attended	  over	  a	  period	  of	  two	  and	  a	  half	  years.	  In	  2008,	  32	  out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  39	  (82%)	  negotiation	  days	  were	  observed,	  while	  in	  2009,	  23	  out	  of	  57	  days	  were	  attended	  (40%);	  a	  grand	  total	  of	  55	  out	  of	  96	  (57%).	  The	   decision	   not	   to	   participate	   in	   all	   negotiation	   sessions	   was	   mainly	   due	   to	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  budgetary	  restrictions,	  but	  considerations	  of	  the	  distance	  of	  the	  session	  locale	  and	  the	  associated	  environmental	  impact	  of	  travel	  to	  attend	  were	  also	  made	  (e.g.	  in	  the	  case	  of	   the	   2008	   Accra	   and	   2009	   Bangkok	   sessions).	   Table	   1	   below	   summarises	   my	  attendance	  by	  listing	  the	  time	  and	  place	  of	  the	  conference,	  the	  names	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  bodies	  that	  were	  holding	  sessions	  during	  the	  respective	  conferences36.	  During	  these	  negotiation	   conferences,	   I	  was	   formally	   admitted	   as	   a	   delegate	   of	   an	  NGO	  observer	  organisation	   (as	   explained	   in	   the	   following	   section	   below),	   granting	   me	   the	   same	  access	   to	   the	   negotiation	  meetings	   and	   CAN	   internal	   meetings	   as	   most	   other	   NGO	  delegates.	  	  
Table	  1:	  	  Attendance	  of	  UNFCCC	  Negotiation	  Sessions	  –	  Fieldwork	  in	  "In-­‐Session"	  Setting	  Date	   Place	   UNFCCC	  Bodies	  in	  Session	   No	  of	  Days	  26	  Aug	  2007	  –	  31	  Aug	  2007	   Vienna,	  Austria	   AWG-­‐KP	  4,	  Dialogue	  4	   	   6	  2	  Dec	  2007	  –	  14	  Dec	  2007	   Nusa	  Dua,	  Bali,	  Indonesia	   COP	  13,	  CMP	  3,	  AWG-­‐KP	  4bis,	  	  SBI	  27,	  SBSTA	  27,	  (Dialogue)	   	   13	  29	  Mar	  2008	  –	  4	  Apr	  2008	   Bangkok,	  Thailand	   AWG-­‐KP	  5,	  AWG-­‐LCA	  1	   	   7	  1	  Jun	  2008	  –	  13	  June	  2008	   Bonn,	  Germany	   AWG-­‐KP	  5bis,	  AWG-­‐LCA	  2,	  	  SBI	  28,	  SBSTA	  28	   	   13	  1	  Dec	  2008	  –	  12	  Dec	  2008	   Poznań,	  Poland	   COP	  14,	  CMP	  4,	  AWG-­‐KP	  6bis,	  	  AWG-­‐LCA	  3bis,	  SBI	  29,	  SBSTA	  29	   	   12	  30	  Mar	  2009	  –	  8	  Apr	  2009	   Bonn,	  Germany	   AWG-­‐KP	  7,	  LWG-­‐LCA	  5	   	   10	  7	  Dec	  2009	  –	  19	  Dec	  2009	   Copenhagen,	  Denmark	   COP	  15,	  CMP	  5,	  AWG-­‐KP	  10	  ,	  	  AWG-­‐LCA	  8,	  SBI	  31,	  SBSTA	  31	   	   13	  AWG-­‐KP:	   Ad-­‐Hoc	  Working	   Group	   on	   Further	   Commitments	   of	   Annex	   I	   Parties	   Under	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	  COP:	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  CMP:	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  Serving	  as	  the	  Meeting	   of	   the	  Parties	   of	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	   SBI:	   Subsidiary	  Body	  on	   Implementation,	   SBSTA:	   Subsidiary	  Body	  on	  Scientific	  and	  Technological	  Advice,	  AWG-­‐LCA:	  Ad-­‐Hoc	  Working	  Group	  on	  Long-­‐Term	  Cooperative	  Action	  	  Although	  the	  participant	  observation	  was	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  CAN,	  observations	  also	   included	  other	  actors	  within	   the	   climate	   change	  negotiations.	  For	  example,	   the	  delegations	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  were	  observed	  during	  their	  formal	  negotiations	  and	  informal	  negotiation	  groups	  if	  they	  were	  open	  to	  NGO	  observers	   and	   through	   my	   attendance	   of	   some	   of	   CAN’s	   lobbying	   meetings.	   I	   also	  observed	   some	  of	   the	   activities	  of	   environmentalists	   and	   climate	   justice	   activists	  of	  the	  emerging	  Climate	  Justice	  Now!	  (CJN!)	  network	  who	  began	  to	  provide	  an	  alterna-­‐tive	   voice	   for	   the	   environmental	   movement	   during	   my	   fieldwork	   period.	   Further,	  observation	  sometimes	  included	  delegates	  of	  other	  observer	  organisations,	  including	  business	   and	   research	   organisations,	   demonstrators	   outside	   the	   UN	   conference	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  	   The	  number	  after	  the	  name	  of	  each	  body	  denotes	  the	  number	  of	  its	  session,	  for	  example,	  “COP	  15”	  refers	  to	  the	  15th	  session	  of	   the	  Conference	  of	   the	  Parties,	  while	  “AWG-­‐KP	  6bis”	   is	   the	  resumed	  (i.e.	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the)	  6th	  session	  of	  the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Working	  Group	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  For	  a	  description	  of	  the	  function,	  mandate	  and	  scope	  of	  work	  of	  these	  bodies,	  see	  chapter	  4	  or	  the	  glossary.	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  venues	   and	   so	   forth.	   Observation	   (participatory	   and	   non-­‐participatory)	   of	   these	  additional	  actors	  was	  important	  in	  order	  to	  aid	  understanding	  of	  the	  wider	  contexts	  in	  which	  CAN	  as	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  was	  operating.	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   attendance	   of	   the	   negotiation	   sessions	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   (“in-­‐session”	   setting),	  my	  participant	  observation	  also	   took	  place	   in	  what	   I	   call	   “virtual”	  and	  “hybrid”	  settings.	  The	  former	  took	  place	  in	  the	  time	  between	  the	  climate	  change	  conferences,	  when	  CAN	  predominantly	  interacts	  through	  means	  of	  various	  email	  lists	  (some	  of	  which	  have	  very	  high-­‐traffic;	  for	  example,	  in	  December	  2009	  the	  main	  email	  list,	   CANtalk,	   received	   295	   emails	   on	   a	   single	   day)	   and	   occasional	   small	   scale	  telephone	   conferences.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   “hybrid”	   setting	   is	   a	   cross	   over	   between	  virtual	   and	   in-­‐session	   settings,	   where	   parts	   of	   CAN	   are	   physically	   present	   at	   a	  UNFCCC	  session	  while	  another	  part	  of	  the	  network,	  including	  myself,	  would	  only	  have	  virtual	   links	   with	   the	   members	   at	   the	   session.	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   specifics	   of	   these	  distinct	  settings	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  
3.3 Access	  to	  the	  Field	  
Formally	  speaking,	  I	  attended	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiation	  sessions	  as	  a	  delegate	  of	  one	  of	  the	   member	   organisations	   of	   CAN-­‐I,	   which	   afforded	   me	   the	   same	   access	   to	   CAN	  internal	  meetings	  and	  processes	  as	  any	  other	  CAN	  delegate.	  Furthermore,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  attend	  the	  plenary	  and	  contact	  group	  sessions	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  bodies	  just	  like	  any	  other	  delegate	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations.	  
Adequate	   access	   to	   the	   field	   was	   obtained	   in	   two	   steps,	   both	   of	   which	  will	   be	  outlined	  in	  detail	  below.	  The	  first	  step	  was	  to	  secure	  general	  field	  access	  to	  my	  first	  UNFCCC	  conference	  in	  August	  2007	  and	  the	  second	  step	  was	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  CAN	  for	  all	  subsequent	  conferences	  and	  the	  “virtual”	  and	  “hybrid”	  settings.	  During	  the	  process	  of	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  field,	  some	  individuals	  acted	  as	  gatekeepers,	  a	  role	  which	  will	  receive	  more	   attention	   later	   in	   the	   section	   discussing	   ethical	   considerations	   of	   the	  research.	  
On	   the	   occasion	   of	   the	   first	   conference	   I	   attended	   in	  August	   2007,	   I	  was	   regis-­‐tered	  with	  the	  defunct	  “Scottish	  Academic	  Network	  on	  Global	  Environmental	  Change”	  (SANGEC).	   SANGEC	   used	   to	   be	   a	   network	   of	   Scottish	   academics	   from	   different	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  disciplines	   working	   on	   themes	   related	   to	   global	   environmental	   change	   and	   was	  mainly	  active	  during	  the	  early	  1990s,	  particularly	  surrounding	  Agenda	  21	  in	  the	  lead	  up	   to,	   during	   and	   immediately	   following	   the	   1992	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   on	  Environment	  and	  Development	  (UNCED)	  in	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro,	  dubbed	  the	  “Earth	  Summit”	  (for	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  some	  of	  SANGEC’s	  history	  and	  its	  involvement	  in	  implement-­‐ing	  the	  Agenda	  21	  in	  Scotland,	  see	  Roddick	  1995).	  Since	  SANGEC	  was	  involved	  as	  an	  observer	  in	  the	  UNCED	  and	  INC	  processes	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  it	  gained	   (semi-­‐)	   automatic	   accreditation	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   (UNFCCC	   1995),	   which	   had	  only	   been	   used	   to	   register	   SANGEC	   members	   for	   the	   very	   first	   Conference	   of	   the	  Parties	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  1995	  but	  which	  never	  expired	  even	  after	  SANGEC	  ceased	  to	  exist	   except	   on	   paper	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s.	   I	   came	   across	   SANGEC	   when	   searching	  through	  the	  list	  of	  organisations	  accredited	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  to	  identify	  organisations	  to	  approach	   with	   a	   request	   to	   be	   included	   in	   their	   delegation	   so	   I	   could	   attend	   the	  UNFCCC	   sessions	   for	  my	   fieldwork.	   I	   noticed	   that	   SANGEC’s	   point	   of	   contact	  was	   a	  member	  of	  staff	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Glasgow	  (not	  related	  to	  my	  PhD	  research	  or	  the	  department	   or	   faculty	   at	   this	   this	   research	   was	   carried	   out)	   whom	   I	   subsequently	  contacted	   and	   who	   agreed	   to	   register	   my	   name	   as	   a	   delegate	   of	   SANGEC	   for	   the	  upcoming	   UNFCCC	   session	   in	   Vienna	   in	   August	   2007.	   It	   was	   understood	   that	   my	  registration	  as	  SANGEC	  delegate	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  would	  not	  empower	  me	  to	  formally	  represent	  SANGEC	  there,	  however,	  since	  my	  intentions	  for	  this	  meeting	  were	  passive	  observation	  and	  networking,	  this	  was	  not	  considered	  a	  problem.	  
During	  this	  first	  UNFCCC	  session	  in	  Vienna,	  I	  attended	  every	  day	  what	  was	  posted	  in	  the	  official	  daily	  programme	  of	  the	  conference	  as	  “ENGO	  daily	  meeting.”	  During	  the	  course	  of	   the	  conference,	   it	  became	  clear	  that	   this	  meeting	  –	  although	  posted	   in	  the	  daily	   programme	   as	   open	   to	   all	   ENGO	   observers	   –	   was	   a	   closed	   meeting	   of	   CAN	  member	  organisations	  (with	  SANGEC	  not	  being	  a	  CAN	  member),	  so	  I	  approached	  one	  of	   the	   CAN	   node	   coordinators	   to	   discuss	   my	   attendance	   at	   these	   meetings.	   He	  confirmed	  that	  these	  daily	  meetings	  were,	  in	  fact,	  closed	  CAN	  meetings	  but	  that	  it	  was	  acceptable	   if	   I	   continued	   to	  attend	   these	  meetings	   for	   the	   remainder	  of	   that	  Vienna	  conference	   but	   that	   my	   continued	   participation	   in	   “CAN	   only”	   activity	   was	   only	  possible	   if	   I	   gained	   accreditation	   to	   subsequent	   UNFCCC	   negotiation	   sessions	   via	   a	  CAN	  member	  organisation.	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  Thus,	   the	   second	   step	   of	   gaining	   access	   to	   the	   field	   consisted	   of	   identifying	   a	   CAN	  member	  organisation	  that	  was	  willing	  to	  register	  me	  to	  subsequent	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  as	  part	  of	  their	  organisation’s	  delegation.	  Consequently,	  I	  approached	  the	  director	  of	  one	  CAN	  member	  organisation	  that	  I	  was	  told	  had	  in	  the	  past	  been	  accommodating	  to	  similar	  requests	  from	  researchers.	  After	  agreeing	  the	  conditions	  of	  this	  arrangement	  (for	  example	  that	   I	  would	  refrain	   from	  speaking	  during	   lobbying	  meetings,	  or	   that	   I	  would	   not	  make	   statements	   that	  would	   contradict	   the	   organisation’s	   positions)	  we	  agreed	   that	  my	   request	  would	  be	   granted	   for	   the	  next	   and,	   if	   required,	   subsequent	  UNFCCC	  sessions.	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  agreement,	  I	  was	  included	  in	  that	  organisation’s	  list	  of	  partici-­‐pants	   for	  all	   following	  UNFCCC	  sessions	   I	  attended	  starting	  with	   the	  Nusa	  Dua,	  Bali	  session	  in	  December	  2007.	  The	  specific	  composition	  and	  internal	  structure	  of	  CAN-­‐I	  afforded	  me	  a	  high	  level	  of	  insight	  and	  group	  membership	  that	  is	  hard	  to	  achieve	  in	  other	  participant	  observation	  settings	  where,	  for	  example,	  obvious	  markers	  of	  gender,	  education,	   language,	   ethnicity,	   class,	   etc.	   or	   the	   mere	   knowledge	   of	   the	   observed	  group	  about	  the	  researcher’s	  role	  disallow	  the	  researcher	  to	  become	  a	  full	  member	  of	  the	  group	  researched.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  CAN,	  however,	  the	  group	  membership	  undergoes	  relatively	  fast	  changes,	  with	  large	  numbers	  of	  new	  individuals	  joining,	  leaving	  or	  re-­‐joining	   the	   process	   virtually	   constantly	   as	   new	   member	   organisations	   join	   the	  network,	   existing	   members	   hire	   new	   staff	   or	   funding	   situations	   or	   organisations’	  priorities	   change.	   Thus	   it	   is	   a	   very	   common	   experience	   for	   CAN	   members	   to	  encounter	   individuals	   they	  have	  not	  previously	   interacted	  with	  and	   instantly	  accept	  them	  as	  members	  of	  their	  group	  and	  work	  with	  them.	  	  
This	   is	   facilitated	   by	   a	   general	   gatekeeping	   arrangement,	   where	   regional	   CAN	  coordinators	   distribute	   to	   individuals	   they	   know	   to	   belong	   to	   a	   CAN	   member	  organisation	   stickers	  with	   the	   CAN	   logo	   to	   be	   affixed	   to	   the	   conference	   badge,	   and	  therefore	   CAN	   members	   can	   easily	   assume	   that	   individuals	   in	   possession	   of	   a	  conference	  badge	  with	  CAN	  sticker	  are,	  in	  fact,	  legitimate	  CAN	  members	  themselves.	  At	  larger	  internal	  CAN	  meetings	  it	  is	  usual	  to	  have	  a	  person	  at	  the	  door	  checking	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  stickers	  and	  “sticker	  check”	  agenda	  items	  where	  members	  are	  asked	  to	  check	  the	  people	  sitting	  next	  to	  them	  to	  present	  their	  stickers.	  Occasionally,	  these	  “sticker	  checks”	  are	  also	  repeated	  just	  before	  particularly	  sensitive	  agenda	  items.	  As	  a	  delegate	  of	  a	  CAN	  member	  organisation,	  I	  was	  also	  given	  a	  CAN	  sticker.	  
3.	  Methodology,	  Research	  Design	  and	  Preliminary	  Theoretical	  Model	   94	  	  It	   is	   important	  to	  note,	  however,	   that	  generally	  “being	  a	  delegate”	   in	  the	  sense	  used	  above	   –	   in	   respect	   to	   my	   registration	   via	   both	   of	   the	  mentioned	   NGOs	   –	   does	   not	  imply	  any	   formal	   functions	  of	   representation	  of	   these	  organisations	  at	   the	  UNFCCC.	  Since	   the	   process	   of	   accrediting	   an	   organisation	   at	   the	  UNFCCC	   is	   a	   relatively	   time	  consuming	   process	   which	   also	   requires	   certain	   formal	   characteristics	   of	   the	  organisation	   seeking	   accreditation	   and	   is	   not	   open	   for	   individuals37,	   it	   is	   quite	  common	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  environment	  for	  individuals	  to	  merely	  be	  “put	  on	  the	  list”	  of	  an	  organisation	  that	  is	  accredited	  and	  willing	  to	  accommodate	  such	  a	  request.	  Some	  organisations,	  for	  example,	  routinely	  add	  media	  representatives	  to	  their	  lists	  (media	  access	  is	  more	  restrictive	  than	  NGO	  access)	  or	  “do	  a	  favour	  to	  smaller	  organisations	  who	  don’t	  yet	  have	  their	  own	  individual	  official	  status	  with	  the	  UNFCCC”	   (Hardstaff	  2007).	  This	  widespread	  practice	   is	  also	  employed	  by	  some	  government	  delegations,	  with	   for	   example,	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   European	   and	   Latin	   American	   countries	  routinely	  registering	  NGO	  representatives	  as	  part	  of	  their	  official	  delegations	  (see,	  for	  example,	   Duwe	   2000,	   2001).	   In	   these	   cases,	   individuals	   so	   gaining	   access	   are	   not	  representing	  the	  organisation	  or	  country	  of	  which	  they	  are,	  “formally,”	  a	  delegate	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  are	  required	  to	  sign	  a	  formal	  agreement	  to	  this	  effect	  while	  for	  others	  verbal	  arrangements	  are	  satisfactory.	  For	  example,	  NGO	  representatives	  registered	  as	  part	   of	   the	   delegation	   of	   an	  EU	  member	   state	   are	   requested	   to	   agree	   to	   and	   sign	   a	  specific	   Code	  of	   Contact	   that	   prohibits	   them	  attempting	   to	   get	   into	   certain	   types	  of	  closed	  meetings	  or	  participate	  in	  certain	  activities	  (field	  note,	  Poznań,	  4	  Dec	  2008).	  
3.4 Fieldwork	  Settings	  
The	  main	   focus	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   carried	   out	   for	   this	   research	   project	  was	  with	   the	  ENGOs	   that	   are	   organised	   within	   CAN.	   This	   fieldwork	   took	   place	   within	   two	  main	  settings,	  with	   the	   first	   being	   the	   negotiating	   sessions	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	   at	   the	   various	  climate	   change	   conferences	   attended,	   during	   which	   many	   CAN	   members 38 	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  	   My	  initial	  attempts	  of	  securing	  access	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  involved	  an	  attempt	  to	  obtain	  accreditation	  as	   observer	   organisation	   for	   the	   University	   of	   Glasgow,	   but	   the	   time	   consuming	   nature	   of	   this	  process,	   additional	   institutional	   barriers	   within	   the	   University,	   and,	   ultimately,	   my	   success	   in	  gaining	  access	  through	  other	  means,	  made	  me	  abandon	  this	  path.	  38	  	   Strictly	  speaking,	  CAN	  members	  are	  organisations,	  not	  individuals.	  However,	  it	  is	  common	  for	  the	  staff	  of	  these	  member	  organisations	  to	  think	  of	  themselves	  as	  members	  of	  CAN,	  too,	  and	  therefore,	  though	  strictly	  speaking	   incorrect,	   I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  “CAN	  member”	  mainly	   to	  refer	   to	  repre-­‐sentatives	   of	   CAN	  member	   organisations	   who	   act	   as	   the	   member	   organisations’	   agents	   within	  CAN	  (to	  avoid	  having	  to	  use	  the	  cumbersome	  “individuals	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  CAN	  member	  organ-­‐	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  physically	   located	   in	   the	   same	   locale,	   enabling	   among	   other	   things	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  interactions,	   and	   the	   other	   referring	   to	   the	   “inter-­‐sessional”	   period	   between	   these	  sessions,	   where	   CAN	   largely	   exists	   as	   a	   “virtual	   community”	   largely	   based	   upon	  emails	  exchanges	  and	  occasional	  phone	  conferences.	  Within	  both	  of	   these	  fieldwork	  contexts,	  my	  role	  as	  a	  researcher	  within	  the	  field	  changed	  substantially	  over	  the	  two	  and	  a	  half	  year	  fieldwork	  period.	  These	  changes	  related	  to	  an	  increasing	  involvement	  with	   the	   political	   work	   of	   CAN.	   The	   specific	   settings	   and	   related	   methodological	  concerns	  of	  both	  main	  fieldwork	  contexts	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  turn.	  
3.4.1 In-­‐Session	  Setting	  
Within	   the	   first	   setting,	   I	   attended	   the	   negotiating	   sessions	   of	   the	   bodies	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	   in	  order	   to	  carry	  out	  participant	  observation	  of	   the	   involvement	   therein	  of	  environmental	   non-­‐governmental	   organisations	   in	   general	   and	   CAN-­‐I	   in	   particular.	  During	  a	  typical	  UNFCCC	  session,	  my	  fieldwork	  would	  include	  attendance	  of	  an	  (often	  full-­‐day)	   “CAN	   strategy	   session”	   on	   the	   day	   before	   the	   official	   start	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	  session,	   during	   which	   CAN	   would	   discuss	   recent	   developments	   in	   international	  climate	   change	  politics	   and	   their	   strategy	   for	   the	  upcoming	  UNFCCC	   session.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  two	  week	  long	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	  a	  second	  strategy	  session	  would	  be	  held	  half-­‐way	   through	   the	  meeting.	  During	   the	  actual	  UNFCCC	  session,	  a	  daily	  meeting	  of	   the	  delegation	  of	   the	  CAN	  member	  organisation	  would	   typically	   start	   the	  day,	   in	  which	  that	   organisation	   discussed	   the	   developments	   of	   the	   previous	   day	   (both	   in	   the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  and	  internally	  within	  CAN),	  the	  likely	  developments	  of	  that	  day	  and	   their	   own	   strategy	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   past	   or	   potential	   future	  developments	   as	  well	   as	   a	  distribution	  of	  that	  day’s	  tasks.	  	  
Further	  items	  included	  attending	  the	  daily	  meeting	  of	  CAN	  members	  where	  polit-­‐ical	   developments	   were	   shared	   and	   discussed,	   press	   conferences	   and	   other	   media	  activities	   planned	   and	   overviews	   over	   the	  work	   of	   the	   CAN	  working	   groups	   given.	  During	  some	  of	  the	  later	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  I	  attended,	  I	  became	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  work	  with	  one	  of	  CAN’s	  working	  groups	  –	  the	  “CDM	  Working	  Group,”	  which	  is	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  issues	  around	  carbon	  markets	  –	  and	  the	  work	  of	  that	  working	  group	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  isations”	  or	  similar	  phrases).	  When	  it	  is	  important	  to	  clarify	  that	  I	  am,	  indeed,	  speaking	  about	  the	  “CAN	  member	  organisations”	  I	  will	  use	  this	  term	  instead.	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  became	  a	  focus	  of	  the	  daily	  activities.	  Working	  group	  activities	  included	  attending	  the	  group’s	   meetings,	   accompanying	   group	   members	   to	   their	   lobbying	   meetings	   with	  members	  of	  government	  delegations,	  making	  contact	  with	  government	  delegations	  to	  set	   up	   such	  meetings,	   involvement	   in	  drafting	   articles	   for	   the	  CAN	  daily	   newsletter	  ECO	  or	  interventions	  for	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  bodies	  on	  the	  working	  group’s	  issue.	  It	  also	  included	  participation	  in	  the	  group’s	  development	  of	  CAN	  policy	  in	  their	  area	   and	   attendance	   of	   joint	   meeting	   with	   other	   working	   groups,	   where	   areas	   of	  concern	   to	   different	   working	   groups	   overlapped.	   As	   further	   elaborated	   in	   a	   later	  section	   of	   this	   chapter,	   over	   time	   the	   degree	   and	   nature	   of	  my	   involvement	  would	  intensify,	  and	  came	  to	   include	  acting	  as	   lead	  or	  coordinating	  author	  on	  a	  number	  of	  the	  group’s	  written	  outputs	  as	  well	  as	  a	  brief	  period	  as	  the	  group’s	  coordinator.	  Given	  my	   initial	   agreement	   with	   the	   CAN	   member	   organisation	   that	   had	   provided	   my	  registration	  with	   the	  UNFCCC	  to	  refrain	   from	  statements	   that	  would	  contradict	   that	  organisation’s	  views,	  I	  regularly	  confirmed	  with	  representatives	  of	  that	  organisation	  that	  our	  views	  were,	  in	  fact,	  aligned.	  
Throughout	   every	   day,	   and	   in	   fact	   throughout	   the	   entire	   period	   of	  my	   PhD	   re-­‐search,	  my	  role	  as	  a	  participant	   in	  and	  observer	  of	   the	  work	  of	  CAN	  required	   that	   I	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  political	  developments	  surrounding	  climate	  change	   in	  general	  and	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  particular	  as	  well	  as	  the	  internal	  policy	  development	  processes	  within	  CAN	   (I	   will	   deal	   with	   this	   issue	   more	   thoroughly	   in	   the	   section	   “Learning	   the	  Language”	  below).	  This	  staying	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  with	  political	  and	  policy	  development	  was	  necessary	   in	   order	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   internal	   dynamics	  within	   CAN	   that	  would	  unfold	   during	   my	   fieldwork.	   This	   meant	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   aforementioned	  activities	  during	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	  I	  also	  had	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  a	  massive	  body	  of	  CAN	  internal	  emails	  –	  at	  peak	  times	  during	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  in	  excess	  of	  several	  hundred	  emails	   daily	   –	   as	   well	   as	   attending	   some	   of	   the	   actual	   negotiation	  meetings	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	  bodies	  to	  follow	  the	  political	  developments	  during	  the	  session.	  
Generally,	  on	  a	  typical	  day,	  I	  would	  have	  to	  get	  up	  around	  7	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  only	  come	  back	  to	  the	  accommodation	  late	  in	  the	  evening,	  often	  after	  midnight,	  with	  only	   little	   time	   during	   the	   day	   between	   meetings,	   sessions	   and	   events.	   This	   very	  intensive	  fieldwork	  period	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  challenge	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  including	  note	   taking:	   during	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   there	   was	   no	   time	   to	   sit	   back	   and	   write	  reflective	   field	   notes;	  most	   of	   the	  more	   reflective	   field	   notes	  were	   produced	   in	   the	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  weeks	  after	  I	  had	  returned	  from	  the	  session.	  General	  note	  taking,	  however,	  was	  easily	  possible	  during	   the	   fieldwork,	   as	   in	   the	   setting	  of	   a	   climate	   change	  conference,	   it	   is	  very	   common	   for	   people	   in	   attendance	   to	   take	   notes	   during	   conversations	   and	  events39.	  However,	  note	  taking	  also	  proved	  to	  be	  one	  area	  where	  a	  degree	  of	  conflict	  between	  my	  role	  as	  researcher	  and	  my	  role	  as	  a	  participant	  in	  CAN’s	  work	  had	  to	  be	  negotiated:	  in	  the	  researcher	  role,	  I	  was	  mainly	  interested	  in	  –	  and	  thus	  taking	  notes	  regarding	  –	  observations	  that	  would	  help	  me	  further	  my	  understanding	  of	  CAN	  with	  regards	  to	  my	  research	  theme,	  while	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  CAN	  member	  I	  would	  be	  mainly	  interested	   in	   –	   and	   thus	   taking	   notes	   regarding	   –	   details	   of	   political	   developments.	  Typically,	   individual	  events	  would	  contain	   information	  and	  observations	  relevant	  to	  both	   roles,	   so	   field	  notes	  often	   contain	   a	  mélange	   of	   these	   two	  aspects,	   or	   could	  be	  variably	   dominated	   by	   either	   one	   of	   the	   roles.	   To	   distinguish	   from	   the	   other	   two	  classes	  of	   field	  notes	  described	  below,	  field	  notes	  that	  were	  taken	  while	   in	  the	  field,	  are	  simply	  labelled	  “field	  note”	  when	  quoted.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  note	  taking	  at	  the	  sessions,	  whose	  completeness,	  as	  mentioned,	  suffered	   from	   time	   constraints	   as	   well	   as	   the	   role	   conflict	   described,	   I	   typically	  attempted	   to	  write	   detailed	   accounts	   of	   a	   field	   trip,	   as	   complete	   as	  memory	  would	  allow,	  during	  the	  days	  or	  weeks	  following	  my	  return	  from	  the	  field.	  Naturally,	   these	  notes	   would	   be	   subject	   to	   some	   degree	   of	   bias	   due	   to	   selective	   recall	   and	   this	  selectiveness	  of	  recall	  would	  likely	  favour	  events	  that	  turned	  –	  in	  hindsight	  –	  out	  to	  be	  parts	   of	   contingent	   themes	   over	   those	   occurring	   in	   isolation,	   but	   nonetheless	   I	  considered	  this	  approach	  the	  best	  compromise	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  challenges	  to	  note	  taking	   faced	   in	   the	   field.	   This	   class	   of	   notes	   is	   designated	   as	   “post-­‐field	   note”	  whenever	   used	   in	   subsequent	   chapters.	   However,	   during	   the	   process	   of	   reviewing	  and	  analysing	  the	  existing	  notes	  in	  order	  to	  prepare	  the	  writing	  up	  of	  the	  research,	  I	  recalled	  relevant	  events	  and	  details	   that	  were	  neither	  contained	   in	   the	   “field	  notes”	  nor	  the	  “post-­‐field	  notes”	  and	  so	  I	  reconstructed	  these	  events	  from	  recall.	  Depending	  on	  which	  fieldwork	  period	  the	  notes	  refer	  to,	  this	  reconstruction	  took	  place	  between	  6	   months	   and	   3	   years	   after	   the	   fieldwork	   took	   place	   and	   notes	   obtained	   in	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  	   In	   this	   sense,	  my	   fieldwork	   setting	  differed	   from	  many	  other	   settings	  where	   ethnographic	   field	  research	  is	  carried	  out	  and	  where	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  take	  notes	  in	  the	  field.	  This	  problem,	  shared	  by	  many	  ethnographers,	   is,	   for	  example,	  described	  by	  Homan	  who,	  during	  his	  own	  field-­‐work	  period,	  took	  accommodation	  ”within	  a	  two	  minutes	  walk	  of	  the	  chosen	  assembly	  [fieldwork	  site]	  and	  field	  notes	  were	  recorded	  there	  after	  each	  observation”	  (Homan	  1980:	  50)	  since	  it	  was	  not	  appropriate	  to	  use	  pen	  and	  paper	  at	  the	  fieldwork	  site.	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  fashion	   are	   labelled	   as	   “reconstructed	   notes.”	   It	   is	   prudent	   to	   clearly	   mark	   the	  different	  ways	   and	   settings	   in	  which	  notes	  were	   obtained	   as	   each	   of	   these	   settings	  were	  subject	  to	  their	  own	  set	  of	  specific	  challenges,	  for	  example	  the	  role	  conflict	  and	  time	  constraints	  of	  the	  in-­‐field	  setting	  vs.	  the	  increasing	  selective	  bias	  and	  recall	  bias	  that	  the	  post-­‐field	  and	  reconstructed	  notes	  are	  subject	  to40.	  Furthermore,	  it	  has	  been	  pointed	   out	   that	   fieldnotes	   should	   be	   considered	   textual	   representations	   of	   events,	  “reducing	  just-­‐observed	  events,	  persons	  and	  places	  […]	  [and]	  welter	  and	  confusion	  of	  the	   social	   world	   to	   written	   words,”	   which	   should	   be	   “produced	   in	   or	   in	   close	  proximity	   to	   ‘the	   field’.	   Proximity	   means	   that	   field	   notes	   are	   written	   more	   or	   less	  
contemporaneously	  with	  the	  events”	  (Emerson	  et	  al.	  2001:353,	  cit.	  in	  Mason	  2002:	  98,	  original	   emphasis).	  Thus,	   the	   textual	   representation	  of	   an	  event	   can	  be	   expected	   to	  differ	  when	  produced	  a	   few	  days	  or	  weeks	   (in	   the	   case	  of	  post-­‐field	  notes)	  or	  even	  months	   to	   years	   (reconstructed	  notes)	   after	   the	   events.	  As	   the	   representation	   (and	  not	  the	  event	  itself)	  represents	  the	  data	  of	  any	  research	  using	  participant	  observation,	  it	  must	  be	  made	  clear	  when	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  completely	  adhere	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  contemporaneousness.	  	  
3.4.2 Virtual	  Setting	  
In	  addition	  to	  its	  work	  during	  the	  sessions	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  CAN	  and	  its	  members	  are	  also	   actively	   working	   on	   climate	   change	   policy	   throughout	   the	   year.	   Parts	   of	   that	  activity,	  namely	  the	  aspects	  that	  are	  directed	  towards	  or	  related	  to	  policy	  making	  at	  the	   international	   level,	   are	   often	   coordinated	   through	   CAN	   International41.	   This	  includes	  the	  sharing	  of	  information	  from	  official	  sources	  from	  different	  countries	  and	  the	  UNFCCC,	  and	  new	  relevant	  developments	  in	  the	  field	  of	  climate	  science,	  sharing	  of	  CAN	   member	   organisations’	   analysis	   of	   political	   developments	   or	   other	   reports	  related	  to	  climate	  change,	  for	  example	  relating	  to	  countries’	  performance	  in	  fulfilling	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  	   The	  place	  and	  date	  indicated	  for	  post	  field	  notes	  and	  reconstructed	  notes	  are	  the	  date	  and	  place	  of	  the	  event	  described	  or	  referred	  to	  rather	  than	  the	  date	  and	  place	  where	  and	  when	  the	  note	  taking	  occurred.	  However,	  since	  it	  was	  often	  not	  possible	  to	  pin-­‐point	  the	  exact	  date	  of	  the	  event,	  dates	  for	  post	  field	  notes	  and	  reconstructed	  notes	  will	  be	  specified	  by	  month	  and	  year	  only.	  41	  	   In	   addition	   activities	   coordinated	   through	   CAN	   International,	   regional	   and	   national	   CAN	   nodes	  also	  coordinate	  and	  cooperate	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  their	  domestic	  and/or	  regional	  policy	  making	  with	   regards	   to	   climate	   change	   and	   related	   issues	   (such	   as	   energy),	   for	   example,	   CAN	   Europe	  which	   is	   based	   in	  Brussels	   is	   actively	   lobbying	   on	   the	  EU	   level.	  However,	   since	   this	   research	   is	  concerned	  with	  CAN’s	  role	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations,	  these	  activities	  are	  largely	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study,	  and,	  since	  many	  of	  them	  are	  also	  coordinated	  though	  the	  nodes’	  own	  dedicat-­‐ed	  communications	  channels,	  which	  I	  have	  not	  monitored,	  remained	  largely	  invisible	  to	  me.	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  their	   various	   obligations	   and	   promises.	   This	   also	   includes	   the	   development	   of	   CAN	  policy	   positions	   on	   specific	   aspects	   of	   the	   climate	   change	   policy	   process	   under	   the	  UNFCCC	  and	  the	  presentation	  of	  such	  positions	  in	  various	  forms,	  such	  as	  background	  or	  discussion	  papers,	  position	  papers	  or	  formal	  submissions	  to	  the	  UNFCCC.	  	  
Due	   to	   the	   international	   nature	   of	   the	   network,	   CAN	   members	   from	   different	  countries	   or	   regions	   would	   not	   typically	   be	   physically	   in	   the	   same	   place	   unless	   a	  UNFCCC	   session	   is	   underway	   or	   a	   special	   event	   is	   taking	   place42.	   Consequently,	   in-­‐between	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	  CAN	  makes	  use	  of	  various	  means	  of	  communication,	  including	   telephone	   or	   Skype	   conferencing,	   and	   primarily	   its	   suite	   of	   email	   lists,	  wherein	  the	  main	  email	  list	  (“CANtalk”)	  is	  complemented	  by	  additional	  email	  lists	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  various	  working	  groups	  within	  CAN.	  Thus,	  between	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	  CAN	   turns	   into	   a	   “virtual	   community”	   –	   a	   term	   first	   coined	   in	   the	   seminal	  work	  by	  Howard	   Rheingold	   (1993)	   –	   which	   presents	   a	   distinct	   set	   of	   methodological	  challenges43.	  
In	   the	   virtual	   fieldwork	   setting,	   then,	   data	  mainly	   consists	   of	   the	   large	   body	   of	  emails	  exchanged	  through	  the	  various	  CAN	  lists	  to	  which	  I	  was	  subscribed.	  Specifical-­‐ly,	  I	  was	  subscribed	  to	  the	  general	  purpose	  email	  list,	  CANtalk,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  lists	  of	  three	   of	   CAN’s	   working	   groups,	   the	   can	   cdm/ji	   list,	   used	   by	   CAN’s	   Flexible	  Mecha-­‐nisms	  group,	   and	  can	  sinks,	   used	   jointly	  by	   the	  REDD	  and	  LULUCF	  working	  groups.	  During	  the	  fieldwork	  period	  from	  August	  2007	  to	  December	  2009	  these	  lists	  received	  a	   total	   of	   10,091,	   789	   and	  3,168	  messages	   respectively.	   In	   order	   to	   effectively	   deal	  with	  this	   large	  amount	  of	  messages,	   I	  pre-­‐sorted	  each	  email	  after	  reading	   in	   folders	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  	   For	  example,	  during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  fieldwork,	  the	  CAN	  equity	  summit	  and	  a	  CAN	  strategy	  retreat	  brought	   together	   a	   number	   of	  members	   outside	   the	   UNFCCC	   setting.	   In	   addition	   to	   these	   CAN	  events,	  other	  non-­‐UNFCCC	  events	  related	  to	  climate	  change	  occasionally	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  for	   a	   small	   subset	   of	   members	   to	   get	   together,	   such	   as	   G8/G20	   meetings	   or	   the	   Cochabamba	  conference	  in	  April	  2010.	  43	  	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “virtual	  community”	  is	  not	  uncontested,	  in	  particular	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  “community”	  requires	  a	  character	  of	  reality	  beyond	  what	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  virtual,	  or	  whether	  communities	  are	  rather	  largely	  social	  constructions	  (i.e.	  imagined	  as	  commu-­‐nities	  by	  community	  members).	  Most	  of	  the	  criticisms,	  however,	  that	  are	  voiced	  with	  regards	  to	  labelling	  these	  phenomena	  “communities”	  are	  not	  applicable	  to	  CAN	  as	  it	  presents	  the	  special	  case	  where	   it	   exists	  both	   in	   “real	   life”	   and	   in	   the	  virtual.	  As	   a	   lengthy	  discussion	  of	   this	   controversy	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  thesis,	  it	  shall	  suffice	  to	  point	  to	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  study	  by	  Nick	  Fox	   and	   Chris	   Roberts	   (1999)	   who	   find	   that	   virtual	   communities	   can	   in	   fact	   be	   described	   as	  communities	  at	  least	  in	  cases	  where	  they	  are	  concerned	  with	  “real,”	  as	  opposed	  to	  virtual,	  issues	  (in	  their	  study	  GP	  practice	  in	  the	  UK,	  in	  mine	  international	  climate	  policy)	  and	  that	  the	  criticism	  only	   applies	   to	   virtual	   communities	   where	   both	   the	   community	   and	   its	   topical	   concerns	   are	  virtual.	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  based	  on	  my	  assessment	  of	  whether	  a	  given	  email	   could	  be	  potentially	   relevant	   for	  later	   re-­‐reading	   and	   use	   in	   the	   thesis44.	  Within	   the	   “relevant”	   category	   I	   also	   used	  three	   subcategories	   corresponding	   to	   degrees	   of	   relevance.	   Frequently,	   I	   also	   sent	  additional	  emails	  to	  myself	  containing,	  for	  example,	  information	  on	  the	  wider	  context	  of	   an	   email	   thread	   or	   reflections	   on	   the	   reason	   why	   I	   thought	   the	   email	   thread	  warranted	  further	  attention	  (akin	  to	  field	  notes	  in	  an	  “offline”	  ethnographic	  setting),	  using	  the	  subject	  line	  of	  an	  email	  thread	  so	  that	  the	  email	  containing	  the	  notes	  would	  be	  stored	  alongside	  the	  thread	  to	  which	  it	  related.	  In	  addition	  to	  reading	  emails	  sent	  over	   the	   CAN	   lists,	   I	   participated	   in	   a	   number	   of	   conference	   calls	   of	   the	   Flexible	  Mechanisms	  working	  group	  within	  CAN,	  where	  the	  work	  of	  the	  group	  was	  coordinat-­‐ed	  and	  policy	  positions	  and	  related	  publications	  of	  the	  group	  prepared.	  	  
3.4.3 Hybrid	  setting	  
While	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  non-­‐attendance	  of	  a	  few	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  period	  related	  mainly	  to	  budgetary	  restrictions45,	  the	  experience	  of,	  what	  I	  call	   “hybrid”	   attendance	   was	   very	   useful	   as	   well.	   Hybrid	   attendance	   refers	   to	  situations	  where	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiation	  bodies	  are	  in	  session	  and	  thus	  a	  number	  of	  CAN	  members	  are	  physically	  present	  at	  the	  negotiation	  venue,	  while	  another	  part	  of	  the	  membership	  is	  not	  physically	  present	  but	   linked	  to	  the	  events	  at	  the	  conference	  venue	   through,	   for	   example,	   significantly	   heightened	   activity	   of	   the	   electronic	  communication	   tools	   of	   CAN.	   The	   ratio	   of	   CAN	  members	   in	   hybrid	   versus	   physical	  attendance	   differs	   vastly	   between	   the	   different	   negotiation	   sessions	   and	   types	   of	  UNFCCC	  body	  in	  session	  (e.g.	  COP	  and	  CMP	  meetings	  vs.	  others)	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  a	   later	  stage	   in	   this	   thesis,	  alongside	   its	   implications	   for	   the	   internal	  dynamics	  of	  CAN’s	  work	  at	  the	  climate	  conferences.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  	   Emails	  classed	  as	  “non-­‐relevant”	  where	  mainly	  those	  in	  which	  CAN	  members	  shared	  news	  items	  or	  reports	  of	  member	  organisations	  or	  other	  relevant	  bodies	  thought	  to	  be	  of	  general	  interest,	  but	  also	  short	  email	  conversations	  of	  a	  mere	  coordinator	  matter,	   for	  example	  arranging	  the	  particu-­‐lars	  of	  a	  meeting	  or	  phone	  conference.	  	  45	  	   These	  budgetary	   limitations	  were	  amplified	  by	  an	   increased	   intensity	  of	  negotiations	  under	   the	  UNFCCC	   during	   the	   time	   covered.	   While	   a	   “regular’	   negotiation	   year	   only	   has	   two	   two-­‐week	  sessions	  with	  a	  total	  of	  about	  24-­‐25	  days,	  there	  were	  four	  sessions	  with	  39	  days	  in	  2008	  and	  six	  sessions	  with	  57	  days	  in	  2009.	  	  	   The	  omitted	  sessions	  were	  in	  2008:	  Accra,	  Ghana,	  7	  days	  in	  August;	  in	  2009:	  Bonn,	  Germany,	  12	  days	  in	  June	  and	  5	  days	  in	  August;	  Bangkok,	  Thailand,	  12	  days	  in	  October,	  and	  Barcelona,	  Spain,	  5	  days	  in	  November.	  
3.	  Methodology,	  Research	  Design	  and	  Preliminary	  Theoretical	  Model	   101	  	  In	  addition	  to	  increased	  email	  volume,	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  also	  differs	  from	  the	  virtual	  setting	   by	   the	   content	   and	   style	   of	   the	   communication,	   which	   is	   more	   directly	  concerned	  with	  the	  UNFCCC	  session	  in	  progress	  and	  characterised	  by	  more	  urgency	  and	   a	   faster	   turnaround	   time	   for	   email	   exchanges.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   hybrid	   setting	  differs	  from	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting	  in	  that	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  allows	  only	  a	  superficial	  and	  mediated	  insight	  into	  what	  is	  happening	  simultaneously	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  session,	  through	  webcasts	   of	   a	   selection	   of	   negotiation	  meetings,	  minutes	   of	   CAN	  meetings	  and	  the	  like.	  
3.5 Growing	  Involvement	  –	  “Going	  Native”	  vs.	  “Being”	  Native	  
During	   the	   fieldwork	  period,	  my	  role	  within	   the	   fieldwork	  setting	  changed	  substan-­‐tially,	   in	   all	   three	   fieldwork	   situations,	   i.e.	   “in-­‐session,”	   “virtual”	   and	   “hybrid.”	   This	  change	   can	   be	   partly	   understood	   as	   a	   moving	   along	   on	   an	   observer–participant	  continuum,	   as	   described	   by	   Raymond	   Gold	   (Gold	   1958;	   based	   on	   earlier	   work	   by	  Junker	  (1952)).	  Gold	  describes	  four	  ideal	  typical	  stages	  on	  that	  continuum:	  complete	  participant,	  participant-­‐as-­‐observer,	  observer-­‐as-­‐participant	  and	  complete	  observer,	  each	  of	  which	  entail	   their	   specific	  advantages	  and	  dangers.	  This	  change	  can	  also	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Victor	  de	  Munck’s	  (1998)	  “three	  stages	  of	  hanging	  out,”	  where	   first	   a	   “stranger”	   stage	   is	   characterised	   by	   the	   researcher’s	   learning	   of	   the	  language	  and	  rules	  of	  interacting	  within	  the	  group	  as	  well	  as	  with	  mutual	  familiarisa-­‐tion.	   The	   second,	   “acquaintance”	   stage,	   where	   the	   researcher	   and	   the	   researched	  begin	   to	   recognise	  each	  other	  as	   individuals	   and	  where	   “the	   researcher	   is	   accepted	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  liked)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  audience	  at	  the	  various	  public	  arenas	  in	  the	  community”	  (de	  Munck	  1998:	  42).	  In	  this	  stage	  the	  researcher	  also	  becomes	  more	  and	  more	  competent	  in	  the	  specific	  language	  and	  behaviour	  of	  the	  group.	  In	  the	  final,	  or	   “intimate,”	   stage	   the	   researcher	   has	   become	   a	   “full-­‐fledged	  participant	   observer,	  acting	  and	  responding	  automatically-­‐without	  first	  having	  to	  consciously	  construct	  his	  or	  her	  behavior	  and	  speech-­‐to	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  nearby”	  (de	  Munck	  1998:	  42).	  
During	   my	   first	   attendance	   at	   a	   UNFCCC	   conference,	   the	   August	   2007	   Vienna	  Intersessional	  Meetings,	  I	  chose	  a	  role	  in	  the	  fieldwork	  setting	  that	  matches	  well	  with	  Gold’s	   description	   of	   the	   complete	   observer,	   one	   of	   the	   extreme	   points	   of	   the	  continuum,	   which	   he	   states	   is	   only	   rarely	   employed	   in	   fieldwork:	   This	   “role	   is	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  illustrated	  by	  […]	  reconnaissance	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  social	  setting	  as	  preparation	  for	  more	  intensive	   study	   in	   another	   field	   role	   […]	   [and	   thus	   an]	   important	   starting	   point	   for	  subsequent	   observations	   and	   interactions	   in	   appropriate	   roles.	   It	   is	   not	   surprising	  that	  reconnaissance	   is	  almost	  always	  a	  prelude	  to	  using	   the	  participant-­‐as-­‐observer	  role	  in	  community	  study”	  (Gold	  1958:	  222).	  This	  phase	  also	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  “stranger”	  stage	  in	  de	  Munck’s	  description.	  During	  that	  conference	  then,	  I	  mainly	  sought	   to	   understand	   in	   more	   general	   terms	   the	   internal	   structure	   of	   CAN’s	   work	  during	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  and	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  these	  sessions.	  In	  both	  cases,	  I	  had	   attempted	   to	   prepare	   well	   for	   the	   fieldwork	   by	   studying	   publicly	   available	  documents	  (mainly	  CAN	  policy	  positions	  available	  from	  CAN’s	  website	  as	  well	  as	  the	  CAN	  Charter)	  and	  webcasts	  of	  negotiation	  sessions,	  which,	  however	  only	  gave	  a	  very	  superficial	  and	  thus	  distorted	  insight	  into	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  session.	  For	  example,	  the	  webcasts	   of	   negotiation	   sessions	   on	   the	   UNFCCC	   website	   only	   covered	   publicly	  accessible	  discussions	  (i.e.	   sessions	  open	  to	  NGO	  observers	  and	  media),	  while	  other	  discussions,	   in	   particular	   contact	   groups	   and	   informal	   consultations	   (both	   being	  closed	   for	   media	   and	   only	   the	   former	   open	   for	   NGO	   observers)	   and	   corridor	  encounters	  (providing	  some	  degree	  of	  access	  to	  the	  proceedings	  in	  the	  closed	  rooms),	  remained	  hidden	  until	  actually	  attending	  a	  UNFCCC	  session.	  Likewise,	  with	  regards	  to	  certain	   documents,	   including	   negotiating	   text	   and	   NGO	   briefings,	   publicly	   available	  documents	  were	  restricted	  to	  finished	  versions	  while	  the	  attendance	  also	  gave	  access	  to	  versions	  of	  the	  same	  texts	  as	  they	  were	  developed.	  During	  this	  first	  session,	  I	  also	  negotiated	  continued	  access	   to	   internal	  CAN-­‐I	  meetings	  by	   introducing	  my	  research	  project	   to	  a	   regional	  CAN	  node	  coordinator	  and	  a	  director	  of	  one	  of	  CAN’s	  member	  organisations,	  who	  in	  turn	  agreed	  to	  provide	  me	  with	  registration	  to	  future	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  via	   that	  organisation.	  Besides	   the	   logistical	  advantage	  of	  gaining	  continued	  access	  to	  the	  sessions,	  this	  also	  constituted	  explicit	  informed	  consent	  to	  my	  research	  by	  two	  important	  gatekeepers.	  
During	  later	  conferences,	  I	  increased	  my	  participation	  within	  CAN,	  and	  my	  inter-­‐action	  with	  other	  CAN	  members,	  including	  participation	  at	  meetings	  of	  some	  working	  groups	  of	  CAN,	  which	  I	  had	  not	  done	  during	  the	  Vienna	  conference.	  I	  also	  started	  to	  occasionally	  offer	  my	  help	  to	  CAN,	  for	  example,	  at	  the	  Bali	  climate	  change	  conference	  in	   December	   2007,	   I	   wrote	   a	   computer	   program	  which	   allowed	   for	   the	   sending	   of	  bulk	  text	  messages	  about	  breaking	  news	  and	  fast	  developments	  to	  the	  mobile	  phones	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  of	  all	  CAN	  members	  present	  in	  Bali,	  or	  offered	  layout	  help	  for	  CAN’s	  daily	  newsletter,	  ECO.	  During	   the	  same	   time,	   I	  was	  signed	  up	   to	  some	  of	  CAN’s	   internal	  email	   lists,	  a	  resource	   initially	   not	   available	   to	   me,	   which	   now	   enabled	   observation	   of	   the	  interactions	  within	  CAN	  in	  the	  “virtual”	  situations.	  This	  became	  possible	  as	  I	  moved	  increasingly	   towards	   the	   “acquaintance”	   stage	   of	   my	   interaction	   with	   CAN.	   Using	  Gold’s	   (1958)	   categorisation,	   my	   role	   during	   this	   period	   could	   be	   described	   as	   a	  “participant-­‐as-­‐observer”	  since	  I	  did	  not	  actively	  participate	  in	  the	  network.	  However,	  the	   realities	   of	  my	   fieldwork	   situation	   also	   show	  a	   substantial	   problem	  with	  Gold’s	  categorisation.	   Gold’s	   work,	   which	   is	   regarded	   as	   “one	   of	   the	   most	   widely	   cited	  schemes	   […]	   [of]	   classification	   of	   participant	   observer	   roles”	   (Bryman	   2008:	   410),	  links	   the	   observer-­‐participant	   continuum	   to	   a	   covert-­‐overt	   continuum,	   where	   the	  “complete	   participant”	   employs	   the	   most	   covert	   approach	   to	   the	   field,	   anxiously	  hiding	  her	  true	  identity	  as	  a	  researcher	  from	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  group	  and,	  in	  fact	   fearing	   the	   discovery	   of	   his	   real	   identity	   which	   may	   jeopardise	   the	   entire	  research	  project	  (Bryman	  2008:	  406),	  and	  typically	  merely	  “playing”	  a	  role:	  “He	  must	  bind	   the	   mask	   of	   pretense	   to	   himself	   or	   stand	   the	   risk	   of	   exposure	   and	   research	  failure”	   (Gold	   1958:	   219).	   In	   his	   characterisation	   of	   the	   “participant-­‐as-­‐observer,”	  however,	   Gold	   assumes	   universal	   knowledge	   among	   the	   group	  members	   regarding	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  researcher,	  i.e.	  a	  fully	  overt	  situation.	  	  
In	   this	   stage	   of	   my	   own	   research,	   however,	   full	   disclosure	   of	   my	   position	   and	  intentions	  as	  a	  researcher	  was	  not	  practical:	  most	  of	  the	  settings	  that	  I	  participated	  in,	  involved	   rather	   large	   number	   of	   people,	   where	   no	   individual	   introductions	   were	  made,	   and	   even	   in	   smaller	   settings,	   members	   usually	   only	   introduced	   themselves	  with	  their	  names	  and	  the	  organisation	  that	  they	  worked	  for,	  with	  no	  time	  for	  further	  details.	   As	   a	   result,	   while	   I	   strove	   to	   inform	   CAN	   members	   of	   my	   particular	   role	  wherever	  practical	   (for	  example,	   in	   smaller,	   even	  more	   informal	  encounters,	   and	   in	  particular	  those	  with	  whom	  I	  interacted	  more	  frequently	  and	  more	  personally),	  most	  CAN	  members	  were	  not	  aware	  of	  my	  role	  during	  this	  period,	  rendering	  my	  research	  effectively	  semi-­‐overt	  research46.	  However,	  it	  is	  often	  acknowledged	  that	  virtually	  all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  	   Semi-­‐overt,	   or	   partially	   overt,	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   close	   relative	   of	  what	   Bryman	   (2008:	   406)	  calls	   “partially	  covert,”	  where	  some	  are	  aware	  of	   the	  researchers	   identity	   (in	  Bryman’s	  case	   the	  business	  owner,	  in	  mine	  the	  “gatekeepers”	  with	  whom	  I	  had	  negotiated	  access	  as	  well	  as	  individ-­‐uals	  I	  had	  closer	  contact	  with)	  while	  others	  are	  not	  (in	  Bryman’s	  case	  the	  costumers,	  in	  mine	  the	  large	   majority	   of	   CAN	  members).	   However,	   I	   chose	   to	   conceive	   of	   my	   research	   as	   semi-­‐overt,	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   observation	  will	   involve	   some	   covert	   elements	   (Bryman	   2008;	   Fielding	  2008;	  Mason	  2002;	  Pollner	  and	  Emerson	  2001),	  often	   for	  practical	   reasons	   such	  as	  the	   ones	   outlined	   above,	   and	   “that,	   short	   of	   wearing	   a	   sign,	   ethnographers	   cannot	  signal	  when	  they	  are	  and	  are	  not	  collecting	  data”	  (Fielding	  2008:	  272).	  
In	   the	   later	   stages	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   period	   (starting	   with	   the	   December	   2008	  climate	  change	  conference	  in	  Poznań),	  I	  got	  more	  actively	  engaged	  in	  the	  work	  of	  one	  particular	  CAN	  working	  group	  –	   the	  CAN	  working	  group	  on	   “Flexible	  Mechanisms,”	  which	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   carbon	   market	   instruments	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	  framework.	  Among	  the	  CAN	  working	  groups,	  this	  working	  group	  was	  the	  group	  that	  I	  had	   followed	   most	   closely	   as	   an	   non-­‐participating	   observer	   during	   the	   previous	  fieldwork	  periods,	  and	  when	  I	  decided	  to	  become	  a	  more	  active	  participant	  in	  one	  of	  the	   groups,	   I	   chose	   this	   one	   over	   the	   others	   since	   I	   had	   –	   through	   the	   preceding	  passive	  observation	  –	  acquired	  a	  more	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  group’s	  issue	  area	  including	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  carbon	  markets	  as	  well	  as	  some	  of	  the	  specific	  technical	  and	  academic	  aspects	  of	  this	  area.	  An	  increased	  involvement	  also	  seemed	  appropriate	  at	   this	   stage,	   as	   I	   had	   over	   the	   course	   of	  my	   research	   acquired	   relevant	   skills	   and	  specialist	  knowledge	  in	  issues	  related	  to	  carbon	  market	  that	  would	  be	  of	  use	  to	  this	  group	  –	  thus,	  I	  saw	  it	  as	  my	  obligation	  to	  offer	  these	  skills	  where	  they	  could	  be	  useful	  to	  CAN.	  
This	  change	  of	  involvement	  opened	  a	  new	  set	  of	  situations	  in	  which	  I	  was	  able	  to	  participate.	  I	  contributed	  to	  the	  development	  of	  text	  for	  media	  purposes	  or	  to	  be	  used	  as	  verbal	  interventions	  or	  written	  submissions	  to	  the	  UNFCCC,	  accompanied	  some	  of	  the	  group	  members	   to	   lobbying	  meetings	  with	  members	  of	  government	  delegations	  and	  in	  general	  had	  more	  access	  to	  and	  insights	  into	  the	  more	  informal	  and	  “produc-­‐tive”	  parts	  of	  working	  group	  activities	  that	  took	  place	  beyond	  the	  formally	  convened	  working	  group	  meetings	  I	  had	  restricted	  myself	  to	  until	  that	  point.	  During	  that	  period,	  my	   involvement	   increased	   to	   the	   point	   where	   I	   became	   the	   coordinator	   of	   the	  working	  group	  for	  a	  period	  of	  several	  months.	  I	  had	  thus	  moved	  into	  the	  third	  of	  de	  Munck’s	  stages	  of	  “hanging	  out,”	  the	  “intimate”	  stage,	  where	  my	  role	  in	  the	  group	  was	  largely	  indistinguishable	  from	  other	  members.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  rather	   than	   semi-­‐covert,	   since	   the	   general	   attitude	   employed	  was	   that	   of	   openness	   rather	   than	  concealment.	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  One	  possible	  problem	  with	  such	  an	  approach,	  which	  is	  frequently	  discussed	  in	  texts	  on	  ethnography	  and	  participant	  observation,	   is	  associated	  with	   the	  notion	  of	   “going	  native.”	   “Going	   native,”	   as	   a	   phrase,	   clearly	   gives	   away	   participant	   observation’s	  history	  as	  the	  dominant	  method	  of	  the	  early	  anthropology	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  a	  period	  “in	  which	  social	  and	  political	  life	  saw	  race,	  gender,	  and	  sex	  as	  white,	  male,	  and	  heterosexual;	  academia	  and	  science	  reflected	  that	  same	  homogeneous	  state;	  and	   lands	   of	   the	   non-­‐Western	   world	   were	   occupied	   by	   the	   objects	   of	   science	  commonly	   known	   as	   ‘natives’	   and	   ‘savages’”	   (Kanuha	  2000:	   439).	  While	   the	   notion	  has,	  for	  that	  reason,	  certainly	  a	  racist	  and	  colonial	  dimension	  which	  causes	  un-­‐ease	  in	  using	  it,	  the	  phrase	  and	  the	  processes	  it	  described	  keep	  appearing	  in	  methodological	  discussions	  (e.g.	  Malinowski	  2003	  [1922];	  Gold	  1958;	  Atkinson	  et	  al.	  2001;	  Adler	  et	  al.	  1986;	  Fuller	  1999;	  Kidd	  2008;	  Kanuha	  2000).	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	  while	   the	  descriptions	  of	   the	  process	  remain	   largely	   identical	  –	  a	  very	  high	  degree	  of	   involve-­‐ment	  of	  the	  researcher	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  researched	  that	  causes	  the	  researcher	  to	  adopt	  at	   least	  some	  of	  the	  values,	  practices	  and	  meanings	  of	  those	  being	  researched	  as	  his	  or	  her	  own	  –	  the	  judgement	  of	  its	  desirability	  shifts	  over	  time.	  
The	  phrase	  is	  routinely	  attributed	  to	  Bronislaw	  Malinowski	  (e.g.	  by	  Kanuha	  2000)	  who,	   in	   his	   own	   ethnographic	   account	   of	   the	   “Argonauts	   of	   the	   Western	   Pacific”	  (Malinowski	  2003	  [1922])	  argued	  that	  a	  degree	  of	  “going	  native”	  is	  a	  required	  step	  to	  fully	   understand	   the	   social	   relationships	   within	   the	   groups	   and	   society	   under	  observation.	   Starting	   with	   the	   Chicago	   School	   of	   social	   scientific	   research,	   though,	  “going	  native”	  was	  considered	  a	  grave	  risk	  that	  was	  to	  be	  avoided.	  It	  was	  feared	  that	  “developing	  an	  overrapport	  with	  research	  subjects	  […]	  can	  harm	  the	  data-­‐gathering	  process”	   (Adler	   et	   al.	   1986:	   364)	   which	   could	   occur	   when	   an	   academic	   observer	  abandoned	   the	   role	   of	   the	   non-­‐engaged	   outsider	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   role	   of	   a	   full	  participant	  who	  is	  getting	  too	  involved	  in	  the	  group.	  This	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  possible	  result	  of	  “the	  prolonged	  immersion	  of	  ethnographers	   in	  the	   lives	  of	   the	  people	  they	  study,	  coupled	  with	  the	  commitment	  to	  seeing	  the	  social	  world	  through	  their	  eyes”	  (Bryman	  2008:	   412).	   In	   other	  words,	   ethnography	   “is	   enmeshed	   in	   the	   very	   lived	   order	   and	  ordering	  activities	   it	  ought	   to	   study,	   and	  as	  a	   consequence	   its	   findings	  and	  analysis	  risk	  ‘usurpation’	  by	  the	  lived	  order”	  (Pollner	  and	  Emerson	  2001:	  124).	  
Recently,	   however,	   it	   has	   increasingly	  been	   argued	   that	   this	   alleged	  problem	   is	  not	  necessarily	  problematic	  after	  all.	  For	  example,	  it	  has	  been	  stated	  that	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   What	  seems	  to	  lie	  behind	  the	  belief	  that	  “going	  native”	  poses	  a	  seri-­‐ous	  danger	  to	  the	  fieldworker	  is	  the	  logical	  construction	  of	  the	  rela-­‐tionship	  between	  objectivity	  and	  subjectivity,	  between	  scientist	  and	  native	  […]	  as	  an	  unbridgeable	  opposition.	  	   (Tedlock	  1991:	  71)	  Of	   course,	   participant	   observation	   always	   has	   a	   strong	   subjective	   aspect	   to	   it	   and	  there	   is	  no	  shortage	  of	  ethnographies	  conducted	  of	  groups	  that	   the	  researcher	   feels	  particularly	   sympathetic	   with	   or	   worthy	   of	   support	   in	   their	   struggle	   and/or	   is	   an	  active	  member	  or	  has	  previously	  been	  a	  member	  of	  (among	  the	  vary	  many	  example	  are	   Roseneil	   1993;	   Davis	   2006;	   Kidd	   2008),	   or	   indeed	   of	   “auto-­‐ethnographies”	  (Murphy	  and	  Dingwall	  (2001)	  discuss	  a	  few	  examples	  of	  auto-­‐ethnographies),	  which	  put	   the	   researcher	   right	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   research	   thus	   making	   subjectivity	   an	  obvious	   feature	   of	   the	   research.	   Further,	   as	   has	   been	   pointed	   out	   above,	   that	  fieldnotes,	  rather	  than	  representing	  events	  themselves,	  are	  always	  textual	  represen-­‐tations	  of	  events	  as	  seen,	   interpreted	  and	  described	  by	  the	  researcher,	  which	  clearly	  adds	  an	  additional	  element	  of	  subjectivity.	  	  
Valli	   Kalei	   Kanuha	   (2000)	   points	   out	   that	   for	  much	   ethnographic	   research	   the	  question	  of	  “going”	  native	  does	  not	  even	  apply	  as	  the	  researcher	  has	  chosen	  groups	  for	  her	   study	  which	   she	  was	   sympathetic	   towards	  or	  part	  of	   from	   the	  outset	  of	   the	  research	  and	   thus	   the	  question	  of	   “being	  native”	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	  embracing	  the	  standards	  of	  academic	  inquiry	  steps	  into	  the	  centre	  of	  attention.	  Likewise,	  Duncan	  Fuller’s	  (1999)	  reflections	  on	  his	  own	  research	  show	  that	  a	  critical	  perspective	  can	  be	  retained	   in	   social	   scientific	   inquiry	   even	   if	   the	   researcher	   chooses	   a	   position	   of	   a	  “researcher	  as	  activist,”	  which	  implies	  full	  engagement	  with	  the	  group	  researched	  and	  explicitly	  departs	  from	  any	  claim	  of	  objectivity	  (at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  the	  activist	  aspect	  of	  the	   researcher’s	   overall,	   integrated	   self	   is	   concerned).	   Indeed,	   as	   he	   concludes	  (quoting	   Fraser),	   social	   scientific	   inquiry	   that	   aims	   to	   contribute	   to	   critical	   theory	  should	  develop	   “its	   research	  program	  and	   its	   conceptual	   framework	  with	  an	  eye	   to	  the	  aims	  and	  activities	  of	  those	  oppositional	  movements	  with	  which	  it	  has	  a	  partisan,	  though	  not	  uncritical	  identification”	  (Fraser,	  cit.	  in	  Fuller	  1999:	  226).	  
The	  implicit	  suggestion	  of	  Barbara	  Tedlock’s	  afore-­‐quoted	  double	  negative	  is	  that	  subjectivity	  and	  objectivity	  are	  in	  a	  “bridgeable”	  opposition	  to	  one	  another.	  This	  might	  suggest	  that	  while	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  subjectivity	  in	  the	  field	  is	  an	  inherent	  feature	  of	  participant	  observation,	  objectivity	  in	  analysis	  and	  interpretation,	  once	  returned	  from	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  the	  field,	  could	  be	  achieved.	  However,	  even	  in	  this	  aspect	  the	  possibility	  of	  producing	  accounts	   free	   of	   subjectivity	   has	   been	   questioned.	   Clifford,	   for	   example,	   points	   out	  that	  ethnographic	  texts	  are	  always	  based	  on	  “systematic	  and	  contestable	  exclusions”	  (cit.	   in	   Murphy	   and	   Dingwall	   2001:	   344)	   made	   according	   to	   the	   ethnographers’	  subjective	  judgement.	  
We	  are	  also	  reminded	  by	  Howard	  Becker	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  “to	  do	  research	  that	  is	  uncontaminated	  by	  personal	  and	  political	  sympathies	   […]	  and,	   therefore,	   that	   the	  question	   is	   not	   whether	   we	   should	   take	   sides,	   since	   we	   inevitably	   will,	   but	   rather	  whose	   side	  we	  are	  on”	   (1967:	  239)	   and,	   given	   this	   situation,	   those	   sympathies	   and	  this	   side-­‐taking	   should	   be	   made	   explicit.	   In	   that	   context,	   for	   example,	   engaged	  anthropologists	   (Kidd	  2009)	  or	   “pracademics”	   (Davis	  2006)	  understand	   themselves	  as	  having	  a	  moral	  and	  ethical	  obligation	  for	  taking	  the	  side	  of	  the	  underprivileged	  and	  marginalised	  and	  “using	  research	  for	  change”	  (Davis	  2006:	  229).	  	  
Participant	   observation	   is	   typically	   chosen	   as	   a	   method	   since	   other	   methods	  would	  not	  allow	  the	  same	  depth	  of	   insight	   into	   the	  researched	  group.	  Peter	  Newell,	  for	   example,	   argues	   that	   “being	   closer	   to	   the	   activities	   being	   studied	   provides	  valuable	  insights	  that	  are	  not	  otherwise	  available	  to	  the	  academic	  who	  observes	  from	  the	   sideline”	   (2000:	  12),	  while	   Severyn	  Bruyn	   (1966)	   includes	   “intimacy”	   as	  one	  of	  the	   criteria	   to	   guarantee	   the	   subjective	   adequacy	   of	   participant	   observation	   and	  Raymond	  Gold	  notes	  that	  the	  logical	  opposite	  of	  “going	  native,”	  causes	  the	  fieldwork-­‐er	  to	  “seemingly	  or	  actually	  [reject]	  the	  informant's	  views	  without	  ever	  getting	  to	  the	  point	   of	   understanding	   them”	   (Gold	   1958:	   222).	   Thus,	   participant	   observation	  requires	   that	   researchers	   immerse	   themselves	   in	   their	   fieldwork	   setting	   and	   in	   the	  lives	  of	   those	   researched	   in	  order	   to	  be	  able	   to	  understand	  how	  reality	   is	   seen	  and	  interpreted	  by	  them	  and	  to	  produce	  rich	  accounts	  and	  explanations	  of	  these	  lives.	  
It	  thus	  seems	  that	  much	  of	  the	  cautioning	  against	  “going	  native”	  risks	  limiting	  the	  desirable	  immersion	  into	  the	  field	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  preserve	  the	  (largely	  unattainable)	  value	  neutrality	  and	  objectivity	  of	  the	  research.	  If	  this	  interpretation	  of	  “going	  native”	  poses	  the	  quest	  for	  neutrality	  and	  objectivity	  against	  the	  need	  for	  immersion,	  it	  seems	  that	  an	   active	   avoidance	  of	   “going	  native”	   in	   this	   sense	  of	   the	  phrase	  would	  more	   likely	  hinder	  than	  support	  an	  adequate	  research	  outcome.	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   is	   important	   to	   note,	   though,	   that	   despite	   this,	   it	   remains	   important	   that	   the	  researcher	   aims	   to	   keep	   a	   critical	   view	   on	   the	   observed	   events	   and	   on	   their	   own	  interpretation	   and	   the	   interpretations	   of	   those	   researched.	   “Going	   native”	   is	   also	  described	  as	   the	  process	  where	  a	  researcher	   “may	  over-­‐identify	  with	   the	   informant	  […]	  [and]	  accepting	  the	  informant’s	  views	  as	  his	  [sic]	  own”	  (Gold	  1958:	  222).	  Recently,	  however,	   researchers	   (especially	   from	   a	   feminist	   background)	   have	   begun	   to	  question	  the	  researchers’	  exclusive	  authority	  to	  interpret	  the	  social	  realities	  of	  those	  researched	  (Murphy	  and	  Dingwall	  2001).	  Thus,	  research	  projects	  aim	  for	  formulating	  interpretations	   and	   conclusions	   together	   with	   the	   research	   subjects,	   consequently	  accepting	  that	  in	  all	  likelihood	  (at	  least	  some	  of)	  informants’	  views	  will	  be	  accepted	  as	  the	   researcher’s	   own	   (Davis	   2006;	   Roseneil	   1993).	   In	   conclusion,	   it	   appears	   that	  “going	  native”	  is	  only	  a	  problem	  if	  researchers	  identify	  with	  the	  research	  subjects	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  as	  to	  uncritically	  accept	  their	  interpretations	  as	  their	  own47.	  	  
3.6 	  “Learning	  the	  Language”	  
“Learning	  the	  language”	  of	  the	  field	  is	  important	  for	  ethnographic	  insights	  to	  generate	  relevant	   knowledge	   and	   to	   enable	   any	   meaningful	   participation	   of	   the	   participant	  observer	  (Fielding	  2008).	  This	  is	  quite	  obviously	  the	  case	  where	  the	  language	  used	  is	  foreign	  –	   in	   the	   literal	  sense	  of	   the	  word	  –	   to	   the	  participant	  observer.	  However,	  as	  stressed	  by	  Severyn	  Bruyn	  who	  (based	  on	  work	  by	  George	  Homan)	  puts	  knowledge	  of	  the	  language	  forward	  as	  one	  of	  his	  “six	  indexes	  of	  subjective	  adequacy”	  of	  participant	  observation,	   this	   “applies	   equally	   to	   the	   study	   of	   people	   who	   appear	   to	   speak	   the	  same	   tongue	   as	   the	   observer”	   (Bruyn	   1966:	   182),	   “on	   the	   argument	   that	   the	  more	  familiar	   the	   observer	   is	   with	   the	   argot,	   slang	   or	   jargon	   in	   use,	   and	   with	   ordinary	  phrases	   which	   bear	   a	   setting-­‐specific	   meaning,	   the	   greater	   is	   the	   accuracy	   of	  observation”	   (Fielding	  2008:	  279).	   In	   the	   context	  of	  my	   research,	   this	   “learning	   the	  language”	  entailed	  getting	  intimate	  with	  the	  meanings	  of	  the	  many	  acronyms	  used	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  understanding	  to	  a	  certain	  level	  the	  science	  behind	  climate	  change,	  the	  political	  positions	  of	  the	  major	  countries	  and	  groups	  of	  countries	  and	  of	  the	  major	  NGOs	   and	   groups	   of	   NGOs	   as	   well	   as	   the	   implications	   of	   various	   possible	   policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  	   Clearly,	   if,	   after	   critical	   consideration,	   the	   researcher	   arrives	   at	   the	   same	   interpretation	   as	   the	  research	   subject,	   this	   interpretation	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   valid,	   if	   only	   for	   the	   reason	   that	   two	  individuals	  came	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  independently	  of	  each	  other.	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  outcomes	   for	   the	   future	  of	   the	  climate	  negotiations,	  and,	   thus,	   indirectly,	   the	   fate	  of	  future	   generations	   with	   regards	   to	   climate	   change.	   Without	   this	   knowledge,	   my	  interpretation	  of	  certain	  events	  would	  possibly	  be	  flawed	  or	  even	  completely	  wrong.	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  I	  offer	  this	  field	  note	  from	  my	  first	  UNFCCC	  session	  in	  2007:	  Later	  on	  that	  day	  [of	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  report48],	  I	  got	  the	  text	  of	   the	   report	   off	   the	   internet	   since	   I	   thought	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  presentation	   that	   there	  was	   something	   funny	   about	   the	  mitigation	  scenario.	   So	   I	   did	   some	   calculations	   (and	   even	   used	   Acrobat	   to	  measure	  the	  lengths	  of	  some	  of	  the	  bars	  in	  a	  bar	  chart	  to	  use	  in	  my	  calculations)	   and	   found	   that	   the	   “mitigation	   scenario”	   actually	   al-­‐lows	  a	  substantial	  increase	  of	  emissions	  in	  2030	  compared	  to	  2000	  (in	  the	  region	  of	  15%)	  while	  claiming	  to	  reduce	  emissions	  by	  25%.	  	   	  The	   only	   sector	   that	  DOES	   reduce	   its	   emissions	   is	   LULUCF,	  where	  positive	  emissions	  turn	  negative	  in	  2030,	  but	  I	  doubt	  very	  much	  that	  it	   is	  possible	   for	  LULUCF	  to	  soak	  up	  all	   that	  carbon.	   I	  mean,	  unless	  you	  really	  want	  to	  plant	  LOTS	  of	  trees	  or	  green	  the	  desert	  or	  some-­‐thing.	   I	   asked	   […]	   [a	   CAN	  member],	   who	   is	   also	   a	   newbie,	   and	   he	  couldn’t	  imagine	  that	  either.	  	   	  So	  I	  was	  really	  wondering	  why	  nobody	  in	  CAN	  picked	  up	  on	  that	  and	  raised	  it	  in	  the	  daily	  meeting.	  I	  personally	  didn’t	  think	  it	  was	  appro-­‐priate	  for	  me	  to	  raise	  the	  issue	  myself.	  But	   just	  how	  DO	  things	   like	  this	  get	  picked	  up?	  It	  would	  be	  really	  interesting	  to	  see	  how/if	  CAN	  would	  deal	  with	  something	  like	  this.	  	   	  Also,	  what	  are	  the	  (political)	  implications	  if	  the	  [UNFCCC]	  secretari-­‐at	  or	  the	  consultants	  they	  hire	  chose	  mitigation	  scenarios	  that	  plan	  to	   achieve	   emissions	   reductions	   by	   planting	   trees	   (the	   report	   also	  mentions	   CCS	   and	   nukes)	   rather	   than	   ACTUALLY	   reducing	   emis-­‐sions?	  	   (post	  field	  note,	  Vienna,	  Aug	  2007)	  Given	  my	  lack	  of	  “language	  skills,”	  i.e.	  knowledge	  of	  the	  relevant	  background,	  at	  that	  point	  in	  time,	  I	  really	  felt	  I	  was	  onto	  something	  interesting	  and	  important.	  This	  feeling	  was	   further	  supported	  when	   I	   realised	   that	   the	  appendix	   to	   the	  document	   that	  was	  supposed	  to	  provide	  further	  background	  information	  on	  the	  scenarios,	  had	  not	  been	  uploaded	  with	  all	  the	  other	  appendices	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  website:	  
Is	   it	   just	  a	  random	  coincidence	  that	   the	  “Appendix	  5”	   to	   the	  report	  that	  should	  contain	  more	  details	  and	  information	  on	  both	  (reference	  and	   mitigation)	   scenarios	   can	   be	   found	   nowhere	   on	   the	   UNFCCC	  website	  (but	  no	  problems	  finding	  appendices	  1-­‐4)?	  	   	  	   	  (post	  field	  note,	  Vienna,	  Aug	  2007)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  	   “Investment	   and	   Financial	   Flows	   to	   Address	   Climate	   Change”	   (UNFCCC	   2007a),	   a	   report	  commissioned	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretary	  as	  requested	  by	  the	  parties	  whose	  main	  outcomes	  were	  presented	  to	  parties	  in	  Vienna.	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  However,	   during	   the	   analysis	   of	   my	   field	   notes	   nearly	   three	   years	   later,	   after	  acquiring	  more	  competence	  in,	  as	  it	  were,	  the	  language	  of	  the	  field,	  the	  note	  reveals	  an	   observer	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   his	   fieldwork,	   eagerly	   (zealously?)	   looking	   for	  interesting	   and	   relevant	   events	   rather	   than	   revealing	   anything	   in	   itself	   interesting	  and	  relevant:	  in	  hindsight,	  and	  equipped	  with	  a	  much	  better	  understanding	  of	  climate	  change,	   the	   figures	   do	   not	   suggest	   to	   me	   anymore	   that	   questionable	   politicised	  assumptions	  have	  been	  made	  by	   the	   authors	  of	   the	   report.	  The	   size	  of	   the	  LULUCF	  sector’s	  difference	  between	  reference	  scenario	  and	  mitigation	  scenario	  in	  2030	  in	  the	  report	  is	  quoted	  as	  14.6Gt	  CO2eq	  globally	  (UNFCCC	  2007a:	  216),	  which	  is	  reasonably	  close	  to	  other	  commonly	  used	  scenarios,	  for	  example	  the	  IPCC	  scenarios	  which	  gives	  a	  global	   figure	   of	   13.8Gt	   CO2eq	   (IPCC	   2007b:	   559),	   based	   on	   a	   synthesis	   of	   three	  different	  models.	  
However,	  what	  became	  clear	  (although	  at	  the	  time	  I	  was	  obviously	  not	  aware	  that	  the	  event	  described	  above	  would	  be	  an	  example	  of	  that)	  at	  the	  first	  UNFCCC	  meeting	  attended	   was	   that	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   relevant	   insight	   and	   to	   reduce	   the	   chance	   of	  inappropriate	   interpretations	   (which	   can	   result	   in	   both	   missing	   a	   relevant	   event	  whose	   relevance	   is	   not	   recognised	   and	   overestimating	   the	   relevance	   of	   benign	  occurrences)	   I	   would	   need	   to	   learn	   the	   relevant	   language	   and	   gain	   intimate	  knowledge	   of	   at	   least	   some	   aspects	   of	   climate	   change	   politics.	   It	   also	   became	   clear	  that	  climate	  change	  politics	  is	  too	  wide	  a	  field	  to	  acquire	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  all	  its	  aspects,	   so	   I	   decided	   –	   while	   still	   aiming	   to	   obtain	   and	   maintain	   good	   working	  knowledge	   of	   the	  wider	   climate	   change	   policy	   context	   –	   to	   focus	   on	   one	   particular	  sub-­‐issue	   (carbon	   markets),	   where	   the	   level	   of	   specific	   knowledge	   I	   acquired	   was	  soon	  enough	  to	  produce	  discussion	  papers	  on	  policy	  options	  proposed	  by	  countries	  (e.g.	   Holz	   2009a)	   or	   give	   a	   conference	   presentation	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   CAN	   member	  organisation	   on	   related	   topics	   (Holz	   2009b),	   and,	   as	   indicated	   above,	   act	   as	   a	  coordinator	  of	  the	  relevant	  CAN	  working	  group	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time.	  
3.7 Ethics	  
Ethical	   considerations	   must	   guide	   any	   social	   science	   research	   exercise.	   This	   is	  mandated	   by	   both	   a	   universal	   imperative	   of	   ethical	   behaviour	   in	   general	   and	   then	  more	   specific	   requirements	   of	   professional	   codes	   and	   institutional	   requirements	   of	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  professional	  bodies,	  funding	  institutions	  or	  Universities	  (ASA	  1999;	  ESRC	  2010;	  BSA	  2002;	  University	  of	  Glasgow	  2010,	  2011).	  My	  research	  posed	  some	  ethical	  questions,	  mainly	  related	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  limited	  consent	  in	  the	  semi-­‐overt	  research	  setting	  I	  employed	   as	  well	   as	   the	   use	   of	   data	   gathered	   in	   confidential	   settings.	   After	   a	   short	  introduction	   to	   the	   general	   topic	   of	   social	   research	   ethics,	   I	   will	   consider	   these	  concerns	  as	  they	  presented	  themselves	  to	  me,	  their	  discussion	  in	  the	  ethics	  literature	  and	  how	  I	  proceeded	  to	  address	  these	  concerns.	  The	  research	  on	  which	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	   has	   been	   submitted	   to	   the	   research	   ethics	   committee	   of	   the	   Department	   of	  Sociology,	   Anthropology	   and	   Applied	   Social	   Sciences	   for	   approval	   and	   the	   board	  granted	  this	  approval	  on	  July	  9,	  2007.	  
Research	   ethics	   frameworks	   are	   often	   designed	   around	   principles	   intended	   to	  ensure	  the	  validity	  and	  quality	  of	  the	  research	  in	  question,	  to	  avoid	  or	  minimise	  the	  harm	  to	  research	  participants	  and	  to	  protect	  the	  researcher	  and	  the	  discipline.	  Among	  other	  things,	  research	  ethics	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  overriding	  notion	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	   a	   given	   research	   project	   that	   involves	   human	   subjects	   ought	   to	   outweigh	   the	  potential	   risks	   or	   adverse	   effects	   of	   that	   research.	   The	   obligation	   to	   avoid	   harm	   is	  typically	   summarised	  under	   the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐maleficence,	  while	   the	  principle	  of	  general	   beneficence	   refers	   to	   an	   (albeit	   not	   generally	   accepted)	   obligation	   to	  contribute	  to	  the	  increase	  of	  good	  in	  the	  world.	  Generally,	  both	  the	  concept	  of	  risk	  as	  well	  as	   the	  concept	  of	  benefit	  are	  rather	  broadly	  understood.	   In	  that	  sense,	  benefits	  include	  both	  the	  “potential	  to	  increase	  the	  sum	  of	  good	  in	  the	  world”	  (Israel	  and	  Hay	  2006:	   2)	   that	   is	   inherent	   in	   increasing	   social	   science’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   social	  world	   as	   well	   as	   the	   use	   of	   social	   sciences	   and	   social	   scientists’	   often	   privileged	  positions	  to	  directly	  benefit	  marginalised	  and	  disadvantaged	  groups	  under	  investiga-­‐tion.	   Christopher	   Kidd,	   for	   example,	   found	   himself	   morally	   obliged	   to	   change	   his	  research	  design	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Batwa	  people	  of	  South-­‐Eastern	  Uganda	  to	  take	  up	  a	  role	  as	  an	  active	  advocate	  for	  their	  rights	  rather	  than	  the	  envisioned	  position	  as	  a	  “normal”	  ethnographic	  observer	  (Kidd	  2008).	  In	  a	  similar	  experience,	  Dana-­‐Ain	  Davis	  was	  more	  directly	  “recruited”	  by	  a	  study	  participant	  to	  become	  an	  engaged	  envoy	  for	  the	  concerns	  of	  that	  particular	  group:	  
Sherita	  asked	  me	  what	  I	  was	  going	  to	  do	  with	  all	  of	  the	  information	  I	  collected.	  She	  make	  it	  very	  clear	  that	  she	  was	  only	  a	  “case	  file”	  at	  so-­‐cial	   services	  and	   that	   it	  was	  my	  responsibility	   to	   tell	   “people”	  how	  difficult	  life	  was	  and	  share	  the	  problems	  woman	  faced	  while	  on	  wel-­‐
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   fare.	  What	  Sherita	  was	  asking	  of	  me	  was	  to	  move	  my	  work	  as	  an	  an-­‐thropologist	  from	  the	  margin	  of	  my	  own	  personal	  achievement,	  that	  of	  being	  awarded	  a	  degree	  and	  facilitating	  my	  employment	  as	  an	  ac-­‐ademic,	  to	  a	  center	  of	  relevance,	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  policy.	  In	  return	  for	  the	   “gift”	   of	   her	   life	   story	   and	   the	   stories	   of	   other	   women,	   I	   was	  asked	  to	  do	  something	  that	  might	  make	  a	  difference.	  	   	  	   (Davis	  2006:	  231)	  In	   general,	   though,	   the	   benefit	   that	   research	   represents	   as	   an	   increase	   in	   social	  science’s	   understanding	  of	   social	   reality	   is	   deemed	   largely	   sufficient,	   assuming	   that	  the	  risks	  involved	  in	  a	  certain	  research	  project	  are	  minimised.	  
In	   turn,	   the	  notion	  of	   risk,	   following	   the	  emerging,	  yet	  not	  unproblematic	  para-­‐digm	   of	   analysing	   the	   merit	   of	   proposed	   research	   by	   the	   means	   of	   cost-­‐benefit-­‐analysis	   (Israel	   and	   Hay	   2006)	   –	   is	   interpreted	   in	   a	   number	   of	   not	   necessarily	  straight-­‐forward	  conceptualisations.	  The	  most	  basic	  and	  obvious	  notion	  of	  risk,	  and	  the	  demand	   that	   social	   science	   research	  ought	   to	  be	  designed	   to	  avoid	  or	  minimise	  that	  risk,	  refers	  to	  the	  	  potential	   physical	   or	   psychological	   harm,	   discomfort	   or	   stress	   to	  human	  participants	  that	  a	  research	  project	  might	  generate.	  	   	  	  	   (ESRC	  2010:	  26)	  However,	  besides	  this	  fundamental	  and	  rather	  self-­‐evident	  notion	  of	  risk,	  	  social	  science	  raises	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  risks	  that	  […]	  include	  risk	  to	  a	  subject’s	  personal	  social	  standing,	  privacy,	  personal	  values	  and	  be-­‐liefs,	  their	  links	  to	  family	  and	  the	  wider	  community,	  and	  their	  posi-­‐tion	  within	   occupational	   settings,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   adverse	   effects	   of	  revealing	  information	  that	  relates	  to	  illegal,	  sexual	  or	  deviant	  behav-­‐iour.	  	   (ESRC	  2010:	  26)	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  with	  these	  broad	  conceptualisations	  of	  benefit	  and	  risk,	  the	  assessment	  as	   to	  whether	   the	  benefits	  outweigh	   the	  potential	  harm,	   is	  not	  simply	  a	  straightfor-­‐ward	  exercise.	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	  often	  not	   fully	  possible	  at	   the	  outset	  of	  a	   study	   to	  foresee	   the	   potential	   risks	   or	   the	   need	   to	   adapt	   research	   design	   and	  methodology	  during	   the	   life	   time	   of	   a	   research	   project	   and	   thus	   ethical	   evaluations	   need	   to	   be	  carried	  out	  throughout	  the	  research	  process	  from	  design	  through	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  to	  publication	  and	  beyond.	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  Mark	   Israel	   and	   Iain	  Hay,	   for	   example,	   compiled	   a	   collection	  of	   studies	  where	   such	  ethical	  problems	  arise	  throughout	  the	  research	  process.	  Among	  others,	  they	  describe	  the	   ethical	   dilemma	   during	   the	   data	   gathering	   process	   that	   researchers	   found	  themselves	   in	  when	   they	   realised	   that	   their	   intravenously	   (IV)	   drug	   using	   African-­‐American	  and	  Puerto	  Rican	  informants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  arrest	  when	  seen	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   white	   persons	   (i.e.	   the	   researchers).	   Subsequently,	   the	  researchers	   had	   to	   decide	   whether	   it	   was	   ethical	   to	   continue	   with	   the	   research	  project	   (and	   thus	   potentially	   harming	   individual	   informants)	   in	   order	   to	   fulfil	   the	  research’s	   aim	   to	   identify	   the	   sources	  of	   contaminated	   syringes	  which	   represents	   a	  potential	  considerable	  benefit	   for	  the	  wider	  community	  of	   IV	  drug	  users	  (Israel	  and	  Hay	  2006,	  104-­‐5).	  	  
Similarly,	  in	  other,	  later	  stages	  of	  the	  research	  process,	  researchers	  found	  them-­‐selves	  routinely	  subject	  to	  ethical	  (and	  legal)	  dilemmas,	  for	  example	  when	  refusing	  to	  share	  data	  covering	  possibly	  illegal	  activities	  with	  relevant	  authorities.	  In	  an	  example	  for	  the	  latter	  case,	  an	  American	  graduate	  student	  found	  himself	  sentenced	  to	  over	  five	  months	   jail	   time	   after	   refusing	   to	   disclose	   information	   to	   a	   grand	   jury	   that	   he	   had	  gathered	   under	   the	   promise	   of	   confidentiality	   (Israel	   and	  Hay	   2006:	   88).	   Similarly,	  Jane	  Fountain	  (1993)	  had	  difficulties	  negotiating	  the	  interest	  of	  her	  informants	  –	  pot	  dealers	   in	  England	  –	   to	   remain	  unidentifiable	  by	  police	   and	   to	   keep	   secret	   some	  of	  their	   more	   ingenious	   ways	   of	   avoiding	   arrest	   with	   her	   desire	   to	   publish	   detailed	  accounts	  of	  her	  ethnographic	   fieldwork.	  As	  a	   result	   “some	  highly	   relevant	  data	  was	  omitted	  –	  often	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  emphasizing	  a	  particular	  point	  or	  providing	  a	  ‘good’	  story”	  (Fountain	  1993:	  167).	  
In	  dealing	  with	  the	  ethical	  consideration	  of	  my	  own	  study,	  I	  had	  particular	  diffi-­‐culties	  dealing	  with	  aspects	  of	  prior	  informed	  consent	  and	  the	  use	  of	  data	  gathered	  in	  confidential	  settings,	  which	  I	  will	  now	  consider	  in	  turn.	  
Generally	   speaking,	   most	   ethics	   guidelines	   of	   professional	   and	   funding	   bodies	  require	  prior	  informed	  consent	  by	  study	  participants	  for	  a	  study	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  compliance	   with	   ethics	   requirements	   (for	   example,	   ESRC	   2010;	   ASA	   1999;	   for	   an	  overview	  of	  the	  relevant	  conventions	  in	  English	  speaking	  countries	  outside	  the	  UK,	  cf.	  Israel	   and	  Hay	  2006).	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   often	   acknowledged	   (especially	   in	   the	  context	  of	  ethnographic	  research)	  that	  negotiating	  consent	  also	   implies	   flexibility	   in	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  the	  way	  that	  information	  and	  consent	  is	  communicated	  in	  the	  particular	  circumstanc-­‐es	  of	  a	  given	  research	  project	  (ASA	  1999),	  for	  example,	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  handing	   out	   written	   information	   sheets	   and	   collecting	   signed	   consent	   forms,	   as	  stipulated	   as	   the	   expected	   default	   approach	   in	   some	   disciplines	   (University	   of	  Glasgow	  2010).	  	  
In	  my	  particular	  case,	  consent	  from	  each	  individual	  member	  of	  CAN	  could	  not	  be	  practically	   obtained,	   as	   it	  would	   have	   considerably	   disrupted	   the	   daily	  work	   of	   the	  network	  and	  thus	  violated	  the	  non-­‐maleficence	  requirement	  of	  ethical	  behaviour.	  For	  example,	  since	  the	  daily	  meetings	  of	  the	  CAN	  delegations	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  varied	  considerably	  in	  their	  composition	  from	  day	  to	  day,	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  complete	  informed	   consent	   from	  every	   person	   in	   the	   room,	   I	  would	   have	   had	   to	   request	   the	  floor	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  meeting,	  explain	  the	  purpose	  of	  my	  research	  and	  allow	  time	   for	   questions	   and	   finally	   responses	   to	   my	   request	   for	   consent.	   Since	   these	  meetings	  were	  important	  strategising	  tools	  for	  CAN	  and	  time	  extremely	  precious	  (in	  fact,	   I	   cannot	   recall	   attending	   a	   daily	   meeting	   where	   the	   agenda	   was	   completed	  without	   exceeding	   the	   allotted	   time)	   it	   would	   have	   been	   inappropriate	   to	   seek	  consent	  in	  this	  manner.	  
Due	  to	  this	  restriction,	  consent	  had	  to	  be	  sought	  through	  other	  means.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  both	  gained	  consent	  from	  relevant	  gatekeepers	  and	  disclosed	  my	  role	  as	  a	  research-­‐er	   to	   any	   individuals	   I	   had	   repeated	   and	   intensive	   contact	   with.	   The	   gatekeeper	  consent	  was	  sought	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	  during	  the	  August	  2007	  UNFCCC	  session	  in	  Vienna.	  During	  that	  session	  I	  approached	  the	  coordinator	  of	  one	  of	  the	  regional	  nodes	  of	  CAN	  and	  explained	  my	  research.	  In	  addition	  to	  express-­‐ing	   support	   for	  my	   project,	   the	   coordinator	   also	   advised	  me	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   have	  continued	  access	  to	  CAN	  internal	  meetings,	  I	  would	  have	  to	  approach	  a	  CAN	  member	  organisation	   in	   order	   to	   be	   added	   to	   their	   list	   of	   nominations	   to	   future	   UNFCCC	  sessions	  and	  also	  mentioned	  one	  particular	  organisation	  that	  had	  in	  the	  past	  already	  accommodated	   similar	   requests	   by	   researchers.	   Consequently,	   I	   approached	   my	  second	  gatekeeper	  –	  one	  of	  the	  directors	  of	  that	  CAN	  member	  organisation	  –	  with	  this	  request.	   After	   I	   explained	   in	   detail	   the	   aim	   and	   purpose	   of	   my	   research	   and	   he	  outlined	  the	  terms	  under	  which	  my	  request	  would	  be	  granted,	  we	  agreed	  that	  I	  would	  be	  added	  to	  the	  organisation’s	  list	  for	  subsequent	  UNFCCC	  sessions.	  The	  terms	  of	  my	  participation	  included	  the	  stipulation	  that	  I	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  publicly	  state	  political	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  positions	  of	  my	  own	  that	  contradicted	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  organisation	  (or	  of	  CAN,	  for	  that	  matter)	  in	  internal	  CAN	  meetings	  or	  when	  I	  came	  to	  accompany	  NGO	  delegates	  to	  meetings	  with,	   for	  example,	   government	   representatives	  or	  ministers.	  This	   require-­‐ment	  was	  particularly	  important	  as	  I	  would	  wear	  a	  conference	  badge	  with	  the	  name	  of	   the	   organisation	   on	   it	   and	   thus	   would	   be	   seen	   by	   the	   uninitiated	   to	   be	  making	  statements	  on	  their	  behalf.	  This	  requirement	  then,	  is	  also	  in	  line	  with	  the	  CAN	  charter,	  which	   stipulates	   that	   members	   should	   not	   make	   “statements	   in	   the	   name	   of	   CAN	  which	   are	   contradictory	   in	   substance	  of	   in	   interpretation	   to	  CAN	   statements”	   (CAN	  2002:	  26).	  	  
Further,	   the	   initial	   terms	   indicated	   that	   I	  would	   not	   actively	   participate	   in	   any	  CAN	  internal	  work,	  i.e.	  in	  terms	  of	  actively	  participating	  in	  substantial	  discussions	  on	  the	   formulation	   of	   CAN	   policy	   positions,	   lobbying	   strategy	   and	   the	   like.	   This	  agreement	  was	   later	   subject	   to	   re-­‐negotiation	   as	   an	  opportunity	  presented	   itself	   to	  become	   more	   involved	   in	   the	   CAN	   working	   group	   on	   “flexible	   mechanisms,”	   i.e.	  carbon	   market	   instruments.	   This	   re-­‐negotiation	   involved	   that	   I	   wrote	   a	   detailed	  description	  of	  my	  own	  “personal”	  understanding	  and	  position	  regarding	  the	  relevant	  political	  issues,	  which	  would	  then	  be	  commented	  on	  by	  the	  director	  of	  the	  organisa-­‐tion	   to	   highlight	   the	  minor	   areas	  where	   his	   organisation	   and	  my	   views	   differed	   by	  some	  specific	  details.	   In	   those	   few	  cases,	   I	  would	   then	  represent	   their,	  not	  my	  own,	  view	  in	  public49.	  
As	   a	   result	   of	   these	   two	   conversations,	   two	   important	   figures	  were	   fully	   aware	  and	   supportive	   of	   my	   research.	   However,	   since	   I	   did	   not	   intent	   to	   conduct	   covert	  research	   (as	   stated	  above,	   I	   consider	  my	  methodology	  semi-­‐overt,	  but	  adopted	   that	  approach	  for	  pragmatic	  rather	  than	  methodological	  reasons),	  I	  disclosed	  my	  dual	  role	  as	   participant	   in	   CAN’s	   activity	   and	   PhD	   researcher	   to	   anybody	   with	   whom	   my	  contact	   became	  more	   frequent	   and	  more	   intensive.	   In	   doing	   so,	   I	   also	   followed	   the	  cautioning	   of	   several	   ethics	   guidelines	   that	   gatekeeper	   consent	   cannot	   simply	   be	  taken	  as	  proxy	  for	  the	  consent	  of	  members	  of	  the	  group	  in	  question	  (e.g.	  ASA	  1999;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  	   It	  was	   also	   agreed,	   during	   a	   later	   conversation	   about	   the	   issue	   of	  my	  participation,	   that	   during	  large	   CAN	   internal	   meetings	   I	   would	   indicate	   my	   institutional	   affiliation	   not	   as	   “University	   of	  Glasgow”	  but	   rather	   state	   the	  name	  of	   the	  organisation	   that	  had	   “sponsored”	  my	  attendance	   to	  make	  this	  relationship	  clear	  to	  all	  attendees.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  smaller	  contexts,	  for	  example,	  in	  CAN	  working	  group	  meetings,	  I	  would	  continue	  to	  self-­‐identify	  as	  a	  University	  researcher.	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  ESRC	  2010)50.	  In	  that	  sense	  –	  and	  thus	  in	  contrast	  to	  covert	  observation	  as	  described	  in	  the	  literature	  –,	  I	  never	  actively	  deceived	  people	  by	  hiding	  my	  “true	  identity”	  using	  “the	  mask	  of	  pretense”	  (Gold	  1958:	  219)	  or	  inventing	  elaborate	  cover	  stories	  like	  the	  one	  Fountain	  (1993)	  employed	  to	  hide	  her	  true	  intentions	  from	  some	  of	  her	  research	  participants	  (but	  also	  from	  police	  and	  her	  own	  acquaintances	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  protect	  her	  participants).	  
In	  contrast,	   for	  example,	  when	  writing	  emails	   to	  CAN’s	   internal	  email	   lists,	   I	   in-­‐cluded	  my	  standard	  email	   signature	  which	   identified	  me	  as	  a	   “Doctoral	  Researcher,	  University	  of	  Glasgow,	  Department	  of	  Sociology.”	  Similarly,	  when	  introducing	  myself	  to	   other	   CAN	   members,	   or	   in	   fact,	   anybody	   during	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions,	   I	   would	  typically	   introduce	   my	   organisational	   affiliation	   as	   being	   with	   the	   University	   of	  Glasgow	  (including	  by	  using	  University	  of	  Glasgow	  business	  cards)	  and	  would	  correct	  people	   if	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   (for	   example,	   by	   reading	  my	   conference	   badge)	   they	  assumed	   that	   I	   was	   with	   the	   organisation	   that	   had	   registered	   me	   for	   the	   session.	  Whether	  this	  statement	  of	  organisational	  affiliation	  was	  followed	  by	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  dual	  nature	  of	  my	  attendance	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  session	  depended	  on	  the	  setting	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  encounter.	  For	  example,	  when	  attending	  lobbying	  meetings	  with	  time-­‐constrained	  members	  of	  government	  delegations,	  it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  appropriate	  to	  use	  up	  some	  of	  the	  precious	  lobbying	  time	  by	  explaining	  my	  project,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  I	  was	  most	  forthcoming	  with	  details	  in	  more	  informal	  settings	  where	  time	  pressure	  was	  less	  of	  an	  issue,	  or	  indeed	  whenever	  asked	  for	  any	  details.	  	  
Further,	  when	  escalating	  my	  involvement	   from	  a	  rather	  passive	  observer	  to	  the	  coordinator	   of	   one	   of	   the	   CAN	   working	   groups,	   I	   put	   considerable	   effort	   into	  negotiating	  my	  new	  role	  with	  relevant	  people,	  in	  particular	  with	  the	  directors	  of	  both	  CAN	  International	  and	  the	  organisation	  on	  whose	  list	  I	  attended	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions.	  I	  also	  made	  sure	  that	  the	  email	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  working	  group	  in	  which	  I	  was	  nominated	   as	   coordinator	   contained	   a	   clear	   statement	   of	   my	   “true”	   organisational	  affiliation	   (i.e.	   as	   a	  Doctoral	   student	  of	   the	  University	  of	  Glasgow)	  and	  my	   research	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	   The	  ASA	  ethics	  guidelines	  caution	  that	  “researchers	  should	  not	  devolve	  their	  responsibilities	  onto	  the	  gatekeeper”	  (ASA	  1999),	  which	  would	  include	  the	  responsibility	  to	  secure	  consent,	  while	  the	  ESRC’s	  remarks	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  gatekeepers	  explicitly	  suggest	  that	  “[p]assive	  assent,	  includ-­‐ing	  group	  assent	  (with	  consent	  given	  by	  a	  gatekeeper)	  should	  be	  avoided	  wherever	  possible,	  and	  every	  effort	  should	  be	  made	  to	  develop	  methods	  of	  seeking	  consent	  that	  are	  appropriate”	  (ESRC	  2010:	  30).	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  interest	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   although	   most	   (if	   not	   all)	   of	   the	   more	   active	  members	  of	  that	  group	  were	  already	  aware	  of	  this.	  
As	  a	  result,	  I	  believe	  that	  I	  have	  undertaken	  a	  sufficient	  effort	  to	  secure	  consent	  in	  a	  setting	  where	  the	  method	  suggested	  as	  standard	  in	  some	  research	  disciplines	  (e.g.	  written	   consent	  after	   reading	  an	   information	   sheet	   and	  being	  able	   to	  ask	  questions	  about	   the	   information	   provided)	   had	   only	   limited	   applicability.	   In	   that	   sense,	   I	  followed	  the	  advice	  that	  Andrew	  Garner	  offers	  his	  students:	  Use	  ethical	   guidelines.	  Pragmatically.	   […]	  Apart	   from	   laying	  out	   an	  ideal	  for	  professional	  practice	  […],	  the	  ethical	  guidelines	  point	  us	  to	  a	   key	   principle	   underpinning	   ethnographic	   research:	   how	   do	   we	  avoid	   situations	  which	  would	   result	   in	   a	   betrayal	   of	   identification	  and	  trust?	  	   (Garner	  2008)	  The	   second	   issue	  of	   ethical	   concern	   relates	   to	   the	  use	  of	   some	  of	   the	  data	   that	  was	  obtained	   during	   the	   fieldwork.	   A	   number	   of	   different	   internal	   settings	   within	   CAN	  entail	  the	  basic	  understanding	  of	  confidentiality,	  for	  example,	  the	  strategy	  meetings	  at	  the	  beginning	   of	   each	  UNFCCC	   session,	   the	  daily	  meetings	   throughout	   the	   sessions,	  and	  email	   conversations	  on	  CANtalk.	  However,	   this	   confidentiality	  understanding	   is	  not	  universal,	  for	  example	  intelligence	  shared	  during	  meetings	  or	  via	  email	  would	  be	  further	   shared	   during	   lobbying	   meetings	   if	   that	   is	   deemed	   useful	   or	   occasionally	  emails	  sent	  to	  CANtalk	  are	  quoted	  in	  publications	  of	  CAN	  member	  organisations	  (cf.,	  for	   example,	   Bals	   2007:	   19).	   Thus	   confidentiality	   cannot	   be	   assumed	   to	   be	   an	  overriding	  principle	  and	  the	  decision	  over	  whether	  a	  particular	  piece	  of	  information,	  an	  event	  or	  part	  of	  a	  conversation	  is	  confidential	  must	  be	  made	  every	  time	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis.	   Further,	   the	   confidentiality	   of	   some	   pieces	   of	   information	   might	  “expire,”	  in	  other	  words,	  information	  that	  was	  very	  sensitive	  and	  thus	  confidential	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  past,	  might	  now	  have	  become	  common	  knowledge	  and	  thus	  lost	  its	  confidential	  character.	  	  
In	   studying	   the	  written	  documentation	   regarding	   the	   requirements	   imposed	  on	  certain	   classes	   of	   actors	   that	   CAN	   interacts	   with	   and	   grants	   access	   to	   its	   internal	  debates,	  it	  also	  becomes	  clear	  that	  my	  position	  as	  a	  researcher	  who	  has	  been	  granted	  access	   by	   an	   organisation	   that	   is	   a	   full	   member	   of	   CAN	   (i.e.	   via	   the	   CAN	   member	  organisation	   that	   nominated	  me	   as	   a	   delegate)	   via	   inclusion	  on	   their	   list	   of	   partici-­‐pants,	  is	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  statutes.	  For	  example,	  CAN’s	  policy	  on	  the	  participation	  of	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  non-­‐CAN	  members	   during	   the	   2007	   Bali	   Climate	   Change	   Conference	   (CAN	   2007a),	  states	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  the	  participation	  of	  these	  groups	  in	  CAN	  daily	  meetings,	  the	  observance	  of	  restraint	  when	  sharing	  information	  obtained	  from	  these	  meetings:	  All	   information	  aired	  at	  CAN	  meetings	  are	  confidential,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  divulged	  to	  outsiders	  unless	  this	  is	  part	  of	  an	  agreed	  political	  strategy.	  	   (CAN	  2007a)	  Further,	  the	  CAN	  charter	  stipulates	  that	  organisations	  or	  individuals	  that	  are	  not	  full	  members	  of	  the	  network,	  but	  enjoy	  a	  status	  as	  observer	  members,	  ought	  to	  “respect	  the	  confidential	  nature	  of	  internal	  CAN	  meetings	  at	  all	  times”	  (CAN	  2002:	  10).	  From	  these	  rules	  of	  engagement	   for	  partial	   (observer)	  or	  non-­‐members	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  CAN	  meetings	  are	  generally	  understood	  to	  be	  confidential,	  but	  since	  equivalent	  rules	   are	   not	   contained	   in	   the	   code	   of	   conduct	   for	   full	   CAN	   members,	   it	   can	   be	  assumed	   that	   a	   different	   approach	   to	   confidentiality	   applies	   to	   these	   members.	  Further,	   while	   clearly	   describing	   the	   requirements	   imposed	   with	   regards	   to	   CAN	  meetings,	  the	  Charter	  does	  not	  contain	  any	  rules	  governing	  the	  use	  of	  CAN’s	  various	  email	  lists.	  	  
Another	  related	  area	  of	  regulation	  in	  the	  CAN	  Charter	  (CAN	  2002:	  26)	  deals	  with	  rules	  regarding	  the	  issuance	  of	  statements	  by	  CAN	  members	  and	  details	  the	  principle	  that	  statements	  should	  not	  be	  issued	  “in	  the	  name	  of	  CAN	  which	  are	  contradictory	  in	  substance	  or	  interpretation	  to	  CAN	  statements”	  (CAN	  2002:	  26).	  While	  this	  section	  of	  the	   Charter	   seems	   to	   be	   relevant	   to	   the	   research	   –	   since	   certainly	   statements	   are	  made	  in	  this	  thesis	  –	  the	  context	  of	  these	  regulations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opening	  sentence	  of	   this	   part	   of	   the	   CAN	   Charter	   (“A	   statement	   refers	   to	   a	   position	   statement.”)	  indicated	  that	  the	  word	  “statement”	  in	  this	  context	  exclusively	  refers	  to	  statement	  of	  policy	  preference	  or	  policy	  position	  with	  regards	  to	  climate	  change	  policy	  and	  related	  policy	  fields.	  Since	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  climate	  change	  policy	  per	  se,	  such	  a	  conflict	  did	  not	  arise	  during	  the	  production	  of	  this	  thesis,	  but	  the	  underlying	  spirit	  of	  these	  regulations	  was	  nonetheless	  observed.	  	  
However,	  although	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  relevant	  CAN	  regulations	  were	  not	  fully	  clear	  regarding	  my	  particular	  situation	  as	  someone	  occupying	  a	  dual	  role	  as	  a	  researcher	  but	  also	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  CAN	  member’s	  delegation	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  (and	  later	  as	  the	  coordinator	  of	  one	  of	  CAN’s	   issue	  based	  working	  groups),	   the	  spirit	  of	   these	  regula-­‐
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  tions	  and	  generally	  my	  knowledge	  of	  the	  largely	  tacit	  agreement	  of	  confidentiality	  as	  an	   general	   underlying	   principle	   but	   not	   as	   a	   non-­‐negotiable	   hard	   and	   fast	   doctrine	  required	   some	   more	   attention	   in	   dealing	   with	   this	   issue.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   ethical	  requirement	  of	  non-­‐maleficence	  but	  also	  with	  my	  own	  firm	  conviction	  to	  avoid	  by	  all	  means	   necessary	   that	   any	   possible	   harm	   originating	   from	   my	   research	   could	  adversely	  affect	  CAN	  or	   the	   larger	  struggle	   to	   find	  a	  political	  solution	  to	   the	  climate	  crisis	  (but	  also	  individual	  organisations	  or	  persons),	  I	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  employ	  further	  safeguards	  in	  my	  research	  process.	  	  
The	  first	  of	  these	  safeguards	  was	  the	  anonymisation	  of	  names	  of	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  as	  well	  as	  events.	  This	  is	  a	  standard	  practice	  suggested	  in	  several	  ethics	  codes	   (e.g.	   ESRC	   2010)	   to	   preserve	   confidentiality	   of	   information	   given	   by	   partici-­‐pants.	  It	  has	  been	  variously	  recognised	  that	  the	  mere	  changing	  of	  names	  might	  not	  be	  sufficient	   to	   effectively	   protect	   individuals	   from	   being	   identified	   in	   the	   finished	  research	  report	  (Israel	  and	  Hay	  2006;	  Roseneil	  1993;	  Tolich	  2004)	  since,	  for	  example,	  verbal	   mannerisms	   (Tolich	   2004),	   specific	   details	   of	   events	   (decription	   of	   Ellis’	  fieldwork	  in	  Tolich	  2004)	  or	  characteristic	  quirks	  (Fountain	  1993)	  might	  be	  sufficient	  for	   other	   insiders	   or	   even	   partially	   initiated	   outsiders	   to	   identify	   otherwise	   anony-­‐mised	   individuals.	   Jane	   Fountain,	   in	   her	   study	   of	   pot	   dealers,	   describes	   her	   anxiety	  when	  thinking	  about	  how	  confidentiality	  could	  be	  compromised	  in	  such	  a	  way,	  with	  potentially	  very	  serious	  effects	  for	  her	  study	  participants:	  	  My	  anxiety	  knew	  no	  bounds:	  for	  instance,	  I	  quoted	  Sally	  saying	  that	  her	  profits	  from	  selling	  cannabis	  meant	  that	  she	  could	  make	  impulse	  buys	  without	  worrying	  about	  the	  cost.	  She	  gave	  an	  example:	  “I’m	  go-­‐ing	   through	  Marks	  and	  Sparks	  and	   I	   fancy	  some	  prawns,	  and	   I	  can	  buy	  loads.”	  I	  became	  obsessed	  with	  the	  prawns	  that	  were	  usually	  in	  her	   fridge,	   and	   that	   if	   she	  was	   arrested,	   her	   relationship	  with	  me	  would	   be	   revealed;	  my	   thesis	   scrutinized	   by	   the	   police;	   the	   quote	  and	   the	   prawns	   in	   the	   fridge	   connected;	   everything	   I	   had	  written	  about	   “Sally”	  used	  against	  her;	  and	   the	  whole	  network	   traced	  –	  all	  because	  of	  those	  dratted	  prawns.	  	   (Fountain	  1993:	  168)	  The	  point	  here	  is,	  that	  while	  mere	  changes	  of	  names	  protects	  participants	  from	  being	  identified	  by	  outsiders	  (what	  Martin	  Tolich	  (2004)	  calls	  “external	  confidentiality”)	  it	  cannot	  guarantee	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  protection	  from	  discovery	  by	  insiders	  (or	  even	  partial	   insiders	  or	   individuals	  that	  gain	  a	  degree	  of	   insider	  knowledge	  later,	   like	  the	  police	  in	  Fountain’s	  example).	  However,	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  participant	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  by	   an	   insider	   leaves	   participants	   potentially	   even	   more	   vulnerable	   (compared	   to	  discovery	  by	  an	  outsider)	  as	  Fountain’s	  example	  clearly	  illustrates.	  Tolich,	  who	  calls	  this	  “internal	  confidentiality,”	  decries	  the	  fact	  that	  potential	  vulnerabilities	  stemming	  from	  breaches	   of	   internal	   confidentiality	   are	   not	   addressed	   in	   the	   ethics	   codes	   of	  professional	  associations	  and	  funding	  bodies51	  but	  must	  be	  taken	  seriously	  to	  at	  least	  the	   same	   degree	   as	   external	   confidentiality52.	   In	   practice	   this	  might	  mean	   that	   not	  only	  names	  of	  individuals,	  places	  and	  organisations	  are	  changed,	  but	  it	  might	  be	  also	  required	  to	  amend	  details	  in	  particular	  quotes	  or	  events	  or	  even,	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  risk	   of	   discovery	   is	   too	   grave,	   to	   omit	   material	   in	   the	   final	   report.	   Tolich	   (2004)	  cautions,	   though,	   that	   even	   this	   might	   not	   be	   enough.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   couple	  research	  mentioned	  in	  footnote	  51	  above,	  he	  is	  concerned	  that,	  for	  example,	  the	  wife	  might	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  the	  husband	  even	  though	  the	  researcher	  might	  have	  altered	  the	  child	  support	  payment	  for	  expenses	  for	  prostitutes	  if,	  for	  example,	  certain	  speech	  mannerisms	  appear	  in	  quotes	  that	  the	  researcher	  did	  not	  change	  because	  they	  did	  not	  seem	   to	  be	  particularly	   typical	  of	   that	  participant	  but	  would	  allow	   the	  participant’s	  partner	  to	  breach	  internal	  confidentiality.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  my	  research,	   I	   found	  that	  (at	   least	  as	  far	  as	  external	  anonymity	  is	  concerned)	  anonymisation	  was	  sufficiently	  realised	  by	  not	  using	  any	  names	  (not	  even	  changed	  ones)	  of	  organisations	  or	  individuals	  and	  instead	  referring	  to	  them	  by	  using	  collective	   nouns,	   such	   as	   “delegate,”	   “director,”	   “staff	   member”	   and,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  organisations,	   where	   necessary	   for	   the	   argument	   being	   made,	   occasionally	   adding	  vague	  geographic	  identifiers	  such	  as	  “American”	  or	  “developing	  country.”	  
The	  more	  difficult	  aspect	  to	  resolve	  in	  my	  research,	  though,	  was	  the	  decision	  over	  which	   particular	   events	   and	   details	   should	   be	   omitted	   from	   this	   thesis	   for	   their	  potential	   to	   cause	   harm	   not	   only	   to	   individual	   participants	   but	   possibly	   the	   wider	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  	   Another	   very	   illustrative	   example	   (taken	   from	   Tolich	   2004)	   involves	   research	   into	   decision	  making	  regarding	  the	  spending	  of	  money	  by	  married	  couples,	  which	  were	  interviewed	  individual-­‐ly	   and	   where,	   for	   example,	   the	   husband	   confessed	   to	   the	   researcher	   that	   he	   secretly	   diverts	  money	  from	  his	  salary	  to	  pay	  child	  support	  for	  a	  child	  fathered	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  an	  extra-­‐marital	  affair	   or	   where	   a	   wife	   shares	   with	   the	   researchers	   her	   secretly	   financing	   an	   abortion	   that	   the	  teenage	   daughter	   underwent.	   Clearly,	   compromised	   internal	   confidentiality	   would	   leave	   the	  individuals	  in	  these	  cases	  particularly	  vulnerable.	  52	  	   Referring	  to	  the	  American	  Sociological	  Association	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  he	  also	  observes	  that	  that	  code’s	  definition	  of	  vulnerability	  would	  have	  to	  be	  substantially	  extended	  to	  include	  the	  ethical	  challeng-­‐es	  posed	  by	  internal	  confidentiality	  taken	  serious	  (Tolich	  2004).	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  network	   of	   CAN53,	   or	   by	   extension	   even	   CAN’s	   aim	   to	   work	   toward	   a	   solution	   as	  regards	   dangerous	   climate	   change,	   an	   aim	   that	   I	   deeply	   identify	   with.	   Since	   there	  were	  no	  specific	  rules	  governing	  the	  use	  of	  confidential	  material	  by	  full	  CAN	  members	  (and	  even	   less	  so	  by	   individuals	   in	  dual	  roles	   like	  myself),	  and	  since	  I	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  “spirit”	   that	  underlies	  the	  general	  notion	  of	  confidentiality	  within	  CAN	  meetings	  and	  email	   lists,	  as	  well	  as	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  portion	  of	   the	  exchanges	  taking	  place	   in	  those	  meetings	  and	  on	  these	  lists	  were	  never	  sensitive	  or	  had	  their	  sensitivity	  expired	  at	   some	   point,	   I	   came	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   it	   would	   be	   useful	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  conversation	  with	  CAN	  about	  which	  particular	  piece	  of	  evidence	  would	  be	  potentially	  harmful	   for	   CAN	   and	   its	   mission.	   In	   that,	   I	   followed	   Tolich’s	   advice	   who	   suggests	  engaging	  the	  group	  in	  question	  to	  make	  this	  sort	  of	  determination:	  	  This	  involves	  taking	  time	  to	  learn	  from	  insiders	  what	  information	  is	  potentially	  damaging	  […]	  and	  which	  information	  is	  innocuous.	  (Tol-­‐ich	  2004:	  105)	  To	  that	  end,	  I	  proactively	  engaged	  with	  CAN	  members	  from	  different	  backgrounds	  in	  conversations	  about	  specific	  examples	   from	  the	   fieldwork	  which	   I	   considered	   likely	  candidates	  for	  inclusion	  into	  the	  thesis.	  These	  conversations	  started	  toward	  the	  end	  of	   the	   fieldwork	   period	   and	   continued	   beyond	   the	   end	   of	   the	   fieldwork	  with	   some	  CAN	  members	  with	  whom	  I	  continued	  to	  maintain	  ties,	  for	  example	  due	  to	  friendships	  that	  had	  developed	  over	  time	  or	  due	  to	  my	  continued	  involvement	  in	  CAN’s	  Flexible	  Mechanisms	  working	  group	  and	   in	   the	  carbon	  market	  related	  advocacy	  activities	  of	  other	   environmental	   groups	   with	   links	   to	   CAN.	   Through	   these	   conversations	   I	  cultivated	   a	   sense	   of	   where	   it	   is	   uncontroversial	   to	   share	   information	   and	   where	  there	   was	   a	   chance	   of	   disagreement,	   thus	   following	   Tolich’s	   advice.	   Further,	   when	  ultimately	  deciding	  what	  to	  include,	  I	  chose	  to	  err	  on	  the	  side	  of	  caution	  if	  I	  had	  doubt	  about	  whether	  a	  particular	  piece	  of	   information	  should	  be	   included.	  Also,	   to	   further	  defuse	  this	  potential	  problem,	  on	  some	  occasions,	  I	  chose	  to	  rely	  on	  publicly	  available	  material	   to	   support	   my	   argument	   rather	   than	   information	   gained	   in	   confidential	  settings,	  even	  if	  thus	  my	  argument	  was	  slightly	  weakened.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  	   To	   illustrate,	   if	   I	   would	   directly	   reveal	   sources	   or	   means	   through	   which	   CAN	   gains	   access	   to	  important	   confidential	   information	  or	  provide	   careless	  descriptions	   from	  which	  people	   familiar	  with	  the	  UNFCCC	  could	  deduce	  these	  sources	  or	  means,	  these	  sources	  could	  be	  jeopardised	  was	  my	  thesis	  to	  be	  read	  by	  somebody	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  interrupting	  this	  access	  to	  information.	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3.8 Data	  Analysis	  and	  Presentation	  of	  Preliminary	  Theoretical	  Model	  
3.8.1 Data	  Analysis	  and	  Organisation	  
The	   large	   amount	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   data	   collected	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   period	  represented	   a	   challenge	   for	   systematic	   data	   analysis.	   As	   indicated	   above,	   the	   data	  generally	   consisted	   of	   field	   notes	   (as	   well	   as	   post	   field	   notes),	   a	   large	   amount	   of	  emails	  as	  well	  as	  documents	  from	  various	  sources	  such	  as	  official	  UNFCCC	  documents	  (and	   their	   various	   preliminary	   versions),	   CAN	   papers	   and	   documents	   from	   other	  organisations.	   In	   particular	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   email	   data,	   on-­‐going	   “filtering”	   of	   the	  emails	   into	   the	  broad	  categories	  of	   “potentially	   interesting”	  and	  “not	  so	   interesting”	  throughout	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  was	  employed	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  amount	  of	  emails	  manageable.	   However,	   this	  means	   that	   only	   a	   fraction	   of	   the	   overall	   email	   volume	  became	   “data”	  which	  was	   readily	   available	   for	   analysis.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   though,	  that	   as	   a	   subscriber	   to	   the	   relevant	   email	   lists,	   I	   had	   continued	   access	   to	   the	   email	  archives	   and	   so	   I	   could,	   during	   the	   analysis	   phase,	   attempt	   to	   find	   emails	   that	   had	  been	  originally	  classed	  as	  “not	  so	  interesting”	  where	  necessary.	  	  
To	  aid	  analysis	  of	  my	  field	  notes,	  I	  scanned	  my	  hand	  written	  fieldwork	  notes	  and	  combined	   them	   with	   the	   post	   field	   notes	   (which	   I	   had	   entered	   directly	   into	   the	  computer)	   into	   a	   computer	   file	   where	   the	   left	   half	   of	   the	   landscape	   page	   would	  contain	  the	  scanned	  image	  of	  the	  page	  or	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  text	  of	  the	  post	  field	  note	  and	  the	  right	  half	  would	  be	  split	  into	  three	  columns	  to	  allow	  the	  input	  of	  codes	  and	  notes.	  The	  same	  approach	  was	  undertaken	  with	  the	  emails	  from	  the	  “potentially	  interesting”	  category.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  UNFCCC	  and	  CAN	  documents,	  I	  added	  them	  to	  my	  document	  database	   within	   the	   reference	   management	   software	   Zotero,	   which	   allows	   adding	  notes	  to	  documents	  as	  well	  as	  convenient	  searches	  for	  documents’	  names	  and	  within	  their	  full-­‐text	  content.	  
Thus	   prepared,	   I	   embarked	   on	   a	   data	   analysis	   process	   wherein	   I	   would	   read	  through	  all	  my	  notes	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  “potentially	  interesting”	  emails)	  and	  begin	  to	  fill	  the	  three	  columns	  reserved	  for	  data	  analysis.	  These	  columns	  were	  supposed	  to	  fulfil	  the	  double	  objective	   that	   I	  wanted	   to	   achieve	  with	   this	  undertaking:	   on	  one	  hand	   I	  wanted	  to	  make	  the	  data	  (especially	  the	  scanned	  hand	  written	  notes)	  more	  systemat-­‐ically	   searchable	   and	  organised	   and	   therefore	   I	   used	   the	   first	   column	   to	   record	   the	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  reason	  for	  the	  field-­‐note	  (for	  example,	  “conversation	  with”,	  “reflection”,	  “background	  information”)	   or,	   when	   recording	   a	   specific	   episode,	   its	   main	   setting	   (for	   example	  “AWG-­‐KP	  plenary”	  or	  “CAN	  daily	  [meeting]”)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  main	  participants	  in	  that	  episode	  (e.g.	  “Uganda”,	  “chair”,	  “Peter”	  etc.).	  This	  enabled	  me,	  during	  the	  writing	  up	  of	  my	  research,	  to	  quickly	  find,	  re-­‐read	  and	  use	  the	  relevant	  parts	  of	  my	  notes.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  read-­‐through	  of	  my	  notes	  served	  the	  second	  objective	  of	  advancing	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data.	  This	  is	  where	  the	  second	  and	  third	  columns	  were	  used.	   The	   second	   column	  was	   used	   to	   record	   categories	   that	  were	   assigned	   to	   the	  notes,	  while	  the	  third	  column	  was	  reserved	  for	  noting	  any	  thoughts	  or	  observations	  that	   I	   had	  while	   reading	   through	   the	   field	   notes.	   The	   categories	   used	   at	   this	   stage	  broadly	  reflect	  the	  themes	  that	  were	  later	  used	  to	  structure	  chapters	  5	  and	  6	  of	  this	  thesis	   (for	   example,	   “North/South	   conflict”,	   “realpolitik”,	   “consensus	   formation”,	  “language”	  or	  “technology”)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  main	  political	  and	  institutional	  themes	  that	  were	  relevant	  for	  chapter	  4	  (e.g.	  “CDM”	  or	  “target	  discussion”).	  This	  read-­‐through	  also	  served	   to	   re-­‐familiarise	  myself	  with	   the	   events	  of	   the	   earlier	  parts	  of	   the	   fieldwork	  phase	   and	   to	   verify	   whether	   the	   themes	   that	   had	   already	   emerged	   during	   the	  fieldwork	  as	  the	  likely	  major	  themes	  of	  the	  analysis	  were	  also	  supported	  by	  the	  data	  and	  could	  be	  sufficiently	  well	  illustrated	  using	  the	  data	  available.	  	  
After	  having	  read	  through	  all	  notes	  and	  emails	  once,	  I	  decided	  upon	  the	  indicative	  structure	  of	  the	  chapters	  4	  to	  6	  and	  went	  through	  the	  data	  once	  more	  to	  start	  adding	  references	  to	  and/or	  quotes	  from	  specific	  pieces	  of	  data	  to	  the	  relevant	  sections	  of	  the	  skeletal	  structure	  of	  these	  chapters.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  also	  refined,	  where	  appropriate,	  the	  categorisation	   of	   the	   data	   (as	   recorded	   in	   column	   2)	   or	   added	   additional	   notes	   to	  column	  3	  of	  my	  data	  analysis	  document.	  This	  enabled	  me	  then,	  to	  begin	  writing	  about	  the	  themes	  that	  were	   identified	   in	  the	   indicative	  structure	  of	   the	  chapters	  using	  the	  material	  so	  added.	  During	  this	  process,	  I	  regularly	  referred	  back	  to	  the	  data	  analysis	  document	  to	  search	  for	  additional	  material	  or	  to	  re-­‐read	  some	  of	  the	  notes	  that	  recall	  suggested	  could	  also	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  topic	  currently	  under	  consideration.	  
It	  should	  be	  noted,	  that	  already	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  period	  I	  had	  identified	  major	  themes	  within	  the	  research	  and	  that	  no	  additional	  major	  themes	  surfaced	  during	  this	  analysis	  process.	  However,	  the	  process	  helped	  organising	  the	  material	  around	  these	  major	  themes	  and	  to	  further	  differentiate	  subthemes.	  Additionally,	  the	  process	  helped	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  advance	  thinking	  on	  a	  preliminary	  theoretical	  model	  which	  had	  already	  taken	  some	  shape	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  and	  which	  will	  be	  presented	  now	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  upon	  the	  model	  during	  the	  following	  chapters.	  
3.8.2 Preliminary	  Theoretical	  Model	  –	  	  
The	  Nested	  Public	  Spheres	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  CAN	  
During	   the	   fieldwork,	   and	   more	   importantly	   during	   the	   data	   analysis	   process,	   it	  became	   evident	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   public	   sphere,	   while	   certainly	   allowing	   for	  useful	   insights,	   had	   certain	   limits	   when	   applied	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   and	   its	   various	  interlocutors,	   especially	   the	   environmental	   NGOs	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   research.	  Especially	   while	   observing	   how	   certain	   discursive	   structures	   and	   practices	   are	  reproduced	  on	  different	  levels	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  this	  political	  space	  is	  perhaps	  best	  thought	  of	  as	  an	  assemblage	  of	  multiple	  public	  spheres,	  that	  are	  partially	  parallel	  to	  each	  other,	  partially	  overlapping	  and	  partially	  parts	  of	  each	  other	  and	  that	  variably	  target	  different	  centres	  of	  authority,	  which,	  in	  some	  cases,	  might	  in	  turn	   themselves	   constitute	   collective	   interlocutors	   on	   other	   levels	   of	   this	   multi-­‐dimensional	  arrangement	  of	  publics.	  Before	  this	  backdrop	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  required	  to	  be	  developed	  to	  another	  level	  of	  abstraction	  to	  adequately	  capture	  the	  discursive	  practices	  observed.	  	  
In	  this	  context,	   I	  understand	  Nancy	  Fraser’s	  work	  of	  discussing	  the	  implications	  of	  imagining	  public	  spheres	  on	  a	  transnational	  level	  as	  a	  first	  step	  of	  abstraction:	  by	  unpacking	   the	   theory	   on	   its	   former	   level	   closely	   associated	   with	   the	   Westphalian	  system	  and	  then	  carefully	  re-­‐assembling	  it	  on	  the	  transnational	  level,	  she	  developed	  the	  elements	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	   theory	   in	   a	  way	   that	   could	   still	   be	   applied	   to	   the	  special	   case	   of	   the	   Westphalian	   nation	   state,	   but	   also	   to	   many	   other	   empirical	  situations.	  Specifically,	  as	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  2	  of	  this	  thesis,	  she	  detached	  the	  public	  from	   the	   specific	   notion	   of	   a	   public	   conceptualised	   as	   the	   political	   citizenship	   of	   a	  Westphalian	  state	  that	  was	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  employed	  by	  previous	  theorists	  of	  the	  public	   sphere.	   Instead	   she	   conceptualised	   it	   as	   the	   collective	  of	   individuals	   that	  share	   a	   common	   fate	   by	   either	   being	   “all	   affected”	   by	   a	   given	   issue	   or	   being	   “all	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  subjected”	   to	   the	  rule	  making	  of	  a	  given	   institutionalised	  centre	  of	  authority54.	  This	  making	   explicit	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   public	   still	   allows	   her	   to	   conceptualise	   the	  citizenship	  of	  a	  nation	  state	  as	  a	  public,	  as	  individuals	  are,	  for	  example,	  all	  collectively	  subjected	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  their	  government,	  but	  it	  also	  enables	  conceptualisations	  of	  publics	  beyond	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  nation	  state,	  such	  as	  publics	  consisting	  of	  all	  EU	   citizens	  which	   are	   all	   subjected	   to	   the	   authority	   of	   EU	   institutions	   or,	   indeed,	   a	  globally	   universal	   public	   of	   all	   of	   humanity	   with	   regards	   to	   climate	   change	   as	   the	  entirety	  of	  humanity	  is	  potentially	  “all	  affected”	  by	  its	  impacts.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  also	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  Fraser’s	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐construct	  on	  the	  transnational	   level	  what	   formerly	  equated	  to	  the	  Westphalian	  state	   itself,	   i.e.	  the	  addressee	  of	  public	  opinion,	  is	  not	  as	  straightforward	  as	  the	  re-­‐construction	  of	  the	  public	   just	  described.	  Here,	   she	   focuses	  on	   the	  processes	   that	   link	   the	   addressee	  of	  public	  opinion	  with	  the	  generators	  of	  that	  opinion.	   	  That	  is,	  first,	  the	  communicative	  process	  through	  which	  the	  public	  opinion	  is	  transmitted	  to	  its	  addressee	  who	  is	  then	  expected	   to	   translate	   it	   into	  binding	   laws	  and	   the	  administrative	  power	  required	   to	  enforce	  those	  laws	  and,	  secondly,	  through	  the	  reverse	  process	  of	  actually	  implement-­‐ing	   the	   will	   expressed	   by	   public	   opinion	   and	   thus	   illustrating	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	  addressee	  to	  be	  the	  appropriate	  target	  of	  the	  first	  process.	  These	  two	  processes	  also	  map	  onto	  the	  conditions	  that	  Fraser	  identifies	  as	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  a	  public	  sphere	  to	  possess	  political	  efficacy:	  the	  translation	  and	  the	  capacity	  conditions.	  In	  the	  Westphalian	  case,	  again,	  this	  maps	  onto	  the	  Westphalian	  state	  itself,	  which	  is	  both	  the	  addressee	   to	   which	   the	   public	   communicates	   the	   public	   opinion	   with	   the	   view	   of	  translation	  into	  enforced	  laws	  as	  well	  as,	  in	  the	  reverse	  flow	  of	  processes,	  the	  entity	  possessing	   the	   capacity	   to	   implement	   the	   wishes	   contained	   in	   the	   public	   opinion	  (precisely	  by	  translating	   it	   into	  enforced	   laws).	  Figure	  1	  shows	  how	  both	   the	  public	  sphere	  as	  the	  locus	  of	  the	  generation	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	  the	  corresponding	  centre	  (or	   sphere)	   of	   authority	   is	   created	   through	   counter-­‐directional	   processes.	   These	  processes	   are	   communication	   of	   the	   public	   opinion	   from	   the	   public	   sphere	   on	   one	  hand	  (which	  corresponds	  to	  the	  translation	  condition	  and	  thus	  to	  one	  of	  the	  aspects	  constituting	   the	   “authority”)	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   public	   opinion	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  	   As	  also	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  but	  worth	  repeating	  here	  again	  as	  it	  will	  be	  part	  of	  the	  argument	  unfolding	  here,	  Fraser	  changed	  her	  preference	  from	  the	  all-­‐affected	  to	  the	  all-­‐subjected	  principle	  over	  time.	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  other	  hand	  (which	  corresponds	  to	  the	  capacity	  condition	  as	  well	  as	  the	  all-­‐subjected	  principle).	  
Figure	  1:	  	   The	   Constituting	   Processes	   of	   the	   Public	   Sphere	   and	   its	   Corresponding	   Centre	   of	  
Authority	  
	  
However,	   as	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   2,	   in	   the	   transnational	   case	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	  public	  and	  the	  corresponding	  “centre	  of	  authority”	  is	  not	  as	  clear:	  in	  fact,	  as	   Fraser	   herself	   is	   sure	   to	   point	   out,	   the	   reality	   of	   transnational	   public	   spheres	   is	  often	  characterised	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  these	  two	  conditions:	  most	  often	  due	  to	  the	  addressee	  of	   the	   public	   not	   possessing	   the	   capacity	   for	   effectively	   implementing	   the	   public’s	  wishes	   (as	   illustrated	   by	   her	   example	   of	   the	   protests	   against	   the	   Iraq	   war).	   This	  problem	  is	  interesting	  for	  two	  reasons:	  first,	  when	  considering	  the	  normative	  use	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  theory	   it	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  suggest	   that	   the	  practice	   in	   the	   transna-­‐tional	   public	   sphere	   lacks,	   at	   least	   currently,	   political	   relevance	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	  political	   efficacy	   expressed	   by	   severe	   limitations	   in	   both	   the	   translation	   and	   the	  capacity	  condition.	  When,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  observing	  actually	  existing	  transnational	  phenomena	  (e.g.	  those	  variously	  described	  as	  transnational	  social	  movements,	  global	  civil	  society)	  the	  question	  arises	  what	  this	  asymmetry	  (where,	  so	  to	  speak,	  the	  public	  has	  arrived	  in	  the	  transnational	  arena	  before	  the	  corresponding	  centre	  of	  authority)	  means	   for	   the	   democratic	   practice	   on	   this	   level.	   Fraser	   therefore	   concludes	   that	  transnational	   social	  movements	   should	   focus	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   institutional	   actors	  that	   can	   fulfil	   this	   role.	   Besides	   its	   normative	   dimension,	   this	   problem	   is	   also	  interesting	   from	   a	   theoretical	   perspective:	   if	   actually	   existing	   relevant	   phenomena	  can	  not	  be	  explained	  with	  the	  theory,	  for	  example,	  since	  the	  addressees	  of	  the	  actually	  existing	  transnational	  public	  sphere	  lack	  with	  regards	  to	  both	  the	  translation	  and	  the	  capacity	   condition	   (i.e.	   they	   cannot	   reasonably	   be	   called	   upon	   for	   translating	   the	  communicative	   power	   of	   the	   public	   into	   the	   instituted	   power	   of	   enforced	   laws),	  maybe	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  theory	  should	  be	  considered.	  
	  public	  sphere	  (generation	  of	  public	  opinion)	  	   	  authority	  (addressee	  of	  public	  opinion)	  	  	  communication	  of	  	  public	  opinion	  
implementation	  of	  	  public	  opinion	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  It	   is	   in	   this	   context	   that	   I	   believe	   that	   a	   further	   development	   of	   both	   Fraser’s	  conceptualisation	   of	   the	   public	   as	   well	   as	   the	   addressee	   of	   its	   communicatively	  derived	   collective	   opinion	   can	   improve	   the	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   use	   of	   the	  concept	   as	   well	   as	   its	   usefulness	   as	   a	   normative	   device.	   First,	   it	   appears	   that	   in	  particular	   the	  definition	  of	   the	  centre	  of	  authority	  requires	   further	  development.	  As	  has	  been	  shown	  in	  figure	  1,	   the	  centre	  of	  authority	   is	  defined	  by	  being	  the	  target	  of	  the	   communicative	   process	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   and,	   explicitly,	   the	   expectation	  embedded	  in	  this	  process	  to	  “do	  something”	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  toward	  a	  world	  that	  is	   considered	   desirable	   according	   to	   the	   public	   opinion	   so	   communicated.	   While	  Fraser,	  Habermas	  and	  other	  theorists	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  take	  for	  granted	  that	  this	  “something”	  can	  only	  be	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  “communicative	  power	  generated	  in	  […]	  civil	   society	   […]	   into	   legislative	   and	   administrative	   power”	   (Fraser	   2008:	   81,	  paraphrasing	   Habermas’	   original	   argument),	   I	   would	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   a	   very	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  the	  “translation	  condition”	  among	  many	  possible	  others	  and	  is,	   in	   fact,	   a	   late	   artefact	   from	   a	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   public	  with	   a	   view	   to	   the	  Westphalian	   state.	   In	   my	   view,	   a	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   translation	   condition	   is	  more	  appropriate	  if	  it	  	  leaves	  open	  the	  question	  of	  what	  exactly	  public	  opinion	  should	  be	  translated	  into	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  toward	  a	  situation	  deemed	  desirable.	  	  
This	   conceptualisation	  overcomes	   the	  a	  priori	   assumption	  within	  public	   sphere	  theory	   that	   translating	  public	  opinion	   into	   “legislative	  and	  administrative	  power”	   is	  always	   the	   aim	   of	   the	  members	   of	   a	   given	   public	   and	   the	   degree	   of	   its	   success	   in	  fulfilling	  this	  aim	  is	  the	  normative	  yard	  stick	  against	  which	  the	  translation	  condition	  is	  to	  be	  assessed.	  By	  departing	  from	  this	  a	  priori	  assumption,	  the	  question	  as	  to	  what	  exactly	   the	   collective	  opinion	  of	   a	   given	  public	   ought	   to	  be	   translated	   into	  not	  only	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  deliberations	  within	  that	  public	  itself	  –	  “Who	  are	  we	  trying	  to	  get	  to	  do	  what?”	  –	  but	  it	  also	  can	  so	  become	  one	  of	  the	  parameters	  of	  empirical	  engage-­‐ment	   with	   this	   public.	   For	   example,	   Catherine	   Squires	   refers	   to	   a	   set	   of	   situations	  wherein	   a	   given	   public	   attempts	   to	   convince	   other,	   dominating	   publics	   to	   “reject	  pejorative	   definitions	   of	   [that]	   group’s	   identity,	   cultural	   practices,	   rights,	   and	  privileges”	  (Squires	  2002:	  448).	  In	  this	  case	  the	  “who”	  is	  not	  a	  state	  but	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  society	  while	  the	  “what”	  is	  not	  the	  passing	  and	  implementation	  of	  laws	  but	  rather	  a	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  their	  own	  beliefs	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  dominated	  public.	  Similar	  to	  Fraser’s	  own	  work	   on	   further	   developing	   the	   constituting	   concepts	   and	   processes	   of	   public	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  sphere	  theory	  to	   fit	   the	  transnational	  case	  (as	  described	  above),	   this	  suggestion	  can	  also	  explain	  the	  specific	  configuration	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Westphalian	  state	  and	  its	  public	  sphere,	  as	  a	  unique	  case	  among	  many	  other	  potential	  cases	  –	  one	  where	  the	   “who”	   in	   the	   question	   above	   is	   the	   state	   and	   the	   “what”	   is	   the	   adoption	   and	  enforcement	  of	  appropriate	  legislation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   it	  also	  allows	  for	  a	  wider	  theoretical,	  empirical	  and	  normative	  spectrum	  to	  be	  considered.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  within	  this	  thesis,	  this	  conceptual	  expansion	  allows	  for	  the	  public	  sphere	   concept	   to	   be	   applied	   to	   a	   wider	   variety	   of	   empirical	   phenomena	   –	   here,	  crucially,	   the	   various	   levels	   of	   public	   spheres	   within	   CAN	   and	   the	   UNFCCC	   –	   and	  therefore	  also	  allows	  the	  normative	  dimensions	  of	  the	  theory	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  these	  cases.	  
Thus,	  this	  exactly	  is	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  further	  development	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  concept	   that	   I	   am	   suggesting:	   instead	   of	   presuming	   that	   enforced	   laws	   are	   always	  ultimately	  the	  appropriate	  “something”	  that	  public	  opinion	  requires	  translation	  into,	  this	  question	  ought	   to	  be	   left	  open	   to	  deliberation	  within	   the	  public	  as	  well.	  Conse-­‐quently,	   since	   the	   centre	   of	   authority	   is	   defined	   primarily	   as	  whoever	   or	  whatever	  potentially	   possesses	   the	   capacity	   to	   translate	   public	   opinion	   into	   whatever	   is	  deemed	  desirable	  to	  further	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  public55,	  the	  centre	  of	  authority	  itself	  is	  reconceptualised	  more	  broadly	  as	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  just	  enforced	  laws	  that	  are	  theorised	  as	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  the	  translation	  process.	  This	  appears	  particularly	  appropriate,	  as	   current	   governance	   arrangements	   in	   the	   transnational	   arena	   do	   not	   feature	   a	  strong	  enough	  component	  that	  could	  enact	  globally	  binding	  laws	  and	  enforce	  them.	  
The	  second	  aspect	  of	  further	  developing	  the	  definitions	  that	  underpin	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  public	  sphere	  itself.	  Theories	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  generally	  imply	  that	  public	  spheres	  are	  populated	  by	  individuals	  engaging	  in	  discussions	  on	  their	  own	  behalf.	  This	  is	  particularly	  clear	  in	  Habermas’	  description	  of	  the	  historical	  case	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  public	  of	  the	  coffee	  houses	  but	  this	  notion	  is	  never	  completely	   abandoned	   by	   later	   discussions	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   even	   where	   the	  concept	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   civil	   society	   of	   voluntary	   associations	   and	  organisations.	   I	   would	   submit,	   however,	   that	   this	   idea	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  	   For	   example,	   a	   nation	   state’s	   government	   potentially	   possesses	   the	   capacity	   to	   translate	   public	  opinion	  into	  binding	  laws	  and	  associated	  administrative	  means	  of	  enforcement.	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  populated	   by	   individuals	   deliberating	   on	   their	   own	   behalf	   has	   to	   be	   revised	   if	   the	  concept	  is	  still	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  changing	  empirical	  reality.	  In	  particular,	  I	  submit	  that	  the	  interlocutors	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  not	  only	  consisting	  of	   individuals	  discussing	  their	  own	  position	  but	  crucially	  also	  of	   institutional	  actors,	  such	   as	   organisations	   of	   various	   sizes,	   types	   and	   internal	   mechanisms,	   which	   are	  typically	   represented	   by	   individuals.	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that,	  especially	   given	   that	   deliberations	  within	   public	   spheres	   increasingly	   take	   place	   in	  virtual	   spaces	   through	   computer	   mediated	   communications,	   the	   agents	   of	   an	  institutional	  actor	  might	  be	  fully	  hidden	  from	  the	  other	  interlocutors	  thus	  increasing-­‐ly	   creating	   the	   impression	   that	   it	   is,	   in	   fact,	   the	   institutional	   actor	   itself	   who	   is	  participating	  in	  the	  discussions,	  as	  opposed	  to	  its	  agents56.	  
This	  proposed	  change	  allows	  for	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  to	  be	  brought	  into	  the	  centre	  of	  attention:	  first,	  the	  degree	  of	  agency	  that	  individual	  agents	  possess	  while	  acting	  as	  agents	  of	  an	  institutional	  actor	  varies	  widely	  between	  agents	  and	  organisations,	  thus	  determining,	   for	  example,	   the	  breadth	  of	  possible	  positions	  a	  given	   interlocutor	  can	  take	   during	   discussions	   or	   the	   degree	   to	  which	   agents	   are	   capable	   of	   changing	   the	  position	  of	  the	  institutional	  actor	  on	  whose	  behalf	  they	  are	  acting.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  later	  in	   this	   thesis,	   this	  appears	   to	  be	  a	  particularly	  useful	  perspective	   for	  examining	   the	  deliberations	   within	   the	   CAN	   (especially	   in	   cases	   of	   friction	   between	   member	  organisation’s	  own	  positions	  and	  emerging	  consensus	  within	  the	  network)	  as	  well	  as	  the	   UNFCCC	   (where,	   for	   example,	   civil	   servants	   negotiating	   on	   behalf	   of	   their	  governments	   receive	   specific	   negotiation	   mandates).	   Further,	   and	   crucial	   for	   the	  normative	  application	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  theory,	  conceptualising	  the	  membership	  of	  that	  sphere	  in	  this	  way	  allows	  for	  a	  changing	  perspective	  when	  examining	  the	  equity	  condition	  that	  is	  part	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  public	  sphere:	  clearly	  the	  presence	  of	   institutional	  actors	  alongside	   individuals	  acting	  on	  their	  own	  behalf	  requires	   a	   shift	   in	   thinking	   about	   what	   the	   notion	   of	   discursive	   equity	   means	   in	  practice.	  Again,	  while	  it	  can	  still	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  special	  case	  of	  the	  Westphalian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  	   In	   fact,	   it	  might	   even	   be	   the	   case,	   that,	   in	   the	   background,	   a	   number	   of	   different	   and	   changing	  agents	  are	  acting	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  the	  institutional	  actor.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  an	  organisation’s	  profile	  on	  a	  social	  networking	  site.	  It	   is	  typically	  fully	  opaque	  to	  a	  visitor	  who	  might	  engage	  in	  a	  discussion	  on	  that	  site	  which	  agent,	  or	  over	   the	  course	  of	  a	  prolonged	  conversation,	  how	  many,	  possibly	   changing	   agents,	   are	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   organisation.	   This,	   ultimately	   creates	   an	  impression	  of	  interacting	  with	  the	  organisation	  itself	  instead	  of	  an	  agent	  or	  agents	  thereof.	  
3.	  Methodology,	  Research	  Design	  and	  Preliminary	  Theoretical	  Model	   130	  	  state	  or	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  public	  spheres	  exclusively	  made	  up	  of	  natural	  persons57,	  the	  value	  of	  a	  public	  sphere	  model	  thus	  expanded	  lies	  in	  its	  broader	  applicability	  and	  therefore	  usefulness	   to	  examine	   the	  (post-­‐Westphalian)	   international	  context	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  where	  interlocutors	  may	  well	  represent	  NGOs	  or	  other	  collective	  actors.	  
In	  my	  conceptualisation,	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  all-­‐subjected	  princi-­‐ple	   that	  Fraser	  already	  suggested	  as	  more	  appropriately	  suited	  than	  the	  all-­‐affected	  principle	   of	   Habermas’	   conceptualisation	   or	   other	   proposals,	   for	   example	   Michael	  Warner’s	  assertions	  that	  a	  public	  comes	  into	  existence	  by	  the	  mere	  process	  of	  “being	  addressed”	   (Warner	   2002:	   50).	  However,	   the	   implicit	   assumption	   that	   only	   natural	  persons	  can	  be	   the	  subjects	   is	  abandoned	   to	  explicitly	  allow	   for	   legal	  persons	   to	  be	  considered	  parts	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  as	  well.	  This	  makes	  sense,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  as	  for	  example	   the	   internal	  processes	  within	  CAN	  or	   the	  deliberations	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  public	  spheres	  and	  in	  these	  cases	  many,	  if	  not	  close	  to	  all,	  of	  the	  interlocutors	   are	   not	   individuals	   acting	   in	   their	   own	   behalf	   but	   rather	   institutional	  actors	  (or	  legal	  persons)	  which	  are	  represented	  by	  natural	  persons.	  The	  public	  sphere	  is	  also	  defined	  (as	  illustrated	  in	  figure	  1)	  by	  being	  the	  collective	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  communicative	  process	  that	  transmits	  the	  collectively	  established	  public	  opinion.	  
It	   is	   further	   important	   to	   note,	   that	   the	   theorised	   relationship	   between	   public	  spheres	  and	  their	  corresponding	  centre	  of	  authority	  explicitly	  intends	  to	  capture	  the	  possibility	   that	   different	   publics	  might	  map	   onto	   the	   same	   centre	   of	   authority	   and	  further	  that	  an	  entity	  which	  is	  the	  centre	  of	  authority	  in	  one	  configuration	  might	  be	  one	  of	  many	  interlocutors	  in	  another	  setting.	  	  
To	   illustrate	   these	   points,	   I	  would	   like	   to	   briefly	   describe	   how	   the	   relationship	  between	   CAN	   and	   the	   larger	   UNFCCC	   can	   be	   so	   conceptualised;	   a	   topic	   that	   will	  receive	  greater	  attention	  within	   the	   following	  chapters.	  While	   the	   internal	  delibera-­‐tions	   within	   CAN	   can	   be	   seen,	   so	   goes	   the	   proposition,	   as	   taking	   place	   in	   a	   public	  sphere	  of	  its	  own	  right	  –	  the	  public	  sphere	  of	  CAN	  member	  organisations	  –	  CAN,	  as	  a	  whole,	  also	  acts	  (through	  various	  agents)	  as	  an	  interlocutor	  of	  a	  larger	  public	  sphere	  –	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  	   The	  term	  “natural	  person”	   is	  used	  here	  in	  contrast	  to	  “legal	  person,”	  where	  the	  former	  refers	  to	  actual	  human	  beings	  while	  the	  latter	  refers	  to	  an	  institutionalised	  association	  of	  persons	  which	  is	  bestowed	  with	   a	   (albeit	   typically	   somewhat	   limited)	   legal	   personhood	   distinct	   from	   that	   of	   its	  constituents.	  (c.f.,	  for	  a	  very	  early	  discussion	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  Deiser	  1908)	  
3.	  Methodology,	  Research	  Design	  and	  Preliminary	  Theoretical	  Model	   131	  	  the	   public	   sphere	   that	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   political	   deliberations	   within	   the	  UNFCCC.	  In	  the	  former	  case	  –	  the	  internal	  CAN	  discussions	  –	  CAN	  itself,	  as	  a	  collective	  entity,	   is	   the	   centre	   of	   authority	   according	   to	   the	  model	   of	   public	   sphere	  discussed	  here	   and	   the	   membership	   of	   CAN	   represents	   the	   public	   sphere	   in	   question.	   This	  example	   demonstrates	   the	   purchase	   of	   this	   extended	   understanding,	   especially	   in	  terms	  of	  translating	  the	  public	  sphere’s	  collective	  opinion:	  clearly,	  CAN	  does	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  required	  to	  pass	  binding	  laws	  and	  enforce	  them,	  however	  this	  is	  not	  the	  expectation	  of	  the	  CAN-­‐internal	  public	  sphere.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail,	  a	  substantial	   portion	   of	   CAN	   internal	   deliberation	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	   question	   of	  which	   policy	   positions	   CAN	   should	   publicly	   argue	   for	  when	   it,	   as	   it	  were,	   acts	   as	   a	  collective	  interlocutor	  (represented	  by	  agents)	  in	  the	  larger	  public	  sphere	  that	  is	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  proposed	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  theory,	  CAN’s	   unified	   negotiation	   stance	   in	   the	   wider	   political	   deliberations,	   then,	   is	   the	  specific	   case	   of	   the	   abstract	   “something”	   that	   CAN’s	   internal	   public	   expects	   as	   the	  outcome	  of	  the	  internal	  deliberations	  –	  its	  public	  opinion,	  as	  it	  were	  –	  to	  be	  translated	  into.	  	  
Likewise,	  CAN’s	  membership	  can	  be	  regarded	  CAN’s	  internal	  public	  sphere,	  as	  it	  is	   subjected	   to	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   translation	   of	   its	   internal	   public	   opinion	   –	   here	  unified	  CAN	  policy	  positions.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  expectations	  –	  expressed	  in	  the	  CAN	  Charter,	   established	   network	   practice	   and	   implicit	   norms	   –	   that	   once	   agreed	   upon,	  CAN	   member	   organisations	   typically	   refrain	   from	   advocating	   positions	   that	   are	  openly	   contradictory	  with	   the	   unified	   position58.	   Thus	   by	   becoming	   CAN	  members,	  organisations	   subject	   themselves	   to	   these	   rules	   and	   therefore	   become	  members	   of	  the	   CAN-­‐internal	   public	   sphere	   as	   understood	   and	   operationalised	   through	   the	   all-­‐subjected	   principle.	   From	   a	   normative	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   theory	   now	   allows	   for	   a	  different	  demarcation	  of	  various	  publics	  and	  allows	  for	  normative	  expectations	  that	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  public	  sphere	  theory,	  i.e.	  democratic	  legitima-­‐cy	  and	  political	  efficacy,	  to	  be	  assessed	  within	  this	  demarcation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   CAN	   Charter	   explicitly	   permits	   member	   organisations	   and	   CAN	   regional	   and	  national	  nodes	  to	  take	  contradictory	  positions	  (albeit	  not	  when	  communication	  on	  behalf	  of	  CAN)	  but	  mandate	  them	  to	  make	  explicit	  where	  and	  when	  they	  decide	  to	  do	  so.	  However,	  established	  informal	  norms	  and	  practices	  expect	  CAN	  members	  normally	  to	  refrain	  from	  such	  activity.	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  Generally	  speaking,	   then,	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	  proposal	   is	   to	  be	  able	  to	  conceptualise	  what	  appeared	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  and	  the	  data	  analysis	  to	  be	  a	  multi-­‐layered	  and	   overlapping	   formation	   of	   multiple	   public	   spheres	   with	   multiple	   centres	   of	  authorities	  that	  are	  often	  in	  relationship	  to	  each	  other,	  for	  example	  by	  being	  counter	  publics	  to	  each	  other,	  by	  being	  elements	  of	  each	  other,	  by	  addressing	  the	  same	  centre	  of	  authority	  or	  by	  being	  publics	  that	  are	  aiming	  to	  influence	  the	  interlocutors	  of	  other	  publics.	   This	   echoes	   Charles	   Taylor’s	   notion,	   as	   described	   in	   chapter	   2,	   of	   “nested	  public	  spheres”	  wherein	  “smaller	  public	  spheres	  are	  nested	  within	  larger	  ones,	  in	  the	  sense	   that	   what	   goes	   on	   in	   the	   smaller	   ones	   feeds	   into	   and	   has	   an	   impact	   on	   the	  agenda	   of	   the	   national	   sphere”	   (Taylor	   1995:	   208).	   Taylor’s	   analysis	   is	   a	   useful	  starting	   point	   (not	   only	   for	   his	   coining	   of	   the	   apt	   phrase	   ”nested	   public	   sphere”).	  However,	  in	  his	  characterisation	  the	  “smaller”	  publics	  are	  always	  parts	  of	  the	  larger,	  national	   public	   (he	   speaks	   of	   regionally	   differentiated	   publics	   or	   those	   of	   specific	  parties	  or	  social	  movements)	  and	  aim	  at	  the	  same	  centre	  of	  authority	  that	  the	  larger	  publics	   relate	   to	   and	   he	   always	   assumes	   this	   larger	   public	   to	   be	   a	   national	   public	  sphere	   aiming	   at	   influencing	   a	  Westphalian	   state.	   However,	   the	   concept	   of	   nested,	  multi-­‐layered	   and	   overlapping	   publics	   remains	   useful,	   especially	  when	   imagining	   a	  larger	  variety	  of	  possible	  constellations	  than	  those	  in	  Taylor’s	  account.	  
To	   be	   sure,	   this	   proposal	   does	   not	   intend	   to	   advocate	   a	   postmodern	   “anything	  goes”	  approach	  to	  the	  empirical	  analysis,	  normative	  critique	  and	  democratic	  practice	  of	   the	   public	   sphere.	   Specifically,	   the	   proposal	   does	   not	   intend	   to	   deny	   that	   it	   is	  possible	   that	   a	   global	   demos	  which	   is	   conceptualised	   as	   being	   the	   public	   sphere	   of	  some	   sort	   of	   global	   centre	   of	   authority	   might	   remain	   the	   most	   desirable	   outcome	  from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   normative	   democracy	   critique	   –	   which	   would	   set	   the	   bar	  extremely	   high	   for	   the	   assessment	   of	   normative	   legitimacy.	   But	   regardless	   of	   the	  outcome	  of	  such	  a	  discussion,	  it	  is	  probably	  uncontroversial	  to	  state	  that	  the	  current	  configuration	  of	  the	  global	  does	  not	  feature	  a	  global	  demos	  that	  comes	  even	  near	  to	  fulfilling	  the	  function	  of	  a	  public	  sphere	  on	  that	  level	  (and	  even	  if	  it	  did	  it	  would	  lack	  so	   substantially	   in,	   for	   example,	   the	   equity	   condition	   that	   its	   democratic	   legitimacy	  would	   be	   all	   but	   non-­‐existent).	   Furthermore,	   there	   is	   considerable	   doubt	   whether	  there	  is	  a	  global	  centre	  of	  authority	  and	  even	  more	  so	  whether	  this	  centre	  of	  authority	  is	   suitably	   equipped	  with	   power	   to	   fulfil	   the	   translation	   and	   capacity	   conditions	   of	  political	  efficacy.	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  Quite	  clearly,	   this	  arguably	  desirable	  situation	   is	  all	  but	  absent	   in	  current	  empirical	  reality.	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  one	  can	  clearly	  observe	  considerable	  transnation-­‐alisation	   of	   problems	   facing	   humanity,	   of	   discursive	   spaces	   wherein	   possible	  solutions	   are	   discussed	   and	   of	   political	   activity	   to	   address	   the	   issues.	   Given	   this	  empirical	   situation,	   the	  proposed	  development	  of	   the	   theory	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	   is	  intended	   to	  allow	  capturing	   the	  multi-­‐dimensional,	   intertwined	  and	   interdependent	  character	   of	   the	   currently	   existing	   phenomena	   that,	   in	   my	   view,	   resemble	   public	  spheres	   in	   the	   transnational	   space.	   It	   is	   now	   also	   possible	   to	   conceptualise	   public	  spheres	  that	  are	  concerned	  with	  specific,	  possibly	  narrow,	  political	  issues,	  while	  not	  suggesting	  that	  the	  specific	  political	  issue	  is	  separate	  from	  other	  political	  issues.	  
3.9 Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	   has	   focussed	   on	   the	   methodological	   aspects	   of	   the	   research.	   This	  included	   a	   brief	   description	   of	   my	   own	   political	   identity	   and	   highlighted	   why	   this	  identity	   enabled	  me	   to	   employ	   the	   innovative	  methodological	   approach	   to	  my	   field	  especially	  the	  aspect	  of	  gradually	  increasing	  my	  direct	  involvement	  with	  the	  work	  of	  CAN	   over	   time	   until	   the	   status	   of	   a	   fully	   participating	   member	   was	   achieved.	   I	  outlined	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  and	  also	  showed	  how	  the	  ethnographic	  approach	  to	  the	  field	  overcomes	  some	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  previous	  research,	  which	  was	  based	  on	  interviews	  and	  document	  analysis.	  Further,	  I	  described	  how	  initial	  access	  to	  CAN	  was	  negotiated	  and	  how	  the	  continuing	  issue	  of	  consent	  was	  addressed.	  I	  presented	  the	   three	   different,	   distinct	   fieldwork	   settings	   within	   which	   the	   research	   has	   been	  carried	   out	   (“in-­‐session”,	   “virtual”	   setting	   and	   “hybrid”	   setting)	   and	   indicated	   the	  specific	   challenges	   and	   opportunities	   that	   each	   of	   these	   settings	   presented	   to	   the	  researcher.	   I	   also	  discussed	  how	   the	  notion	  of	   “going	  native”	  has	  been	  discussed	   in	  the	   literature	   over	   time	   and	   made	   the	   case	   that	   “being”	   native	   can	   be	   a	   desirable	  position	   for	   an	   ethnographer	   if	   the	  potential	   conflict	   between	   genuine	   involvement	  with	  the	  group	  under	  examination	  and	  a	  necessary	  critical	  position	  as	  researcher	  can	  be	  resolved.	  
In	  “Learning	  the	  Language”,	  I	  discussed	  how	  gaining	  some	  level	  of	  proficiency	  in	  understanding	  international	  climate	  change	  policy	  and	  climate	  science	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	   to	  avoid	   inadequate	   interpretations	  of	  events,	   and	   illustrated	   this	   claim	  by	  
3.	  Methodology,	  Research	  Design	  and	  Preliminary	  Theoretical	  Model	   134	  	  discussing	  an	  example	  of	  such	  an	  inadequate	  interpretation	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fieldwork	   period.	   Finally,	   after	   describing	   the	   method	   of	   data	   organisation	   and	  analysis	  employed	  in	  the	  research,	  I	  proceeded	  to	  describe	  the	  preliminary	  theoreti-­‐cal	  model	   that	   emerged	  during	   fieldwork	   and	  data	   analysis.	   The	  model	   emphasises	  the	   character	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   as	   a	  multiple	   public	   sphere	  with	   a	  multitude	   of	  interdependent,	   interconnected	   and	   nested	   public	   spheres.	   This	   model	   is	   crucially	  important	  for	  fulfilling	  the	  dual	  objective	  of	  the	  research	  as	  it	  is,	  on	  one	  hand,	  used	  to	  structure	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   ethnographic	   account	   throughout	   the	   following	  chapters,	  while	   it	   also,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   represents	   a	   further	   development	   of	   the	  theory	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	  which	   is	   then	  used	   to	   inform	  the	   theoretical	  analysis	  of	  the	  empirical	  material.	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Chapter	  4 	  
	  
Contextualising	  ENGO	  Participation	  in	  the	  UN	  Climate	  Change	  
Regime	  –	  History,	  Politics	  and	  Institutional	  Make-­‐up	  of	  the	  
UNFCCC	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  introduce	  the	  context	  within	  which	  the	  fieldwork	  for	  this	  thesis	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  –	  the	  political	  negotiations	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  between	  2007	  and	  2009.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this,	  I	  will	  –	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  –	  provide	  a	  brief	   history	   of	   international	   climate	   change	   politics	   in	   the	   20th	   and	   early	   21st	  centuries,	   including	   the	  circumstances	  surrounding	   the	  creation	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  and	  its	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  The	  political	   landscape	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  during	   the	   fieldwork	  phase	   was	   characterised	   by	   the	   endeavour	   to	   create	   a	   post-­‐2012	   climate	   change	  regime	  starting	  with	  the	  landmark	  UNFCCC	  conference	  in	  December	  2007	  in	  Bali	  with	  a	   planned	   completion	   of	   that	   work	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	   conference	   in	   Copenhagen	   in	  December	   2009.	   Next,	   I	   will	   therefore	   provide	   a	   sketch	   of	   this	   landscape	   (and	   the	  developments	   immediately	   leading	   up	   to	   that	   phase),	  whereby	   particular	   emphasis	  will	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  carbon	  market	  instruments	  –	  the	  substantive	  focus	  of	  this	  fieldwork.	  
In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  give	  substantial	  attention	  to	  the	  institu-­‐tional	  make-­‐up	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  –	  the	  context	  within	  which	  the	  participation	  of	  ENGOs	  that	  constitutes	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  interest	  of	  this	  thesis	  takes	  place.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	   am	   first	   going	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   different	   classes	   of	   participants	   in	   the	   process:	  delegates	   of	   parties	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   (including	   their	   negotiation	   groupings),	   non-­‐governmental	   observers,	   and	   observers	   of	   the	   various	   UN	   and	   intergovernmental	  organisations	  as	  well	  as	  their	  relationships	  to	  each	  other	  and	  their	  respective	  rights	  within	   the	  process.	  Secondly,	   the	  settings	  of	   the	  different	  negotiation	  arenas	  will	  be	  described	   and	   their	   characteristics	  with	   regards	   to	   access	   and	   formality	   as	  well	   as	  their	   specific	   role	  within	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	   particular	   topic	  within	   the	  negotiations	  will	  be	  considered.	  Lastly,	   I	  will	   introduce	  the	  most	   important	  types	  of	   text	   that	  are	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  used	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  as	  well	  as	  their	  role	   in	  helping	  to	  “translate”	  the	  raw	  input	  provided	  by	  parties	   (and	   to	   a	   lesser	  degree,	   observer	   organisations)	   in	   the	   form	  of	  submissions	   and	   during	   negotiations	   into	   text	   that	   can	   be	   adopted	   as	   collective	  decisions	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  parties.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  quick	  summary	  of	  the	  main	  themes	  discussed	  in	  the	  chapter.	  	  
4.1 A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Climate	  Change	  as	  an	  Issue	  in	  International	  Politics	  
Climate	   Change	   as	   a	   political	   issue	   can	   now	  be	   considered	   to	   be	   firmly	   established	  within	  regional,	  national,	  and	  international	  politics	  with	  a	  number	  of	  sub	  and	  sub	  sub	  issues	  –	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  (with	  the	  very	  important	  and	  complex	  sub	  issue	   of	   tropical	   deforestation59),	   adaptation,	   the	   carbon	   markets,	   technology	   and	  finance	  transfers	  etc.	  –	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  links	  to	  other	  policy	  areas	  –	  like	  international	  trade	   and	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	   foreign	   aid,	   energy,	   security,	   etc.	   The	   rise	   of	  climate	   change	   as	   an	   item	   on	   the	   political	   agenda	   has	   been	   quite	   rapid,	   and	   the	  following	  shall	  provide	  a	  brief	  historical	  overview	  over	  that	  process.	  
The	   link	   between	   increasing	   carbon	   dioxide	   concentrations	   in	   the	   atmosphere	  from	   human	   activity	   and	   temperatures	   on	   the	   surface	   of	   the	   Earth	   has	   first	   been	  proposed	   in	  1896	  by	  Swedish	  chemist	  Svante	  Arrhenius60.	  However,	  his	   theory	  was	  largely	  discredited	  by	  natural	  scientists	  until	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  and	  certainly	   did	   not	   receive	   any	   attention	   in	   political	   circles.	   The	   first	   time	   “global	  warming”61	  appeared	   visibly	   on	   the	   stage	   of	   international	   political	   was	   (again	   in	  Sweden)	   on	   the	   occasion	   of	   the	   1972	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   on	   the	   Human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	   In	  the	  terminology	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  negotiations	  this	   is	  referred	  to	  as	  “Reducing	  Emissions	  from	  Deforestation	  and	  Forest	  Degradation”	  (in	  developing	  countries),	  or	  REDD.	  60	   Whose	   early	   estimates	   of	   the	   magnitude	   of	   that	   link	   were	   surprisingly	   accurate:	   Arrhenius	  estimated	  the	  increase	  in	  temperature	  from	  doubling	  the	  CO2	  concentration	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  to	  be	  2.1C;	  currently	  this	  value	  (called	  “climate	  sensitivity”)	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  in	  the	  range	  of	  2	  to	  4.5C	  (IPCC	  2007c).	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note,	  that	  Arrhenius	  considered	  the	  greenhouse	  effect	  he	  discov-­‐ered	  to	  be	  beneficial	  to	  humanity	  since	  he	  expected	  it	  to	  prevent	  further	  ice	  ages	  and	  contribute	  to	  increasing	  food	  production	  to	  feed	  the	  fast	  growing	  population	  of	  the	  planet.	  61	   Global	  warming	  was	  the	  preferred	  term	  in	  the	  past.	  However,	  since	  the	  term	  only	  covers	  parts	  of	  the	  effects	  expected	  from	  climatic	  change	  (the	  overall	  increase	  of	  average	  global	  surface	  tempera-­‐tures),	  the	  more	  inclusive	  term	  “climate	  change”	  (which	  includes	  other	  aspects	  of	  expected	  climat-­‐ic	  changes	  such	  as	  changing	  precipitation	  pattern,	  increase	  of	  frequency	  and	  severity	  of	  extreme	  weather	  events,	  possible	  cooling	  of	  some	  regions	  and	  so	  forth.	  For	  a	  detailed	  description	  cf.	  IPCC	  2007c;	  especially	  its	  “Summary	  for	  Policy	  Makers”)	  has	  over	  time	  replaced	  “global	  warming”	  and	  is	   the	   preferred	   term	   used	   in	   this	   text.	   In	   popular	   use,	   however,	   the	   terms	   are	  mutually	   inter-­‐changeable	  (also	  c.f.	  Conway	  2008,	   for	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	   the	  history	  and	  relationship	  of	  both	  terms).	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  Environment	  (UNCHE)	  in	  Stockholm,	  the	  first	  of	  a	  series	  of	   large	  UN	  conferences	  on	  the	   relationship	   between	   humanity	   activity	   and	   the	   environment.	   This	   conference	  covered	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  environmental	   concerns	  of	   the	   time,	   such	  as	  air	  and	  water	  pollution,	   acid	   rain,	   species	  extinction,	  deforestation	  and	   so	   forth	  and	  also	   included	  global	  warming	  as	  one	  of	  the	  many	  areas	  of	  concern.	  The	  conference	  is	  considered	  an	  important	   milestone	   in	   the	   genesis	   of	   the	   international	   institutional	   structure	  concerned	  with	  environmental	  protection	  by,	  inter	  alia,	  acknowledging	  the	  potential-­‐ly	  negative	  impact	  of	  industrial	  development	  on	  the	  environment,	  recommending	  that	  governments	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  on	  environmental	  issue	  with	  internation-­‐al	   implications	   and,	   most	   importantly,	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	  Environmental	  Programme	  (Buss	  2007).	  	  
Despite	   elevating	   the	  profile	   of	   global	  warming	   to	   an	   issue	  of	   international	   im-­‐portance	  at	  UNCHE,	  it	  took	  another	  7	  years	  until	  the	  First	  World	  Climate	  Conference	  in	   Geneva	   in	   1979,	   which,	   although	   rather	   a	   scientific	   than	   a	   political	   conference,	  concluded	   that	   governments	   should	   “foresee	   and	   prevent	   potential	   [hu]man-­‐made	  changes	   in	   climate	   that	   might	   be	   adverse	   to	   the	   well-­‐being	   of	   humanity”	   (WCC-­‐1	  declaration	   cited	   in	  UNEP	  2000).	   Even	   after	   that	   declaration,	   progress	   on	   the	   issue	  remained	   very	   slow	   until	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1980s	  with	   scientific	   and	   political	   confer-­‐ences	   regularly	   taking	  place	   in	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	  1980s,	   for	   example,	   the	  1985	  Villach	   conference,	   which	   helped	   raise	   the	   awareness	   of	   the	   findings	   of	   climate	  science	  among	  policy	  makers	  (Newell	  2000),	  and	  the	  1988	  Toronto	  Conference	  on	  the	  Changing	   Atmosphere,	   which	   for	   the	   first	   time	   called	   for	   a	   specific,	   albeit	   merely	  voluntary,	   target	   of	   emission	   reductions	   by	   industrialised	   nations	   of	   20%	   of	   their	  1988	  levels	  by	  the	  year	  2005.	  The	  Toronto	  Conference	  also	  established	  the	  Interna-­‐tional	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC),	   the	   large	   intergovernmental	  body	  of	  climate	  scientists	   who	   have	   since	   then	   published	   their	   Assessment	   Reports	   of	   the	   state	   of	  climate	  science	  (in	  1990,	  1995,	  2001,	  2007,	  with	  the	  Fifth	  Assessment	  Report	  being	  due	  in	  2014).	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  IPCC	  is	  the	  second	  international	  science	  body	  on	  climate	  change.	  The	   first	  attempt	   for	  such	  a	  body,	   the	  AGGG	  (Advisory	  Group	  on	  Greenhouse	  Gases)	  was	  abandoned	  by	  governments	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  body	  since	  the	  AGGG	  was	  seen	  to	  have	  become	  too	  influential	  and	  included	  too	  much	  direct	  advice	  on	  the	  energy	  policy	  implications	  of	  its	  findings	  (Newell	  2000).	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  The	  IPCC	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  “hybrid	  or	  borderline	  organisation	  between	  science	  and	   policy”	   (Conrad	   2010:	   102,	   own	   translation)	   and	   both	   of	   these	   aspects	   are	  reflected	  in	  the	  main	  aspects	  of	  its	  work:	  first	  and	  foremost,	  the	  IPCC	  is	  known	  for	  its	  Assessment	   Reports	   (ARs),	   in	   which	   the	   leading	   climate	   scientists	   review	   and	  synthesise	  the	  current	  peer-­‐reviewed	  and	  published	  literature	  in	  climate	  science.	  The	  ARs	  consist	  of	   the	  reports	  of	   the	   three	   IPCC	  working	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  a	   “Synthesis	  Report”	  summarising	  the	  contributions	  of	  all	  three	  working	  groups.	  Each	  of	  the	  three	  working	  groups	  is	  responsible	  for	  a	  certain	  aspect	  of	  the	  wider	  area	  of	  climate	  science:	  “[i.]	  the	  physical	  scientific	  aspects	  of	  the	  climate	  system	  and	  climate	  change	  […,	  ii.]	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  natural	  systems	  to	  climate	  change	  […]	  [and,	   iii.]	  options	  for	  mitigating	  climate	  change”	  (IPCC	  2010a).	  Within	  each	  working	  group,	  the	  work	   is	   shared	   by	   designating	   two	   or	   three	   Coordinating	   Lead	   Authors	   for	   each	  chapter	   and	   a	   larger	   number	   of	   Lead	   Authors	   and	   Review	   Editors.	   The	   individuals	  serving	   in	   these	   functions	   are	   experts	   from	   their	   field	   and	   go	   through	   a	   process	   of	  nomination	  (by	  member	  governments	  of	  the	  IPCC	  as	  well	  as	  observer	  organisations)	  and	  selection	  (by	  the	  IPCC	  bureau).	  Additionally,	  contributing	  authors	  are	  involved	  in	  managing	  the	  work.	  In	  addition	  to	  and	  complementing	  these	  scientific	  ARs,	  the	  IPCC	  also	  produces	  “Summaries	  for	  Policy	  Makers”	  for	  each	  working	  group	  report	  and	  the	  synthesis	   report	   of	   the	   ARs.	   These	   Summaries	   go	   through	   a	   much	   more	   thorough	  approval	  process,	  wherein	  they	  are	  subjected	  to	  line-­‐by-­‐line	  discussion	  and	  approval	  by	   the	   IPCC	  plenary,	  which	   consists	   of	   delegates	   of	   the	  member	   states	   of	   the	   IPCC.	  Like	   the	   UNFCCC,	   the	   IPCC	   has	   grown	   to	   near	   universal	   membership.	   Therefore	  nearly	   all	   countries	   can	   be	   involved	   in	   this	   approval	   process.	   This	   line-­‐by-­‐line	  discussion	  and	  approval	  process	  acknowledges	   the	  much	  higher	  policy	  relevance	  of	  these	  shorter	  Summaries	  compared	  to	  the	  much	  longer,	  full	  reports62	  and	  is	  instituted	  to	   reassure	   the	  users	   of	   the	   Summaries	   “that	   the	   Summary	   for	  Policymakers	   […]	   is	  consistent	  with	  the	  factual	  material	  contained	  in	  the	  under-­‐lying	  report”	  (IPCC	  2004:	  2).	  
In	  1990,	  the	  IPCC	  released	  its	  First	  Assessment	  Report	  (FAR),	  which	  summarised	  the	  state	  of	  climate	  science	  at	  that	  time.	  The	  FAR	  enjoyed	  a	  broad	  level	  of	  support	  and	  acceptance	  that	  led	  to	  the	  agreement,	  at	  the	  Second	  World	  Climate	  Conference	  (WCC-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  	   For	   example,	   the	   full	   contribution	   of	  Working	   Group	   I	   to	   the	   Fourth	   Assessment	   Report	   has	   a	  volume	  of	  996	  pages,	  while	  its	  Summary	  for	  Policy	  Makers	  is	  only	  18	  pages	  long	  (IPCC	  2007c).	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  2)	  in	  Geneva	  in	  1990,	  to	  use	  it	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  negotiation	  of	  a	  climate	  convention.	  Without	  dwelling	  any	  further	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  IPCC	  in	  the	  climate	  process,	  it	  suffices	   to	  point	  out	   that	   this	  decision	  –	   to	  use	   the	   IPCC’s	  reporting	  as	   the	  scientific	  knowledge	   base	   to	   inform	   policy	   making	   toward	   an	   international	   climate	   policy	  regime	  –	  cemented	  the	  role	  of	  the	  IPCC	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  for	  the	  international	  climate	  policy	  process63.	  The	  delegates	  of	  the	  WCC-­‐2	  also	  agreed	  on	  a	  number	  of	  principle	  design	  elements	  of	   the	   future	   climate	   convention,	  namely	  the	  principle	  of	  “common	  but	  differentiated	  responsibilities	  and	  respective	  capabili-­‐ties	  (CBDRRC)”	  and	  the	  “precautionary	  principle.”	  The	  principle	  of	  CBDRRC	  acknowl-­‐edges	   that	  countries	  at	  different	   levels	  of	  development	  are	  responsible	   for	  different	  historical	   and	   current	   contributions	   to	   the	   climate	   problems	   and	   have	   at	   their	  disposal	   different	  magnitudes	   of	   resources	   to	   contribute	   to	   solving	   the	   issue,	  while	  the	  “precautionary	  principle”	  stipulates	  that	  lack	  of	  scientific	  certainty	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  an	  excuse	  for	  delaying	  actions	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  
Following	  WCC-­‐2,	   in	  December	  1990	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	   formally	  started	  the	  process	  of	  negotiating	  a	  climate	  convention	  by	  establishing	  the	  Intergovernmen-­‐tal	  Negotiating	  Committee	  for	  a	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (INC).	  The	  INC	   negotiated	   and	   prepared	   the	   text	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   in	   time	   for	   the	   1992	   Rio	   de	  Janeiro	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development	  (UNCED),	  also	  widely	   known	   as	   the	   Earth	   Summit,	   where	   the	   UNFCCC	  was	   formally	   adopted	   and	  opened	  for	  signature,	  alongside	  its	  “sister	  conventions,”	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  and	  the	  UN	  Convention	  to	  Combat	  Desertification.	  According	  to	  Article	  23	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  the	  convention	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  March	  1994,	  90	  days	  after	  the	  50th	  signatory	   country	   ratified	   the	   convention,	   and	   the	   bodies	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	   (COP,	   SBI	  and	  SBSTA)	  started	  their	  work	  implementing	  the	  convention	  in	  1995.	  Since	  then,	  the	  UNFCCC	  has	  reached	  near	  universal	  membership	  (the	  only	  countries	  not	  parties	  are	  those	   whose	   statehood	   is	   not	   universally	   accepted,	   like	   Taiwan,	   Palestine,	   West	  Sahara	  etc.).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  Assessment	  Reports,	  the	  IPCC	  reports	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  other,	  often	  very	  specific	  and	  technical,	  climate	  change	  related	  topic,	  often	  as	   the	  result	  of	  requests	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  when	  gaps	  in	  the	  knowledge	  hinder	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  in	  these	  areas	  (for	  an	  overview,	  see	  the	  “Special	  Reports”	  and	  “Technical	  Papers”	  sections	  in	  IPCC	  2010b).	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  The	  UNFCCC	  is	  designed	  to	  merely	  be	  a	  framework	  convention	  and	  does	  not	  contain	  any	  specific	  binding	  emission	  targets	  –	  its	  “ultimate	  objective”	  is	  the	  “stabilization	  of	  greenhouse	   gas	   concentrations	   in	   the	   atmosphere	   at	   a	   level	   that	   would	   prevent	  dangerous	  anthropogenic	  interference	  with	  the	  climate	  system”	  (UNFCCC	  1992:	  Art.	  2)	  without	  any	  specific	  provisions	  on	  what	  those	  levels	  might	  be	  and	  how	  to	  specifically	  implement	  this	  objective.	  Therefore,	  over	  time,	  the	  UNFCCC	  established	  a	  number	  of	  temporary	  ad-­‐hoc	  groups	  and	  permanent	  subsidiary	  bodies	  to	  advance	  the	  work	  on	  the	   implementation	   of	   the	   convention,	   i.e.	   to	   translate	   the	   UNFCCC’s	   political	  declaration	   of	   intent	   into	   actual	   practical	   policies.	   Figure	   2	   below	   shows	   the	  development	  of	  these	  bodies	  over	  time.	  	  
The	   Convention	   itself	   does	   contain	   references	   to	   specific	   targets,	   namely	   the	  return	  to	  1990	  emission	  levels	  by	  2000,	  but	  the	  phrasing	  of	  that	  reference	  is	  generally	  understood	  not	  to	  establish	  a	  legally	  binding	  target	  –	  the	  Convention	  merely	  speaks	  of	  “the	   aim	   of	   returning	   […]	   to	   their	   1990	   levels	   these	   anthropogenic	   emissions	   of	  carbon	   dioxide	   and	   other	   greenhouse	   gases”	   (own	   emphasis,	   UNFCCC	   1992:	   Art.	  4.2.b).	  Thus,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  main	  tasks	  of	  the	  convention	  bodies	  was	  the	  negotiation	  and	   adoption	   of	   an	   additional	   instrument	   to	   legally	   enshrine	   specific	   targets.	   To	  advance	  toward	  this	  goal,	  the	  first	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  (COP1)	  in	  Berlin	   in	   1995	   established	   the	   Ad-­‐hoc	   Group	   on	   the	   Berlin	   Mandate	   (AGBM)	   to	  negotiate	  such	  an	  instrument.	  The	  AGBM	  finalised	  its	  work	  by	  COP3,	  in	  Kyoto	  in	  1997,	  and	  the	  protocol	  which	  had	  been	  prepared	  by	  the	  AGBM	  was	  subsequently	  adopted	  as	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  
The	  main	   feature	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   is	   a	   specific	   target	   for	   greenhouse	   gas	  emission	   reductions	   in	   industrialised	   countries,	   namely	   a	   collective	   5.2%	   emission	  reduction	  compared	  to	  1990	  levels	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  the	  “first	  commitment	  period”	  in	  2008	  to	  2012.	  Based	  on	  the	  convention’s	  principle	  of	  “common	  but	  differentiated	  responsibilities	  and	  respective	  capabilities”	  (CBDRRC),	   the	  convention,	  and	  thus	   the	  Kyoto	   Protocol,	   differentiates	   between	   two	   groups	   of	   countries:	   Annex	   I	   countries	  and	  non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries.	  Annex	   I	   countries,	   thus	   labelled	   since	   they	   are	   listed	   in	  Annex	  I	  to	  the	  convention,	  are	  advanced	  western	  industrialised	  countries	  (specifically,	  those	   countries	   that	   were	   members	   of	   the	   OECD	   in	   1990	   when	   the	   negotiation	  process	   commenced)	   plus	   the	   formerly	   socialist	   countries	   of	   Central	   and	   Eastern	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  Europe	   (known	   to	   the	   convention	   as	   “countries	   with	   economies	   in	   transition	   to	   a	  market	  economy”(EIT	  countries)).	  
The	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  covers	  a	  certain	  limited	  list	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  (contained	  in	  its	  Annex	  A).	  Since	  carbon	  dioxide	  (CO2)	  is	  the	  most	  important	  one	  of	  these	  gases	  (the	  others	   being	   methane,	   nitrous	   oxide,	   hydrofluorocarbons,	   perfluorocarbons	   and	  sulphur	  hexafluoride)	  the	  emissions	  of	  these	  other	  gases	  are	  converted	  into	  “carbon	  dioxide	  equivalents”	  (CO2e)	  based	  on	  their	  “global	  warming	  potential.”	  For	  example,	  one	   ton	   of	   emissions	   of	   the	   hydrofluorocarbon	  HFC-­‐23	   equals	   11,700	   tons	   of	   CO2e	  since	  HFC-­‐23	   has	   11,700	   times	  more	   impact	   on	   the	   greenhouse	   effect	   as	   the	   same	  amount	  of	  CO2.	  The	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  also	  created	  a	  number	  of	  “flexibility	  mechanisms”	  to	   reach	   these	   emission	   reduction	   commitments,	   namely	   Emissions	   Trading	   (ET),	  Joint	   Implementation	   (JI)	   and	   the	  Clean	  Development	  Mechanism	  (CDM)	  which	  will	  be	  described	   in	  more	  detail	   later.	  Despite	   being	   adopted	  by	  COP3	   in	   late	  1997	   and	  signed	  by	  a	   large	  number	  of	  UNFCCC	  parties,	   it	   took	  over	  seven	  years	  for	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  to	  enter	  into	  force.	  This	  was	  due,	  first,	  to	  missing	  specifics	  about	  some	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  Protocol,	  such	  as	  the	  specific	  rules	  for	  accounting	  for	  emissions	  and	  carbon	   dioxide	   sequestration	   by	   forestry	   and	   agriculture,	   the	   process	   details	  governing	  elements	  of	  the	  Protocol	  such	  as	  the	  CDM	  and	  other	  flexibility	  mechanisms	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  process	  of	  negotiating	  and	  adopting	  these	  rules	  took	  another	  4	  years	  until	  COP7	  in	  Marrakesh	   in	  2001	  adopted	  the	  Marrakesh	  Accords,	  which	  contain	  all	  the	  specifics	  that	  were	  missing	  from	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  
The	  second	  reason	  for	  the	  long	  delay	  for	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  was	  the	  requirement	  that	  the	  protocol	  had	  to	  be	  ratified	  by	  enough	  Annex	  I	  parties	  to	  represent	   at	   least	   55%	  of	   the	   total	   emissions	   of	   Annex	   I	   parties	   in	   1990.	   After	   the	  Marrakesh	  Accords	  were	  adopted,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  signatories	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  ratified	   the	   Protocol	   within	   a	   few	   months’	   time.	   Crucially,	   however,	   the	   Russian	  Federation	   and	   the	   USA	   (among	   a	   few	   others)	   did	   not	   initially	   ratify	   the	   Protocol,	  making	  it	  impossible	  to	  reach	  the	  required	  55%.	  This	  threshold	  was	  exceeded	  by	  the	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  ratification	  by	  the	  Russian	  parliament	   in	  November	  2004,	   three	  years	  after	  COP7	  in	  Marrakesh,	  and	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  February	  200564.	  
4.2 UNFCCC	  Politics	  During	  the	  Fieldwork	  Phase	  
The	   fieldwork	   for	   this	   thesis	   took	  place	  during	   the	  period	   just	  before	   the	  2007	  Bali	  Climate	   Change	   Conference	   (COP13)	   up	   to	   and	   including	   the	   2009	   Copenhagen	  Climate	  Change	  Conference	   (COP15).	  The	  main	  objective	  of	   the	  negotiations	  during	  that	  period	  was	  to	  come	  to	  an	  agreement	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  international	  climate	  change	  regime	  after	  2012	  in	  which	  year	  the	  first	  commitment	  period	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  reduction	  commitments	  for	  industrialised	  countries	  (2008-­‐2012)	  under	  the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   would	   end.	   Media	   stories	   routinely	   (and	   incorrectly)	   reported	  2012	   as	   the	   year	   in	   which	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   would	   “expire”	   (for	   example,	   BBC	  Online	  2007).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  however,	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  does	  not	  include	  any	  expiration	  date	  and	  parties	  to	  the	  Protocol	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  bound	  by	   its	   provisions.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Protocol	   was	   explicitly	   negotiated	   with	   the	  expectation	  of	  a	  continuation	  for	  subsequent	  commitment	  periods.	  
The	  negotiations	  on	  the	  reduction	  targets	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	   the	  second	  com-­‐mitment	  period	   started	   in	  2005	   in	  Montreal,	  Quebec	  when	  COP1165	  established	   the	  Ad-­‐hoc	  Working	   Group	   on	   Further	   Commitments	   of	   Annex	   I	   Parties	   (AWG-­‐KP).	   In	  accordance	  with	  Art	  3.9	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  which	  stipulates	  that	  negotiations	  for	  the	  second	  commitment	  period	  should	  be	   initiated	  at	   least	   seven	  years	  prior	   to	   the	  end	  of	  the	  first,	  the	  AWG-­‐KP	  was	  tasked	  with	  negotiating	  the	  targets	  and	  modalities66	  for	   Annex	   I	   countries	   for	   the	   second	   commitment	   period	   from	   2012.	   COP11	   also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  	   Meanwhile,	   like	   the	  Convention	   itself,	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  has	   achieved	  near	  universal	  member-­‐ship,	  with	  –	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  –	  the	  notable	  exception	  of	  the	  USA	  (which	  also	  have	  repeatedly	  and	  under	  different	  administrations	  reaffirmed	  their	  position	  to	  never	  ratify	  and	  remain	  the	  only	  signatory	  to	  the	  protocol	  not	  having	  done	  so)	  as	  well	  as	  Afghanistan	  and	  Andorra.	  65	   More	   precisely,	   it	   was	   CMP1	   –	   CMP	   stands	   for	   “Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   of	   the	   Convention	  serving	  as	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol”	  –,	  which	  is	  meeting	  in	  parallel	  to	  the	  COP	  since	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  66	   It	  is	  not	  consensus	  among	  the	  parties	  whether	  anything	  else	  but	  the	  quantitative	  targets	  is	  within	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  AWG-­‐KP,	  i.e.	  whether	  the	  modalities	  are	  also	  to	  be	  negotiated	  within	  the	  group.	  Most	   vocally,	   China	   has	   denied	   this	   interpretation	   while	   Annex	   I	   countries	   have	   insisted	   that	  additional	   areas	   (most	   importantly	   the	  means	   of	   reaching	   these	   targets,	   e.g.	   new	  and	   improved	  flexibility	  mechanisms	  and	  altered	  rules	  for	  forestry	  and	  agriculture)	  are	  part	  of	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  group.	  Despite	  the	  differences,	  the	  group	  has	  discussed	  a	  variety	  of	  topics	  that	  went	  beyond	  the	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  its	  mandate.	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  established	  the	  “Dialogue	  on	  long-­‐term	  cooperative	  action	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  by	  enhancing	  implementation	  of	  the	  Convention,”	  an	  informal	  platform	  for	  countries	  to	   share	   views	   and	   exchange	   experiences	   and	   ideas	   on	   how,	   besides	   a	   second	  commitment	  period	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	   the	   international	  response	  to	  climate	  change	  could	  be	  further	  advanced	  in	  the	  future.	  
The	  Dialogue	  had	  its	  last	  session	  at	  the	  first	  UNFCCC	  meeting	  attended	  during	  the	  fieldwork,	   in	   August	   2007	   in	   Vienna	   and	   was	   subsequently	   upgraded	   to	   a	   formal	  negotiation	   body,	   the	   Ad-­‐hoc	   Working	   Group	   on	   Long-­‐Term	   Cooperative	   Action	  (AWG-­‐LCA),	   at	   the	   2007	  Bali	   Climate	   Change	   Conference	   (see	   also	   figure	   2	   below).	  Both	  the	  Dialogue	  and	  the	  AWG-­‐LCA	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  important	  negotiation	  spaces	  for	  the	  development	  of	   the	  overall	  post-­‐2012	  climate	  regime	  since	  they	  allowed	  for	   the	  conversation	  on	   the	   role	   of	   the	  USA	   in	   a	   future	   climate	   change	   response	   as	  well	   as	  opening	   up	   a	   space	   to	   talk	   about	   possible	   increased	   contributions	   toward	   climate	  change	  mitigation	  by	  so	  called	  emerging	  economies	  such	  as	  China,	  India,	  et	  al67.	  
After	  a	  failed	  COP12	  in	  2006	  in	  Nairobi	  (the	  Nairobi	  COP	  has	  typically	  been	  char-­‐acterised	   as	  mere	   “talking	   about	   talks,”	   Bals	   2007:	   11),	   climate	   change	   enjoyed	   an	  increased	   level	   of	   public	   concern	   following	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   IPCC	   Fourth	  Assessment	  Report	  (AR4)	  in	  spring	  2007,	  which	  laid	  out	  in	  detail	  the	  likely	  effects	  of	  unmitigated	   climate	   change	   as	  well	   as	   the	  magnitude	  of	   a	   response	   to	   the	  problem	  required	  to	  avoid	  these	  effects.	  The	  joint	  award	  of	  the	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  to	  the	  IPCC	  and	   Al	   Gore68	  and	   widely	   publicised	   events	   such	   as	   the	   “LiveEarth”	   international	  series	  of	  pop	  concerts	  on	  July	  7th,	  2007	  further	  helped	  to	  raise	  the	  profile	  of	  climate	  change	   on	   the	   public	   agenda.	   In	   addition,	   the	   UN	   General	   Assembly’s	   (UNGA)	   first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	   Both,	  the	  USA	  and	  all	  developing	  countries,	  are	  –	  albeit	  for	  very	  different	  reasons	  –	  not	  required	  by	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  to	  implement	  emission	  reductions	  targets	  and,	  consequently,	  any	  outcome	  of	  the	  AWG-­‐KP	  regarding	  the	  second	  commitment	  period	  of	  the	  Protocol	  would	  not	  apply	  to	  these	  countries.	  For	   the	   USA,	   the	   reason	   is	   its	   non-­‐ratification	   of	   the	   Protocol	   (and	   its	   insistence,	   under	   both	  republican	  and	  democratic	  administrations,	   that	   it	  will	  never	  do	  so)	  while	  developing	  countries	  enjoy	   this	  status	  due	   to	   the	  Protocol’s	   implementation	  of	   the	  Convention’s	  principle	  of	  common	  but	  differentiated	  responsibilities	  and	  respective	  capabilities	   (CBDRRC),	  which	  would	  remain	   in	  place	  during	  subsequent	  commitment	  periods	  of	  the	  Protocol	  as	  well.	  68	  	   The	  prize	  was	  awarded	  to	  the	  IPCC	  since	  it	  “has	  laid	  the	  scientific	  foundations	  for	  our	  knowledge	  about	  climate	  change,”	  not	   least	  by	  publishing	   the	  AR4	   in	   the	  year	   in	  which	   it	  was	  awarded	  the	  price,	  while	   Gore	  was	   “in	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	  Norwegian	  Nobel	   Committee	   the	   single	   individual	  who	   has	   done	  most	   to	   prepare	   the	   ground	   for	   the	   political	   action	   that	   is	   needed	   to	   counteract	  climate	  change”	  (The	  Nobel	  Foundation	  2007),	  especially	  for	  his	  book,	  film	  and	  associated	  speak-­‐ing	  series	  “An	  Inconvenient	  Truth”	  (Gore	  2006).	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  ever	   session	   devoted	   exclusively	   to	   climate	   change	   was	   held	   in	   July/August	   2007,	  which	   further	   helped	   raise	   the	   profile	   of	   the	   issue	   with	   numerous	   states	   making	  political	   commitments	   to	   take	   decisive	   steps	   to	   address	   the	   issue.	   Benefitting	   from	  that	   increased	   level	   of	   public	   attention	   and	   support	   as	  well	   as	   the	   strong	   and	   clear	  message	   of	   the	   UNGA,	   COP13	   in	   Bali	   in	   December	   2007	   resulted	   in	   an	   important	  outcome,	  the	  Bali	  Road	  Map	  and,	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  Road	  Map,	  the	  Bali	  Action	  Plan	  (BAP),	   a	   comprehensive	   mandate	   to	   advance	   negotiations	   towards	   a	   post-­‐2012	  climate	  regime	  to	  be	  completed	  by	  COP15	  in	  Copenhagen	  in	  200969.	  The	  Bali	  Action	  Plan	  also	  specified	  some	  of	  the	  guiding	  principles	  of	  these	  negotiations.	  For	  example,	  in	  referring	  to	  the	  IPCC’s	  AR4,	  it	  suggested	  that	  the	  range	  of	  25%	  to	  40%	  of	  emission	  reductions	  by	  2020,	  compared	  to	  1990	  levels,	  should	  be	  considered	  for	  Annex	  I	  in	  the	  negotiations	   of	   the	   AWG-­‐KP	   (Bals	   2008;	   for	   a	   more	   detailed	   discussion	   of	   the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Bali	  conference	  including	  assessments	  of	  the	  outcome	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  negotiations	  between	  Bali	  and	  Copenhagen,	  c.f.,	  for	  example,	  Ott	  et	  al.	  2008).	  
The	  BAP,	  in	  its	  Article	  1.b,	  also	  outlines	  the	  principles	  for	  the	  negotiations	  under	  the	   AWG-­‐LCA	   –	   the	   negotiation	   space	   for,	   inter	   alia,	   the	   contributions	   to	   climate	  change	  mitigation	  by	  the	  USA	  and	  developing	  countries.	  Against	  strong	  objections	  by	  the	   USA,	   the	   BAP	   anticipates	   for	   the	   USA70	  mitigation	   commitments	   of	   a	   similar	  nature	   to	   those	   of	   the	   other	   Annex	   I	   countries:	   the	   phrase	   “quantified	   emission	  limitation	  and	  reduction	  objective”	  (QELRO)	  is	  used,	  which	  generally	  refers	  to	  Kyoto-­‐style	   commitments,	   and	   the	   text	   also	   stipulates	   that	   the	   US	   contributions	   have	   to	  “ensure	   the	   comparability	  of	   efforts	   among	   [Annex	   I	  parties]”	   (UNFCCC	  2007b:	  Art.	  1.b.i).	  These	  strong	  objections	  were	  only	  dropped	  after	  UN	  Secretary	  General	  Ban	  Ki-­‐Moon	   flew	   in	   from	  nearby	  East	  Timor	   to	  remind	  delegates	   in	  a	  very	  stern	  and	  very	  brief	  speech	  (Ban	  2007)	  of	  the	  political	  commitments	  their	  governments	  had	  made	  a	  few	  months	  prior	  at	  the	  UN	  GA	  and	  after	  the	  US	  were	  famously	  told	  by	  the	  delegate	  from	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	  to	  “get	  out	  of	  the	  way”	   if	   they	  refused	  to	   lead	  (or	  even	  just	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	   The	  2009	  deadline	  for	  negotiations	  was	  seen	  as	  important	  to	  avoid	  a	  “gap”	  between	  commitment	  periods.	  It	  was	  generally	  accepted	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  post-­‐2012	  policy	  package	  was	  required	  to	  give	  parties	  enough	  time	  to	  ratify	  that	  package	  so	  it	  could	  enter	  into	  force	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  commitment	  period	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  in	  2012.	  70	   Or	   rather,	   in	   the	   actual	   text	   of	   the	   BAP,	   for	   “all	   developed	   country	   Parties”.	   However,	   since	   all	  other	   developed	   countries	   have	   ratified	   the	   much	   more	   stringent	   and	   legally	   binding	   Kyoto	  Protocol,	  this	  phrase	  is	  generally	  seen	  to	  be	  the	  “placeholder”	  for	  the	  USA	  which	  was	  expected	  to	  engage	  more	  fully	  in	  the	  negotiations	  after	  an	  anticipated	  change	  in	  administrations	  following	  the	  November	  2008	  presidential	  elections	  in	  that	  country.	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  follow)	   in	   the	  matter.	  Developing	   countries,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   agreed	   to	  negotiate	  their	  own	  actions	  of	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  for	  the	  post-­‐2012	  period,	  thus	  making	  a	  large	  good-­‐faith	  gesture	  toward	  developed	  country	  parties	  by	  agreeing	  to	  open	  up	  for	   negotiation	   the	   important	   distinction	   between	   Annex	   I	   countries	   that	   were	  expected	   to	   perform	   mitigation	   actions	   and	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries	   that	   were,	   in	  recognition	   of	   the	   CBDRRC	   principle	   and	   their	   acknowledged	   preoccupation	   with	  poverty	   eradication,	   not	   required	   to	   do	   so.	   The	   BAP	   also	   stipulates	   that	   these	  mitigation	  actions	  by	  developing	  countries	  could	  expect	  to	  be	  “supported	  and	  enabled	  by	   technology,	   financing	   and	   capacity-­‐building”	   (UNFCCC	   2007b:	   Art.	   1.b.ii)	   by	  developed	   countries,	   thus	   expressing	   the	   willingness	   of	   developed	   countries	   to	  provide	   and	   the	   expectation	   of	   developing	   countries	   to	   receive	   in	   exchange	   for	  enhanced	  mitigation	  action,	   financial,	   technological	  and	  capacity-­‐building	  assistance	  to	  achieve	  this	  mitigation.	  
The	   third	  main	   component	   of	   the	  BAP	  was	   the	   launch	   of	   a	   negotiation	  process	  aiming	   at	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   comprehensive	   REDD	   regime	   (Reduction	   of	   Emissions	  from	   Deforestation	   and	   Forest	   Degradation)	   under	   the	   UNFCCC	   by	   COP15	   in	  Copenhagen	   in	   2009.	   These	   negotiations	   were	   also	   tasked	   with	   resolving	   all	  associated	  issues	  such	  as	  financing,	  accounting,	  or	  verifiability	  of	  such	  a	  regime.	  This	  step	  recognised	  the	  large	  role	  that	  tropical	  deforestation	  and	  forest	  degradation	  play	  in	  respect	   to	  climate	  change71	  and	  was	   taking	   toward	   the	  deliberations	  on	   the	   topic	  that	   were	   already	   launched	   at	   COP11	   in	  Montreal	   to	   the	   next	   level.	   In	   addition	   to	  these	  three	  main	  streams,	  the	  Bali	  Road	  Map	  also	  mandated	  negotiations	  on	  a	  number	  of	  related	  themes	  such	  as	   financing,	   technology	  transfer,	  and	  the	  role	  of	   Intellectual	  Property	  Rights.	  
In	   order	   to	   achieve	   this	   ambitious	   work	   programme,	   the	   number	   of	   UNFCCC	  sessions	  was	   significantly	   increased	   for	   this	   two-­‐year	   period,	  with	   four	   (instead	   of	  regularly	   two	   per	   year)	   sessions	   taking	   place	   in	   2008	   and	   five	   sessions	   in	   2009.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	   Nearly	  20%	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	   from	  human	  sources	  are	  due	   to	   tropical	  deforestation	  and	   forest	   degradation	   (Parker	   et	   al.	   2008).	   The	   distinction	   between	   deforestation	   and	   forest	  degradation	   is	   one	   of	   degree:	   forest	   degradation	   describes	   the	   process	   in	  which	   natural	   forest	  loses	  some,	  but	  not	  all,	  of	  its	  tree	  cover	  (depending	  on	  the	  specific	  definition,	  at	  least	  10%-­‐30%	  of	  an	  area	  has	  to	  be	  tree	  covered	  to	  still	  be	  considered	  a	  forest),	  for	  example	  due	  selective	  logging.	  Deforestation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  describes	  the	  process	  of	  conversion	  of	  forested	  to	  non-­‐forested	  land	  (i.e.	  no	  tree	  cover	  or	   less	  than	  10%)	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  the	  extreme	  case	  of	  forest	  degradation.	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  Fieldwork	   followed	  most	  of	   these	  sessions	   in	  2008	  and	  a	  number	  of	   the	  sessions	   in	  2009,	  as	  already	  detailed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  (also	  cf.	  table	  1).	  The	  last	  UNFCCC	  session	   that	   I	   attended	   as	   part	   of	   this	   fieldwork	   was	   COP15	   in	   Copenhagen	   in	  December	  2009,	  which	  was	  expected	   to	   complete	   the	  work	  programme	  of	  both	   the	  AWG-­‐KP	  and	  AWG-­‐LCA	  –	  but	  famously	  failed	  to	  do	  so	  –,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  compre-­‐hensive	  agreement	  that	  would	  establish	  the	  climate	  regime	  for	  the	  post-­‐2012	  period.	  
Figure	  2:	  Negotiation	  Streams	  Related	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  Over	  Time	  (1990-­‐2010)	  INC	   	   	   	   COP	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   CMP	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   SBSTA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   SBI	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   AGBM	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   AG13	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   AGW-­‐KP	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Dialogue	   AWG-­‐LCA	  90	   91	   92	   93	   94	   95	   96	   97	   98	   99	   00	   01	   02	   03	   04	   05	   06	   07	   08	   09	   10	  	   	   ↑	  UNFCCC	  adopted	   ↑	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  adopted	   ↑	   Kyoto	  Protocol	  entry	  	  into	  force	  	   	   	   	   ↑	  UNFCCC	  entry	  into	  force	   ↑	   Marrakesh	  Accords	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Notes:	   INC=Intergovernmental	   Negotiating	   Committee	   for	   a	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change,	  COP=Conference	  of	   the	  Parties	   (of	   the	  UNFCCC),	   CMP=Conference	  of	   the	  Parties	   Serving	   as	   the	  Meeting	   of	   the	  Parties	   of	   the	   Protocol,	   SBSTA=Subsidiary	   Body	   on	   Scientific	   and	   Technical	   Advice,	   SBI-­‐Subsidiary	   Body	   on	  Implementation,	  AGBM=Ad-­‐Hoc	  Group	  on	  the	  Berlin	  Mandate,	  AG13=Ad-­‐Hoc	  Group	  on	  Article	  13,	  AWG-­‐KP=Ad-­‐Hoc	  Working	  Group	  on	  Further	  Commitments	   of	  Annex	   I	   Parties	   under	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  AWG-­‐LCA=Ad-­‐Hoc	  Working	  Group	  on	  Long	  Term	  Cooperative	  Action	  under	  the	  Convention	  	  Since	  its	  creation,	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  and	  the	  negotiations	  of	  its	  bodies	  have	  quickly	  increased	  both	  in	  scope	  and	  complexity.	  Therefore,	  most	  party	  and	  NGO	  delegations	  as	  well	  as	  party	  groupings	  have	  developed	  a	  system	  of	  separation	  of	  labour	  wherein	  certain	  groups	  or	  individuals	  would	  follow	  and	  specialise	  in	  specific	  areas	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime,	  including	  creating	  closer	  relationships	  with	  the	  experts	  in	  the	  same	  area	  of	  other	  parties,	  NGOs	  etc.	  This	  system,	  however,	  presents	  a	  major	  problem	  to	  delegations	   of	   poorer	   countries,	   which	   often	   only	   comprise	   very	   few	   members	   or	  even	   just	  a	  single	  person.	  The	  UNFCCC	  covers	  participation	  of	  only	  two	  or	  three	  (in	  the	   case	   of	   least	   developed	   countries	   and	   small	   island	   states)	   delegates	   from	  developing	   countries.	   In	   addition	   to	   having	   to	   cover	   the	   entire	   spectrum	   of	   issues	  related	  to	   the	  UNFCCC,	  climate	  change	  often	  only	  represents	  one	  part	  of	   the	  overall	  responsibilities	  of	   these	   individuals	   thus	  making	   it	  even	  harder	   to	  effectively	   follow	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  and	   engage	   in	   the	   negotiations	   (conversation	   with	   delegate	   of	   the	   government	   of	  Afghanistan,	  field	  note,	  Bangkok,	  3	  Apr	  2008,	  c.f.	  also	  Lohmann	  2006:	  50).	  
These	   specific	   areas	   are	   also	   often	   more	   formally	   reflected	   as	   they	   map	   onto	  individual	   agenda	   items	   of	   the	   official	   negotiation	   agenda	   and	   formal	   negotiation	  groups	  such	  as	  contact	  groups.	  As	  an	  example,	  CAN-­‐I	  has	  issue	  based	  working	  groups	  in	   REDD,	   Annex	   I	   LULUCF	   (which	   mainly	   deals	   with	   forestry	   in	   industrialised	  countries),	   technology,	   finance,	   flexible	   mechanisms,	   bunker	   fuel	   emissions	   (emis-­‐sions	   from	   international	   shipping	   and	   air	   traffic),	   legal	   matters,	   mitigation	   and	  adaptation.	  Similar	  working	  groups	  exist	  in	  other	  NGO	  groupings	  like	  Climate	  Justice	  Now!	  or	  within	  party	  delegations	  and	  party	  groupings,	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  or	  the	  “G77	  and	  China”	  (see	  also	  sections	  “Parties”	  and	  “Observer	  Organisations,”	  respectively,	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter).	  
Due	   to	   this	   high	   complexity	   and	   wide	   scope	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations,	   the	  context	   of	   my	   fieldwork	   had	   to	   be	   limited	   as	   well	   and	   thus	   was	   mainly	   focussing	  around	   issues	   relating	   to	   carbon	   market	   instruments,	   or	   “flexible	   mechanisms,”	  (while	  also	  maintaining	  a	  general	  sense	  for	  the	  “bigger	  picture”	  of	  the	  negotiations).	  Thus,	  it	  is	  prudent	  to	  provide	  a	  brief	  overview	  over	  this	  specific	  area	  within	  the	  wider	  UNFCCC	  negotiations.	  
4.3 The	  Carbon	  Market	  Instruments	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  Regime	  
Carbon	  market	   instruments	  were	   introduced	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   regime	  mainly	   by	   the	  initiative	  of	  the	  USA	  during	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  The	  USA	  has	  had	  some	  prior	  success	  using	  emissions	  trading	  approaches	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  its	  national	  sulphur	  dioxide	  emissions	  in	  the	  1990s	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  acid	  rain	  and	  was	  therefore	   suggesting	   a	   similar	   approach	   to	   reduce	   GHG	   emissions	   in	   all	   developed	  countries.	  Despite	  initial	  strong	  objections	  by	  most	  developing	  countries,	  the	  EU	  and	  most	  ENGOs,	  trading	  became	  a	  central	  component	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  and	  many	  of	  the	   past	   objectors	   became	   strong	   supporters	   of	   the	   concept,	   for	   example	   the	   EU	  consequently	   established	   the	   world’s	   largest	   marketplace	   for	   greenhouse	   gas	  emissions	   trading,	   the	   EU	   Emissions	   Trading	   Scheme	   (EU	   ETS).	   As	  mentioned,	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	   obligates	  developed	   countries	   to	   collectively	   reduce	   their	   emissions	  by	  an	  average	  of	  5.2%	  in	  the	  period	  2008-­‐2012	  compared	  to	  their	  1990	  levels.	  Three	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  different	   forms	   of	   emissions	   trading	   were	   included	   in	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   to	   allow	  countries	   some	   flexibility	   in	   reaching	   these	   reduction	   targets	   –	   they	   are	   therefore	  called	  Flexible	  Mechanisms	  or	  Flexibility	  Mechanisms	  –	  instead	  of	  having	  to	  carry	  out	  all	  of	  the	  mandated	  reduction	  in	  their	  own	  country.	  
The	  basic	  assumption	  which	  underlies	  any	  such	  trading	  lies	  within	  the	  observa-­‐tion	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  on	  the	  climate	  system	  is	  largely	  independent	  of	   the	   location	   where	   the	   gases	   are	   emitted	   and,	   therefore,	   the	   location	   where	  emission	   reductions	   are	   implemented	   does	   not	   carry	  much	   significance	   either.	   For	  that	   reason	   Annex	   I	   countries	   can	   use	   flexible	  mechanisms	   to	   fulfil	   their	   reduction	  obligations	   in	   addition	   to	   domestic	   reductions	   in	   their	   own	   country	   through	   i)	  emissions	   trading	   (ET),	   ii)	   joint	   implementation	   (JI)	   of	   reduction	   projects	   or	   iii)	  projects	   under	   the	   Clean	  Development	  Mechanism	   (CDM).	   One	   of	   the	   stated	   objec-­‐tives	   of	   these	   flexible	   mechanisms	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   emission	   reductions	   are	   first	  carried	  out	  where	  they	  can	  be	  realised	  in	  the	  most	  cost	  effective	  and	  easiest	  manner.	  In	  all	  three	  cases	  the	  means	  to	  achieve	  this	  is	  the	  issuance	  of	  emission	  certificates	  that	  can	  then	  be	  traded.	  Each	  of	  these	  certificates	  entitles	  the	  holder	  to	  emit	  one	  tonne	  of	  carbon	   dioxide	   equivalents72and	   thus	   emitters	   in	   Annex	   I	   countries	   can	   decide–	  dependent	  on	   the	  current	  market	  value	  of	   these	  emission	  certificates	  –	   if	   it	   is	  more	  economical	  to	  reduce	  their	  emissions	  themselves	  or	  buy	  the	  emission	  rights	  needed	  to	  meet	   their	   legal	   emissions	   reduction	   or	   limitation	   obligations	   (or,	   in	   fact,	   overa-­‐chieve	  with	   respect	   to	   their	   emission	   reduction	   obligations	   and	   subsequently	   have	  spare	  emission	  certificates	  for	  sale	  on	  the	  market).	  
Apart	  from	  this	  shared	  feature	  of	  issuance	  and	  trading	  of	  emission	  certificates	  for	  the	   purpose	   of	   compliance	   with	   Kyoto	   obligations,	   emissions	   trading	   and	   JI	   differ	  from	   the	  CDM	  mainly	   in	   the	  origin	  of	   the	   certificates	   traded:	  unlike	   their	   JI	   and	  ET	  equivalents	  (where	  both	  trading	  partners	  are	  developed	  countries),	  CDM	  certificates	  originate	  from	  CDM	  projects	  in	  developing	  countries	  (in	  CDM	  context	  “host	  countries’)	  which	   are	   not	   listed	   in	   Annex	   I	   of	   the	   convention	   and	   are,	   thus,	   not	   subject	   to	  emission	   limitations	   themselves.	   From	   this	   follows	   the	   necessity	   that	   all	   emission	  certificates	  that	  are	  generated	  through	  CDM	  projects	  must	  represent	  actual	  emission	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	   For	  the	  concept	  of	  “carbon	  dioxide	  equivalents”	  see	  the	  glossary	  or	  the	  section	  on	  the	  history	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  regime	  above.	  
4.	  Contextualising	  ENGO	  Participation	  in	  the	  UN	  Climate	  Change	  Regime	   149	  	  reductions	  that	  would	  not	  have	  happened	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  CDM	  project	  activity.	  In	   CDM	   terms	   these	   projects	   would	   be	   “additional,”	   or	   feature	   “additionality.”	   The	  accurate	   assessment	   of	   this	   additionality	   as	   well	   as	   the	   amount	   of	   the	   additional	  emission	  savings	   is	  crucial	   for	   the	  CDM	  projects	   if	   they	  are	   to	  really	  contribute	   to	  a	  reduction	   of	   global	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   reduction	  obligations	   of	   the	   industrialised	   countries.	   Since	   every	   CDM	   certificate	   (called	  Certified	  Emission	  Reduction,	  or	  CER)	  entitles	  the	  holder	  to	  emit	  one	  tonne	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	   equivalents,	   each	   non-­‐additional	   certificate	   would	   result	   in	   one	   tonne	   not	  saved	  in	  industrialised	  countries	  and	  therefore	  each	  misjudgement	  of	  the	  additionali-­‐ty	   of	   CDM	   projects	   would	   lead	   to	   an	   actual	   increase	   in	   global	   greenhouse	   gas	  emissions	   (for	   more	   thorough	   discussions	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   additionality	   see,	   for	  example,	  McCully	  2008;	  Schneider	  2007;	  Wara	  and	  Victor	  2008).	  
The	  CDM	  has	  not	  only	  been	  set	  up	  to	  facilitate	  the	  inclusion	  of	  developing	  coun-­‐tries	   in	   the	   carbon	   market	   and	   to	   achieve	   the	   goal	   of	   reducing	   the	   level	   of	   global	  emissions	  of	   greenhouse	   gases	  but	   also	  has	   the	   explicit	   goal	   (UNFCCC	  1997:	  11)	   of	  contributing	   to	   sustainable	   and	   low-­‐emission	   economic	   development	   in	   the	   host	  countries	  by	  encouraging	   investment	   in	  sustainable	  development	  projects.	  Emission	  reduction	  and	  sustainable	  development	  are	  therefore	  often	  called	  the	  “twin	  objectives’	  of	   the	   CDM.	   Article	   12.2	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   mentions	   sustainable	   development	  even	   before	   the	   CDM's	   objective	   to	   function	   as	   an	   emission	   offset	   for	   developed	  countries	  and	  the	  name	  of	  the	  mechanism	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  development	  aspect	  is	   supposed	   to	   play	   an	   important	   role.	   However,	   there	   is	   no	   generally	   applied	  definition	   of	   “sustainable	   development’	   in	   the	   CDM;	   rather	   the	   host	   country	   is	  charged	   to	   assess	  whether	   a	   given	   project	   contributes	   to	   sustainable	   development.	  Through	   its	   general	   design	   the	   CDM	   can	   even	   in	   the	   best	   case	   (if,	   and	   only	   if,	   the	  emission	  reductions	  of	   the	  CDM	  project	  are	   indeed	  additional)	  only	  compensate	   for	  the	  emissions	   from	   industrialised	  countries	  without	  providing	  an	  additional	  benefit	  for	   the	   climate.	  The	   South	  Korean	   climate	  negotiator	  Chung	  maintains	   that	   for	   that	  reason	   the	   “CDM	   is	   an	   ‘emission	   shifting’	   mechanism,	   not	   an	   ‘emission	   reduction’	  mechanism”(Chung	  2007:	  172).	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4.4 Developments	  in	  Carbon	  Markets	  During	  the	  Fieldwork	  Phase	  
During	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	  carbon	  market	  related	  issues	  were	  taken	  up	  in	  a	  variety	  of	   UNFCCC	   bodies	   and	   agenda	   items.	   Similar	   to	  most	   other	   policy	   areas	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  period,	  carbon	  market	  instruments	  were	  considered	  as	  part	   of	   the	   emerging	   post-­‐2012	   climate	   but	   there	  was	   also	   on-­‐going	   negotiation	   of	  outstanding	  issues	  relevant	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  flexible	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  in	  its	  first	  commitment	  period.	  
In	  this	   latter	  category,	  SBSTA	  –	  the	  Subsidiary	  Body	  for	  Scientific	  and	  Technical	  Advice,	   one	   of	   the	   subsidiary	   bodies	   established	   under	   the	   COP	   –	   continued	   to	  consider	  proposals	   for	   inclusion	  of	   several	   controversial	  new	  project	   types	   (specifi-­‐cally	   nuclear	   power	   generation	   and	   CCS73	  as	   well	   as	   HFC23	   destruction	   from	   new	  plants74)	  as	  eligible	  CDM	  project	  types,	  which	  have	  been	  agenda	  items	  on	  the	  SBSTA	  agenda	   for	  many	  years,	   being	   carried	  over	   from	  one	   session	   to	   the	  next	  due	   to	   the	  Parties’	  inability	  to	  reach	  consensus	  on	  these	  issues.	  Further,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  a	  standing	  agenda	   item	  of	   the	  CMP	  agenda	   is	  called	  “issues	  relating	   to	   the	  clean	  development	  mechanism”	  (e.g.,	  UNFCCC	  2010a)	  under	  which	  the	  report	  of	  the	  CDM	  Executive	  Board	  (CDM	  EB)	  –	  the	  body	  responsible	  for	  the	  day	  to	  day	  implemen-­‐tation	  and	  decision	  making	  regarding	  the	  CDM	  –	  is	  considered	  and	  typically	  “further	  guidance”	   to	   the	   Executive	   Board	   provided.	   Such	   “further	   guidance”	   generally	  instructs	   the	   Board	   on	   areas	   like	   establishment	   of	   policies	   regarding	   conflict	   of	  interests	  of	  board	  members,	   requests	   for	   review	  of	   certain	  CDM	  methodologies	  etc.	  During	  the	  period	  covered,	  at	  CMP4	  in	  Poznań,	  parties	  also	  used	  this	  agenda	  item	  to	  introduce	   a	   new	   controversial	   project	   type	   –	   Forests	   in	   Exhaustion75	  –	   which	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	   CCS	  is	  short	  for	  Carbon	  Capture	  and	  Storage,	  an	  acronym	  that	  refers	  to	  procedures	  to	  capture	  the	  carbon	   dioxide	   that	   is	   released	   in	   the	   process	   of	   burning	   fossil	   fuels	   and	   is	   then	   pumped	   into	  geological	   storage	   formations	  underground	  or	  under	   the	  sea	  bed.	  These	  procedures	  are	  contro-­‐versial	  since	  (among	  other	  reasons)	  the	  technical	  feasibility	  and	  safety	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  demon-­‐strated	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	  74	   The	  destruction	  of	  the	  very	  potent	  greenhouse	  gas	  HFC23,	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  production	  of	  the	  refrigerant	  HCFC22,	  in	  existing	  facilities	  is	  eligible	  for	  the	  CDM	  –	  in	  fact	  it	  represents	  the	  majority	  of	  emission	  reductions	  implemented	  through	  the	  CDM	  (cf.	  Holz	  2010).	  However,	  the	  eligibility	  of	  the	   destruction	   of	   HFC23	   in	   new	  HCFC22	   production	   facilities,	   i.e.	   those	   that	   were	   established	  after	   the	  cut-­‐off	  year	  2000,	   is	  controversial	   since	   the	   large	  profits	   that	   this	  specific	  project	   type	  promises	   is	   said	   to	   create	  perverse	   incentives	   to	   increase	  HCFC22	  production	   (and	   thus	  HFC23	  pollution)	  artificially	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  then	  earn	  by	  abating	  that	  pollution	  (CDM	  Watch	  2010;	  Forelle	  2008;	  Gronewold	  2009;	  Wara	  and	  Victor	  2008).	  75	  	   See	  footnote	  101,	  on	  page	  185	  in	  chapter	  5	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  this	  concept.	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  later	  at	  CMP5	  in	  Copenhagen	  referred	  to	  SBSTA	  and	  thus	  probably	  added	  to	  the	  list	  of	  CDM	   related	   items	   that	   are	   forwarded	   from	   one	   session	   to	   the	   next	   due	   to	   lack	   of	  agreement76.	  	  
Further,	  Article	   9	   of	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  mandates	   the	  COP	   to	   review,	   based	  on	  “the	  best	  available	  scientific	   information	  and	  assessments	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  its	  impacts,	   as	   well	   as	   relevant	   technical,	   social	   and	   economic	   information”	   (UNFCCC	  1997:	  Art	   9)	  whether	   the	  Protocol	   is	   still	   sufficient	   to	   fulfil	   its	   purpose	   or	  whether	  additional	  actions	  or	  amendments	  have	  to	  be	  undertaken.	  During	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	  the	  second	  such	  “Article	  9	  Review”	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  was	  initiated	  at	  CMP3	  in	  Bali,	  carried	  out	  throughout	  2009	  and	  concluded	  without	  agreement	  on	  actions	  to	  be	  taken,	  despite	  very	  emotional	  interventions	  from	  many	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  closing	  plenary	  of	  CMP4	  in	  Poznań.	  The	  Article	  9	  Review	  included	  several	  elements	  related	  to	  flexible	  mechanisms	  including	  improvement	  of	  the	  regional	  distribution	  of	  the	  Clean	  Development	  Mechanism77	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  “Share	  of	  Proceeds”	  to	  ET	  and	  JI.	  The	   “Share	  of	  Proceeds”	   is	   the	  main	   funding	   source	  of	   the	  Adaptation	  Fund,	   a	   fund	  established	   under	   the	   UNFCCC	   tasked	   with	   “assist[ing]	   developing	   country	   Parties	  that	  are	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  adverse	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  to	  meet	  the	  costs	  of	  adaptation”	  (UNFCCC	  2006b:	  1).	  The	  “Share	  of	  Proceeds”	  on	  the	  CDM,	  is	  a	  2%	  levy	   on	   most	   CDM	   transactions,	   and	   during	   the	   review	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	  developing	  countries	  unsuccessfully	  sought	   to	  extend	  this	  arrangement	   to	   the	  other	  flexibility	  mechanisms,	  Emissions	  Trading	  and	  Joint	  Implementation.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  areas,	  the	  main	  conversation	  regarding	  flexible	  mechanisms	  was	  related	  to	  the	  emerging	  post-­‐2012	  climate	  regime.	  Here,	  discussion	  mainly	  took	  place	   under	   the	   AWG-­‐KP	   agenda	   item	   of	   “analysis	   of	   means	   to	   reach	   emission	  reduction	   targets”	  of	  developed	  countries.	  Flexible	  mechanisms	  are	   included	   in	   this	  agenda	   item	   since	   they	   are,	   besides	   domestic	   emission	   reduction,	   among	   the	  main	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	   There	   is	   some	   indication,	   however,	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   Forests	   in	   Exhaustion	   (FiE)	   as	   a	  project	  type	  might	  have	  been	  a	  strategic	  step	  in	  order	  to	  break	  the	  dead	  lock	  of	  the	  discussion	  on	  some	  of	  the	  new	  project	  types	  in	  SBSTA	  since	  the	  main	  proponents	  of	  FiE	  have	  traditionally	  been	  the	  main	  opponents	  of	  CCS	  in	  CDM	  and	  vice	  versa.	  This	  first	  became	  evident	  when	  these	  two	  items	  were	   linked	   by	   putting	   them	   in	   the	   same	   paragraph	   of	   draft	   text	   and	  within	   the	   same	   bracket	  within	  that	  paragraph	  (field	  note,	  Poznań,	  3	  Dec	  2009).	  77	   75%	  of	   all	   registered	  CDM	  projects	   are	   situated	   in	   just	   four	   countries	   -­‐	   China,	   India,	  Brazil	   and	  Mexico	  –	  while	  in	  contrast	  only	  1.5%	  are	  registered	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (80%	  of	  which	  in	  South	  Africa)	  (Holz	  2010),	  thus	  effectively	  excluding	  these	  countries	  from	  the	  carbon	  market	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	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  ways	  of	  complying	  with	  emission	  reduction	  or	   limitation	  targets.	  Under	  this	  agenda	  item,	  many	  parties	  sought	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  flexible	  mechanisms,	  particular-­‐ly	  those	  mechanisms	  that	  generate	  offset	  credits	  from	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries.	  In	  that	  context,	   parties	   tabled	   a	   large	   number	   of	   proposals	   during	   the	   initial	   negotiation	  rounds	   of	   the	   AWG-­‐KP,	   including,	   for	   example,	   proposals	   to	   generate	   credits	   from	  “sectoral	  approaches”	  or	  multi-­‐project	  baselines78.	  Negotiations	  under	  this	  item	  also	  included	   some	   measures	   to	   improve	   the	   “environmental	   integrity”	   of	   the	   flexible	  mechanisms,	  for	  example	  by	  discounting	  credits	  issued79or	  by	  limiting	  carry-­‐over	  and	  banking	  of	  emission	  credits	  or	  allowances.	  The	  section	  “text”	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	   and	   in	  particular	   table	  4	   in	   that	   section,	   reviews	   in	  more	  detail	   how	   these	  proposals	  of	  parties	  evolved	  from	  “raw”	  input	  as	  written	  submissions	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	   verbal	   statements	   during	   the	   sessions	   to	   formal	   negotiation	   text	   and	   draft	  decisions.	  
As	  mentioned,	   the	  AWG-­‐KP	  did	  not	   finalise	   its	  work	  programme	  by	  the	  original	  deadline	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   period	   at	   COP15	   in	   Copenhagen.	   Since	   COP15	  also	   created	   substantial	   uncertainty	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   continuation	   of	   the	   Kyoto	  Protocol	  after	  2012,	  which	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  any	  decisions	  taken	   by	   the	   AWG-­‐KP,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   at	   the	   time	   of	   writing	   to	   foresee	   the	   final	  outcome	   of	   this	   political	   process.	   However,	   it	   seems	   very	   likely	   that	   some	   of	   the	  elements	  pursued	  by	  parties	  in	  the	  AWG-­‐KP	  negotiations	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  period,	  for	  example	  sectoral	  approaches	  to	  emissions	  crediting	  and	  trading,	  will	  in	  some	  form	  be	  implemented	  in	  a	  post-­‐2012	  climate	  regime.	  Such	  implementation	  could	  take	  form	  either	  as	  part	  of	  a	  second	  commitment	  period	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  a	  new	  Protocol	  or	  instrument	  that	  might	  emerge	  from	  the	  AWG-­‐LCA	  track,	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  unilateral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	   Under	  sectoral	  approaches	  whole	  sectors	  of	  economies,	  such	  as	  power	  generation,	  steel,	  cement,	  transportation	   and	   so	   on	   would	   be	   credited	   if	   they	   were	   to	   emit	   less	   greenhouse	   gases	   than	  mandated	  under	  an	  a	  priori	  agreed	  threshold	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  single	  project-­‐based	  character	  of	  the	  traditional	  CDM).	  	  79	   To	   illustrate,	   a	   fictitious	  10%	  discounting	   factor	  would	  mean	  –	   if	   applied	  at	   the	   supply	   side,	   i.e.	  host	   country	   –	   that	   10	   tons	  of	   avoided	  CO2eq	  would	  only	   generate	   enough	   certificates	   to	   allow	  emission	   of	   9	   tons	   of	   CO2eq.	   Likewise,	   if	   applied	   to	   the	   demand	   side,	   an	   emitter	   in	   an	   Annex	   I	  country	  would	  have	  to	  purchase	  10	  certificates	  in	  order	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  emit	  9	  tons	  of	  CO2eq.	  	   Carry-­‐over	  and	  banking	  of	  credits,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  parties	  to	  carry	  over	  any	  un-­‐used	  credits	  from	  the	  first	  commitment	  period	  to	  the	  next,	  i.e.	  to	  use	  unused	  credits	  from	  the	  2008-­‐2012	  period	  to	  fulfil	  their	  new	  commitments	  in	  the	  post-­‐2012	  regime.	  This	  is	  in	  particu-­‐lar	  a	  controversial	  issue	  relating	  to	  AAUs	  (Assigned	  Amount	  Units	  –	  the	  basic	  units	  of	  allowance	  issued	  to	  Annex	  I	  parties	  corresponding	  to	  their	  allowed	  level	  of	  emissions)	  of	   the	  former	  USSR	  countries,	   whose	   AAU	   allocation	   far	   exceeds	   their	   actual	   emissions	   due	   to	   the	   post	   cold	   war	  collapse	  of	  their	  industrial	  sectors.	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  usage	   of	   these	  mechanisms	   by	   parties	   to	   fulfil	   their	   pledges	   if	   a	   pledge-­‐and-­‐review	  regime	  as	  envisioned	  in	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accords	  should	  emerge	  as	  the	  main	  element	  of	  the	  post-­‐2012	  climate	  regime.	  
4.5 The	  Institutional	  Make-­‐up	  of	  UN	  Climate	  Change	  Negotiations	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  historical	  background	  of	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  current	  UNFCCC	  regime	  and	  the	  political	  developments	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  and	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	  this	  second	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   will	   examine	   the	   general	   institutional	   make-­‐up	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	   negotiations,	   which	   is	   important	   to	   provide	   a	   clear	   understanding	   of	   the	  context	   within	   which	   this	   fieldwork	   took	   place.	   First,	   the	   different	   classes	   of	  “participants”	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   and	   their	   respective	   rights	   and	   roles	   as	  well	  as	  their	  relationships	  to	  each	  other	  will	  be	  introduced.	  In	  a	  second	  step,	  the	  main	  “negotiation	  arenas’,	   that	   is,	   the	  main	  settings	  within	  which	  the	  actual	  deliberations	  and	   conversations	   take	   place,	   will	   be	   laid	   out	   and	   their	   main	   characteristics	   with	  regards	  to	  openness	  of	  access,	  transparency	  and	  formality	  will	  be	  discussed.	  Finally,	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  the	  role	  of	  “text,”	  and	  the	  different	  types	  of	  text,	  will	  be	  provided	  including	   a	   summary	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   ideas	   in	   text	   from	   raw	   input	   provided	   by	  parties	  to	  negotiation	  texts	  and	  draft	  decisions.	  
4.5.1 Participants:	  Parties,	  Observer	  Organisations	  and	  the	  Media	  
4.5.1.1 Parties	  First	   and	   foremost,	   the	   UNFCCC	   is	   a	   negotiation	   process	   among	   its	   parties.	   Party	  delegations	   therefore	   represent	   the	   central,	   albeit	   not	   always	   largest,	   group	   of	  participants	   (see	   figure	   3	  below	   –	   the	   number	   of	   observers	   exceeds	   that	   of	   party	  delegates	  at	  each	  of	  the	  COPs	  except	  for	  COP2,	  COP6	  (Part	  II)	  and	  COP7).	  With	  near	  universal	   membership,	   the	   parties	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   represent	   a	   large	   diversity	   of	  different	  positions	  on	  the	  climate	  change	  issue	  and	  its	  many	  complex	  sub-­‐issues	  and,	  crucially,	  a	   large	  diversity	  of	  actors	  with	  different	  economic	  and	  political	  situations,	  size,	  population,	  and	  position	  within	  the	  global	  structure	  of	  economic	  and	  geopolitical	  power.	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Figure	  3:	  Participation	  Breakdown	  at	  COPs	  (COP	  1	  -­‐	  COP	  15)	  	  
	  
Source:	  own	  representation	  of	  data	  from	  UNFCCC	  2011	  The	  main	  differentiating	   feature	  of	  parties,	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  UNFCCC,	   is	  whether	  they	  are	  Annex	  I	  parties	  or	  not.	  Annex	  I	  to	  the	  Convention	  lists	  parties	  that	  were,	  at	  the	   time	   of	   the	   negotiation	   of	   the	   convention	   framework,	   considered	   to	   be	   further	  developed	  than	  the	  others	  and	  thus	  both	  more	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  problem	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  more	  capable	  of	  contributing	  to	  the	  effort	  of	  its	  solution.	  Annex	  I	  includes	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐Operation	  and	  Develop-­‐ment	  (OECD)	  as	  of	  1990	  (i.e.	  the	  advanced	  industrial	  economies	  of	  Western	  Europe	  as	  well	   as	   the	   USA,	   Canada,	   Japan,	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand)	   as	   well	   as	   the	   former	  socialist	  countries	  of	  Eastern	  and	  Central	  Europe;	  with	  the	  former	  being	  also	  listed	  in	  Annex	  II,	  while	  the	  latter	  are	  considered	  countries	  with	  “Economies	  in	  Transition,”	  or	  EIT	   countries,	   and	   therefore	   not	   included	   in	   Annex	   II.	   The	   convention	   principle	   of	  CBDRRC	   (common	   but	   differentiated	   responsibilities	   and	   respective	   capabilities)	  demands	   that	   Annex	   I	   countries	   take	   the	   lead	   in	   reducing	   their	   greenhouse	   gas	  emissions	   in	   acknowledgement	   of	   their	   greater	   historic	   responsibility.	   In	   addition,	  Annex	   I	   countries	   that	   are	   also	   listed	   in	   Annex	   II	   are	   required	   to	   provide	   financial	  means	  to	  cover	  the	  cost	  of	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  parties	  to	  fulfil	  their	  requirements	  under	  the	  convention	  (for	  example,	  with	  regards	  to	  regular	  reporting	  on	  implementation	  of	  the	  convention)	   as	  well	   as	   for	   promoting	   capacity	   building	   and	   technology	   transfer.	   In	  general,	  in	  UNFCCC	  documents	  the	  term	  “developed	  country”	  is	  roughly	  synonymous	  with	  Annex	  I	  country	  while	  “developing	  country”	  is	  equal	  to	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  country.	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  While	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations,	  as	  in	  many	  other	  UN	  institutions,	  every	  party	  
formally	  has	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  power	  as	  any	  other,	   the	  de	  facto	  power	  within	  the	  process	  varies	  massively	  between	  different	  parties.	  The	  COP	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  has	  never	  adopted	   its	   own	   rules	   of	   procedure	   even	   though	   every	   single	   COP	   deals	   with	   the	  adoption	   of	   the	   draft	   rules	   of	   procedure	   as	   one	   agenda	   item.	   The	   draft	   rule	  which	  parties	   cannot	   agree	   on	   is	   draft	   rule	   42	   on	   voting,	   which	   envisions	   voting	   to	   be	  carried	  out	  if	  consensus	  cannot	  be	  reached.	  In	  that	  case	  every	  party	  would	  have	  one	  single	   vote	   and	   decisions	   could	   be	  made	  with	   a	   75%	  majority	   of	   votes.	   It	   is	   estab-­‐lished	  practice	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  that	  the	  draft	  rules	  (except	  the	  controversial	  rule	  42)	   are	   “applied”	   (rather	   than	   adopted)	   at	   each	   of	   the	   sessions.	   However,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  rule	  which	  would	  codify	  the	  specifics	  of	  voting,	  COPs	  and	  all	  other	  bodies	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  can,	  and	  do,	  never	  take	  a	  vote	  and	  therefore	  they	  operate	  on	  a	  de	  facto	  consensus	   requirement	   with	   every	   party	   wielding	   formally	   the	   same	   amount	   of	  power	  to	  veto	  (or	  rather:	  refuse	  to	   join	  the	  consensus	  for)	  any	  decision	  (Yamin	  and	  Depledge	   2004,	   especially	   p.	   433).	   In	   practice,	   the	   actual	   power	   of	   a	   party	   in	   the	  process	   influences	  whether	   (and	  how	   frequently	   and	   sincerely)	   it	  will	   exercise	   this	  power.	  For	  example,	  industrialised	  countries	  generally	  wield	  more	  power	  due	  to	  their	  overall	  economic	  and	  geopolitical	  position	  as	  well	  as	  process	  internal	  factors	  such	  as	  larger	   and	   more	   highly	   skilled	   delegations	   and	   are	   thus	   frequently	   seen	   blocking	  consensus	   until	   the	   negotiations	   have	   moved	   substantially	   in	   their	   favour.	   On	   the	  other	   hand,	   the	  members	   of	   the	   Alliance	   of	   Small	   Island	   States	   (AoSIS;	   cf.	   also	   the	  section	  entitled	  “Parties”	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter)	  successfully	  managed	  to	  mould	   their	   unique	   situation	   with	   regards	   to	   projected	   climate	   change	   impacts	   –	  including	   the	   predicted	   disappearance	   of	  much,	   in	   some	   cases,	   all	   of	   their	   nations’	  territory	   –	   into	   a	   position	   of	   moral	   authority,	   and	   have	   thus	   acquired	   a	   degree	   of	  power	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   process	   (this	   example	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   much	   more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  6	  of	  this	  thesis).	  
Furthermore,	  whether	  a	  party	  can	  actually	  exercise	  its	  “veto”	  power	  also	  depends	  on	   other	   process	   related	   aspects;	   for	   example,	   since	   no	   universally	   accepted	  definition	  of	   “consensus”	  exists	   (the	   “literal	  meaning	  equates	  with	   ‘common	   feeling’	  or	   ‘concurrence	  of	   feelings’”,	  Depledge	  2005:	  91),	   the	   interpretation	  of	   that	  concept	  by	  the	  chair	  of	  a	  meeting	  can	  become	  a	  central	   factor.	  This	  happened	  in	  the	  famous	  example	   of	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	   where	   the	   president	   of	   the	   COP	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  “gavelled	  through”	  the	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  final	  meeting,	  ignoring	  Saudi	  Arabia	  raising	  its	  flag	  to	  indicate	  a	  request	  to	  take	  the	  floor,	  no	  doubt	  in	  order	  to	  raise	  its	  objections	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  protocol	  (cf.,	  for	  example,	  Depledge	  2005:	  98–99	  for	  an	  account	  of	  these	  events).	  Furthermore,	  in	  order	  to	  voice	  objections,	  obviously	  party	  delegates	  must	   be	   physically	   present	   at	   the	   meeting	   in	   question,	   which,	   given	   that	   UNFCCC	  negotiation	  sessions	  often	  feature	  many	  parallel	  events,	  clearly	  favours	  the	  larger	  and	  better-­‐resourced	  delegations	  over	  others.	  
Within	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  there	  are	  some	  measures	  in	  place	  that	  seek	  to	  over-­‐come	  some	  of	  this	  power	  differential.	  First,	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  Trust	  Fund	  for	  Participation,	  established	   by	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   resolution	   45/212,	   funds	   the	   participation	   of	  one	  delegate	  for	  each	  eligible80	  developing	  or	  EIT	  country	  and	  two	  participants	  from	  small	   island	  states	   if	   funds	  permit.	  The	  Trust	  Fund	  is	   funded	  by	  voluntary	  contribu-­‐tions	  mainly	   by	   developed	   country	   parties,	  which	   introduces	   an	   element	   of	   unpre-­‐dictability	   to	   the	   funding,	   but	   it	   has	  nonetheless	   for	   the	  most	  part	  been	   sufficiently	  endowed	   to	   fulfil	   its	   function.	  However,	   the	   limiting	   to	  one	  or	   two	  delegates	  means	  that,	   while	   able	   to	   participate	   at	   least	   to	   some	   degree,	   delegation	   from	   poorer	  developing	  countries	  are	  still	   in	  a	  disadvantaged	  position	  with	  regards	   to	  attending	  parallel	  events,	  or	  with	  regards	  to	  being	  able	  to	  practice	  a	  separation	  of	  labour	  within	  a	  delegation	   to	  cover	  all	   the	  different,	  highly	  complex	  and	   technical	   issues	  and	  sub-­‐issues	  of	  the	  negotiations.	  
This	   is	   partly	   overcome	   by	   means	   of	   coalitions,	   or	   party	   groupings,	   in	   which	  parties	  voluntarily	  come	  together	  to	  formulate	  and	  advance	  common	  policy	  positions	  within	   the	  process81.	  The	   largest	   among	   the	  main	  party	   groupings	   is	   the	   “G-­‐77	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	   The	  eligibility	   is	  based	  on	  per	  capita	  GDP	  of	  each	  country.	   In	  2005	   the	  eligibility	   threshold	  was	  $6,500	   of	   per	   capita	   GDP	   in	   2000,	  with	   a	   higher	   threshold	   of	   $10,000	   in	   place	   for	   small	   island	  nations	  (Depledge	  2005).	  81	   The	  negotiating	  blocs	  are	  distinct	  from	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  five	  regional	  groups	  typical	   in	   the	   UN	   process,	   “namely	   African	   States,	   Asian	   States,	   Eastern	   European	   States,	   Latin	  American	   and	   the	   Caribbean	   States,	   and	   the	   Western	   European	   and	   Other	   States	   (the	   "Other	  States"	  include	  Australia,	  Canada,	  Iceland,	  New	  Zealand,	  Norway,	  Switzerland	  and	  [as	  an	  observer]	  the	   United	   States	   of	   America,	   but	   not	   Japan,	   which	   is	   in	   the	   Asian	   Group)”	   (UNFCCC	   2010b).	  However,	   these	   regional	  groups	  also	  play	  an	   important	   role	   in	   the	  UNFCCC	  process,	  namely	   for	  establishing	   proper	   regional	   representation	  when	   electing	   officers	   for	   the	   various	  Bureaux	   and	  similar	  bodies	  of	  the	  convention,	  such	  as	  the	  CDM	  Executive	  Board	  (CDM-­‐EB).	  One	  distinction	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  with	  regards	  to	  most	  of	  these	  limited	  member	  bodies,	  such	  as	  the	  11	  member	  COP	  Bureau	  which	  advises	  the	  COP,	  is	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  balanced	  representation	  of	  the	  five	  UN	  regions,	  one	  seat	  is	  reserved	  for	  SIDS.	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  China”	   which	   is	   a	   very	   diverse	   group	   of	   developing	   countries.	  While	   the	   G-­‐77	   and	  China	   tries	   to	   speak	   with	   an	   unified	   voice	   wherever	   possible,	   its	   large	   diversity	  (including	   oil	   producing	   countries	   like	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   rapidly	   industrialising	   econo-­‐mies	   such	   as	  China	   and	   small	   island	  nations	   such	   as	   the	  Maldives)	   also	  means	   that	  there	   are	   sub	   groupings	   within	   the	   group	   or	   groupings	   of	   G-­‐77	   and	   non-­‐G-­‐77	  countries.	   One	   example	   of	   the	   latter	   is	   AoSIS,	   the	   Alliance	   of	   Small	   Island	   States,	  another	  party	  grouping	  that	  has	  managed	  to	  gain	  –	  relative	  to	  the	  size	  and	  geopoliti-­‐cal	  power	  of	  its	  member	  states	  –	  a	  somewhat	  influential	  position	  within	  the	  process,	  based	   on	   the	  moral	   authority	   it	   commands	   due	   to	   the	   predicted	   impact	   of	   climate	  change	   on	   its	   members.	   Other	   groups	   with	   affiliation	   to	   the	   G-­‐77,	   but	   at	   times	  expressing	  their	  own	  positions,	  include	  OPEC,	  the	  African	  group,	  the	  Arab	  League	  and	  others.	   In	   preparations	   towards	   COP15	   in	   Copenhagen	   in	   December	   2009,	   Brazil,	  South	  Africa,	   India	  and	  China	   formed	  the	  BASIC	  group	  of	  countries,	   in	  order	   to	  give	  their	   jointly	   agreed	  minimum	  demands	   higher	  weight.	   A	   basic	   position	   of	   the	  G-­‐77	  and	  China	  is	  to	  defend	  the	  distinction	  between	  Annex	  I	  and	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries	  and	  resist	  any	  attempts	   to	  erode	   this	  distinction.	  The	  G-­‐77	  and	  China	  position	   is	  also	   to	  uphold	  the	  principle	  of	  CBDRRC	  and	  the	  interpretation	  that	  this	  principle	  means	  that	  developed	  countries	  must	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  reducing	  their	  own	  emissions	  first	  before	  limitations	   to	   emission	   growth	   or	   emission	   reductions	   can	   be	   expected	   from	  developing	  countries.	  Based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  CBDRRC	  they	  also	  tend	  to	  stress	  the	  need	   for	   financial	   assistance,	   capacity	   building	   and	   technology	   transfer	   from	  developed	  to	  developing	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  latter	  in	  any	  greenhouse	  gas	  mitigation	  efforts.	  
The	  European	  Union	  is	  another	  of	  these	  coalitions	  and	  differs	  from	  all	  others	  in	  that	   its	   members	   agree	   in	   a	   formal	   process	   prior	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   on	   the	  overall	  positions	  of	  the	  bloc	  and	  always	  speak	  with	  one	  voice	  at	  the	  sessions.	  Unlike	  all	   other	   coalitions,	   the	   EU	   is	   also	   a	   party	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   itself	   (as	   a	   “regional	  economic	   integration	   organisation”),	   although	   it	   does	   not	   have	   a	   vote	   independent	  from	  those	  of	  its	  member	  states.	  The	  position	  of	  the	  EU	  is	  formally	  represented	  by	  the	  member	  state	  currently	  holding	  the	  rotating	  EU	  presidency,	  however,	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  most	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  the	  EU	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  which	  merely	  means	  that	  the	  same	  European	  Commission	  civil	  servants	  sit	  behind	  different	  flags	  every	  six	  months.	  The	  EU	  considers	  itself	  as	  a	  leader	  within	  the	  process	  and	  has,	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  indeed,	  committed	  to	  the	  largest	  reduction	  target	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  of	  8%	  and	  in	  subsequent	  negotiations	  leading	  up	  to	  Copenhagen	  has	  committed	  itself	  unilateral-­‐ly	   to	   a	   20%	   target	   with	   a	   move	   to	   30%	  in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   binding	   international	  agreement82.	  
The	  Umbrella	  Group	  is	  made	  up	  of	  a	  number	  of	  developed	  countries	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  group	  typically	  consists	  of	  the	  US,	  Canada,	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  Japan,	   the	  Russian	   Federation	   and	   the	  Ukraine	   as	  well	   as	   Iceland	   and	  Norway.	   The	  Umbrella	  Group	   is	   often	   seen	  by	   environmentalists	   and	  developing	   country	  delega-­‐tions	  to	  be	  the	  force	  most	  active	  in	  slowing	  down	  or	  blockading	  progress	  within	  the	  process	  with	  its	  members	  ratifying	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  very	  late	  (Russia	  and	  Australia)	  or	   not	   at	   all	   (US)	   or	   openly	   renouncing	   any	   intention	   to	   meet	   their	   Kyoto	   target	  (Canada).	  This	  is	  among	  other	  things	  also	  evidenced	  to	  some	  degree	  by	  the	  Umbrella	  Group’s	   record	   at	   the	   “fossil	   of	   the	   day”	   awards	   handed	   out	   virtually	   daily	   at	   the	  negotiations	   by	   environmental	   NGOs	   which	   “recognise”	   the	   countries	   or	   country	  groupings	  that	  have	  done	  the	  most	  during	  the	  previous	  day	  of	  negotiations	  to	  block	  progress	  toward	  an	  outcome	  considered	  favoured	  by	  these	  NGOs.83	  
In	  2000,	  Switzerland,	  South	  Korea	  and	  Mexico	  formed	  the	  Environmental	  Integri-­‐ty	  Group	  (EIG),	  the	  only	  party	  grouping	  comprising	  of	  both	  Annex	  I	  and	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries,	  with	  the	  express	  focus	  of	  working	  together	  in	  their	  joint	  positioning	  toward	  ensuring	   the	   overall	   environmental	   integrity	   of	   the	   international	   climate	   change	  regime.	  
With	   the	   UNFCCC	   being	   a	   treaty	   and	   negotiation	   process	   between	   parties,	   the	  parties	  are	   the	  class	  of	  participants	  with	   the	  most	  direct	   influence	  over	   the	  process	  and	   its	   outcome	   –	   facilitators	   of	   the	   negotiation	   process	   often	   remind	   parties	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	   In	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	   the	   target	   for	   all	   EU	   countries	   is	   indicated	   as	   8%,	   however,	   the	   EU	   has	  established	   the	   so	   called	   “bubble”	  which	  means	   that	   this	   target	   applies	   for	   the	   EU	   as	   a	  whole,	  while	  the	  EU	  member	  states	  decide	  internally	  how	  this	  joint	  effort	  is	  to	  be	  shared	  amongst	  them.	  In	  that	  context,	  some	  member	  states,	  like	  Portugal,	  are	  allowed	  to	  grow	  their	  emissions	  (by	  25%	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Portugal)	  while	  others,	  like	  Germany	  or	  the	  UK,	  are	  required	  to	  achieve	  cuts	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  overall	  EU	  figure	  (21%	  and	  12.5%,	  respectively).	  83	   In	  the	  fieldwork	  period,	  Canada	  and	  the	  US	  were	  by	  far	  the	  most	  common	  winners	  of	  the	  award,	  while	   other	   Umbrella	   group	   members	   or	   the	   group	   as	   a	   whole	   are	   regular	   recipients	   as	   well.	  Between	  COP5	   in	  1999	  and	  COP11	   in	  2005,	  over	   two	   third	  of	   all	   fossil	   of	   the	  day	  awards	  were	  given	  to	  Umbrella	  group	  countries	  with	  seven	  of	  its	  members	  being	  in	  the	  overall	  TOP10	  and	  all	  in	  the	  TOP20	  of	  award	  recipients	  (CAN	  2006).	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  “this	  is	  a	  party	  driven	  process	  and	  we	  [the	  facilitators]	  can	  only	  work	  with	  what	  you	  [the	   parties]	   are	   giving	   us”	   (Figueres,	   as	   co-­‐chair	   of	   a	   contact	   group	   on	   flexible	  mechanisms,	   field	   note,	   Bonn,	   3	   Apr	   2009).	   Only	   parties	   have	   formal	   voices	   in	   the	  decision	  making	  process	  and,	  besides	  very	  limited	  exceptions84,	  only	  parties	  have	  the	  right	  to	  make	  verbal	  statements	  (“interventions”)	  in	  the	  various	  negotiation	  settings	  (see	  also	  “Observer	  Organisations”	  below).	  
Party	  delegations	  are	  principally	  made	  up	  of	  expert	  civil	  servants	  and	  diplomats	  of	   environmental	   ministries,	   although	   the	   larger	   delegations	   get,	   the	   more	   diverse	  their	   membership	   becomes,	   including	   civil	   servants	   of	   other	   departments	   such	   as	  industry,	   trade	   and	   commerce,	   agriculture	   and	   so	   forth,	   interested	   members	   of	  parliament	   or	   lower	   levels	   of	   government	   (e.g.	   local,	   provincial	   or	   municipal	  governments),	   outside	   experts	   from	   universities,	   think	   tanks	   and	   the	   like.	   Some	  parties	  have	  a	   tradition	  of	   including	  delegates	   from	  NGOs	   (including	  environmental	  as	   well	   as	   business	   NGOs)	   in	   their	   delegations,	   to	   maximise	   their	   access	   at	   the	  negotiations,	  however,	  that	  does	  not	  give	  these	  NGOs	  any	  right	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  country,	  in	  fact,	  NGO	  delegates	  so	  accredited	  often	  have	  to	  sign	  agreements	  with	  their	   country’s	  delegation	   limiting	   the	   types	  of	  permitted	  activities	  or	   statements85.	  During	  the	  Copenhagen	  climate	  conference,	  when	  access	  for	  most	  NGO	  delegates	  was	  revoked	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat	  due	  to	   logistical	  difficulties	  (the	  total	  number	  of	  access	   badges	   for	   the	   over	   12,000	   registered	   participants	   from	   non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  was	   gradually	   reduced	   to	   a	  mere	  500	  during	   the	   second	  week	   of	   the	  conference),	   some	   parties	   which	   do	   not	   typically	   do	   so	   included	   large	   numbers	   of	  NGO	  delegates	  from	  their	  own	  country	  in	  their	  official	  delegation	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  their	  continued	  participation	  (field	  note,	  Copenhagen,	  13	  December	  2009)86.	  In	  some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	   Observer	  organisations	  are	  usually	  given	  limited	  opportunities	  to	  make	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  brief	  statements	  (recently,	  at	  the	  Poznań	  COP,	  a	  practice	  has	  been	  introduced	  to	  switch	  off	  the	  micro-­‐phone	   if	   the	   intervention	   of	   an	   observer	   organisation	   exceeds	   the	   allotted	   2	  minutes)	   in	   some	  plenary	  sessions	  and	  occasional	  contact	  group	  meetings.	  Furthermore,	  experts	  of	  observer	  organ-­‐isations	   are	   sometimes	   asked	   to	   make	   presentations	   on	   specific	   topic	   in	   less	   formal	   formats	  within	  the	  negotiation	  sessions,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  in-­‐session	  workshops.	  85	   For	  example,	  it	  is	  regulated	  to	  which	  type	  of	  meetings	  these	  individuals	  are	  allowed	  to	  seek	  access	  (although	   their	   access	   badge	   identifying	   them	   as	   party	   delegate	   would	   in	   principle	   give	   them	  unrestricted	  access)	  or	  what	  type	  of	  statements	  (if	  any)	  they	  are	  allowed	  to	  make	  to	  media.	  86	   One	  such	  example	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Australia.	  Using	  the	  data	  parsed	  from	  UNFCCC	  participants	  list,	  it	  was	   possible	   to	   compare	   the	   provisional	   list	   (which	   lists	   delegates	   as	   registered	   prior	   to	   the	  conference,	   which	   is	  mandatory	   for	   NGOs)	  with	   the	   final	   list	   (which	   lists	   delegates	   as	   actually	  ultimately	   registered	  during	   the	  conference).	   It	   shows	   that	  among	   the	  99	   individuals	  ultimately	  carrying	   badges	   of	   the	  Australian	   “delegation,”	   16	  were	   originally	   registered	   as	  NGO	  observers	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  cases,	   parties	   are	   formally	   represented	   by	   (former	   or	   current)	  NGO	   staff;	   the	  most	  eminent	   of	   these	   cases	   certainly	   being	   Ian	   Fry	   of	   Tuvalu,	   who,	   before	   becoming	  Tuvalu’s	   long	   standing,	   outspoken	   and	   very	   skilled	   and	   widely	   respected87	  repre-­‐sentative	   at	   the	   UNFCCC,	   used	   to	   work	   for	   Greenpeace	   Australia,	   or	   Andrei	   Marcu	  who	  used	  to	  be	   the	  president	  of	   IETA,	   the	   International	  Emissions	  Trading	  Associa-­‐tion	   –	   the	   largest	   carbon	   trading	   lobby,	   before	   he	   started	   to	   represent	   Papua	  New	  Guinea88.	  
4.5.1.2 Observer	  Organisations	  In	   general,	   observer	   organisations	   fall	   into	   three	   broad	   categories:	   observer	  organisations	   associated	   with	   the	   UN	   system,	   other	   intergovernmental	   observer	  organisations	   and	   non-­‐governmental	   observer	   organisations.	   The	   first	   of	   these	  include	  United	  Nations	   bodies,	   such	   as	   UNICEF	   or	   the	   UN	   Environmental	   Program,	  “specialized	   agencies	   and	   related	   organisations,”	   such	   as	   the	   Food	   and	  Agricultural	  Organisation	   of	   the	   UN	   or	   the	  World	   Bank.	   The	   second	   category	   consists	   of	   other,	  non-­‐UN,	   Intergovernmental	   Organisations,	   such	   as	   the	   OECD	   or	   the	   International	  Energy	   Agency.	   The	   access	   rights	   of	   UN	   or	   intergovernmental	   observers	   are	   more	  similar	   to	   those	  of	  party	  delegations:	   for	  example,	   their	  representatives	  can	  request	  any	  documents	  from	  the	  document	  centre,	  have	  their	  individual	  table	  with	  own	  “flag”	  in	  plenary	   rooms	  while	  all	  NGO	  observers	   share	  a	   single	   table	  with	  a	   “civil	   society”	  flag.	   Furthermore,	   UN	   observers	   have	   access	   to	   all	   formally	   convened	   negotiations	  and	  the	  (rare)	  interventions	  by	  UN	  or	  intergovernmental	  observers	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  restrictions	  that	  are	  placed	  on	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations’	  interventions.	  
The	   vast	   majority	   of	   observer	   organisations	   fall	   in	   the	   third	   category	   of	   non-­‐governmental	  observer	  organisations.	  This	  category	  encompasses	  a	  very	  broad	  range	  of	  organisations	  representing	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  interests	  and	  issues.	  To	  reflect	  this	  range,	  the	  UNFCCC	  has	  established	  a	   system	  of	   recognised	  NGO	  constituencies	  with	  which	  individual	   NGO	   observer	   organisations	   can	   voluntarily	   affiliate.	   Limited	   resources	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  across	   three	  NGO	  constituencies:	   Industry	   (e.g.	  Australian	  Coal	  Association,	  Business	  Council	   of	  Australia),	  Trade	  Unions	  and	  Environmental	  NGOs	  (e.g.	  Greenpeace,	  CAN	  Australia,	  WWF).	  87	   For	   example,	   he	   was	   tasked	   to	   conduct	   informal	   consultations	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   AWG-­‐KP	   chair	  during	  the	  March/April	  2009	  UNFCCC	  meeting	  in	  Bonn	  (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  8	  April	  2009)	  88	   This	  practice	  has	  a	  established	  history	  with	  some	  regional	  differences;	  as	  Duwe	  (2001)	  points	  out	  at	  one	  negotiation	  session	  in	  2000,	  four	  out	  of	  five	  CAN	  delegates	  from	  Latin	  America	  were	  part	  of	  their	  official	  party	  delegation,	  with	  the	  extreme	  case	  of	  Paraguay	  whose	  delegation	  consisted	  just	  of	  one	  ENGO	  person.	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  such	   as	  meeting	   rooms,	   office	   space,	   slots	   for	   interventions	   in	   plenary	   sessions	   or	  secondary	  access	  passes	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  meeting	  rooms	  (or,	  indeed,	  the	  conference	  venue)	  that	  have	  surpassed	  their	  capacity	  are	  distributed	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat	  to	  individual	  organisations	  using	  the	  designated	  focal	  points	  of	  each	  constituency.	  
During	  the	  fieldwork	  period,	  the	  constituency	  system	  underwent	  some	  significant	  changes	   reflecting	   the	   deepening	   of	   societal	   interest	   in	   climate	   change	   and	   the	  associated	  broadening	  of	  different	  specific	  perspectives	  that	  subsequently	  sought	  to	  obtain	   a	   voice	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations.	   The	   constituencies	   that	   were	   formally	  recognised	  by	  the	  COP	  were	  initially	  only	  the	  Environmental	  NGOs	  (ENGOs)	  and	  the	  “Business	   and	   Industry	   NGOs”	   (BINGOs) 89 ,	   which	   represented	   the	   two	   main	  perspectives	   of	   observer	   organisation	   during	   the	   negotiation	   before	   the	   entry	   into	  force	  of	  the	  UNFCCC90.	  The	  “Local	  Government	  and	  Municipal	  Authorities”	  (LGMAs),	  despite	   being	   designated	   within	   UNFCCC	   context	   as	   “non-­‐governmental,”	   include	  representatives	   of	   city,	   municipal	   and	   regional	   governments	   (since	   these	   govern-­‐ments	  cannot	  be	  parties	  to	  the	  convention)	  and	  were	  recognised	  as	  a	  constituency	  at	  COP1	   in	   1995.	   “Indigenous	   Peoples’	   Organisations”	   (IPOs)	   followed	   in	   2001	   and	  “Research	   and	   Independent	   NGOs”	   (RINGOs),	   which	   mainly	   include	   independent	  think	  tanks	  and	  universities,	  in	  2003.	  During	  the	  fieldwork	  period,	  international	  trade	  union	  organisations	  became	   increasingly	   involved	   in	   the	  UNFCCC	  work,	   resulting	   in	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  TUNGOs	  –	  the	  Trade	  Union	  NGOs	  –	  in	  2008.	  In	  addition,	  by	  the	   time	   of	   the	   Copenhagen	   climate	   change	   conference,	   efforts	  were	   under	  way	   to	  formally	   recognise	   Youth	   NGOs	   (YOUNGOs),	   “Women	   and	   Gender,”	   as	   well	   as	  “Farmers”	   as	   distinct	   constituencies91.	   Furthermore,	   during	   and	   following	   the	   Bali	  climate	  change	  conference	   in	  2007	  a	  separate	  perspective	  started	   to	  emerge	  within	  the	  ENGO	  constituency	  as	  distinct	   from	  the	  remainder	  of	   that	  constituency	  (most	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	   The	   criteria	   for	   accreditation	   as	   observer	   organisation	  mandate	   that	   observer	   organisations	   be	  registered	  with	  “non-­‐profit	  and/or	  tax-­‐exempt	  status”	  (UNFCCC	  2010c)	  in	  their	  country	  of	  regis-­‐tration,	   thus	  requiring	  any	   for-­‐profit	  organisation	  or	  enterprise	   to	  set	  up	  a	  dedicated	  non-­‐profit	  front	  organisation	  in	  order	  to	  participate.	  90	   Due	  to	  the	  starkly	  different	  perspectives	  of	  these	  two	  groups,	  the	  constituency	  system	  established	  itself	  naturally	  during	  the	  process	  and	  was	  later	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  COP	  when	  it	  formally	  acknowl-­‐edged	  additional	   constituencies.	  The	  constituency	  system,	  however,	   is	  not	   formally	  anchored	   in	  the	   text	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   or	   its	   (draft)	   rules	   of	   procedure;	   it	   merely	   represents	   an	   established	  convention.	  91	  	   A	   list	   of	   all	   accredited	   non-­‐governmental	   observer	   organisations,	   including	   information	   about	  their	  affiliation	  with	  any	  of	  the	  observer	  constituencies	  within	  the	  UNFCCC,	  is	  maintained	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  website:	  http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/ngo.pl	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  which	   organised	   as	   members	   of	   the	   Climate	   Action	   Network,	   CAN).	   This	   new	  perspective	  –	  self-­‐identifying	  as	   the	  climate	   justice	  perspective	  –	  gave	  rise	   to	  a	  new	  coalition	  of	  NGOs,	  Climate	   Justice	  Now!,	   and	  started	   to	   result	   in	   increasing	  conflicts	  over	   scarce	   resources	   such	   as	   meeting	   rooms,	   intervention	   slots	   and	   secondary	  access	   badges.	   For	   a	   while,	   these	   conflicts	   suggested	   a	   possible	   future	   split	   of	   the	  current	   ENGO	   constituency	   into	   two	   separate	   constituencies,	   however,	   toward	   the	  end	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   period,	   during	   the	   2009	   Bonn	   UNFCCC	   sessions,	   CJN!	   was	  recognised	  as	  an	  additional	  focal	  point	  for	  the	  environmental	  NGOs	  (CJN!	  2010a),	  thus	  resolving	  these	  type	  of	  “resource	  conflicts”.	  
Figure	  4:	  Participation	  at	  UNFCCC	  Sessions	  in	  2007-­‐2009	  by	  NGO	  Constituency	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  data	  extracted	  from	  UNFCCC	  participation	  lists92	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  Figure	  4	  above	  and	  table	  2	  below	  shows	  the	  proportion	  of	  participants	  belonging	  to	  these	   constituencies	   for	   the	   sessions	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   bodies	   during	   the	   fieldwork	  phase.	   It	   shows	   that	   environmental	   NGOs	   are	   by	   far	   the	   largest	   group	   of	   NGO	  	  
Table	  2:	  	  NGO	   Participation	   at	   UNFCCC	   Sessions	   2007-­‐2009	   and	   Share	   of	   Delegates	   from	  
Non-­‐Annex	  I	  Countries,	  by	  Constituency	  
	   	   2007	  Aug	  Vienna	   	   2007	  Dec	  Bali	   	   2008	  Apr	  Bangkok	   	   2008	  Jun	  Bonn	  
Constituency	   N	   %	   %nA1	   	   N	   %	   %nA1	   	   N	   %	   %nA1	   	   N	   %	   %nA1	  ENGO	   	   106	   46.5%	   17.0%	   	   1,987	   39.8%	   17.0%	   	   129	   54.7%	   24.8%	   	   283	   48.6%	   10.2%	  RINGO	   	   26	   11.4%	   11.5%	   	   730	   14.6%	   20.4%	   	   35	   14.8%	   22.9%	   	   129	   22.2%	   19.4%	  BINGO	   	   62	   27.2%	   0.0%	   	   1,278	   25.6%	   9.5%	   	   40	   16.9%	   0.0%	   	   114	   19.6%	   0.9%	  LGMA	   	   1	   0.4%	   0.0%	   	   398	   8.0%	   0.0%	   	   1	   0.4%	   0.0%	   	   	   	   	  Youth	   	   	   	   	   	   25	   0.5%	   0.0%	   	   1	   0.4%	   0.0%	   	   3	   0.5%	   0.0%	  IPO	   	   	   	   	   	   100	   2.0%	   77.0%	   	   3	   1.3%	   100.0%	   	   4	   0.7%	   100.0%	  TUNGO	   	   18	   7.9%	   0.0%	   	   84	   1.7%	   0.0%	   	   2	   0.8%	   0.0%	   	   9	   1.5%	   0.0%	  Women	  &	  Gender	   	   	   	   29	   0.6%	   0.0%	   	   	   	   	   	   14	   2.4%	   0.0%	  Farmers	   	   	   	   	   	   4	   0.1%	   0.0%	   	   1	   0.4%	   0.0%	   	   2	   0.3%	   0.0%	  None	   	   15	   6.6%	   6.7%	   	   357	   7.2%	   64.4%	   	   24	   10.2%	   16.7%	   	   24	   4.1%	   0.0%	  Total	  NGO	   	   228	   100.0%	   9.6%	   	   4,992	   100.0%	   18.3%	   	   236	   100.0%	   19.9%	   	   582	   100.0%	   10.1%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   2008	  Aug	  Accra	   	   2008	  Dec	  Poznań 	   	   2009	  Apr	  Bonn	   	   2009	  Jun	  Bonn	  
Constituency	   N	   %	   %nA1	   	   N	   %	   %nA1	   	   N	   %	   %nA1	   	   N	   %	   %nA1	  ENGO	   	   275	   83.8%	   18.5%	   	   1,701	   44.0%	   8.3%	   	   345	   53.2%	   4.6%	   	   766	   57.4%	   6.4%	  RINGO	   	   11	   3.4%	   0.0%	   	   709	   18.3%	   13.1%	   	   88	   13.6%	   4.5%	   	   247	   18.5%	   4.5%	  BINGO	   	   22	   6.7%	   0.0%	   	   848	   21.9%	   4.4%	   	   101	   15.6%	   1.0%	   	   161	   12.1%	   2.5%	  LGMA	   	   	   	   	   	   258	   6.7%	   0.0%	   	   18	   2.8%	   0.0%	   	   22	   1.6%	   0.0%	  Youth	   	   	   	   	   	   49	   1.3%	   0.0%	   	   21	   3.2%	   0.0%	   	   11	   0.8%	   0.0%	  IPO	   	   3	   0.9%	   100.0%	   	   48	   1.2%	   68.8%	   	   9	   1.4%	   100.0%	   	   15	   1.1%	   93.3%	  TUNGO	   	   1	   0.3%	   0.0%	   	   94	   2.4%	   0.0%	   	   3	   0.5%	   0.0%	   	   24	   1.8%	   0.0%	  Women	  &	  Gender	   	   	   	   58	   1.5%	   0.0%	   	   23	   3.5%	   0.0%	   	   38	   2.8%	   0.0%	  Farmers	   	   3	   0.9%	   0.0%	   	   14	   0.4%	   0.0%	   	   5	   0.8%	   0.0%	   	   11	   0.8%	   0.0%	  None	   	   13	   4.0%	   0.0%	   	   89	   2.3%	   14.6%	   	   35	   5.4%	   0.0%	   	   39	   2.9%	   0.0%	  Total	  NGO	   	   328	   100.0%	   16.5%	   	   3,868	   100.0%	   8.2%	   	   648	   100.0%	   4.6%	   	   1,334	   100.0%	   5.8%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   2009	  Aug	  Bonn	   	   2009	  Oct	  Bangkok	   	   2009	  Nov	  Barcelona	   	   2009	  Dec	  Copenhg	  
Constituency	   N	   %	   %nA1	   	   N	   %	   %nA1	   	   N	   %	   %nA1	   	   N	   %	   %nA1	  ENGO	   	   185	   48.7%	   3.2%	   	   666	   59.8%	   15.9%	   	   624	   54.0%	   5.1%	   	   4,705	   39.1%	   13.4%	  RINGO	   	   75	   19.7%	   0.0%	   	   145	   13.0%	   10.3%	   	   188	   16.3%	   2.7%	   	   3,119	   25.9%	   7.4%	  BINGO	   	   68	   17.9%	   0.0%	   	   89	   8.0%	   0.0%	   	   148	   12.8%	   0.0%	   	   2,005	   16.7%	   3.7%	  LGMA	   	   6	   1.6%	   0.0%	   	   9	   0.8%	   0.0%	   	   76	   6.6%	   0.0%	   	   781	   6.5%	   0.0%	  Youth	   	   3	   0.8%	   0.0%	   	   2	   0.2%	   0.0%	   	   11	   1.0%	   0.0%	   	   449	   3.7%	   2.4%	  IPO	   	   18	   4.7%	   100.0%	   	   123	   11.0%	   99.2%	   	   27	   2.3%	   96.3%	   	   197	   1.6%	   55.8%	  TUNGO	   	   3	   0.8%	   0.0%	   	   17	   1.5%	   0.0%	   	   33	   2.9%	   0.0%	   	   218	   1.8%	   0.0%	  Women	  &	  Gender	   8	   2.1%	   0.0%	   	   41	   3.7%	   0.0%	   	   9	   0.8%	   0.0%	   	   121	   1.0%	   0.0%	  Farmers	   	   1	   0.3%	   0.0%	   	   5	   0.4%	   0.0%	   	   3	   0.3%	   0.0%	   	   102	   0.8%	   14.7%	  None	   	   13	   3.4%	   0.0%	   	   17	   1.5%	   17.6%	   	   37	   3.2%	   0.0%	   	   340	   2.8%	   21.5%	  Total	  NGO	   	   380	   100.0%	   6.3%	   	   1,114	   100.0%	   22.1%	   	   1,156	   100.0%	   5.4%	   	   12,037	   100.0%	   9.5%	  
Notes:	  	   N	   –	   number	   of	   delegates	   of	   non-­‐governmental	   observer	   organisations	   associated	   with	   given	  
constituency;	  %	  –	  share	  of	  participants	  of	  given	  constituency	  of	  total	  NGO	  observers;	  %nA1	  –	  percent-­‐
age	  of	  participants	  within	  given	  constituency	  registered	  as	  delegate	  of	  an	  organisation	  with	  headquar-­‐
ter	  in	  a	  non	  Annex	  I	  country.	  
Source:	  	   own	  calculations	  based	  on	  data	  extracted	  from	  UNFCCC	  participation	  lists;	  cf.	  footnote	  92	  above.	  
observers,	   typically	   representing	   between	   40%	   and	   up	   to	   nearly	   90%	  (Aug	   2008,	  Accra)	  of	  the	  total	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  observers.	  BINGO	  and	  RINGO	  representatives	  variously	  are	  either	  the	  second	  or	  third	  largest.	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  constituencies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  result,	   the	   constituency	   affiliation	   of	   individual	   participants	   was	   thus	   determined	   by	   assigning	  them	  the	  constituency	  status	  of	  the	  NGO	  that	  registered	  them	  for	  a	  given	  session.	  Since	  constitu-­‐ency	   self-­‐assignment	   is	   voluntary,	   there	   is	   a	   “none”	   category	   of	   participants	   that	   chose	   to	   not	  associate	  themselves	  with	  any	  of	  the	  official	  constituencies.	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  are	   only	   represented	  by	   a	   small	   number	   of	   delegates;	   their	   combined	  numbers	   are	  below	   20%	   of	   overall	   NGO	   participation	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   phase.	   Table	   2	   also	  shows	   clearly	   that,	   overall,	   NGO	   participants	   from	   Annex	   I	   countries93 	  greatly	  outnumber	  those	  from	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries.	  This	  is	  particularly	  marked	  for	  BINGO	  organisations	  as	  well	  as	  Youth,	  Women	  and	  Gender,	  LGMA,	  and	  TUNGO	  constituencies.	  It	  can	  also	  clearly	  be	  seen	  that	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  participation	  increases	  significantly	  when	  a	  meeting	  is	  held	  in	  a	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  country	  and	  for	  COPs	  (compared	  to	  Intersession-­‐als).	  
One	  main	  function	  of	  the	  constituency	  system	  is	  to	  make	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	   UNFCCC	   secretariat	   and	   the	   vast	   number	   of	   NGO	   observer	   organisations	  more	  formal	  and	  efficient	  (from	  the	  secretariat’s	  point	  of	  view).	  The	  secretariat	  designates	  an	  individual	  as	  a	  “focal	  point”	  for	  each	  constituency,	  which	  acts	  as	  the	  main	  “conduit	  for	  the	  exchange	  of	  official	  information	  between	  their	  constituents	  and	  the	  secretariat”	  (UNFCCC	  2010d:	  2)	  and	  as	  the	  point	  of	  contact	  for	  coordinating	  intervention	  slots	  or	  the	  distribution	  of	  other	   limited	  resources.	  For	  example,	   in	   the	  opening	  and	  closing	  plenaries	  of	   the	   sessions	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  bodies,	   an	   intervention	  slot	   is	   reserved	   for	  each	  constituency,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  constituency	  (and	  its	  focal	  point)	  to	  decide	  internally	  which	  individual	  of	  which	  organisation	  will	  deliver	  an	  interven-­‐tion	   and	   what	   its	   content	   will	   be.	   The	   name	   of	   that	   individual	   and	   a	   draft	   of	   the	  intervention	   are	   then	   communicated	   to	   the	   NGO	   liaison	   officer	   of	   the	   secretariat.	  Observer	   interventions	   are	   often	   also	   permitted	   on	   specific	   issues	   during	   delibera-­‐tions	  in	  contact	  groups	  at	  the	  sole	  discretion	  of	  the	  chairs	  of	  the	  contact	  group,	  with	  some	  chairs	  being	  more	   likely	  to	  allow	  observer	   interventions	  than	  others	  (see	  also	  footnote	  94	  below).	  While	  on	  occasion	   intervention	  opportunities	  are	  given	  on	  very	  short	   notice,	   they	   typically	   only	   arise	   when	   requested	   in	   advance	   by	   observer	  organisations	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  plenary	  interventions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	   The	  numbers	  presented	  in	  the	  table	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  caution:	  the	  number	  of	  participants	   from	  non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries	   shown	   in	   the	   table	   refer	   to	  participants	   that	  are	   regis-­‐tered	   as	   delegates	   of	   an	   organisation	   that	   has	   its	   head	   office	   –	   as	   registered	  with	   the	   observer	  database	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  –	  in	  a	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  country.	  While	  this	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  crude	  proxy	  of	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  participation,	  the	  actual	  numbers	  are	  very	  likely	  different.	  This	   is	  because	  the	  loca-­‐tion	  of	   the	  head	  office	   is	  not	  necessarily	  the	   location	  of	  each	  delegate.	  This	   is	  especially	  true	  for	  networks	   of	   organisations	   or	   large	   international	   organisations.	   For	   example,	   the	   delegates	   for	  Greenpeace	   China	   are	   counted	   as	   Annex	   I	   country	   delegates	   since	   Greenpeace	   International’s	  head	  office	   is	   in	  The	  Netherlands,	  while	   a	  number	  of	  delegates	  of	   the	  NGO	  Focus	  on	   the	  Global	  South	  who	  are	  in	  fact	  located	  in	  Annex	  I	  countries	  are	  counted	  as	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  since	  that	  organisa-­‐tion’s	  head	  office	  is	  in	  the	  Philippines.	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  With	   regards	   to	   the	   special	   case	   of	   the	   two	   different	   coalitions	   of	  NGOs	  within	   the	  ENGO	   constituency,	   CAN	   and	   Climate	   Justice	   Now!,	   the	   practice	   of	   providing	   one	  intervention	  slot	   for	  each	  constituency	  has	  already	  caused	  some	  conflict	  when	  both	  coalitions	   sought	   to	  present	   their	   views	   in	   the	  plenary.	  Being	   aware	  of	   this	   conflict	  and	  apparently	  embracing	  the	  mandate	  of	  facilitating	  efficient	  observer	  participation,	  the	   NGO	   liaison	   officer	   can	   attempt	   to	   find	   creative	   solutions	   to	   the	   problem,	   for	  example	  by	  trying	  to	  persuade	  the	  chair	  of	  a	  meeting	  to	  allow	  both	  ENGO	  coalitions	  to	  deliver	  an	   intervention	  by	   taking	  up	  an	  unused	  spot	  of	  one	  of	   the	  other	  constituen-­‐cies.94	  The	   existence	   of	   two	   NGO	   coalitions	   within	   the	   ENGO	   constituency	   has	   also	  caused	  some	   friction	  with	  regards	   to	   the	  use	  of	   the	  ENGO	  meeting	  room	  and	  office,	  which	  are	  provided	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat,	  and	  which	  CAN,	  as	  constituency	  focal	  point,	  administers	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  whole	  constituency.	  
NGO	  delegates	  have	  limited	  access	  to	  some	  of	  the	  meeting	  rooms,	  namely	  those	  in	  which	  informal	  meetings	  and	  closed	  contact	  groups	  are	  held,	  thus	  leaving	  all	  plenary	  sessions	   open	   for	   access	   as	  well	   as	   contact	   groups	   that	   are	   not	   declared	   closed	   to	  observers.	  The	  principle	  established	  by	  the	  draft	  rules	  of	  procedure	  gives	  observers	  access	   to	   both	   plenaries	   and	   “private”	   meetings,	   such	   as	   contact	   groups,	   (UNFCCC	  1996:	   rule	  30,	   footnote)	  but	   the	   later	   clarification	  of	   this	   rule	  by	   the	  COP	   (UNFCCC	  1998:	  decision	  18/CP.4)	  stipulates	  that	  contact	  groups	  are	  open	  to	  observers	  unless	  a	  third	  of	  the	  parties	  request	  it	  or	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  contact	  group	  decides	  that	  the	  contact	  group	   should	  proceed	   closed	   to	  observers.	   In	  practice	   this	  often	  means	   that	   after	   a	  first	  open	  meeting	  of	  a	  newly	  established	  contact	  group,	  the	  group	  moves	  into	  closed	  deliberations	  and	  returns	  to	  the	  open	  format	  for	  its	  final	  meeting.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	   In	  my	  role	  as	  CAN	  working	  group	  coordinator	  I	  gained	  some	  first	  hand	  insights	  into	  the	  logistics	  of	  arranging	  interventions	  for	  NGO	  observers:	  “I	  went	  to	  see	  […]	  [the	  NGO	  liaison	  officer	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat]	  to	  ask	  for	  an	  intervention	  in	  the	   CG	   on	  means	   [available	   to	   Annex	   I	   parties	   to	   fulfill	   their	  mitigation	   commitments,	   in	   other	  words,	  flexible	  mechanisms].	  She	  told	  me	  to	  email	  her	  [the]	  text	  of	  the	  intervention	  and	  [the	  name	  of]	  the	  person	  to	  deliver	  [the	  intervention]	  plus	  time	  &	  date	  of	  the	  CG	  where	  we	  want	  to	  do	  it.	  She	  will	   then	  raise	  the	  request	  with	  the	   ‘substantive	  officer’	  of	  that	   issue	  (apparently	  the	  secretariat	  has	  a	   ‘substantive	  officer’	   for	  each	  of	   the	  agenda	   items	  who	  advices/assists	   the	  chairs	  of	  AWGs,	  CGs	  etc.)	  who	  will	   then	   forward	  the	  request	   to	   the	  chair	  of	   the	  CG	  and	  get	  back	  to	  her.	  She	  said	  that	   some	   chairs	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   agree	   to	   intervention	   requests	   than	   others	   ([…])	   –	   so	   we	  should	  be	  fine	  [and	  have	  our	  request	  granted].	  	  	   I	  also	  asked	  about	  problem	  [regarding	  conflict	  over	  intervention	  slots]	  b/w	  CAN	  and	  CJN	  and	  she	  said	   she’s	   trying	   to	   get	   both	   a	   slot	   if	   possible,	   e.g.	   by	   convincing	   chairs	   to	   give	  un-­‐used	   slots	   of	  RINGOs	  or	  loc.	  gov’ts	  [i.e.	  LGMAs]	  to	  ENGOs	  as	  well.	  […]”	  (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  2	  April	  2009)	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  NGO	  delegates	  are	  often	  denied	  access	   to	  documents	  at	   the	  document	  centre.	  As	   a	   general	   rule	   observers	   are	  not	   given	  direct	   access	   to	  preliminary	  draft	  versions	   of	   documents	  while	   they	   generally	   can	   request	   final	   draft	   versions,	   or	   “L”	  documents,	   or	   the	   conclusions	   when	   they	   become	   available.	   This,	   however,	   differs	  significantly	   between	   the	   setting	   of	   the	   session	   (COPs	   vs.	   Intersessionals,	   with	   the	  latter	   having	  much	  more	   relaxed	   access	   restrictions)	   as	  well	   as	   according	   to	   other,	  seemingly	   random,	   factors.	   For	   example,	   in	   at	   the	   2007	   Bali	   COP,	   for	   a	   while	  documents	  were	  freely	  available	  to	  observers	  until,	  or	  so	  it	  seemed,	  the	  locally	  hired	  auxiliary	  staff	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat	  that	  operated	  the	  document	  centre	  were	  told	  by	  (presumably	  permanent)	  secretariat	  staff	  that	  only	  members	  of	  party	  delegations	  were	  eligible	  for	  most	  documents	  (field	  note,	  Bali,	  7	  December	  2007).	  
4.5.1.3 Media	  A	  final	  group	  of	  “participants”	  are	  media	  representatives,	  who	  only	  have	  access	  to	  the	  proceedings	  in	  the	  plenaries,	  but	  for	  which	  access	  to	  specific	  press	  conference	  rooms	  as	  well	  as	  a	  dedicated	  media	  centre	  is	  reserved	  (both	  with	  no	  access	  for	  observers).	  Media	   representatives	   are	   not	   strictly	   considered	   “participants”	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	  sessions,	   which	   is	   illustrated	   by	   the	   lists	   of	   participants	   issued	   by	   the	   UNFCCC	  secretariat,	  which	  lists	  the	  names,	  titles	  and	  affiliations	  of	  all	  participants	  from	  states,	  UN	  bodies,	  IGOs	  and	  NGOs,	  but	  only	  includes	  an	  overall	  number	  of	  media	  representa-­‐tives	   for	   information	   purposes.	   Media	   certainly	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	  formation	  and	  shaping	  of	  public	  opinion	  with	  regards	  to	  climate	  change	  but	  this	  role	  has	  not	  been	  a	  focus	  of	  this	  research	  (for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion,	  especially	  with	  regards	   to	   the	   media’s	   agenda	   setting	   role,	   cf.	   for	   example	   Newell	   2000).	   This	   is	  partially	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  interest	  that	  most	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  apart	  from	  the	  COPs	  receive	   from	  media	   organisations.	   Also	   the	   interaction	   with	   media	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	  conferences	  is	  not	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ENGOs	  at	  these	  conferences,	  with	  the	   latter	   being	   the	  main	   focus	   of	   this	   research.	   This	   holds	   true	   even	   in	   light	   of	   a	  multitude	  of	  media	  interactions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  negotiations:	  CAN,	  for	  example,	  holds	  regular	  press	  conferences	  at	  COPs	  and	  Intersessionals,	  stunts	  like	  the	  Fossil	  of	  the	   Day	   awards	   are	   mainly	   targeted	   at	   media,	   and	   media	   are	   at	   least	   part	   of	   the	  anticipated	  audience	  of	  publications	  such	  as	  the	  ECO	  newsletter.	  Nonetheless,	  media	  work	  is	  not	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  most	  of	  the	  ENGOs’	  participants	  and	  much	  of	  the	  media	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  work	  that	  does	  take	  place	  is	  targeted	  at	  media	  organisations	  “at	  home”	  (as	  opposed	  to	  those	  few	  participating),	  thus	  remaining	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  research.	  
4.5.2 Negotiation	  Arenas	  
All	  of	  the	  negotiation	  sessions	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  period	  were	  concurrent	  meetings	  of	  at	  least	  two	  and	  up	  to	  six	  convention	  bodies:	  the	  most	  important,	  the	  COP	  and	  its	  Kyoto	   Protocol	   equivalent,	   the	   CMP,	  were	   convened	   once	   a	   year	   in	   December.	   The	  permanent	  Subsidiary	  Bodies	  of	  COP	  and	  CMP,	   the	  SBSTA	  and	  SBI,	   are	  holding	   two	  sessions	  each	  year	  –	  one	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  COP/CMP	  and	  a	  second	  one	  in	  early	  June.	   During	   the	   fieldwork	   period,	   two	   temporary	   negotiation	   bodies	   were	   estab-­‐lished	  –	  so	  called	  ad-­‐hoc	  working	  groups,	  the	  AWG-­‐KP	  and	  the	  AWG-­‐LCA,	  both	  with	  a	  limited	  negotiation	  mandate	  and	  a	  limited	  life	  span	  (both	  were	  required	  to	  conclude	  their	  work	  programme	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  COP).	  Both	  of	  these	  bodies	  met	  not	   only	   during	   the	   sessions	   of	   the	   COP/CMP	   as	   well	   as	   the	   June	   sessions	   of	   the	  Subsidiary	   Bodies	   but	   also	   had	   additional	   dedicated	   sessions	   (two	   in	   2008,	   four	   in	  2009)	  to	  complete	  their	  work	  programme.	  
Each	  of	  these	  six	  bodies,	  at	  each	  of	  their	  sessions,	  goes	  through	  a	  similar	  succes-­‐sion	  of	  use	  of	  different	  negotiation	   “arenas.”	  These	  negotiation	  arenas	  mainly	  differ	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  their	  formality,	  openness,	  inclusiveness	  and	  transparen-­‐cy.	  A	  session	  always	  opens	  in	  plenary,	  the	  first	  type	  of	  negotiation	  arena.	  The	  plenary	  is	   the	   most	   formal,	   open	   and	   inclusive	   arena:	   the	   tables	   of	   the	   delegations	   are	  arranged	   in	   a	   fixed	   (alphabetical	   order),	   the	   agenda	  of	   the	  plenary	   is	  prepared	  and	  circulated	   in	   advance,	   interpretation	   services	   in	   all	   six	   official	   UN	   languages95	  are	  provided,	  the	  proceedings	  are	  recorded	  and	  webcast,	  the	  plenary	  is	  open	  to	  all	  party	  delegations	   as	   well	   as	   media	   and	   non-­‐state	   observers,	   and	   the	   proceedings	   follow	  established	   formal	   rules	   and	   practices.	   The	   plenary	   is	   also	   the	   only	   arena	   where	  formal	  decisions	  can	  be	  taken.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	   On	  occasion,	  additional	  languages	  are	  provides	  if	  requested	  (and	  paid	  for)	  by	  parties.	  For	  example,	  the	  Indonesian	  host	  of	  the	  2007	  Bali	  Climate	  Conference	  provided	  for	  interpretation	  to	  and	  from	  Indonesian	   throughout	   the	   plenary	   sessions	   of	   that	   conference	   and	   Japan	   often	   arranges	   for	  Japanese	   interpretation	  when	   senior	   officials	   such	   as	   the	  minister	   or	   the	   prime	  minister	   are	   in	  attendance.	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  While	  being	  the	  most	  open	  and	  inclusive	  arena	  of	  the	  negotiations,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  most	  formal,	  which,	   in	  practice,	  most	  often	  means	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  statements	  are	  prepared	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  meeting	  and	  re-­‐state	  already	  well	  known	  positions	  of	  the	  parties.	   Due	   to	   the	   formal	   nature	   of	   the	   plenary,	   there	   is	   often	   little,	   if	   any,	   actual	  negotiating	  and	  bargaining.	  Rather,	  after	  working	  through	  some	  formal	  requirements	  such	  as	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  agenda,	  the	  election	  of	  officers	  and	  so	  forth,	  the	  plenary	  typically	  decides	  to	  establish	  contact	  groups	  or	  mandate	  the	  chairs	  of	  the	  session	  or	  other	   individuals	   to	  carry	  out	   informal	  consultations	  on	   individual	  agenda	   items.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  a	  session,	  plenaries	  then	  reconvene	  to	  adopt	  the	  draft	  conclusions	  or	  draft	  decisions	   prepared	   by	   contact	   groups	   or	   by	   the	   chairs	   based	   on	   informal	   consulta-­‐tions.	   This	   is	   often	   a	   rubber-­‐stamping	   exercise	   –	   especially	   during	   intersessional	  meetings	  –,	  as	  the	  substantive	  negotiations	  have	  already	  been	  held	  and	  resulted	  in	  an	  agreed	   draft	   text.	   However,	   on	   occasion	   the	   closing	   plenary	   gives	   parties	   the	  opportunity	   to	   state	   their	   disagreement	   with	   decisions	   taken	   or	   not	   taken,	   for	  example	  a	  number	  of	  very	  emotional	  statements	  by	  developing	  countries	  were	  made	  during	  the	  closing	  plenary	  of	  the	  CMP	  in	  Poznań,	  where	  Annex	  I	  countries	  blocked	  a	  decision	   to	   provide	   more	   financial	   means	   to	   the	   Adaptation	   Fund	   through	   the	  extension	   of	   the	   Shares	   of	   Proceed96	  (field	   note,	   Poznań,	   13	   Dec	   2008).	   On	   other	  occasions,	  such	  as	  the	  closing	  plenary	  of	  the	  CMP	  in	  Bali	  or	  the	  COP	  in	  Copenhagen,	  substantial	   developments	   might	   occur,	   such	   as	   the	   US’ 	   agreement	   after	   long	  resistance	  to	  the	  Bali	  Action	  Plan	  or	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  adopt	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord,	  which	  had	  been	  agreed	  on	  by	  a	  number	  of	  parties	  in	  informal	  meetings,	  as	  an	  official	  UNFCCC	  decision.	  Table	  3	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  the	  typical	  stages	  and	  negotiating	  arenas	  through	  which	  an	  issue	  typically	  progresses	  during	  an	  UNFCCC	  session.	  
Contact	  groups	  are	  a	  more	  informal	  type	  of	  negotiation	  arena	  than	  the	  plenaries.	  This	  is	  expressed	  in	  a	  number	  of	  formal	  differences	  and	  functional	  aspects.	  In	  formal	  respects,	  contact	  groups,	  also	  known	  as	  informal	  groups,	  or	  some	  times	  “non-­‐groups”	  –	  to	  underscore	  the	  fact	   that	  the	  groups	  do	  not	  have	  any	  formal	  or	  decision	  making	  status	  (Depledge	  2005)	  –	  differ	  from	  plenaries	  in	  that	  no	  agenda	  is	  prepared	  or	  has	  to	  be	   followed,	   conversation	   takes	   place	   in	   English	   only,	   they	   have	   a	   free	   seating	  arrangement.	  Although	  typically	  originally	  scheduled	  within	  the	  regular	  UN	  meeting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	   For	  more	  details	  on	  “Share	  of	  Proceeds,”	  cf.	  also	  footnote	  79	  above.	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  times	   from	   10am	   to	   6pm,	   contact	   groups	   are,	   unlike	   plenaries,	   often	   re-­‐scheduled	  outside	  of	   these	  times	  and,	  especially	   toward	  the	  end	  of	  major	  negotiation	  sessions,	  well	  into	  the	  night.	  Contact	  groups	  are	  open	  to	  all	  parties	  and,	  unless	  required	  by	  at	  least	  one	  third	  of	   the	  parties	  or	  decided	  by	  the	  contact	  group	  co-­‐chairs,	   to	  NGO	  and	  IGO	  observers.	  
Table	  3:	  	  Time	   Line	   and	   Negotiation	   Arenas	   of	   Negotiations	   Regarding	   Flexible	   Mechanisms	  
During	  AWG-­‐KP	  Session	  in	  Bonn,	  28	  Mar	  to	  8	  Apr	  2009	  
Date	   	   Type	  of	  meetings	  held	  under	  AWG-­‐KP	  	  (all	  agenda	  items)	  
	  
	  
Flexible	  Mechanisms	  	  
(agenda	  item	  5(a))	  28	  Mar	  	   n/a	  (Opening	  Plenary	  scheduled	  but	  cancelled	  due	  to	  another	  meeting	  (AWG-­‐LCA	  plenary)	  taking	  up	  too	  much	  time)	  
	   n/a	  
29	  Mar	  	   Plenary	  (very	  short	  first	  part	  of	  the	  opening	  plenary,	  covering	  only	  two	  formal	  agenda	  items)	   	   n/a	  30	  Mar	  	   Plenary	  (discussion	  on	  organisation	  of	  work	  at	  the	  session;	  agreement	  to	  establish	  contact	  groups	  on	  a	  number	  of	  agenda	  items	  and	  launch	  informal	  consultations	  on	  others)	  
	   Agreement	  to	  establish	  Contact	  Group	  (CG)	  	  
31	  Mar	  	   Plenary	  	   	   Agenda	  item	  taken	  up	  in	  plenary:	  AWG-­‐KP	  chair	  introduced	  the	  text	  prepared	  by	  the	  chair	  on	  the	  item	  before	  the	  session	  and	  statements	  were	  given	  by	  party	  groupings.	  
Contact	  Group	  established.	  01	  Apr	   	   Contact	  Groups	  and	  Informal	  consultations	   	   CG	  (open	  to	  observers)	  Parties	  start	  work	  on	  negotiating	  text	  prepared	  by	  the	  AWG-­‐KP	  chair	  before	  the	  session	  based	  on	  the	  previous	  rounds	  of	  negotiations	  02	  Apr	   	   Contact	  Groups	  and	  Informal	  consultations	   	   CG	  (closed	  to	  observers)	  Parties	  continue	  work	  on	  chair’s	  text:	  going	  through	  options	  contained	  in	  text;	  either	  deleting,	  merging,	  retaining	  or	  referring	  them	  to	  the	  AWG-­‐LCA.	  03	  Apr	  to	  	  06	  Apr	   	  	   Informal	  Consultations	   	   Informal	  consultations	  based	  on	  chair’s	  text	  as	  amended	  by	  contact	  group:	  further	  deletion	  of	  text	  options,	  removal	  of	  text	  brackets	  (i.e.	  agreement	  on	  options),	  general	  improvements	  to	  text	  07	  Apr	   	   Contact	  Groups	  and	  Informal	  consultations	   	   CG	  (open	  to	  observers)	  discussion	  of	  draft	  conclusions	  to	  agenda	  item	  as	  prepared	  by	  CG	  co-­‐chairs	  based	  on	  CG	  meetings	  and	  informal	  consultations	  08	  Apr	   	   Closing	  plenary	   	   Closing	  plenary	  adopts	  draft	  conclusion	  as	  discussed	  in	  CG	  
Sources:	  Field	  Notes	  (29	  Mar	  2009	  to	  08	  Apr	  2009,	  Bonn);	  Official	  Daily	  Programmes	  (UNFCCC	  2009b);	  Earth	  
Negotiation	  Bulletin	  (ENB	  2009)	  Contact	   groups	   are	   typically	   established	  by	  decision	  of	   the	  plenary	  of	   a	  negotiation	  body	  and	  co-­‐chaired	  by	  two	  delegates	  (one	  from	  an	  Annex	  I	  country	  and	  one	  from	  a	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  non-­‐Annex	   I	   country)	   as	   proposed	   by	   the	   chair.	   As	   contact	   groups	   are	   normally	  dealing	   with	   specialised	   issues	   within	   the	   negotiations,	   they	   are	   normally	   only	  attended	  by	  delegates	  and	  observers	  with	  a	  particular	   interest	  and	  expertise	   in	  that	  area.	  This	   is	  particularly	  useful	   for	   small	  delegations	  as	   it	  enables	   them	  to	   focus	  on	  only	  some	  issues	  while	  leaving	  others	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  their	  colleagues	  from	  their	  party	   grouping.	   Another	   effect	   of	   this	   specialisation	   is	   that	   the	   same	   delegates	  will	  work	   together	   on	   the	   same	   issue	   on	   a	   number	   of	   occasions,	   often	   across	   different	  negotiation	  sessions,	  thus	  building	  a	  sustained	  working	  relationship	  with	  each	  other.	  Chairs	  also	  tend	  to	  mandate	  the	  co-­‐chairing	  of	  contact	  groups	  on	  the	  same	  issue	  to	  the	  same	   individuals	   across	   different	   sessions,	   which	   further	   promotes	   a	   productive	  working	  atmosphere	  within	  the	  contact	  groups.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  two	  types	  of	  negotiation	  arenas	  (plenary	  and	  contact	  group)	  that	  are	  open	  to	  all	  parties	  and	  often	  to	  observers	  and	  that	  have	  their	  meeting	  times	  and	  places	  publicly	  announced,	  there	  are	  often	  informal	  consultations	  carried	  out	  on	  specific	  issues.	  Depledge	  (2005)	  points	  out	  that	  these	  informal	  consultations	  are	  done	  for	  two	  broad	  categories	  of	  reasons.	  First,	   informal	  consultations	  are	  carried	  out	  on	  issues	  of	  a	  very	   technical	  or	  procedural	  nature,	  where	  general	   interest	   is	  so	   limited	  that	   the	  convening	  of	  a	   full-­‐scale	  contact	  group	   is	  not	  warranted.	  The	  other	  class	  of	  issues	  includes	  particularly	  politically	  sensitive	  issues,	  where	  a	  contact	  group	  format	  could	  prove	   to	   be	   unproductive	   as	   positions	   are	   too	  hotly	   contested	   or	   parties	   feel	  incapable	  of	  speaking	  frankly	  about	  their	  views	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  others	  (observers	  or	   party	   delegates).	   Representing	   an	   additional	   category	   of	   reasons,	   informal	  consultations	  can	  also	  be	  demanded	  by	  parties	  instead	  of	  full-­‐scale	  contact	  groups	  if	  parties	  feel	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  issue	  under	  consideration	  is	  not	  high	  enough	  to	  warrant	   the	   considerable	   time	  and	  effort	   such	  a	   group	  entails.	   For	   example,	   during	  the	   March/April	   2009	   Bonn	   session	   of	   the	   AWG-­‐KP,	   a	   substantial	   disagreement	  between	  the	  G77	  and	  China	  and	  a	  number	  of	  Annex	  I	  countries	  existed	  as	  to	  whether	  contact	  groups	  should	  be	  established	  on	  a	  number	  of	  agenda	  items	  such	  as	  rules	  for	  LULUCF,	   the	   Flexible	   Mechanisms	   etc.	   The	   G77	   and	   China	   argued	   against	   the	  establishment	  of	  contact	  groups	  based	  on	  the	  allegation	  that	  these	  items	  had	  mainly	  been	  introduced	  to	  distract	  from	  negotiating	  the	  main	  mandate	  of	  the	  AWG-­‐KP	  –	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  future	  emission	  reduction	  commitments	  of	  Annex	  I	  countries	  –	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  and	   should	   therefore	   not	   be	   allowed	   to	   take	   time	   away	   from	   negotiations	   on	   this	  central	  question	  and	  should	  only	  be	  addressed	  through	  informal	  consultations.	  
During	  informal	  consultations,	  the	  chair	  of	  a	  session	  or	  body	  (e.g.	  the	  COP	  presi-­‐dent	  or	   the	  AWG-­‐KP	  chair)	  or	  another	  delegate	   tasked	  by	   the	  chair	  will	  discuss	   the	  matter	  at	  hand	  in	  private	  with	  representatives	  from	  key	  parties	  and	  party	  groupings	  in	  order	  to	  scope	  out	  space	  for	  a	  possible	  compromise.	  If	  trust	  in	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  chair	  is	  sufficient	  among	  the	  parties,	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  speak	  more	  frankly	  about	  the	  range	  of	  different	  options	   that	  might	  be	   acceptable	   to	   them	  and	  under	  what	   condi-­‐tions,	   while	   such	   frankness	   would	   be	   seen	   to	   possibly	   damage	   their	   negotiating	  position	  when	  exercised	  publicly.	  The	   time	  and	  place	  of	   these	  consultations	  are	  not	  publicly	  advertised	  and	  are	  not	  open	  to	  observers,	  nor,	   in	  fact,	   to	  representatives	  of	  parties	  other	  than	  those	  invited.	  
4.5.3 Text	  
Within	  the	  UNFCCC	  climate	  change	  regime,	  as	  within	  indeed	  any	  other	  international	  regime,	   “any	  negotiation	   […]	   can	  be	   characterized	  as	  a	  process	  of	   struggle	  between	  parties	   to	  secure	  the	  translation	  of	   their	   favoured	   ideas	   into	   texts”	   (Depledge	  2005:	  145).	  Several	  examples	  during	  the	   fieldwork	  phase	  highlight	   the	  central	   importance	  of	   text,	   including	   minor	   details	   such	   as	   punctuation,	   capitalisation	   and	   the	   use	   of	  singular	  or	  plural.	  	  
For	   example,	   consider	   the	   famous	   “Bali	   comma”	   in	   the	   Bali	   Action	   Plan.	   Para-­‐graph	  1.b.ii	  of	  the	  Bali	  Action	  Plan	  requests	  “mitigation	  action	  by	  developing	  country	  Parties	   in	   the	   context	   of	   sustainable	   development,	   supported	   and	   enabled	   by	  technology,	   financing	   and	   capacity-­‐building,	   in	   a	   measurable,	   reportable	   and	  verifiable	  manner”	  (UNFCCC	  2007b:	  para	  1.b.ii,	  own	  emphasis).	  The	  “Bali	  comma”	  is	  the	  comma	  after	  “capacity-­‐building”	  which	  was	  dropped	  and	  re-­‐inserted	  at	  different	  stages	  during	  the	  middle-­‐of-­‐the-­‐night	  negotiations	  leading	  into	  the	  last	  day	  of	  the	  Bali	  conference	   (field	   notes,	   Bali,	   14	   Dec	   2007).	   The	   re-­‐insertion	   of	   the	   comma	   was	   a	  result	   of	   the	   insistence	   of	   the	   USA	   (and	   assured	   their	   agreement	   to	   the	   text),	   who	  subsequently	   interpreted	   the	   sentence	  with	   the	   comma	   to	   stipulate	   that	   the	  phrase	  after	   the	   comma	   (that	   is	   the	  measurement,	   reporting	   and	   verification,	   or	   “MRV”	   in	  UNFCCC	   speak)	   refers	   to	   the	   whole	   preceding	   phrase,	   i.e.	   to	   mandate	   MRV	   of	   all	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  mitigation	  actions	  by	  developing	  countries.	  Developing	  countries	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  most	  notably	   India	  and	  China,	   insisted	  that	   the	  MRV	  only	  applies	   to	   the	   technology,	  finance	   and	   capacity-­‐building	   support	   of	   these	  mitigation	   actions,	   and	   possibly	   the	  mitigation	   actions	   so	   supported,	   but	   that	   any	   mitigation	   actions	   performed	   by	  developing	   countries	   without	   any	   external	   assistance	   would	   not	   be	   subjectable	   to	  MRV.	  
The	  political-­‐linguistic	  trick	  of	  the	  “Bali	  comma”	  enabled	  the	  compromise	  text	  to	  be	  adopted	  at	  the	  Bali	  meeting	  but	  the	  issues	  so	  resolved	  resurfaced	  anew	  during	  the	  Copenhagen	   climate	   talks,	   arguably	   contributing	   to	   the	   failure	   of	   that	   latter	   confer-­‐ence.	  Likewise,	  in	  the	  negotiations	  surrounding	  REDD,	  the	  USA,	  supported	  by	  Canada	  and	   Australia,	   were	   successful	   in	   their	   bid	   to	   ensure	   any	   reference	   to	   Indigenous	  Peoples	  be	  expressed	  as	  “indigenous	  people”	  –	  in	  lower	  case	  and	  singular	  –	  allowing	  for	   their	   interpretation	   of	   the	   text	   to	   only	   refer	   to	   individual	   “people”	   rather	   than	  “Peoples”	  with	  any	  collective	  identity,	  status	  and	  –	  subsequently	  –	  specific	  rights	  (for	  example,	   those	   contained	   in	   the	   United	   Nations	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,	  UNDRIP).	  
John	  Vidal,	  regularly	  covering	  the	  negotiations	  for	  the	  Guardian,	  reports	  another	  “surreal”	  example	  of	  such	  language	  issues:	  What’s	   the	   difference	   between	   “sustainable	   forest	   management”	  (SFM)	  and	  “sustainable	  management	  of	  forests”	  (SMF)?	  A	  very	  great	  deal	  in	  the	  surreal	  climate	  change	  talks	  […]	  where	  the	  final	  order	  of	  these	   three	   letters	   could	   make	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   global	  logging	  industry	  being	  subsidised	  by	  governments	  to	  continue	  clear-­‐felling	  […],	  and	  communities	  being	  left	  to	  live	  in	  strongly	  protected	  forests.	  SFM	  is	  the	  villain	  –	  a	  meaningless	  greenwash	  phrase	  adopt-­‐ed	  widely	  by	  the	  global	  logging	  industry	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  carry	  on	  busi-­‐ness	   as	   usual.	   SMF,	   however,	   emphasises	   conservation	   and	  protection.	  	   (Vidal	  2009a)	  The	   struggle	   to	   establish	   parties’	   own	   ideas	   as	   collectively	   agreed	   text	   generally	  follows	  a	  number	  of	  (partially	  overlapping)	  stages,	  each	  with	  their	  corresponding	  text	  forms.	  When	  negotiations	   on	   a	   new	   issue	   are	   started,	   for	   example	   the	   negotiations	  within	   the	   AWG-­‐KP,	  which	  was	   first	   established	   in	   2005,	   submissions	   from	  parties	  are	  requested	  by	  the	  new	  group	  (which	  ultimately	  means,	  by	  the	  parties	  themselves,	  as	  they	  make	  up	  the	  group)	  to	  provide	  their	  initial	  written	  input.	  Within	  the	  UNFCCC	  process,	  it	  is	  established	  practice	  that	  these	  submissions	  are	  then,	  without	  any	  editing	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  or	  translation97,	  assembled	  in	  a	  “MISC”	  document,	  one	  of	  the	  informal	  document	  types	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime,	  and	  circulated	  to	  parties.	  Since	  the	  negotiations	  under	  the	  UNFCCC	  are	  a	  party	  driven	  process,	  submission	  requests	  to	  non-­‐parties	  are	  rare.	  For	  example,	   during	   the	   negotiations	   under	   the	  AWG-­‐KP	   from	   its	   inception	   to	   its	   tenth	  session	  (in	  Copenhagen),	  only	  two	  out	  of	  the	  29	  submission	  requests	  addressed	  non-­‐parties	   as	   well	   (see	   column	   “Addressee”	   in	   table	   4	   below).	   Regardless,	   it	   is	   now	  established	  practice	   that	  observer	  organisations	  provide	  submissions	  of	   their	  views	  on	  any	  of	   the	   topics	  on	  which	  party	   submissions	   are	   requested.	  These	   submissions	  (even	  where	  explicitly	  invited)	  are	  not	  assembled	  in	  official	  documents	  nor	  circulated	  to	  parties	  but	  are	  made	  available	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  website98.	  
These	  initial	  submissions	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  raw	  input	  to	  the	  negotiation	  process	  and	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  first	  few	  rounds	  of	  negotiations	  during	  which	  parties	  share	  more	   information	   about	   their	   views	   as	   submitted,	   including	   further	   explanation	   of	  how	  ideas	   laid	  out	   in	  the	  submission	  could	  function	  in	  practice	  and	  identification	  of	  possible	  areas	  of	  convergence.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  AWG-­‐KP	  negotiations,	  this	  first	  stage	  took	  place	  during	  the	  first	  two	  sessions	  (AWGKP1,	  AWGKP2)	  during	  which	  the	  topics	  for	  submission	  requests	  were	  still	  vague	  and	  mainly	  referred	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  work	  programme	  of	   the	   group	   (see	   table	  4	  below).	  At	   the	   end	  of	   this	  phase,	   topics	  started	   to	   become	   more	   focussed	   and	   submission	   invitations	   now	   refer	   to	   more	  specific	   areas	   –	   AWGKP3	   requested	   specific	   input	   on	   means	   to	   achieve	   mitigation	  potential	   in	  Annex	   I	   countries	   (“means”),	  which,	  by	  means	  of	   further	   submission	  of	  parties,	  then	  further	  specialised	  into	  LULUCF	  and	  Flexible	  Mechanisms	  related	  issues.	  At	   this	   second	   stage,	   in	   the	   example	   by	   AWGKP5,	   written	   input	   from	   parties’	  submissions	  and	  further	  input	  from	  the	  negotiation	  session	  is	  compiled	  by	  the	  chairs	  (of	  the	  AWGKP)	  in	  informal,	  or	  “INF”	  documents,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  “means”	  document	   FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/INF.2,	  which	   at	   this	   stage	   reflects	   a	   rather	   chaotic	  “laundry	   list”	   (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  4	   Jun	  2008)	  of	   all	   possible	  options	   that	  parties	  had	  considered	  at	  any	  point	   in	   time.	  This	   is	   the	   first	   time	  at	  which	   input	   from	  parties	   is	  assembled	  in	  a	  text	  upon	  which	  further	  negotiations	  are	  based.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	   On	   rare	   occasions,	   “unofficial”	   translations	   are	   provided	   by	   the	   UNFCCC	   secretariat,	   as	   for	  example	   with	   a	   submission	   of	   Belarus	   during	   the	   AWG-­‐KP	   negotiations	   that	   was	   submitted	   in	  Russian.	  Most	  countries	  submit	  their	  contributions	  in	  English	  instead	  of	  (or	  in	  addition	  to)	  their	  national	  language	  where	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  other	  five	  UN	  languages,	  so	  that	  this	  is	  not	  frequently	  required.	  98	  	   http://unfccc.int/parties_observers/ngo/submissions/items/3689.php	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  Further	  rounds	  of	  submissions	  are	  typically	  invited	  based	  on	  these	  texts,	  and	  further	  negotiation	   submission	   dedicated	   to	   refining	   the	   text.	   Session	   AWGKP7	   –	   whose	  proceedings	  as	   related	   to	  Flexible	  Mechanisms	  are	  detailed	   in	   table	  3	  above	  –	   is	  an	  example	   of	   such	   a	   session,	   where	   negotiations	   in	   the	   contact	   groups	   focussed	   on	  merging,	  deleting	  and	  refining	  text	  options	  in	  a	  text	  prepared	  by	  the	  chair	  before	  the	  session	   based	   on	   previous	   negotiation	   rounds	   and	   various	   stages	   of	   party	   submis-­‐sions.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  first	  stage	  of	  negotiating,	  the	  relevant	  chairs	  (in	  the	  example,	  the	  chairs	  of	  the	  AWG-­‐KP)	  summarise	  the	  state	  of	  negotiations	  in	  an	  official	  document.	  These	   official	   documents	   are	   issued	   without	   the	   “INF”	   prefix	   and,	   as	   official	   UN	  documents,	  are	  translated	  in	  all	  six	  UN	  languages,	  English,	  French,	  Spanish,	  Russian,	  Arabic	  and	  Chinese.	  The	  text	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  often	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  language	  similar	  to	  the	  language	  used	  in	  final	  decisions	  by	  the	  COP	  or	  CMP	  to	  reflect	  actual	  possible	  final	  language	   that	   might	   be	   used	   in	   such	   decisions	   and	   is	   typically	   laden	   with	   square	  brackets	   around	   text	   which	   has	   not	   been	   agreed	   on	   by	   parties	   or	   that	   represents	  different	  options	   for	   the	  same	  piece	  of	   text,	  brackets	  are	  often	  nested	   (to	  represent	  options	   within	   options)	   on	   multiple	   levels,	   often	   even	   with	   the	   whole	   document	  placed	  in	  brackets.	  
At	   this	   stage,	   generally	  all	   ideas	  and	  proposals	  have	  been	   tabled	  by	  parties	  and	  are	  reflected	  in	  some	  way	  or	  another	  in	  the	  synthesised	  texts.	  Further	  negotiations	  then	  focus	   on	   refining	   this	   text	   with	   a	   particular	   emphasis	   on	   “removing	   brackets”	   by	  agreeing	  on	  particular	  wordings	  or	  removing	  bracketed	  options	  of	  text.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	   AWG-­‐KP	   negotiations	   up	   to	   Copenhagen	   (when	   the	   conclusion	   of	   work	   was	  mandated)	   this	  point	  was	   reached	  after	  AWGKP7,	  which	   can	  clearly	  be	   seen	  by	   the	  number	   and	   the	   topics	  of	   submissions	   requested	   from	  parties	   (as	   shown	   in	   table	  4	  below):	  while	  up	  to	  that	  point	  parties	  were	  invited	  to	  comment	  on	  a	  large	  number	  of	  issues	  with	  broad	   submission	  mandates,	   the	   submission	   requests	  of	  AWGKP7	  were	  much	  more	   focussed	  on	  specific	  comments	  on	   the	   text	   in	   front	  of	  parties,	  while	   the	  remaining	   pre-­‐Copenhagen	   sessions	   of	   the	   AWG-­‐KP	   did	   not	   request	   any	   additional	  submissions	   but	   rather	   focussed	   on	   the	   text	   already	   prepared.	   Text	   will	   then	   go	  through	  a	  number	  of	  iterative	  review	  cycles,	  supported	  through	  various	  negotiations	  fora	  (see	  section	  “Negotiation	  Arenas”	  above)	  with	  the	  final	  version	  either	  adopted	  by	  the	  relevant	  body	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  AWG-­‐KP,	  the	  CMP,	  or	  –	  more	  likely	  with	  more	  controversial	  issues	  –	  forwarded	  with	  the	  remaining	  	  brackets	  to	  	  the	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  high	  level	  segment	  of	  the	  COP/CMP,	  which	  usually	  convenes	  during	  the	  last	  few	  days	  of	  the	  COP/CMP	  meetings	  when	  environmental	  ministers	  or	  even	  heads	  of	  states	  or	  governments	   take	   over	   negotiations	   from	   civil	   servants,	   enabling	   more	   flexibility	  within	  the	  final	  negotiations.-­‐	  
4.6 Conclusions	  
The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   was	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   overall	   context	   of	   the	  fieldwork,	   especially	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   historical	   genesis,	   more	   current	   political	  developments	  and	  institutional	  make-­‐up	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  focussed	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  on	  the	  history	  of	  the	  international	  climate	  change	  regime	  by	  highlighting	  the	  rise	  of	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  political	  issue	  on	  the	  international	  agenda,	  starting	   with	   its	   first	   appearance	   at	   UNCHE	   in	   1972	   and	   the	   subsequent	   develop-­‐ments	   at	   the	   two	   World	   Climate	   Conferences	   (WCC-­‐1	   and	   WCC-­‐2)	   as	   well	   as	   the	  establishment	  of	  the	  IPCC	  and	  publication	  of	  its	  Assessment	  Reports,	  leading	  toward	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  1992	  and	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  in	  1997.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  lent	  specific	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  that	  the	  IPCC	  Assessment	  Reports	  played	  in	  this	  history	  and	  the	  specific	   institutional	  arrangements	  within	  the	  IPCC	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  these	  Reports	  (such	  as	  the	  line-­‐by-­‐line	  approval	  of	  the	  Summaries	  for	  Policy	  Makers	  by	  the	  government	  delegates	  in	  the	  IPCC	  plenary).	  
In	  the	  next	  step,	  I	  described	  the	  political	  development	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  and	  dur-­‐ing	   the	   fieldwork	  phase,	  while	  paying	  particular	  attention	   to	   the	  politics	   relating	   to	  carbon	  markets	   since	   that	   was	   the	   specific	   area	  within	   the	   climate	   negotiations	   in	  which	   I	   specialised	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   phase.	   In	   doing	   so,	   I	   outlined	   the	   political	  efforts	  that	  were	  begun	  at	  the	  UN	  climate	  change	  conference	  in	  Bali	  in	  2007	  and	  were	  supposed	   to	  be	   finalised	  by	   the	  end	  of	  2009	   in	  Copenhagen,	   to	  negotiate	  a	  compre-­‐hensive	   post-­‐2012	   climate	   change	   regime	   for	   the	   time	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	  commitment	   period	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   and	   described	   the	   two	  main	   negotiation	  tracks	   that	   were	   evident	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   phase.	   First,	   the	   Kyoto	   track	   within	  which	   parties	   to	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   (which,	   most	   notably,	   excludes	   the	   USA)	  negotiated	  in	  the	  AWG-­‐KP	  the	  emission	  reduction	  targets	  for	  industrialised	  countries	  for	  the	  time	  after	  2012	  including	  the	  specific	  rules	  of	  accounting,	  land	  use	  emissions	  and	   removals	   (LULUCF)	   and	   carbon	  markets.	   The	   second	   negotiation	   track,	  mainly	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  taking	  place	  in	  the	  AWG-­‐LCA,	  intended	  to	  advance	  all	  issues	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  most	  notably	  mitigation	  of	  those	  countries	  whose	  mitigation	  efforts	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  such	  as	  the	  USA	  and	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries,	  adaptation	  to	   the	   effects	   of	   climate	   change,	   tropical	   deforestation	   (under	   the	   agenda	   item	  “Reduction	   of	   Emissions	   from	  Deforestation	   and	   Forest	  Degradation,”	   or	  REDD),	   as	  well	   as	   additional	   issues	   such	   as	   financing,	   technology	   and	   capacity	   building.	   In	  concluding	   the	   first	   part	   of	   the	   chapter,	   I	   pointed	   out	   the	   failure	   of	   both	   tracks	   to	  come	   to	   a	   conclusion	   of	   their	   work	   programme	   by	   the	   envisioned	   dead	   line	   in	  December	   2009	   in	   Copenhagen	   and	   a	   resulting	   uncertainty	   with	   regards	   to	   the	  institutional	  structure	  of	  the	  post-­‐2012	  climate	  regime,	  especially	  whether	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  will,	  indeed,	  be	  continued	  for	  a	  second	  and	  subsequent	  commitment	  periods	  or	  whether	   it	   will	   be	   replaced	   by	   another,	   potentially	   less	   ambitious	   arrangement.	  However,	   I	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  regardless	  of	   the	  outcome	  of	   these	   future	  develop-­‐ments,	   it	   seems	   likely	   that	   the	   progress	   made	   in	   the	   deliberations	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  (for	  example,	  relating	  to	  the	  carbon	  market	  or	  REDD)	  will	  in	  some	  work	  be	  part	  of	  a	  future	  regime.	  
The	   second	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   focussed	   on	   the	   institutional	   make-­‐up	   of	   the	  UNFCCC.	   In	  particular,	   I	   introduced	   the	  several	   classes	  of	  participants:	  on	  one	  hand	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  convention	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  three	  types	  of	  observer	  organisa-­‐tions:	   UN	   observers,	   intergovernmental	   and	   non-­‐governmental	   observer	   organisa-­‐tions.	  I	  introduced	  the	  main	  distinction	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  of	  parties	  as	  either	  Annex	  I	  parties	  (which	  roughly	  translates	  to	  industrialised	  countries)	  or	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  parties	  and	   further	   introduced	   the	  main	   negotiating	   blocs	   that	   parties	   have	   established	   to	  enhance	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   their	   participation,	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   smaller	  delegations.	   In	  discussing	   the	  UNFCCC’s	   lack	  of	   formally	   agreed	   rules	   of	   procedure,	  and	   in	   particular	   a	   lack	   of	   agreement	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   rule	   on	   voting	   with	   the	  result	   of	   a	   de-­‐facto	   consensus	   requirement	   within	   the	   UNFCCC,	   I	   established	   that,	  formally,	   every	   party	   has	   the	   equal	   power	   to	   veto	   any	   decision.	   However,	   I	   also	  pointed	   out	   that,	   in	   practice,	   this	   power	   differs	   depending	   on	   a	   party’s	   negotiating	  bloc,	  its	  overall	  economic	  and	  geopolitical	  position,	  the	  size	  and	  skills	  of	  its	  delegation	  or	   factors	   such	   as	  power	   stemming	   from	   the	  moral	   authority	   commanded	  by	   some	  small	   island	   states	   due	   to	   their	   particularly	   vulnerable	   situations	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   climate	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  change	  or	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “consensus”	  of	  the	  chair	  of	  a	  UNFCCC	  meeting.	  
While	  parties	  take	  the	  central	  role	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  and	  have	  the	  most	  far	   reaching	   set	  of	  privileges,	   the	  delegates	  of	  observer	  organisations,	  most	  notably	  non-­‐governmental	   observer	   organisations,	   routinely	   outnumber	   party	   delegates.	   I	  introduced	   the	   constituency	   system	   that	   has	   developed	  within	   the	   UNFCCC,	  within	  which	   NGO	   observers	   are	   loosely	   and	   voluntarily	   associated	   with	   a	   number	   of	  constituencies	  that	  represent	  the	  different	  types	  of	  interests	  and	  backgrounds	  of	  the	  observers	   such	   as	   environmental	  NGOs,	   business	  NGOs,	   research	   institutions,	   trade	  unions	   and	   so	   forth,	   with	   the	   ENGO	   constituency	   currently	   undergoing	   an	   internal	  polarisation	  process	  between	  two	  distinct	  perspectives	  (the	  traditional	  environmen-­‐tal	   and	   a	   newly	   emerging	   perspective,	   self	   describing	   as	   the	   “climate	   justice”	  perspective).	   I	  also	  described	  how	  this	  system	  is	  used	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat	   to	  distribute	   information	   and	   limited	   resources	   such	   as	   secondary	   access	   badges	   or	  speaking	  slots	  for	  plenary	  interventions.	  Further,	  I	  pointed	  out	  the	  restrictions	  which	  non-­‐governmental	   observer	   organisations	   are	   subjected	   to	   in	   comparison	   to	   party	  delegates	  or	  intergovernmental	  observers	  with	  regards	  to	  access	  to	  meeting	  venues,	  documents	  and	  opportunities	  for	  direct	  participation.	  
In	  the	  next	  step,	  I	  described	  the	  different	  negotiation	  arenas	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  pointed	  out	   their	  different	   levels	  of	   formality,	  openness	  and	   inclusiveness,	  with	  plenaries	  being	   the	  most	  open,	  most	   formal	  and	  most	   inclusive	  of	   these	  arenas	  and	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  informal	  consultations	  (e.g.	  “friends	  of	  the	  chair”	  groups)	  taking	  the	   other	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum.	   I	   also	   pointed	   out	   how	   these	   characteristics	   of	   the	  negotiation	   arenas	   are	   of	   great	   importance	   for	   the	   participation	   of	   NGO	   observers,	  who	  only	  have	  access	  to	  plenary	  and	  some	  contact	  group	  meetings.	  Finally,	   I	  briefly	  introduced	  the	  different	  types	  of	  text	  that	  exist	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  explained	  the	  process	   of	   textual	   development	   (using	   the	   specific	   example	   of	   the	   deliberations	  within	   the	   AWG-­‐KP	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   phase)	   from	   raw	   input	   in	   the	   form	   of	  submission	   of	   parties	   and	   the	   proceedings	   at	   the	   negotiation	   sessions	   to	   formal	  negotiation	  text	  and	  further	  to	  draft	  decision	  text	  and	  finally	  to	  decisions.	  	  
The	  overall	  context	  provided	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  further	  development	  of	  this	  thesis	  –	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  participation	  of	  environmental	  NGOs	  in	  the	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  UNFCCC	  process,	  the	  contextual	  framework	  within	  which	  this	  participation	  is	  taking	  place	   is	   crucially	   important	   as	   this	   framework	  both	   imposes	   restrictions	  and	  opens	  opportunities	   for	   participation	   and	   has	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	  appreciate	   how	   ENGOs	   avoid	   or	   circumnavigate	   and	   use	   or	   further	   broaden	   them,	  respectively.	   Thus,	   the	   next	   chapter	   will	   proceed	   further	   in	   analysing	   how	   ENGOs	  negotiate	  issues	  of	  access	  and	  hierarchy	  within	  this	  framework.	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Chapter	  5 	  
	  
Inclusion	  and	  Exclusion,	  Influence	  and	  Resources	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   will	   focus	   in	   detail	   on	   issues	   related	   to	   access	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	  negotiations	   in	   general	   and	   the	   CAN-­‐I	   activities	   within	   and	   in	   relation	   to	   these	  negotiations	  in	  particular.	  In	  this	  context,	  I	  will	  first	  consider	  the	  general	  parameters	  of	  access	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  as	  well	  as	  the	  barriers	  thereto,	  in	  particular	  as	  experienced	  by	   individuals	   associated	   with	   ENGOs.	   Following	   that,	   I	   will	   specifically	   focus	   on	  access	  to	  the	  three	  settings	  of	  CAN	  activity	  as	  they	  related	  to	  UNFCCC	  politics:	  the	  in-­‐session,	  virtual	  and	  hybrid	  settings.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  that,	  however,	  the	  specifics	  of	  CAN	  work	   including	   the	   specific	   activities	   of	   CAN	   members,	   working	   groups	   and	   their	  representatives	  in	  these	  settings	  will	  receive	  substantial	  attention	  first.	  In	  relation	  to	  this	   examination,	   particular	   attention	   will	   be	   given,	   in	   the	   second	   section	   of	   both	  parts,	  to	  barriers	  to	  that	  access,	  as	  they	  might	  relate	  to	  access	  to	  the	  general	  UNFCCC	  regime	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  various	  settings	  of	  CAN-­‐I	  work	  respectively.	  
Examining	  these	  issues	  is	  important	  to	  further	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  work	  of	  CAN	  (and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree,	  ENGOs	  and	  other	  actors	  in	  general)	  within	  UNFCCC:	  in	  order	   to	   understand	   their	   participation	   in	   climate	   change	   politics,	   we	   need	   to	  examine	  how	  they	  can	  access	  the	  arenas	  in	  which	  the	  relative	  deliberations	  are	  taking	  place	  as	  well	  as	  which	  limits	  and	  barriers	  to	  access	  exist,	  as	  this	  might	  systematically	  exclude	  or	  marginalise	  certain	  perspectives	  from	  CAN	  and	  UNFCCC	  work.	  In	  relation	  to	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  CAN	  as	  public	  spheres	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  work	  of,	   inter	   alia,	   Jürgen	  Habermas	   (1990,	  1992)	  and	  Nancy	  Fraser	   (1990,	  2007,	  2008),	  this	   is	   also	   important	   as	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   public	   spheres	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   a	  largely	   free	   access	   to	   these	   spheres	   (as	   discussed	   in	   chapter	  2).	   In	   addition,	   given	  CAN’s	   implicit	   claim	   and	   self-­‐perception	   to	   represent	   the	   ENGO	   “constituency”	  (further	  entrenched	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat’s	  long	  established	  designation	  of	  CAN	  as	   the	   ENGO	   “focal	   point”	   –	   c.f.	   chapter	   4),	   especially	   in	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	  fieldwork	   period,	   this	   question	   of	   possible	   exclusions	   of	   certain	   perspectives	   and	  possible	  barriers	  to	  access	  can	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  perceived	  validity	  of	  that	  claim.	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  This	  becomes	  even	  more	  important,	  given	  both	  the	  implicit	  and	  explicit	  claims	  of	  the	  ENGO	  constituency	  to	  represent	  present	  and	  future	  generation’s	  interest	  in	  a	  liveable	  natural	   environment,	   which	   amounts	   to	   a	   claim	   that	   the	   relatively	   small	   group	   of	  environmental	  NGOs	  represented	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  acts,	  in	  fact,	  as	  a	  legitimate	  representative	  of	  this	  larger	  group.	  
Obviously,	   as	   a	   basic	   but	   overriding	   condition,	   participation	   in	   both	   the	   internal	  deliberations	   within	   CAN	   and	   the	   wider	   UNFCCC	   process	   requires	   access	   to	   the	  physical	  and	  virtual	  spaces	  where	  these	  deliberations	  are	  taking	  place.	  The	  nature	  of	  that	  access,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  barriers	  that	  might	  restrict	  such	  access	  and	  any	  means	  to	  overcome	   such	   barriers,	   is	   distinctly	   different	   for	   the	   three	   settings	   in	   which	   CAN	  work	  occurs	  and	  which	  have	  been	  outlined	  above	  (in-­‐session,	  virtual	  and	  hybrid)	  as	  well	   as	   for	   the	   general	   access	   to	   the	  UNFCCC	   sessions	   themselves.	  Therefore,	   these	  four	   distinct	   areas	   (UNFCCC	  plus	   three	   settings	   of	   CAN	  work)	  will	   subsequently	   be	  considered	  in	  turn	  –	  with	  some	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  specific	  activities	  of	  CAN	  in	  each	  of	  the	  settings	  –,	  after	  briefly	  recapitulating	  the	  characteristics	  of	  these	  settings	  here.	  
As	  “in-­‐session”	  setting,	   I	  understand	  the	  situation	   in	  which	  those	  CAN	  members	  that	   are	   physically	   present	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiation	   sessions	   work	   and	   interact	  with	   each	   other	   and	   other	   relevant	   actors	   during	   these	   sessions.	  Obviously,	   the	   in-­‐session	  setting	  can	  only	  occur	  during	  the	  few	  weeks	  of	  UNFCCC	  conferences	  each	  year.	  During	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  time,	  interaction	  within	  CAN	  takes	  places	  in	  what	  I	  previously	  called	   the	  “virtual”	  setting,	  wherein	  communication	  within	   the	  network	   is	  mediated	  through	   technological	  means	   such	   as	   email	   lists,	   telephone	   conferences,	   Skype	   and	  collaborative	   online	   tools,	   for	   example	   Wikis,	   Google	   Docs	   etc.	   Similar	   to	   the	   “in-­‐session”	  setting,	  the	  “hybrid”	  setting	  only	  occurs	  during	  UNFCCC	  negotiation	  sessions	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  those	  CAN	  members	  who	  are	  not	  physically	  present	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  venue	  and	  who	  therefore	  have	  to	  resort	  to	  the	  mediated	  communication	  means	  otherwise	  associated	  with	  the	  “virtual”	  setting	  to	  interact	  with	  their	  colleagues	  at	  the	  venue	  and	  follow	  the	  developments	  there.	  
5.1 General	  Access	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  Negotiations	  and	  Barriers	  
Generally,	   “any	   body	   or	   agency,	   whether	   ...	   governmental	   or	   non-­‐governmental”	  (UNFCCC	  1992:	  12)	  is	  allowed	  to	  seek	  accreditation	  to	  participate	  as	  observers	  in	  the	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  UNFCCC	   negotiations.	   However,	   the	   application	   for	   this	   accreditation	   requires	   a	  certain	   institutional	   status	   (the	   requirement	   of	   being	   some	   sort	   of	   an	   incorporated	  organisation	   and	   having	   charitable	   tax	   status	   in	   the	   country	   of	   incorporation)	   and	  relatively	  extensive	  documentation	  is	  required,	  such	  as	  documentary	  evidence	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  past	  work	  in	  areas	  related	  to	  climate	  change,	  annual	  reports	  including	  financial	   statements,	   formal	   documents	   detailing	   the	   governing	   structure	   of	   the	  organisation	  and	  so	  on	  (UNFCCC	  2006a,	  2010c).	  These	  requirements	  and	  the	  labour-­‐intensive	   application	   process	   certainly	   discourage	   some	   interested	   individuals	   and	  groups	  from	  applying	  for	  accreditation;	  in	  fact,	  comments	  from	  ENGO	  delegates	  have	  confirmed	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  shortly.	  
However,	  it	  is	  very	  common	  for	  environmental	  NGOs	  with	  accreditation	  to	  regis-­‐ter	   the	   delegates	   of	   other	   ENGOs	   or	   un-­‐incorporated	   groups	   for	   UNFCCC	   sessions	  (Hardstaff	   2007)	   and,	   in	   fact,	   CAN-­‐I	   and	   the	   regional	   and	   national	   CAN	   nodes	  routinely	   perform	   this	   service	   for	   delegates	   of	   CAN	   member	   organisations.	   This	  practice	  is	  also	  common	  among	  other	  constituencies	  –	  for	  example	  the	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  has	   an	  open	   invitation	   to	   register	  persons	  nominated	  by	   its	  members	   and	   likewise	   IETA,	   the	   International	   Emissions	   Trading	   Association,	  registers	   a	   large	   number	   of	   representatives	   of	   its	   member	   corporations	   (Hardstaff	  2007).	  Recently	   (at	   the	  Copenhagen	   climate	   conference	   and	  beyond)	   a	  practice	  has	  emerged	  of	   limiting	  NGO	  access	   to	   the	  negotiation	  venue	  by	  means	  of	  a	   “secondary	  badge”	   system.	   In	   this	   system	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   secondary	   access	   badges	   are	  distributed	  to	  each	  organisation	  when	  the	  venue	  approaches	  maximum	  capacity	  and	  are	   then	   required	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   regular,	   “primary”	   badge	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   the	  venue.	  Since	   the	  allocation	   formula	  of	   this	   system	   favours	  organisations	  with	   fewer	  registered	  participants,	  CAN-­‐I	  has	  actively	  encouraged	  all	  national	  and	  regional	  nodes	  as	  well	  as	  individual	  member	  organisations	  to	  seek	  their	  own	  accreditation	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  delegates	  on	  the	  CAN-­‐I	  list	  and	  thus	  avoid	  being	  penalised	  for	  having	  too	  many	  individuals	  registered.	  	  
In	   this	   context	   it	  was	   also	   revealed,	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   that	   some	   nodes	   and	  organisations,	   especially	   from	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries,	   find	   it	   difficult	   to	   fulfil	   the	  registration	   requirements	   with	   regards	   to	   documentation	   to	   be	   provided	   and	  institutional	  requirements	  as	  detailed	  above	  (private	  communication	  with	  CAN-­‐I	  staff,	  October	  2010).	  In	  addition,	  recently,	  in	  2009,	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat	  actively	  started	  
5.	  Inclusion	  and	  Exclusion,	  Influence	  and	  Resources	   184	  	  to	  encourage	  this	  practice	  by	  placing	  a	  notice	  in	  the	  relevant	  section	  of	  their	  website	  stating	  the	  “admission	  [of	  an	  organisation	  as	  observer]	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  to	  attend	  sessions.	  […]	  [T]he	  representatives	  of	  your	  organization	  can	  be	  nominated	  to	  attend	  sessions	  by	   already-­‐admitted	  observer	   organizations	  who	   agree	   to	  nominate	   them”	  (UNFCCC	  2009c).	  This	  change	  in	  policy	  was	  probably	  due	  to	  the	  very	  large	  volume	  of	  new	  accreditation	  request	  prior	  to	  COP15	  in	  Copenhagen.	  Before	  COP15	  in	  Copenha-­‐gen,	  the	  average	  annual	  number	  of	  newly	  accredited	  NGOs	  was	  58	  (ranging	  from	  19	  (COP7,	  Marrakech)	   to	  106	   (COP14,	  Poznań)),	  while	   for	  COP15	  345	  new	  NGOs	  were	  accredited.	   Further	   analysis	   (using	   linear	   regression	   analysis	   with	   the	   number	   of	  newly	   accredited	   NGOs	   as	   dependent	   variable	   and	   year	   of	   the	   session	   as	   well	   as	  dummy	   variables	   for	   each	   COP	   as	   independent	   variables)	   also	   showed	   that	   the	  difference	  in	  levels	  of	  new	  accreditations	  was	  only	  statistically	  significantly	  different	  from	   other	   COPs	   in	   the	   case	   of	   COP15	   (own	   calculations	   using	   data	   from	   UNFCCC	  2010e).	  
Furthermore,	  this	  change	  in	  positions	  was	  considered	  somewhat	  surprising	  since	  this	   encouragement	   creates	   a	   potentially	   confusing	   and	   harmful	   situation	   with	  regards	   to	  which	   organisation	   is	   responsible	   for	   potential	   breaches	   of	   the	   codes	   of	  conduct	   by	   delegates	   from	  other	   organisations	   so	   registered	   –	   this	   question	   occurs	  primarily	  as	  a	  result	  of	  unauthorised	  demonstrations	  inside	  the	  conference	  venue.	  To	  illustrate,	   during	   the	   November	   2000	   COP6	   in	   The	   Hague,	   an	   activist	   who	   was	  registered	   as	   an	   attendee	   to	   the	   COP	   through	   another	   organisation	   than	   his	   or	   her	  own,	   chained	   her-­‐	   or	   himself	   to	   the	   doors	   of	   the	   negotiation	   rooms,	   threatening	   to	  keep	  the	  doors	  shut	  until	  the	  negotiators	  in	  the	  room	  successfully	  broke	  the	  deadlock	  from	  which	  the	  negotiations	  were	  suffering	  (to	  illustrate	  the	  severity	  of	  this	  deadlock,	  COP6	  was,	   regardless	   of	   this	   action,	   ultimately	   suspended	   and	   resumed	   six	  months	  later	   as	   COP6bis).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   organisation	   that	   had	   registered	   the	   activist	  was	  threatened	  with	  withdrawal	  of	  their	  accreditation	  and	  ultimately	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  register	  anybody	  but	  full	  time	  employees	  of	  that	  organisation	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years	  (conversation	  with	  ENGO	  delegate,	   field	  notes,	  Bali,	  13	  Dec	  2007).	   Similarly,	  during	  the	   second	   week	   of	   the	   Copenhagen	   COP	   in	   December	   2009,	   a	   group	   of	   about	   30	  Youth	  delegates	   from	  developing	  and	  developed	  countries	  staged	  a	  sit-­‐in	  on	  a	  main	  junction	   within	   the	   conference	   centre	   (without,	   however,	   fully	   blocking	   traffic)	   to	  protest,	   among	   other	   things,	   the	   unprecedented	   near	   complete	   shut-­‐out	   of	   civil	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  society	  participants	  from	  the	  venue	  during	  the	  high-­‐level	  segment	  of	  the	  last	  few	  days	  of	  the	  conference	  (as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4).	  In	  this	  example,	  too,	  many	  of	  the	  Youth	  delegates	  were	  registered	  though	  other	  organisations	  than	  their	  own,	  thus	  jeopardis-­‐ing	  those	  organisations’	  future	  participation	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  meetings.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  found	  themselves	  not	  only	  in	  conflict	  with	  UN	  security	  but	  also	  with	  representatives	  of	   their	   registering	   organisations	   who	   asked	   them	   to	   end	   their	   action	   to	   avoid	  repercussions	   (fieldnotes,	   Copenhagen,	   16	  Dec	  2009;	   also	   cf.	   SustainUS	  2009).	   This	  illustrates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  there	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  organisations	  to	  be	  cautious	  about	  whom	  to	  include	  on	  their	  lists	  and	  therefore	  this	  creative	  way	  of	  circumventing	  barriers	  to	  achieving	  an	  own	  accreditation	  has	  limits.	  
Besides	  this	  institutional	  barrier,	  the	  main	  barrier	  for	  ENGOs	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  negotiation	   session	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   is	   financial.	   Normally,	   UNFCCC	   bodies	   hold	   two	  negotiation	  sessions	  annually,	  totalling	  about	  20	  days.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  workload	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   to	   produce	   an	   outcome	   by	   the	   end	   of	   2009,	   during	   the	  fieldwork	  period	  the	  number	  of	  meetings	  doubled	  in	  2008	  (4	  meetings,	  39	  days)	  and	  tripled	   in	   2009	   (6	   meetings,	   57	   days;	   see	   table	   1	   Error!	   Reference	   source	   not	  
found.in	  chapter	  3).	  It	  is	  clear,	  that	  the	  associated	  costs	  are	  difficult	  to	  meet	  for	  often	  underfunded	   ENGOs,	   and	   have	   often	   prohibitive	   effect	   on	   the	   participation	   of	  environmentalists	  from	  developing	  country	  ENGOs	  or	  smaller	  NGOs	  from	  developed	  countries.	   There	   are	   support	   schemes	   through	   which	   developed	   country	   govern-­‐ments	   or	   NGOs	   seek	   to	   enable	   the	   participation	   of	   NGO	   delegates	   from	   developing	  countries.	  For	  example,	  CAN	  Europe	  succeeded	  in	  securing	  funding	  from	  Scandinavi-­‐an	   governments	   to	   bring	   Southern	   NGO	   delegates	   to	   COPs	   in	   2006	   and	   2007.	  However,	  these	  schemes	  primarily	  focus	  on	  improving	  Southern	  participation	  at	  the	  Conferences	  of	  the	  Parties	  (COPs),	  which	  results	  in	  a	  clearly	  visible	  shift	  in	  the	  ratio	  of	  NGO	  delegates	   from	  developed	   countries	   to	   those	   from	  developing	   countries	   at	   the	  COPs	   compared	   to	   the	   other	   (so-­‐called	   intersessional)	   UNFCCC	   conferences	   (Holz	  2010).	  This	  funding	  comes	  with	  its	  own	  sets	  of	  issues	  and	  problems.	  For	  example,	  the	  funding	   of	   the	   government	   of	   Finland	   to	   support	   southern	   NGO	   attendance	   at	   the	  2007	  COP	   in	  Bali	  was	  subject	   to	  a	  set	  of	   restrictions	  and	  a	   timeline	   that	   resulted	   in	  only	   2	   days	   of	   decision	   making	   time	   during	   which	   coordinators	   of	   Southern	   CAN	  nodes	  had	  to	  decide	  which	  individuals	  to	  send	  to	  the	  COP.	  Since	  the	  decision	  making	  procedures	   in	   at	   least	   one	   of	   these	   nodes	   could	   not	   accommodate	   such	   short	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  that	  node	  ended	  up	  missing	  out	  on	  this	  chance	  –	  and	  subsequently	  raised	  this	   grievance	   at	   the	   CAN-­‐I	   Annual	   General	   Assembly	   in	   Bali	   (field	   note,	   Bali,	   16	  December	  2007).	  	  
It	  is	  also	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  visa	  problems	  might	  also	  represent	  a	  barrier	  to	  attendance	  at	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  and	  that	  these	  problems	  affect	  potential	  participants	  from	  developing	  countries	  much	  more	  often.	  Reports	  of	  individuals	  from	  developing	  countries	  who	  are	  not	  successful	  in	  securing	  an	  entry	  visa	  for	  the	  country	  in	  which	  a	  given	  UNFCCC	   session	   is	  held,	   are	  not	  uncommon	  and	   cause	   substantial	   frustration	  especially	   when	   this	   affects	   individuals	   for	   whose	   participation	   funds	   have	   been	  secured,	  which	  are	  thus	  lost	  (e.g.	  post	  field	  note,	  Copenhagen,	  Dec	  2009).	  
Furthermore,	  as	  mentioned,	  these	  prevailing	  problems	  –	  especially	  those	  related	  to	  funding	  –	  lead	  to	  lower	  participation	  of	  NGO	  delegates	  from	  developing	  countries	  at	  the	  smaller,	  intersessional	  conferences,	  which	  has	  significant	  implications	  for	  their	  effective	   participation	   in	   the	   overall	   process.	   Most	   obviously,	   it	   means	   that	   these	  observers	  cannot	  participate	  or	  influence	  the	  many	  discussions	  and	  decisions	  at	  these	  conferences.	   Furthermore,	   there	   are	   strong	   implications	   for	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  lobbying	   and	   the	   access	   to	   negotiators.	   The	   atmosphere	   at	   the	   intersessional	  meetings	  is	  generally	  less	  tense	  compared	  to	  the	  COPs,	  which	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  generally	  lower	  level	  of	  political	  seniority	  at	  these	  meetings99,	  the	  resulting	  focus	  on	  technical	  details	  as	  opposed	   to	  grand	  political	  breakthroughs,	  and	   the	  consequently	  lower	  attention	  of	  media	  and	  the	  public	  that	  is	  awarded	  to	  these	  meetings.	  As	  a	  result,	  negotiators	  are	  under	  less	  pressure	  and	  there	  are	  less	  time	  constraints	  compared	  to	  COPs	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  approach	  negotiators	  to	  ask	  for	  meetings	  and	  these	  are	  more	  open	   for	   inputs	   from	  and	  exchange	  with	  NGO	  delegates.	  Thus,	  NGO	  delegates	  who	   attend	   intersessional	   meetings	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   have	   many	   more	   chances	   to	  establish	   good	   rapport	   with	   individual	   negotiators	   during	   these	   intersessionals,	  which	   can	   then	   be	   useful	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   the	   same	   individuals	   during	   COPs	   even	  with	   their	   increased	   pressure	   in	   terms	   of	   time,	   expectations,	   demands	   due	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  	   The	  negotiators	   attending	   intersessionals	   are	  generally	  more	   technically	   focussed	   civil	   servants	  while	  at	  COPs	  often	  the	  environmental	  minister	  takes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  head	  of	  delegation	  or	  even	  Heads	  of	  State	  or	  Government	  attend.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  during	  the,	  thus	  named,	  high-­‐level	  segment	  of	  COPs	  wherein	  during	  the	  last	  few	  days	  most	  countries	  are	  represented	  by	  their	  envi-­‐ronmental	  minister	  or	  Head	  of	  State	  or	  Government.	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  presence	   of	   their	   minister,	   increased	   public	   interest	   in	   the	   session	   and	   higher	  expectations	  of	  “success.”	  I	   run	   into	   […]	   [a	   European	   negotiator]	  while	   she	  was	   queuing	   for	  coffee.	   I	  managed	  to	  get	  some	  information	  [from	  her]	  about	  what’s	  happening	  in	  the	  informals.	  	   	  […]	  I	  also	  got	  a	   chance	   to	   talk	  very	  briefly	  about	  some	  of	   the	  concerns	  that	  we	  were	  discussing	  within	  CAN.	   	  	   (field	  note,	  Copenhagen,	  11	  Dec	  2009)	  It	  was	  very	   clear	   to	  me	  during	   this	   situation,	   that	   this	   easy	  and	  quick	  access	   to	   the	  negotiator	  was	  only	  possible	  since	  there	  was	  already	  an	  established	  relationship	  with	  the	   individual	   as	   a	   result	   of	   my	   increased	   involvement	   with	   CAN	  work	   during	   the	  preceding	  year.	  In	  particular,	  I	  felt	  that	  the	  same	  access	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  for	  me	  at	  the	  previous	  COP	  in	  Poznań	  –	  which	  predated	  my	  increased	  involvement.	  	  
Before	  this	  first-­‐hand	  experience,	  I	  had	  frequently	  observed	  how	  ENGO	  delegates	  interrupted	  conversations	  they	  were	  having	  with	  other	  environmentalists	  to	  engage	  a	  party	  negotiator	  they	  knew	  and	  who	  walked	  past	  or	  came	  out	  of	  a	  closed	  session	  in	  front	   of	  which	   they	   had	   congregated.	   On	   one	   occasion,	   for	   example,	   I	   had	   joined	   a	  number	  of	  ENGO	  delegates	  who	  were	  waiting	  outside	  of	  a	  room	  within	  which	  a	  closed	  negotiation	   session	   took	   place.	   After	   the	   doors	   opened	   and	   the	   delegates	   started	  streaming	   out	   of	   the	   room,	   one	   of	   the	   environmentalists	   I	   had	   been	   talking	   to	  followed	   one	   of	   the	   negotiators	   to	   try	   and	   obtain	   information	   about	  what	   develop-­‐ments	   had	   occurred	   in	   the	   talks.	  When	   I	   asked	   him	   later	   how	   it	   went,	   he	   seemed	  irritated	  and	  even	  upset	   that	   the	  negotiator	  had	  refused	  to	  talk	  to	  him	  since	  he	  had	  thought	   he	   had	   a	   good	   relationship	   with	   that	   person	   that	   had	   developed	   over	   the	  course	   of	   many	   sessions	   (field	   note,	   Bonn,	   10	   Jun	   2008).	   Another	   CAN	   delegate	  provides	   more	   insights	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   these	   relationships,	   including	   their	  personal	  character:	  You	  meet	  these	  guys,	  you	  talk	  to	  these	  guys	  at	  conference	  after	  con-­‐ference	  after	  conference,	  so	  inevitable	  you	  form	  a	  relationship.	  	   	  […]	  Sometimes	   we	   get	   information	   from	   governments	   when	   [other]	  countries	  misbehave	  [in	  closed	  negotiations]	  –	  [they	  say]	  “NGOs	  do	  something	   about	   this”	   [for	   example	   through	   contacts	   with	   other	  NGOs	  or	  media	  in	  the	  countries	  in	  question].	  So	  it’s	  a	  give	  and	  take	  relationship	  but	  you	  have	  to	  grow	  trust	  with	  the	  people	  that	  you’re	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   talking	   to	  and	  vice	  versa,	   so	  all	   this	   is	  about	  building	  relationships	  and	  having	  trust,	  interpersonal	  trust.	   	  	   (conversation	  with	  CAN	  delegate,	  field	  note,	  Vienna,	  29	  Aug	  2007)	  Lack	  of	  attendance	  at	  the	  intersessional	  UNFCCC	  meetings	  can	  also	  restrict	  the	  insight	  into	  the	  political	  developments	  that	  underlie	  the	  specific	  versions	  of	  negotiating	  text	  that	   are	   adopted	   at	   the	   end	   of	   a	   meeting	   (or	   passed	   onto	   the	   next	   one).	   Without	  physical	   attendance	   at	   the	   meeting	   it	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   know	   the	   details	   of	   the	  contents	   of	   the	   different	   versions	   that	   documents	   have	   gone	   through	   during	   a	  meeting	  and	  even	  less	  possible	  to	  know	  which	  countries	  have	  proposed,	  supported	  or	  opposed	   certain	   changes	   to	   the	   document	   such	   as	   addition	   of	   text,	   changes	   to	   text,	  deletion	  of	  text	  or	  removal	  of	  brackets	  around	  parts	  of	  text	  and	  the	  specific	  justifica-­‐tions	  and	  bargains	  that	  accompany	  the	  changes.	  New	  versions	  of	  text	  under	  negotia-­‐tion	   are	   published	   regularly	   throughout	   a	   session,	   often	   with	   new	   versions	   of	   the	  same	  text	  coming	  out	  daily	  or	  even	  multiple	  times	  daily.	  Some	  of	  these	  text	  versions	  are	   easily	   accessible	   by	   NGO	   delegates	   (e.g.	   text	   versions	   that	   are	   distributed	   by	  UNFCCC	  staff	  during	  contact	  group	  meetings	  that	  are	  open	  to	  NGO	  observers),	  while	  access	  to	  others	  depends	  on	  environmentalists	  that	  are	  registered	  with	  a	  UN	  agency,	  like	  the	  UN	  University,	  or	  their	  own	  country’s	  official	  delegation100	  or	  the	  cooperation	  of	  party	  delegates	  that	  are	  supportive	  of	  the	  ENGO	  work.	  Within	  the	  ENGO	  communi-­‐ty	  at	  the	  sessions,	  distribution	  of	  text,	  which	  is	  not	  publicly	  available,	  typically	  occurs	  through	   working	   group	   coordinators.	   At	   working	   group	   meetings	   working	   group	  coordinators	  would	   often	  distribute	   copies	   of	   text	   that	   is	   relevant	   for	   that	  working	  group’s	  work	  to	  the	  ENGO	  colleagues	  present	  at	  the	  meeting.	  Further,	  working	  group	  coordinators	   would	   also	   receive	   text	   relevant	   to	   their	   working	   group’s	   work	   that	  ENGO	   delegates	  working	   on	   other	   issues	   have	   gained	   access	   to	   in	   one	   of	   the	  ways	  described	  and	  where	  the	  latter	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  working	  group	  in	  question.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  	  This	  latter	  is	  quite	  common	  for	  some	  countries	  –	  being	  registered	  as	  a	  member	  of	  an	  official	  party	  delegation	  equips	  the	  NGO	  delegate	  with	  a	  “pink	  badge”	  (as	  opposed	  to,	   for	  example,	  the	  yellow	  badges	   of	   NGO	   observers),	   which	   in	   principle	   grants	   them	   the	   same	   access	   as	   any	   other	   party	  delegate,	   e.g.	   access	   to	   documents	   that	   are	   not	   otherwise	   distributed	   to	   NGO	   observers.	   NGO	  delegates	  with	  pink	  badges,	  however,	  typically	  have	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  code	  of	  conduct	  that	  limits	  their	  activities,	  for	  example	  prohibiting	  them	  to	  make	  statements	  to	  media	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  country	  or	  access	  meeting	  rooms	  closed	  to	  observers.	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  Additionally,	   verbal	   statements	   made	   by	   party	   delegates	   during	   negotiations,	   in	  negotiation	  arenas	  that	  are	  open	  for	  observers,	  are	  not	  accessible	   to	  observers	  who	  are	  not	  present	  in	  person.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  statements	  made	  in	  those	  arenas	  (e.g.	  contact	   groups)	   differ	   crucially	   from	   those	   made	   in	   plenary	   sessions	   (which	   are	  accessible	   to	   the	   public,	   and	   therefore	   also	   to	   observers	   not	   physically	   present,	   by	  means	  of	  webcast	  and	  being	  open	  to	  media)	  in	  that	  plenary	  statements	  are	  often	  pre-­‐prepared,	   are	   much	   more	   formal	   and	   largely	   follow	   parties’	   well	   known	   official	  positions.	  
Knowledge	  of	  all	  these	  details,	  however,	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  specific	  insid-­‐er	  knowledge	  that	  convenes	  influence	  both	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  as	  well	  as	  in	  CAN.	   For	   example,	   such	   knowledge	   can	   be	   used	   to	   identify	   potential	   allies	   among	  states	  to	  advance	  environmentalists’	  objectives	  and	  to	  develop	  specific	  strategies.	  
The	  textual	  development	  with	  regards	  to	  two	  controversial	  CDM	  project	  types	  –	  Forests	   in	   Exhaustion	   (FiE)	   and	   Carbon	   Capture	   and	   Storage	   (CCS)	   –	   during	  COP14/CMP4	   in	   December	   2008	   in	   Poznań	   is	   a	   useful	   example	   to	   illustrate	   this	  (various	  field	  notes,	  Poznań,	  5	  -­‐	  11	  December	  2008):	  under	  the	  CMP	  agenda	  “Issues	  Related	   to	   the	   Clean	   Development	  Mechanism,”	   the	   CMP	   typically	   provides	   further	  guidance	   to	   the	   CDM	   Executive	   Board	   (EB),	   the	   body	   that	   oversees	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  operation	  of	  the	  CDM.	  In	  Poznań,	  during	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  contact	  group	  tasked	  with	  the	  detailed	  deliberations	  on	  this	  item	  and	  the	  preparation	  of	  draft	  conclusions	  to	   be	   adopted	   by	   the	   CMP	   plenary,	   text	   referring	   to	   “Forests	   in	   Exhaustion”101	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “Forests	  in	  Exhaustion”	  (FiE),	  no	  definition	  of	  this	  term	  existed	  nor	  was	  there	  a	  coherent	  understanding	  of	  what	  this	  concept	  related	  a	  potential	  new	  CDM	  project	  type	  involving	  FiE	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  Afforestation	  and	  Reforestation	  (A/R)	  CDM	  projects	  would	  entail.	  The	  original	  phrasing	  as	  “planted	  forests	  in	  exhaustion”	  (used	  in	  draft	  text	  to	  decision	  2/CMP.4,	  version	  9	  Dec	  2009,	  cit.	  in	  field	  note,	  Poznań,	  10	  Dec	  2009)	  at	  least	  clarified	  that	   the	   concept	   related	   to	  plantation	   forests	  but	  not	  much	   later	  even	   that	   limited	  specification	  was	  dropped.	  Therefore,	  CMP4	  ultimately	  agreed	  to	   instruct	  the	  CDM	  EB	  “to	  assess	  the	   implica-­‐tions	  of	  the	  possible	  inclusion	  of	   lands	  with	  forests	  in	  exhaustion	  as	  afforestation	  and	  reforesta-­‐tion	  [CDM]	  projects”	  (UNFCCC	  2009d,	  decision	  2/CMP.4,	  para	  42)	  and	  the	  board	  commissioned	  a	  review	   of	   this	   issue.	   That	   review	   describes	   for	   the	   first	   time	  what	   forestation	   of	   FiE	   as	   a	   CDM	  project	   type	   could	  mean	   in	   practice:	   while	   the	   CDM	   A/R	  methodology	   generally	   excludes	   land	  which	  was	   forest	   on	   December	   31,	   1989	   (in	   order	   to	   remove	   a	   possible	   perverse	   incentive	   to	  deforest	   land	   solely	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   later	   establishing	   a	   CDM	   re-­‐forestation	   project	   to	   earn	  carbon	  credits),	  the	  inclusion	  of	  FiE	  as	  understood	  by	  the	  CDM	  EB’s	  assessment	  would	  mean	  that	  land	  that	  might	  have	  been	  a	  forest	  by	  the	  deadline	  could	  also	  qualify	  for	  the	  CDM	  if	  a	  forest	  planta-­‐tion	   that	   was	   established	   on	   such	   land	   is	   expected	   to	   revert	   to	   non-­‐forest	   land,	   for	   example	  through	  final	  harvesting	  (final	  harvesting	  would	  make	  that	  forest	  a	  “forest	  in	  exhaustion”),	  unless	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  introduced	   into	   the	   text	   by	  Brazil	   and	   later	   supported	   by	   Indonesia,	   both	   of	  which	  would	  be	  one	  of	  the	  main	  benefactors	  of	  such	  a	  change	  due	  to	  their	  extensive	  forest	  plantations.	  The	  text	  was	   introduced	   into	   the	  draft	  decision	  text	   in	  square	  brackets,	  indicating	   that	   there	   was	   no	   general	   consensus	   for	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   item.	   In	  particular,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  other	  OPEC	  states	  as	  well	  as	  the	  EU	  were	  opposed	  to	  the	  proposed	  changes.	  During	  the	  textual	  developments	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	   informal	  consultations	  of	  the	  co-­‐chairs	  of	  the	  contact	  group,	  however,	  the	  text	  referring	  to	  FiE	  was	  moved	  to	  the	  same	  paragraph	  and	  into	  the	  same	  set	  of	  square	  brackets	  and	  using	  the	  same	  language	  as	  the	  text	  referring	  to	  CCS102,	  indicating	  a	  new	  political	  linking	  of	  these	  two	  issues	  as	  typically	  all	  text	  in	  one	  set	  of	  brackets	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  unit	  and	  rejected	  or	  retained	  in	  its	  entirety.	  This	  link	  became	  more	  apparent	  as	  the	  opposition	  of	  Brazil	  against	  CCS,	  which	  has	  traditionally	  been	  strong,	  appeared	  to	  weaken	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  against	  FiE.	  It	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out,	  that	  in	  the	  final	  text	  of	  the	  CMP	   decision	   (UNFCCC	   2009d:	   decision	   2/CMP.4,	   para	   41–42)	   both	   items	   are	  included,	  each	  of	  them,	  however,	  contained	  in	  a	  separate	  paragraph,	  thus	  making	  the	  political	  linkage	  and	  bargaining	  that	  accompanied	  their	  inclusion	  on	  the	  final	  version	  opaque	  for	  observers	  that	  were	  not	  present	  at	  the	  conference	  and	  thus	  had	  no	  access	  to	  the	  meeting	  rooms	  and	  the	  intermediate	  draft	  versions	  of	  the	  text.	  
The	  knowledge	  of	  this	  background,	  however,	  proved	  important	  during	  the	  nego-­‐tiations	   on	   this	   issue	   in	   the	   lead	   up	   to,	   during	   and	   after	   the	   Copenhagen	   climate	  change	  conference,	  where	  support	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  FiE	  as	  a	  A/R	  CDM	  project	  type	  was	  increasing,	  particularly	  among	  countries	  that	  would	  not	  themselves	  benefit	  from	  the	  proposal,	  but	  who	  either	  were	  traditionally	  supportive	  of	  CCS	  or	  who	  seemed	  to	  have	  received	  misleading	  briefings	  about	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  proposal	  (field	  note	  and	  email	  exchanges,	  Copenhagen,	  14	  December	  2009).	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  background	  of	  the	   genesis	   of	   the	   issues,	   also	   enabled	   ENGO	   delegates	   to	   identify	   the	   possible	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  specific	  targeted	  steps,	  which	  would	  require	  further	  financial	  incentives	  (for	  example	  as	  provided	  through	  the	  sale	  of	  CDM	  carbon	  credits)	  and	  which	  could	  thus	  constitute	  the	  CDM	  project,	  were	  undertaken	  to	  avert	  that	  reversion	  (CDM	  EB	  2009).	  102	  	  Saudi	  Arabia	  had	  requested	  text	  to	  mandate	  the	  CDM	  EB	  to	  conduct	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  implications	  of	   the	   inclusion	  of	  CCS	  as	  a	  CDM	  project	   type,	   in	  an	  attempt	  to	  advance	  negotiations	  on	  CCS	  –	  a	  technology	   that	   OPEC	   countries	   are	   generally	   very	   supportive	   of	   as	   it	   theoretically	   allows	   the	  continued	   use	   of	   fossil	   fuels	   while	   reducing	   the	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   to	   the	   atmosphere	  associated	  with	   their	   use,	   and	   that	   is	   explained	   to	   greater	   detail	   in	   footnote	   73	   in	   chapter	   4	   –,	  which	  had	  not	  made	  any	  progress	  under	  the	  SBSTA	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years.	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  bargaining	   concessions	   towards	   which	   proponents	   of	   FiE	   were	   suspected	   to	   be	  disposed:	  Another	   dangerous	   twist	   to	   the	   story	   is	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   FiE	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	   […]	  [a]	   trade-­‐off	   for	  Brazil	   to	  drop	  their	  veto	  on	  CCS	  in	  CDM.	   (field	  note,	  Copenhagen,	  12	  Dec	  2009)	  Thus,	   FiE	  was	   correctly	   identified	   as	   an	   important	   skirmish	   in	   the	   overall	   battle	   to	  prevent	   CCS	   becoming	   a	   CDM	   project	   type.	   ENGO	   delegates	   thus	   included	   that	  information	   in	   their	   lobbying	   efforts	   to	   prevent	   both	   FiE	   and	   CCS	   by,	   for	   example,	  pointing	  these	  connections	  out	  to	  parties	  opposed	  to	  CCS,	  thus	  increasing	  the	  chances	  that	   these	  parties	  would	  also	  become	   (or	   remain)	  opponents	  of	  FiE.	   Further,	  ENGO	  delegates	   lobbied	   to	   have	   the	   issue	   of	   FiE	   referred	   to	   the	   IPCC	   for	   further	   analysis	  before	  decisions	  could	  be	  made,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  decouple	  CCS	  and	  FiE	  in	  the	  bargaining	  within	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   and	   thus	   retain	   Brazil	   and	   others	   as	   allies	   against	  CCS	  in	  the	  CDM.	  
It	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   despite	   some	   public	   access	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   via	  webcasts	   of	   plenary	   meetings,	   media	   coverage	   and	   publication	   of	   final	   decision	  documents,	  physical	  presence	  at	  the	  conference	  venue	  is	  crucially	  important.	  This	  is	  because	   it	   does	   not	   only	   allow	   access	   to	   the	   negotiators,	   whose	   behaviour	   ENGO	  participation	   ultimately	   aims	   to	   influence,	   but	   also	   since	   it	   allows	   the	   building	   of	  valuable	   relationships	   with	   negotiators,	   gives	   access	   to	   non-­‐webcast	   meetings	   and	  corridor	   rumours,	   to	   intermediate	   stages	   of	   textual	   developments	   and	   easier	  understanding	  of	  the	  intricacies	  involved	  in	  the	  genesis	  of	  particular	  issues	  during	  the	  negotiations.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  demonstrated,	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  advantages	  of	  physical	  attendance	  can	  only	  be	   fully	   realised	  when	  not	  only	   the	  annual	  major	  COP	  meetings	  are	  attended	  but	  crucially	  the	  smaller	  intersessional	  meetings	  as	  well.	  
It	   is	   important	   to	  point	  out,	   though,	   that	  non-­‐attendance	  at	   these	   intersessional	  conferences	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  major	  COP	  conferences)	  also	  has	  impacts	  on	  the	  delibera-­‐tions	  within	  CAN,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section	  which	  will	  consider	  access	  to	  CAN	  in	  the	  in-­‐session	  and	  other	  settings.	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5.2 Access	  to	  CAN	  Work	  and	  Activities	  
In	   addition	   to	   mere	   access	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiation	   venue,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  consider	   how	   access	   to	   CAN’s	   various	   settings	   is	   structured.	   Before	   proceeding,	  though,	   I	   will	   first	   describe,	   in	   the	   next	   step,	   the	   three	   main	   settings	   –	   in-­‐session,	  virtual	   and	   hybrid	   –	   and	   CAN’s	  main	   activities	   in	   each	   of	   these	   settings	   in	   greater	  detail	   before	   considering	   issues	   of	   access	   and	   barriers	   to	   access	   for	   each	   of	   these	  settings	  in	  turn.	  
5.2.1 Main	  CAN	  Activities	  in	  the	  In-­‐Session	  Setting	  
CAN	   International	   is	   mainly	   active	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   (as	  opposed	   to	   regional	   or	   national	   CAN	   nodes	   which	   are	   also	   trying	   to	   influence	   the	  national	  or	   regional	  politics	  of	   climate	   change)	  and	  since	  CAN	  members	   come	   from	  many	  different	  countries	  and	  from	  all	  five	  continents,	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  represent	  virtually	  the	  only	  opportunity	  for	  more	  than	  a	  few	  CAN	  members	  to	  be	  physically	  in	  the	   same	   space103.	   Consequently,	   a	   large	   number	   of	   CAN	   activities	   are	   centred	   on	  these	   sessions.	   As	   described	   above,	   I	   call	   this	   setting	   within	   which	   CAN	   activity	  occurs,	   the	   “in-­‐session	   setting.”	   It	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   only	   those	   CAN	  members	   are	   considered	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   work	   within	   this	   setting	   who	   are	  physically	  present	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  conference	  venue.	  	  
The	  activities	   that	  CAN	  member	  organisations	  engage	   in	  during	   their	  participa-­‐tion	  at	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  can	  be	  broadly	  divided	  into	  external	  and	  internal	  activities,	  with	   the	   external	   activities	   aiming	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	   process,	   e.g.	   following	   and	  attempting	  to	  influence	  the	  negotiations,	  while	  internal	  activities	  are	  concerned	  with	  processes	   within	   CAN,	   e.g.	   work	   toward	   development	   of	   policy	   positions,	   strategic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  	  On	   rare	  occasions,	   events	   like	   the	   “CAN	  equity	   summit”	   in	  2008	  are	   organized	  where	  over	  100	  delegates	   of	   CAN	   member	   organisation,	   as	   well	   as	   additional	   individuals	   from	   non-­‐member	  organisations	  within	   the	  wider	   environmental	  movement,	   from	   nearly	   50	   countries	  met	   to	   ad-­‐vance	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  “equity”	  within	  climate	  policy	  and	  to	  try	  resolve	  asso-­‐ciated	   conflicts	   between	   their	   organisations.	   However,	   due	   to	   the	   substantial	   financial	   and	  logistical	  demands	  of	  such	  events,	  they	  are	  very	  rare	  –	  the	  2008	  CAN	  equity	  summit	  was	  only	  the	  second	  time	  after	  the	  first	  equity	  summit	  in	  2001	  that	  such	  an	  event	  was	  held.	  	   Face-­‐to-­‐face	   interaction	   outside	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   is	   slightly	   more	   common	   for	   CAN	   members	  from	   the	   same	   regional	   or	   national	   nodes	   as	   there	   are	  more	   occasions	   to	   cooperate	  within	   the	  node,	  for	  example,	  CAN-­‐Europe	  holds	  annual	  AGMs	  and	  strategy	  planning	  sessions	  in	  Brussels	  and	  organises	  other	  events	  offering	  such	  as	  an	  October	  2007	  conference	  and	  workshop	  on	  the	  post-­‐2012	  future	  of	  the	  CDM.	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  planning	  etc.	  Since	  most	  of	  the	  work	  of	  CAN-­‐I	  is	  aimed	  toward	  the	  UNFCCC	  process,	  the	   boundary	   between	   internal	   and	   external	   activities	   is	   often	   blurry.	   To	   illustrate	  this	   demarcation	   problem,	   consider	   for	   example	   the	   (internal)	   work	   required	   to	  formulate	   a	   common	   response	   statement	   to	   recent	   developments	   at	   a	   UNFCCC	  session	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   using	   the	   outcome	   for	   lobbying	   and	   media	   work	  (external).	  For	  the	  present	  task	  of	  contrasting	  the	  different	  settings	  of	  CAN	  work	  –	  in-­‐session,	   virtual	   and	   hybrid	   –	   the	   internal	   activities	   are	   more	   relevant	   and	   are	  therefore	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  following	  section.	  
Among	   the	   internal	  work	   at	  UNFCCC	   session,	   the	   increase	   of	   intensity	   and	   fre-­‐quency	  of	  working	  group	  work	  is	  the	  clearest	  example	  for	  how	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting	  differs	  from	  the	  virtual	  setting	  which	  characterises	  the	  work	  of	  the	  network	  most	  of	  the	   time.	   For	   example,	   the	  CAN	  working	   group	   that	   I	  was	  most	   involved	  with,	   held	  daily	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   meetings	   at	   most	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   during	   my	   fieldwork	  period	  while	   it	  would	  otherwise,	  during	   the	  periods	  between	   the	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	  only	  hold	  telephone	  meetings	  less	  than	  once	  per	  month	  plus	  sporadic	  email	  exchang-­‐es.	  Within	  the	  virtual	  setting,	  the	  frequency	  of	  both	  calls	  and	  email	  exchange	  increases	  substantially	   when	   the	   group	   is	   working	   to	   prepare	   specific	   submissions	   to	   the	  UNFCCC	   or	   specific	   position	   papers	   but	   never	   comes	   even	   close	   to	   the	   intensity	   of	  collaboration	  during	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions.	  This	  pattern	  is	  consistent	  across	  all	  other	  CAN	  working	  groups	  and	  can	  be	  explained	  through	  mutually	  reinforcing	  internal	  and	  external	   factors.	   Internally,	   the	   comparably	  much	   lower	  effort	   to	  organise	  meetings	  due	  to	  being	  in	  the	  same	  location	  and	  the	  same	  time	  zone	  contributes	  to	  this	  change	  as	  well	  as	  individuals’	  changed	  work	  focus:	  while	  many	  CAN	  delegates	  can	  normally,	  only	  dedicate	  part	  of	  their	  working	  time	  for	  UNFCCC	  related	  work104,	  during	  UNFCCC	  sessions	   (especially	   after	   having	   travelled	   there)	   this	  work	  becomes	   the	   sole	   focus.	  Externally,	   the	   speed	   of	   political	   developments	   relating	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   is	   naturally	  much	  higher	  during	  its	  negotiation	  sessions,	  thus	  the	  need	  to	  share	  intelligence	  about	  these	   developments	   and	   coordinate	   with	   others	   regarding	   possible	   responses	   or	  supportive	  or	  countering	  measures,	  becomes	  much	  greater	  compared	  to	  the	  periods	  between	  sessions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  	  The	  degree	  of	  this	  is	  very	  different	  between	  individuals:	  in	  some	  cases,	  which	  is	  in	  particular	  the	  case	   for	   employees	   of	   the	   large	   ENGOs,	   individuals	   can	   dedicate	   their	   entire	   time	   to	   UNFCCC	  issues	  while,	  on	  the	  other	  extreme,	  some	  others	  are	  expected	  to	  deal	  with	  UNFCCC	  related	  topics	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  full	  time	  duties	  on	  other	  areas	  their	  employer	  organisation	  is	  engaged	  in.	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  In	  addition	  to	  the	  change	  in	  intensity	  and	  frequency	  of	  collaboration	  within	  working	  groups,	  the	  type	  of	  activity	  that	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  groups	  is	  also	  different	  from	  the	  other	  settings	  in	  which	  CAN	  work	  occurs.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  work	  at	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   is	   targeted	   at	   the	   sessions	   themselves	   –	   members	   share	  information	  they	  have	  received	  on	  specific	  developments	  within	  the	  negotiations	  or	  when	   parallel	   sessions	   of	   different	   groups	   under	   the	   UNFCCC	   took	   place,	   further	  interpretations	  of	   these	  developments	  are	  shared	  and	  compared	  and	   it	   is	  decided	   if	  any	   responses	   to	   these	   developments	  might	   be	   necessary,	   and	   if	   so	  what	   sort.	   For	  example,	  when	  developments	  begin	  to	  emerge	  (for	  example,	  in	  parties’	  statements	  or	  in	  actual	  text)	  that	  are	  deemed	  undesirable	  by	  ENGOs,	  steps	  are	  undertaken	  to	  bring	  these	  developments	   to	   the	  heightened	  attention	  of	  other	  parties	  with	  a	  view	  on	   the	  issue	  in	  question	  similar	  to	  the	  ENGOs	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  their	  resistance.	  Steps	  to	  achieve	  this	  can	   include	  the	  publication	  of	  an	  article	   in	  CAN’s	  daily	  and	  widely	  read	  newsletter	   “ECO,”	   coordination	   with	   other	   working	   groups	   within	   CAN	   or	   direct	  meetings	  with	  members	   of	   the	   delegations	   of	   potential	   allies	   among	   the	   parties	   to	  discuss	  the	  matter.	  
For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  appearance	  of	  “Forests	  in	  Exhaustion”	  (see	  above)	  in	  the	  draft	  text	  under	  a	  CDM	  related	  agenda	  item	  at	  CMP4	  in	  Poznań,	  members	  of	  the	  CDM	  working	  group,	  who	  were	  in	  attendance	  at	  the	  relevant	  contact	  group	  meeting,	  alerted	   their	   CAN	   colleagues	   in	   the	   LULUCF	   working	   group	   (the	   LULUCF	   working	  group	   is	  where	  CAN’s	  work	   relating	   to	   forestry	   in	  Annex	   I	   countries	   is	   carried	  out)	  who	  in	  turn	  informed	  the	  forestry	  experts	  among	  the	  delegations	  of	  their	  allies	  among	  parties,	  who	  were	  not	  aware	  of	  this	  development	  since	  it	  occurred	  under	  an	  agenda	  item	   that	   was	   generally	   assigned	   to	   other	   experts	   within	   their	   delegation.	   The	  interaction	  between	  CAN’s	  LULUCF	  and	   flexible	  mechanisms	  working	  group	  on	   this	  issue	  also	  helped	  improve	  the	  latter’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  issue,	  thus	   enabling	   them	   to	   raise	   the	   issue	   in	  meetings	  with	   party	   delegations,	  many	   of	  which	  did	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  understanding	  at	  that	  point	  in	  time	  (cf.	  footnote	  101	  above	  for	  an	  explanation)	  and	  therefore	  CAN’s	   interpretation	  was	  welcome	  to	   further	   that	  understanding	  (field	  notes,	  Poznań,	  10	  Dec	  2008	  and	  11	  Dec	  2008).	  These	  activities	  helped	  to	  build	  opposition	  against	   this	   item,	  as	  political	  actors	  who	  would	  not	  have	  otherwise	  taken	  note	  of	  this	  development	  were	  now	  able	  to	  voice	  their	  disagreement.	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  These	  activities	  –	  sharing	  information	  within	  CAN,	  writing	  ECO	  articles	  and	  meeting	  with	  party	  delegates	  –	  are	  among	   the	  standard	  working	  group	  activities	  even	  when	  not	   directly	   responding	   to	   recent	   developments.	   Since	   ECO	   is	   well	   regarded	   and	  widely	  read	  among	  negotiators	  and	  other	  NGO	  delegates	  as	  well	  as	  media	  (post	  field	  note,	  Vienna,	  Aug	  2007),	   contributing	  articles	   relevant	   to	  a	  working	  group’s	  area	  of	  specialisation	   is	   a	   regular	   activity	   during	   UNFCCC	   sessions.	   Likewise,	   setting	   up,	  preparing	   for	   and	   carrying	   out	   meetings	   with	   the	   relevant	   experts	   from	   parties’	  delegations	   is	  also	  regularly	  done	  as	   this	  represents	  one	  of	   the	  more	  direct	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   negotiations	   can	   be	   influenced.	   Such	  meetings	   often	   offer	   a	   venue	   for	   a	  more	  informal	  and	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  both	  CAN’s	  and	  the	  party’s	  positions	  and	  the	  background	   that	   lead	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   these	   positions	   as	  well	   as	   the	   exchange	   of	  views	  concerning	  what	  aspects	  of	  each	  other’s	  positions	  are	  not	  acceptable	  and	  why.	  The	  meetings	  also	  act	  as	  a	  conduit	  of	  useful	  information	  about	  recent	  developments	  within	  the	  negotiations.	  For	  example,	  the	  party	  delegates	  are	  often	  able	  to	  share	  new	  information	  (or	  even	  hard	  copies	  of	  text)	  about	  the	  proceedings	  in	  closed	  negotiation	  arenas	  while	  the	  CAN	  members	  might	  have	  insights	  into	  the	  thinking	  of	  other	  parties	  that	   go	   beyond	   the	   public	   statements	   of	   these	   parties	   as	   this	   comment	   of	   a	   CAN	  delegate	  illustrates:	  
CAN	   can	   provide	   a	   “second	   loop”	   […]	   [of	   communication	   between	  parties].	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  EU-­‐Japan	  bilateral	  meeting	  they	  will	  not	  always	   talk	  very	   frankly	  with	  each	  other.	   […]	  But	  because	   I	   talk	   to	  the	  EU	  [delegates]	  and	  I	  talk	  to	  my	  Japanese	  [ENGO]	  colleagues	  and	  the	   Japanese	  colleagues	   talk	   to	   their	  own	  government,	  so	  normally	  my	   Japanese	   colleagues	   have	   a	   sense	   of	   what’s	   going	   on	   in	   Japan	  [that	   is	  different]	   from	  what	   the	   Japanese	  government	   is	   saying	   to	  the	  EU.	  So	  we	  can	  through	  the	  Japanese	  NGOs	  we	  can	  give	  further	  in-­‐formation	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  back	  and	  forth.	   	  And	  CAN	  has	  a	  large	  advantage	  in	  this	  area	  because	  of	  being	  a	  large	  global	  network	  of	  organisations	  it	  is	  very	  hard	  to	  trace	  a	  piece	  of	  in-­‐formation	   back	   to	   its	   source	   and	   that’s	   a	   layer	   of	   security	   that	  we	  can	  offer	  [to	  the	  person	  sharing	  the	  information]	  as	  well	  as	  the	  per-­‐sonal	  trust	  that	  we	  won’t	  tell	  the	  wrong	  people	  too	  much.	  So	  we	  can,	  particularly	  [during]	  the	  negotiations,	  be	  quite	  a	  useful	  source	  of	  in-­‐formation	  back	  and	  forth	  like	  that.	  	   (conversation	  with	  CAN	  delegate,	  field	  note,	  Vienna,	  29	  Aug	  2007)	  Since	   NGOs	   are	   not	   allowed	   to	   make	   any	   requests	   for	   text	   changes	   or	   additions,	  meetings	  with	  party	  delegations	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  venue	  for	  ENGOs	  to	  try	  and	  push	  for	  their	   favoured	   changes	   to	   negotiation	   text.	   For	   example,	   during	   meetings,	   CAN	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  members	  will	  often	  specifically	  point	  out	  certain	  pieces	  of	  text	  in	  the	  current	  version	  of	  a	  document	  that	  they	  would	  prefer	  to	  be	  deleted	  or	  suggest	  specific	  text	  changes.	  In	  the	  later	  case,	  CAN	  members	  would	  often	  bring	  copies	  of	  additional	  (or	  amended)	  text	  to	   those	  meetings	   that	   they	  would	   like	   to	   see	   included	   into	   the	   negotiation	   text	   in	  order	   to	  offer	   them	  to	  parties	   in	   case	   the	  meeting	  shows	   that	   the	  party	   in	  question	  and	  CAN	  are	   in	  agreement	  on	  a	  certain	   item	  and	   thus	   the	  party	  might	  be	  willing	   to	  propose	  the	  text	  change	  during	  the	  negotiations105.	  During	  one	  of	  the	  meetings	  [with	  government	  delegates]	  they	  [dele-­‐gates	  from	  one	  CAN	  member	  organisation]	  brought	  two	  sets	  of	  doc-­‐uments	  with	   them.	  On	  one	   they	  had	   their	  briefing	  notes	  with	  very	  detailed	   numbers	   and	   references	   to	   the	   scientific	   literature,	   that	  they	  used	  for	  the	  briefing	  and	  to	  hand	  over	  at	  the	  end.	  After	  they	  had	  a	  sense	  that	  [the	  party	  delegates]	  agreed	  with	  their	  point,	  they	  took	  out	   the	   second	   set	   of	   papers	   which	   had	   specific	   text	   suggestions	  “ready	   to	   use”	   language	   and	   specific	   suggestions	   where	   to	   insert	  that	  text.	  That	  text	  did	  make	  it	  into	  the	  next	  version	  of	  the	  draft	  con-­‐clusion	  but	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  dropped	  later	   from	  the	  text	  during	  the	  chaos	  of	  the	  last	  few	  days.	   	  	   (post	  field	  note,	  Copenhagen,	  Dec	  2009)	  Occasionally,	  either	  on	  CAN’s	  own	  initiative	  or	  upon	  request	  by	  parties,	  CAN	  members	  also	  offer	  briefings	  on	  specific,	  more	   technical	  details	   to	  some	  parties.	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  Copenhagen	  climate	  conference,	  I	  was	  involved	  in	  fulfilling	  the	  request	  of	  some	  parties	   from	   the	  LDC	   (Least	  Developed	  Countries)	  group	   to	  be	  briefed	  on	   the	  more	   technical	   details	   of	   the	   discussion	   on	   “loopholes”	   in	   Annex	   I	   targets,	   which	  ENGOs	  had	  successfully	  established	  as	  a	  central	  agenda	   item	  at	   that	  conference	  and	  where	  some	  parties	  had	  gaps	  in	  their	  specific	  knowledge	  about	  these	  loopholes	  which	  prohibited	  them	  make	  their	  own	  judgement	  about	  the	  issue.	  	  
To	  explain,	  during	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  Copenhagen	  as	  well	  as	  at	  the	  actual	  conference,	  CAN	   tried	   to	   point	   out	   certain	   “loopholes”	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   rules	   that	   effectively	  weaken	  the	  emission	  reduction	  targets	  of	  Annex	  I	  countries	  to	  a	  degree	  where	  instead	  of	  actual	  emission	  reductions	   those	  countries	  could	   further	   increase	   their	  output.	  A	  brief	   report	   prepared	   by	   a	   group	   of	   environmental	   and	   academic	   observers	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  	  Unlike	  other	  papers	  handed	  out	  to	  party	  delegates	  at	  meetings	  –	  for	  example,	  CAN	  position	  papers	  or	  briefing	  documents	  –,	  which	  normally	  bear	  the	  CAN	  logo	  or	  are	  otherwise	  attributable	  to	  CAN,	  such	   text	   suggestions	   are	  normally	  offered	  on	  neutral	  paper	   to	   avoid	  accidentally	   revealing	   the	  true	  authors	  of	  such	  text.	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  Copenhagen	  (Parekh	  et	  al.	  2009),	  for	  example,	  estimated	  that	  the	  reductions	  pledged	  collectively	  by	  Annex	  I	  countries	  at	  that	  point	  of	  13-­‐19%	  would	  be	  weakened	  by	  the	  loopholes	  so	  that	  in	  the	  best	  case	  only	  a	  9.5%	  emission	  reduction	  would	  remain	  or,	  in	  the	  worst	  case,	  emission	  increases	  of	  4%	  could	  be	  allowed.	  These	  loopholes	  refer	  to	  a	  number	   of	   flaws	   within	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   and	   relate	   to	   (i.)	   a	   large	  number	  of	  surplus	  emission	  allowances	  in	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  countries	  due	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	   their	  heavy	   industries	  post-­‐1990;	   (ii.)	   accounting	   rules	   for	   land	  use	   and	  forestry	  emissions	  that	  allow	  countries	  to	  elect	  not	  to	  account	   for	  certain	  emissions	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  taking	  credit	  for	  the	  absorption	  of	  carbon	  by	  forests	  and	  the	  biosphere;	  and	  (iii.)	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  inefficiently	  designed	  offset	  projects	  (also,	  cf.	  CAN	  2009b;	  Vidal	  2009b).	  
Another	  type	  of	  important	  CAN	  internal	  activity	  that	  takes	  place	  at	  UNFCCC	  ses-­‐sions	  are	  half-­‐day	  long	  strategy	  sessions	  that	  are	  organised	  for	  CAN	  delegates	  on	  the	  day	  prior	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  sessions	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  two	  week	  long	  sessions,	  additionally	   on	   the	   day	   halfway	   through	   the	   session	   that	   has	   no	   official	   UNFCCC	  activities	  schedules.	  These	  strategy	  sessions	  typically	  feature	  overview	  presentations	  by	  experienced	  CAN	  delegates	  over	  the	  current	  status	  of	  the	  political	  developments	  in	  the	   main	   streams	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   including	   the	   known	   positions	   of	  parties	   with	   regards	   to	   these	   issues	   as	   well	   as	   brief	   overview	   presentations	   by	  working	   group	   coordinators	   about	   the	   recent	   development	   in	   the	   area	   of	   work	   of	  their	  working	   group	   and	   the	  main	   issues	   under	   negotiation	   at	   the	   present	   session.	  Typically,	  especially	  at	  COPs,	   there	   is	  also	  a	  brief	  presentation	  of	   the	  main	  points	  of	  CAN’s	   expectation	   document	   that	   is	   normally	   prepared	   with	   strong	   collaboration	  from	  all	  CAN	  working	  groups	  in	  the	  weeks	  and	  months	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  conference	  and	   that	   outlines	   which	   developments	   CAN	   would	   like	   to	   witness	   in	   the	   relevant	  negotiation	   streams	   (for	   examples	   of	   such	   expectation	   documents,	   cf.	   CAN	   2009a,	  2010b).	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  overview	  presentations,	  whose	  main	  purpose	  is	  to	  share	  background	  about	  the	  current	  status	  with	  those	  CAN	  delegates	  who	  might	  not	  have	  a	  sufficient	   knowledge	   of	   recent	   developments	   or	   insights	   into	   the	   developments	   of	  specific	  working	  groups’	  area	  of	  expertise106,	  the	  strategy	  session	  is,	  true	  to	  its	  name,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  	  In	  order	  to	  assist	   individuals	  who	  might	  need	  additional	  help,	  CAN	  also	  holds	  “capacity	  building	  sessions”	  before	  each	  of	  these	  strategy	  sessions,	  which	  are	  mainly	  targeted	  at	  first	  time	  observers	  of	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  and	  are	  aimed	  at	  easing	  their	  possible	  confusion	  and	  disorientation	  and	  thus	   helping	   to	   make	   their	   attendance	   more	   efficient	   and	   rewarding.	   Briefer	   versions	   of	   such	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  also	   used	   to	   specifically	   strategise	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   work	   CAN	   and	   its	   member	  organisations	  aim	  to	  perform	  in	  the	  week	  ahead.	  This	   is	   typically	  done	  through	  two	  sets	   of	   break-­‐out	   groups	   –	   one	  by	  working	   group	   topic,	  where	  working	   groups	   can	  plan	  the	  specific	  strategies	  in	  their	  own	  area,	  and	  another	  by	  regional	  focus	  –	  whose	  results	  are	  then	  discussed	  in	  “plenary.”	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   this	   strategic	   planning	   work	   that	   is	   specific	   to	   the	   respective	  UNFCCC	   session,	   occasionally	   strategy	   sessions	   are	   also	   used	   to	   discuss	   new	   CAN	  policy	   positions	   or	   changes	   to	   existing	   policy	   positions	   that	   are	   expected	   to	   cause	  much	  controversy	  and	  are	  therefore	  thought	  to	  be	  better	  resolved	  through	  a	  strategy	  session	  where	  a	  relatively	   large	  number	  of	  CAN	  members	  can	  engage	  in	  direct	  face-­‐to-­‐face	   discussion	   as	   opposed	   to	   long	   and	   complicated	   email	   conversations	   that	  would	   be	   the	   default	   alternative	   to	   discussing	   the	   policy	   positions	   at	   a	   strategy	  meeting.	  However,	   since	   this	  process	   takes	  up	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  valuable	  and	  limited	  time	  at	  the	  strategy	  session,	  this	   is	  done	  only	  on	  very	  rare	  occasions.	  One	  of	  these	  occasions	  was	  at	  the	  April	  2009	  intersessional	  in	  Bonn,	  where	  a	  proposal	  was	  considered	  to	  change	  CAN’s	  position	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  demanded	  range	  of	  collective	  emissions	  reductions	  for	  Annex	  I	  countries	  by	  the	  year	  2020:	  i.e.	  to	  use	  the	  phrase	  “at	  least	  40%”	   instead	  of	   the	   formerly	  used	  “25%-­‐40%”	  compared	   to	  1990	   levels	   (CAN	  2009c).	   This	   proposal	  was	   considered	   controversial	   in	   large	  part	   due	   to	   some	  CAN	  members’	  belief	  that	  it	  would	  be	  incompatible	  with	  the	  “political	  realities”	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	   and	   international	   climate	   change	   politics	   in	   general	   at	   the	   time	   and	   will	  receive	  more	  attention	  later	  in	  the	  thesis.	  
To	  complement	  the	  strategic	  planning	  and	  information	  exchange	  at	  those	  weekly,	  half-­‐day	  long	  strategy	  sessions,	  CAN	  also	  holds	  “CAN	  Daily	  Meetings”	  in	  the	  afternoon	  of	   every	   day	   of	   UNFCCC	   negotiations.	   These	   one-­‐hour-­‐long	  meetings	   always	   follow	  the	   same	   structure:	   i.	   “working	   group	   reports,”	   ii.	   “session	   report	   backs,”	   iii.	   “bilat-­‐erals	  and	  country	  intelligence,”	  iv.	  press	  conference,	  v.	  ECO,	  vi.	  “Fossil	  of	  the	  Day.”	  	  
The	  “working	  group	  reports”	  are	  given	  by	  the	  coordinators	  of	  the	  working	  groups	  on	  the	  developments	  of	  the	  negotiations	  in	  the	  subject	  area	  of	  each	  working	  group	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  capacity	  sessions	  are	  also	  offered	  after	  each	  of	  the	  CAN	  Daily	  Meetings	  where	  newcomers	  can	  talk	  through	  anything	  they	  did	  not	  fully	  understand	  at	  the	  daily	  meeting	  or	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  proceedings	  in	  general.	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  well	  as	  updates	  on	  the	  work	  the	  working	  group	  has	  been	  doing.	  During	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	   this	   “report	   from	   working	   groups”	   section	   was	   extended	   to	   include	   newly	  formed	  working	  groups.	  A	  special	  case	  among	  these	  working	  groups	  is	  the	  newly	  (in	  the	   lead	   up	   to	   the	   Poznań	   COP)	   formalised	   working	   group	   called	   the	   “Political	  Coordination	  Group”	  (PCG),	  which	  consists	  of	  all	  other	  working	  group	  coordinators,	  the	  national	  and	  regional	  node	  coordinators	  and	  a	  number	  of	  specifically	  nominated	  “big	  picture	  experts”	  and	   is	  concerned	  with	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  strategising	  and	   information	  sharing	   on	   levels	   concerning	   the	   negotiations	   overall,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   technical	  level	  focus	  of	  the	  other	  working	  groups	  (the	  composition	  and	  work	  of,	  and	  access	  to	  the	  PCG	  will	  receive	  more	  attention	  in	  the	  next	  chapter).	  During	  the	  “session	  report	  backs”	  from	  the	  negotiation	  sessions,	  CAN	  members	  who	  had	  either	  physically	  been	  in	   attendance	   at	   the	   various	   negotiation	   sessions	   or	   had	   secured	   second-­‐hand	  accounts	   of	   the	   proceedings	   share	   this	   information	  with	   the	   other	   attendees	   of	   the	  Daily	  Meeting.	  This	  is	  done	  to	  enable	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  relatively	  good	  knowledge	  of	  the	  overall	  negotiations	  even	  though	  each	  individual	  would	  never	  be	  able	  to	  attend	  all	  these	  sessions	  due	  to	  sessions	  being	  held	  in	  parallel	  and	  other	  events	  such	  as	  side	  events	  or	  working	  group	  activities	  further	  competing	  for	  sparse	  time.	  During	  the	  next	  segment	   in	   the	   Daily	   Meeting,	   information	   on	   meetings	   with	   party	   delegations	  (known	  as	  “bilaterals”107)	  and	  other	  intelligence	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  positioning	  and	  negotiation	  actions	  of	  specific	  parties	  is	  shared,	  including	  reports	  from	  past	  meeting	  between	  CAN	  members	  and	  members	  of	  party	  delegations,	  information	  on	  scheduled	  or	   planned	   future	   meetings	   (to	   allow	   members	   interested	   in	   participating	   in	   any	  particular	   meeting	   to	   do	   so)	   and	   additional	   intelligence	   from	   countries	   including	  reactions	  by	  media,	  publics	  and	  capitals	  “at	  home.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  	  The	  term	  “bilateral”	  (meeting)	  is	  normally	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  meeting	  of	  (parts	  of)	  delegations	  of	  two	   (or	   sometimes	  more	   than	   two)	   countries	   in	  private	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   information	   sharing	  and	  more	  informal	  and	  frank	  discussion	  of	  the	  respective	  negotiation	  positions.	  CAN’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	   to	   refer	   to	   meetings	   between	   CAN	   members	   and	   party	   delegates	   is	   one	   of	   a	   number	   of	  examples	  where	  CAN	  appropriates	   the	   language	  of	   the	  negotiations	  to	  describe	   its	  own	  internal	  procedures	  and	  structures.	  Others	  are,	  for	  example,	  “non-­‐paper”	  –	  to	  describe	  text	  written	  by	  CAN	  members	  without	  wanting	   it	   to	   be	   understood	   to	   be	   CAN’s	   official	   position	   (for	   example	  when	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  time	  to	  go	  through	  CAN’s	  policy	  position	  process)	  or	  “non-­‐groups”	  –	  refer-­‐ring	  to	  groups	  established	  by	  the	  COP	  chair	  during	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  negotiations	  to	  underscore	  that	  they	  had	  no	  formal	  status	  (Depledge	  2005),	  or,	  in	  the	  CAN	  use	  of	  the	  term,	  that	  they	  are	  not	  official	  CAN	  working	  groups.	  Another	  example,	  CAN’s	  use	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  “capacity”	  and	  “capac-­‐ity	  building”	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  Some	   CAN	   members	   are	   critical	   of	   this	   practice	   as	   they	   see	   it	   reflecting	   a	   misplaced	   self-­‐conception	  of	  ENGO	  observers	   as	  having	   a	   role	   akin	   to	  negotiating	  parties	   in	   the	  process	   (field	  note,	  Bangkok,	  3	  Apr	  2008;	  field	  note,	  Copenhagen,	  13	  Dec	  2009).	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  The	  last	  three	  segments	  of	  the	  daily	  meeting	  are	  designated	  to	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  media	  work:	  first,	  the	  daily	  CAN	  press	  conference	  is	  planned,	  which	  includes	  deciding	  who	   the	  panel	   speakers	  should	  be	  and	  which	   topics	  should	  be	  covered.	  The	  second	  media	  related	  part	  is	  the	  planning	  of	  the	  next	  day’s	  ECO	  newsletter,	  where	  individuals	  can	  make	  suggestions	  for	  articles	  they	  want	  to	  contribute	  and	  which	  are	  then	  selected	  based	   on	   urgency,	   relevance	   and	   space	   in	   the	   paper.	   ECO	   has	   a	   different	   editorial	  board	  each	  day,	  which	  is	  also	  selected	  at	  this	  point,	  and	  which	  aims	  to	  ensure	  balance	  in	   terms	   of	   developed	   and	   developing	   country	   editors	   as	   well	   as	   gender	   and	  experience	   with	   the	   negotiations,	   CAN	   and	   ECO	   editing.	   Also,	   volunteers	   for	   a	  “graveyard	  shift”	  of	  two	  additional	  reviewers	  are	  selected	  who	  check	  the	  final	  version	  for	  grave	  mistakes	  as	  well	  as	  layout	  and	  spelling.	  Finally,	  the	  recipients	  of	  that	  day’s	  satirical	  “Fossil	  of	  the	  Day”	  award	  are	  nominated,	  discussed	  and	  decided	  by	  attendees	  of	  the	  daily	  meetings.	  Fossil	  of	  the	  Day	  awards	  are	  presented	  to	  the	  delegations	  of	  the	  countries	   that	   have	   –	   within	   the	   preceding	   24	   hour	   period	   and	   in	   the	   view	   of	   the	  ENGO	  delegates	  –	  done	  the	  most	  to	  obstruct	  the	  negotiations	  or	  to	  advance	  them	  into	  a	   non-­‐desirable	   direction.	   Examples	   include	   an	   award	   for	   a	   number	   of	   European	  countries	   for	   attempting	   to	   have	   accounting	   rules	   for	   emissions	   from	   logging	   that	  would	   allow	   them	   to	   ignore	   these	   emissions	   in	   their	   emissions	   accounting	   (CAN	  2009d)	   or	   an	   award	   for	   Canada	   when	   its	   Environmental	   Minister	   failed	   to	   attend	  important	  ministerial	  talks	  during	  the	  Bali	  COP	  (CAN	  2009e).	  	  
While	  –	  due	  to	  their	  satirical	  format	  –	  Fossil	  of	  the	  Day	  awards	  mainly	  provide	  an	  additional	  outlet	   for	  ENGOs	   to	  speak	  more	   frankly	  about	   their	  disappointment	  with	  specific	   developments	   and	   while	   they	   are	   thus	   mainly	   targeted	   at	   the	   negotiators	  present	   at	   the	   conference,	   they	   are	   also	   routinely	   covered	   in	   the	   media	   of	   the	  countries	  that	  were	  so	  recognised,	  and	  anecdotes	  circulating	  within	  CAN	  suggest	  that	  this	   occasionally	   leads	   to	   changes	   in	   negotiating	   positions.	   In	   particular,	   one	   such	  anecdote	   has	   it	   that	   after	   Brazil’s	  winning	   of	   a	   first	   prize	   fossil	   award	   at	   COP12	   in	  Nairobi,	  which	  was	  covered	  in	  the	  national	  media,	  the	  Brazilian	  President	  contacted	  the	  Brazilian	  negotiators	   in	  Nairobi	  to	  request	   that	  he	  be	  briefed	  on	  the	  case	  and	  to	  change	  the	  instructions	  to	  the	  negotiators	  (field	  note,	  Bangkok,	  2	  Apr	  2008).	  In	  other	  cases	  and	  countries,	  fossil	  awards	  also	  have	  similar	  (albeit	   less	  extreme)	  effects	  and	  thus	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  an	  award	  on	  a	  country’s	  negotiation	  position	  is	  one	  of	  the	  aspects	  considered	  when	  deciding	  which	  countries	  to	  present	  with	  an	  award.	  In	  the	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  reverse	  case,	  fossil	  awards	  are	  sometimes	  not	  awarded,	  for	  example,	  if	  it	  is	  feared	  that	  such	  an	  award	  could	  undermine	  a	  country’s	  self-­‐perception	  as	  a	  progressive	  force	  in	  the	   negotiations.	   In	   addition	   to	   such	   considerations,	   the	   CAN	   delegates	   from	   the	  nominated	  country	  can	  block	  their	  country’s	  receiving	  of	  the	  fossil	  award	  if	  they	  feel	  that	  the	  award	  could	  negatively	  impact	  on	  their	  government’s	  or	  public’s	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  climate	  negotiations.	  
In	   an	   email	   thread	   during	   the	   Copenhagen	   COP,	   a	   Canadian	   CAN	   delegate	  summed	  up	  the	  positive	  role	  of	  the	  Fossil	  of	  the	  Day	  in	  maintaining	  pressure	  on	  that	  country’s	  government:	  In	  Canada	   the	   fossil	   has	  become	  a	  daily	  part	   of	   the	  discourse.	   It	   is	  now	   finally	   routinely	   mentioned	   in	   all	   of	   the	   major	   papers	   when	  Canada	  gets	   it.	   It	   is	   inspiring	  articles	   that	  don't	   even	  mention	   it	   in	  major	  papers.	  It	  is	  attracting	  high	  profile	  people	  (who	  are	  volunteer-­‐ing	   to	   receive	   it	   on	  behalf	   of	   Canada	   and	  hence	   increase	   the	  press	  coverage).	   It	   is	   even	   sparking	   "counter-­‐awards"	   (the	   environment	  minister	   announced	   yesterday	   in	   Britain	   that	   he	   was	   starting	   the	  daily	  Hot	  Air	  awards	  and	  handed	  it	  out	  on	  the	  first	  day	  to	  the	  Pem-­‐bina	   Institute,	   one	  of	  Climate	  Action	  Network	  Canada's	   leading	  or-­‐ganizations)	  	   	  [I]n	  the	  case	  of	  Canada	  only	  sustained	  political	  pressure	  is	  going	  to	  force	  the	  government	  to	  [improve]	   its	  climate	  position	  […]	  and	  the	  fossils	  have	  become	  an	  important	  vehicle	  to	  sustaining	  that	  pressure.	  So	  you	  don't	  see	  a	  quick	  shift	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis,	  but	  it	  is	  having	  a	  meaningful	  and	  important	  impact.	   	  	   (CAN	  email,	  Copenhagen,	  11	  Dec	  2009)	  In	   addition	   to	   these	   standard	   activities	   that	   CAN	   carries	   out	   at	   any	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	  meetings	  –	  COPs	  and	  Intersessionals	  alike	  –,	  CAN	  International	  also	  holds	  its	  Annual	  General	   Assembly	   (AGA)	   during	   the	   annual	   COPs.	   During	   the	   AGAs,	   the	   outgoing	  Board	   of	   Directors,	   the	   regional	   and	   national	   nodes	   of	   CAN	   as	   well	   as	   the	   large	  international	  organisations108	  within	  CAN	  give	   reports	  on	   their	  activities	  during	   the	  previous	  year.	  Those	  present	  then	  discuss	  these	  reports	  with	  further	  discussion	  about	  the	  general	  direction	  of	  the	  network	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  next	  year	  and	  specifically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  	  Large	  international	  NGOs,	  with	  offices	  in	  at	  least	  20	  countries,	  have	  a	  special	  status	  with	  specific	  rights	  within	  CAN,	  similar	  to	  the	  status	  and	  rights	  of	  regional	  CAN	  nodes	  (CAN	  2002:	  12).	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  period	  in	  2007	  there	  were	  three	  such	  member	  organisations	  in	  CAN-­‐I,	  all	  of	  which	  had	  been	  founding	  members	  of	  CAN	  ever	  since	  1989:	  Greenpeace	  International	  (GPI),	  Friends	  of	   the	  Earth	   International	   (FoE-­‐I)	  and	  WWF.	  This	   changed	  during	   the	   fieldwork	  period,	  with	  FoE-­‐I	  leaving	  CAN	  and	  Oxfam	  International,	  ChristianAid,	  Wetlands	  International	  and	  Caritas	  International	  joining	  the	  network.	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  discussions	   about	   areas	   where	   members	   were	   concerned	   about	   problems	   in	   the	  performance	  of	   the	  board	  or	   the	  network.	  For	  example,	  one	  of	   the	  AGAs	  during	   the	  fieldwork	  period	  (Poznań,	  Dec	  2008)	  also	  included	  the	  discussion	  and	  adoption	  of	  a	  number	  of	  Terms	  of	  Reference	  documents	  –	  for	  working	  groups,	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  new	  or	  revised	  CAN	  policy	  positions,	  for	  CAN	  regional	  and	  national	  nodes	  and	  for	  the	  newly	  established	  Political	  Coordination	  Group	  –,	  which	  were	  prepared	  by	  the	  board	  on	   the	   request	  of	   the	  previous	  year’s	  AGA	   in	  a	  bid	   to	   further	  codify	   the	  procedures	  that	   guide	   CANs	   internal	   policy	   work.	   This	   was	   felt	   necessary	   due	   to	   the	   serious	  problems	  with	  the	  process	  of	  formulating	  policy	  positions	  on	  REDD	  prior	  to	  the	  Bali	  COP	   in	  2007	  and	  the	  deeper	  rooted	  problems	  within	   the	  CAN	  REDD	  working	  group	  that	  came	  to	  light	  during	  this	  process	  (this	  example	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  later	  in	  this	  chapter).	  Establishing	  clear	  Terms	  of	  Reference	  with,	  inter	  alia,	  a	  clearly	  specified	  schedule	  of	  deadlines	  for	  the	  submission	  of	  draft	  versions	  to	  working	  group	  and	   CAN	  wide	   email	   lists,	   was	   felt	   as	   a	   necessary	   step	   to	   avoid	   similar	   frustrating	  experiences	  in	  the	  future	  (field	  notes,	  Bali,	  8	  Dec	  2007;	  Poznań,	  6	  Dec	  2008).	  	  
Further,	  during	  the	  AGA,	  the	  previous	  Board	  is	  relieved	  of	  their	  duties	  and	  a	  new	  Board	  is	  elected.	  The	  number	  of	  members	  and	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  election	  procedures	  are	   not	   specified	   by	   the	   CAN	  Charter	   (CAN	  2002)	   and	   have	   both	   changed	   over	   the	  fieldwork	   period:	   at	   the	   2007	   Bali	   AGA,	   the	   outgoing,	   14	   person	   strong	   board	  recommended	  to	  the	  AGA	  to	  elect	  a	  much	  smaller	  board	  (ultimately,	  a	  new	  board	  of	  9	  people	   was	   chosen)	   as	   the	   coordination	   of	   that	  many	   people	   across	   different	   time	  zones	  was	  experienced	  as	  a	  major	  problem	  particularly	  as	  it	  often	  proved	  impossible	  to	   have	   the	   required	   quorum	   to	  make	   board	   decisions.	   At	   the	   same	   AGA	   –	   and	   in	  contrast	  to	  the	  following	  ones	  –	  nominations	  for	  the	  board	  were	  solicited	  at	  the	  AGA	  itself	  (and	  included	  a	  few	  nominations	  by	  proxy	  of	  individuals	  who	  were	  absent	  from	  the	   meeting)	   and	   following	   the	   nomination,	   CAN	   nodes	   internally	   agreed	   on	   their	  preferred	  board	  composition	  which	  was	  then	  presented	  by	  all	  nodes	  and	  a	  compro-­‐mise	   suggestion	   was	   developed	   from	   that	   by	   the	   AGA	   facilitators.	   In	   the	   following	  years,	   nominations	   were	   solicited	   by	   a	   “nomination	   committee,”	   which	   was	   estab-­‐lished	   for	   this	   purpose	   by	   the	   board,	   well	   ahead	   of	   the	   AGA	   with	   an	   intention	   to	  suggest	  a	  slate	  of	  candidates	  to	  the	  AGA	  for	  adoption	  which	  would	  –	  in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  nomination	  committee	  –	  best	  reflect	   the	  differences	  with	  CAN	  regarding	  geography,	  general	  political	  position,	  gender	  etc.	  and	  have	  a	  collective	  set	  of	  experience	  and	  skills	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  to	   effectively	   fulfil	   the	   board	   duties.	   At	   both	   AGAs	   the	   recommended	   slates	   were	  adopted.	  	  
In	  addition	   to	   these	  main	  activities	  within	   the	   in-­‐session	  setting,	  CAN	  members	  engage	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   other	   activities,	   for	   example,	   engaging	  with	   their	   national	   or	  local	   media	   in	   their	   home	   countries,	   blogging	   or	   podcasting	   their	   experiences,	  interpretations	   and	   insights	   from	   the	   conferences,	   carrying	   out	   publicity	   stunts	   or	  similar	  activities	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  conference	  venue	  (including	  participating	  in	  large	  demonstrations	   that	   typically	  coincide	  with	   the	  COPs)	  and	  so	   forth.	  This	   large	  variety	  and	   intensity	  of	   activities	  during	   the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  makes	   the	   in-­‐session	  setting	  unique	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  density	  of	  activity	  and	  the	  amount	  and	  character	  (i.e.	  face-­‐to-­‐face)	  of	  interactions	  with	  other	  CAN	  members	  as	  well	  as	  with	  negotiators	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  UNFCCC.	  These	  are	  the	  two	  main	  characteristics	  in	  which	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting	  is	  substantially	  different	  from	  the	  virtual	  and	  hybrid	  sessions,	  which	  I	  will	  now	  turn	  to.	  	  
5.2.2 CAN	  Activities	  in	  the	  Virtual	  Setting	  
As	  mentioned	  before,	  CAN	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  in	  its	  virtual	  setting	  at	  all	  times	  when	  the	  UNFCCC	   is	  not	   in	  session	  and	   therefore	  no	  significant	  number	  of	  CAN	  members	  are	   at	   the	   same	   place,	   enabled	   to	   engage	   in	   direct	   interaction	  with	   each	   other	   and	  with	   the	   negotiators	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   parties.	   During	   “normal”	   years,	   with	   only	   two	  two-­‐week	   long	  negotiation	  sessions,	   this	  virtual	  setting	   therefore	  characterises	  CAN	  work	  for	  over	  90%	  of	  the	  year,	  while	  even	  in	  the	  more	  intense	  negotiation	  period	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	  with	  negotiations	  taking	  place	  in	  10	  weeks	  in	  2009,	  still	  over	  80%	  of	  the	  time,	  CAN	  works	  in	  the	  virtual	  setting109.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  substantial	  differences	  between	  this	  setting	  and	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting.	  
The	  most	  obvious	  difference	  is	  the	  speed,	  number	  and	  frequency	  of	  interactions	  both	  within	  CAN	  as	  well	  as	  between	  CAN	  members	  and	  party	  negotiators	  as	  well	  as	  the	   general	   speed	   of	   the	   political	   developments	   related	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   regime.	  Further,	  while	  the	  focus	  of	  attention	  in	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting	  obviously	  lies	  upon	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  	  Since	   the	   virtual	   setting	   is	   only	   relevant	   during	   the	   intersessional	   period,	   I	   am	  using	   the	   terms	  “virtual	  setting”	  and	  “intersessional	  period”	  roughly	  synonymously.	  
5.	  Inclusion	  and	  Exclusion,	  Influence	  and	  Resources	   204	  	  deliberations	  of	  the	  various	  UNFCCC	  bodies,	  and	  therefore	  more	  on	  the	  global	  level	  of	  politics,	  national	  and	  regional	  politics	  take	  a	  more	  important	  role	  in	  the	  virtual	  setting.	  Also,	  due	  to	  the	  dispersion	  of	  CAN	  members	  across	  the	  continents	  and	  time	  zones,	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  means	  of	  communication	  are	  employed,	  in	  particular	  the	  various	  email	   lists	  that	  are	  used	  within	  CAN,	  but	  also	  more	  immediate	  means	  of	   interaction,	  such	   as	   telephone	   conferences	   or	   Skype110	  and	   online	   collaborative	   tools	   such	   as	  Wikis,	  Google	  Docs	  or	  Basecamp.	  	  
CAN’s	  email	   lists,	  while	  certainly	  an	  important	  communications	  tool	  during	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  –	  with	  daily	  email	  volume	  occasionally	  exceeding	  several	  hundred	  messages	  –,	  become	  the	  main	  venue	  of	   interaction	  between	  CAN	  members	  during	  the	  remain-­‐der	   of	   the	   year,	   albeit	   with	  much	   lower	   volume.	   Figure	   5	   shows	   the	   average	   daily	  email	   volume	   during	   the	   UNFCCC	   session	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   period	   as	   well	   as	   the	  intersessional	  periods.	  It	  clearly	  shows	  that	  the	  daily	  volume	  is	  generally	  much	  lower	  during	  the	  intersessional	  periods,	  where	  CAN	  functions	  in	  its	  virtual	  setting	  (also	  note	  the	  overall	  trend	  that	  has	  email	  traffic	  rising	  both	  during	  sessions	  as	  well	  in	  interses-­‐sional	  periods	  since	  the	  Poznań	  COP;	  especially	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  2009).	  	  
CAN	  operates	  a	  variety	  of	   email	   lists,	   including	  a	  general	   list,	  CANtalk,	  which	   is	  intended	   the	   be	   the	   virtual	   venue	   for	   discussion,	   dissemination	   of	   information,	  announcements,	  sharing	  of	  news	  stories,	  press	  releases	  and	  reports,	  and	  the	   like,	  of	  the	  whole	  network.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  general	  list,	  every	  policy	  working	  group	  within	  CAN	  has	   its	  own	  email	   list	  (the	  email	   lists	   for	  the	  Flexible	  Mechanisms	  (“CDM	  List”)	  and	  Forestry	  and	  Agriculture	  (“Sinks	  List”)	  working	  groups	  are	  used	  for	  figure	  5)	  as	  well	   as	   the	  Political	  Coordination	  Group	  and	   there	  are	  also	  additional,	  more	  ad-­‐hoc	  lists	   for	   temporary	   groups,	   such	   as	   the	   “Copenhagen	   Samba	   Group”111	  –	   an	   ad-­‐hoc	  group	   that	   was	   tasked	   with	   compiling	   input	   from	   all	   working	   groups	   as	   well	   as	  various	   other	   sources	   from	   within	   the	   network	   into	   an	   expectation	   document	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  	  Skype	  is	  an	  internet	  based	  service	  that	  allows	  participants	  to	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  using	  their	   computers	   (or	   more	   recently,	   handheld	   devices	   such	   as	   smartphones).	   Skype	   offers	   text	  based	  conversations	  (also	  known	  as	  instant	  messaging),	  as	  well	  as	  voice	  and/or	  video	  conversa-­‐tions.	  Instant	  messaging	  and	  voice	  conversations	  can	  be	  held	  in	  groups,	  thus	  enabling	  communi-­‐cation	   akin	   to	   a	   telephone	   conference	   call.	   One	   important	   feature	   that	   sets	   Skype	   apart	   from	  telephone	   conferencing,	   though,	   is	   the	   cost	   aspect	   –	   calls	  within	   the	   Skype	   network	   are	   free	   of	  charge	  for	  participants,	  making	  the	  service	  a	  popular	  choice	  for	  NGOs.	  111	  	  The	  name	  of	  this	  group	  is	  said	  to	  be	  reflecting	  the	  group’s	  first	  meeting	  place	  –	  a	  Brazilian	  bar	  in	  Bonn	  (field	  note,	  Poznań,	  3	  Dec	  2008).	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  Copenhagen	   –	   as	   well	   as	   lists	   for	   individuals	   interested	   in	   certain	   aspects	   or	   sub-­‐topics	  that	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  a	  formal	  CAN	  working	  group,	  for	  example	  the	  lawyers	  group,	  or	  temporary	  lists	  for	  certain	  meetings,	  such	  as	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	  G8	  summits	  etc.	  (conversation	  with	  CAN	  delegate,	  field	  note,	  Vienna,	  29	  Aug	  2007).	  	  
Figure	  5:	  Average	  Daily	  Email	  Volume	  on	  Selected	  CAN	  Email	  Lists	  During	  UNFCCC	  Sessions	  and	  
Intersessional	  Periods	  
	  
Note:	  For	  calculation	  of	  the	  average	  email	  volume	  during	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	  emails	  have	  been	  taken	  into	  account	  
that	   were	   sent	   during	   the	   session	   as	   well	   as	   on	   the	   day	   before	   and	   after	   the	   official	   start	   of	   the	   session.	  
“General	  List”	  refers	  to	  the	  general	  CANtalk	  list,	  while	  “Sinks	  List”	  and	  “CDM	  List”	  are	  the	  email	  lists	  of	  the	  LULUF	  and	  
REDD	  working	  groups	  and	  the	  Flexible	  Mechanisms	  working	  group,	  respectively.	   	  
Source:	  Own	  calculations	  using	  data	  extracted	  from	  CAN	  listserv	  archives112	  The	  main	  activities	  that	  are	  carried	  out	  by	  CAN	  International	  during	  the	  intersession-­‐al	   period	   are	   information	   sharing,	   monitoring	   text	   developments	   –	   both	   of	   official	  negotiation	  text	  as	  well	  as	  submissions	  by	  parties	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  –	  and	  developing	  the	  network’s	   policy	   positions,	   either	   in	   reaction	   to	   the	   developments	   of	   the	   previous	  session	   (e.g.	   in	   order	   to	   inform	   a	   submission	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   that	   was	   mandated	  
















































































































































































5.	  Inclusion	  and	  Exclusion,	  Influence	  and	  Resources	   206	  	  during	   the	   last	   UNFCCC	   session)	   or	   in	   preparation	   for	   anticipated	   developments	  during	  the	  upcoming	  sessions.	  
Information	   sharing	   –	   posting	   of	   relevant	   news	   articles,	   NGO	   reports,	   scientific	  publications	  etc.	  on	  CANtalk	   or	   the	   relevant	  working	  group	   lists	  –	   is	  useful	   for	  CAN	  members	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   abreast	   with	   the	   large	   amount	   of	   information	   that	   is	  generated	   within	   the	   climate	   change	   related	   policy	   field.	   In	   the	   words	   of	   one	  individual:	  When	  I'm	  very	  busy	  with	  my	  projects,	  I	  pretty	  much	  stop	  following	  the	  general	  news.	  I'm	  pretty	  certain	  that	  the	  most	  important	  climate	  stories	  will	  come	  up	  on	  CANtalk	  anyways,	  so	  keeping	  half	  an	  eye	  on	  
CANtalk	   is	   enough	   to	   feel	   relatively	   certain	   I	   am	   not	  missing	   any-­‐thing	  crucial.	  	   (field	  note,	  Copenhagen,	  12	  Dec	  2009)	  Often,	   sharing	   of,	   for	   example,	   news	   articles	   regarding	   new	   developments	   in	   the	  climate	  policy	  realm	  triggers	  long	  and	  involved	  discussions	  on	  the	  topic	  in	  question	  as	  well	  as	  associated	  issues	  which	  help	  those	  participating	  in	  or	  following	  the	  discussion	  to	   establish	   an	   understanding	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   diversity	   of	   views	   on	   the	   issue	  within	   CAN	   and	   to	   inform	   their	   own	   thinking	   on	   the	   issue.	   For	   example,	   a	   shared	  news	   report	   (Volcovici	   2009)	   on	   statements	   by	   Chinese	   diplomats	   on	   the	   question	  whether	   China	   (as	   producer	   and	   exporter)	   or	   the	   consumers	   in	   other	   countries	  should	  be	  responsible	  for	  emissions	  associated	  with	  the	  production	  of	  exported	  goods,	  triggered	  a	  discussion	  with	  more	  than	  30	  contributions	  that	  lasted	  for	  over	  a	  week	  on	  issues	   such	  as	   climate	   justice,	   international	   trade,	  welfare	   implications	  of	   industrial	  globalisation	   and	  more	   specific	   items	   such	   as	   the	   economics	   of	   Border	   Tax	  Adjust-­‐ments.	   Likewise,	   a	   shared	   excerpt	   from	   a	   speech	   by	   the	   U.S.	   climate	   envoy	   (Stern	  2009a)	  unleashed	  a	  long	  debate	  about	  the	  required	  level	  of	  ambition	  of	  U.S.	  emission	  reductions,	  the	  idea	  of	  comparability	  of	  efforts	  by	  the	  U.S.	  relative	  to	  other	  industrial-­‐ised	   countries,	   the	   relationship	   between	   “political	   realism”	   and	   “scientific	   reality”	  with	  regards	  to	  these	  emission	  reductions	  and	  the	  role	  of	  NGOs	  in	  such	  discussions.	  As	   such,	   the	   sharing	   of	   information,	   being	   useful	   in	   its	   own	   right,	   often	   acts	   as	   an	  important	   catalyst	   for	   the	   discussion	   of	   fundamental	   political	   issues	   and	   thus	  contributes	   to	   a	   shared	   understanding	   of	   these	   issues	   –	   or	   alternatively	   to	   an	  understanding	   about	   the	   differences	   in	   the	   interpretation	   within	   the	   network.	   In	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  addition	   to	   the	   general	  CANtalk	   email	   list,	   information	   sharing,	   of	  more	   specialised	  information,	  also	  takes	  place	  on	  working	  group	  lists.	  
Another	  activity	  during	  the	  intersessional	  periods	  is	  the	  monitoring	  of	  text	  devel-­‐opments.	  During	  the	  fieldwork	  period,	  the	  chairs	  of	  the	  AWG-­‐LCA	  and	  AWG-­‐KP	  would	  on	   occasion	   develop	   “scenario	   notes,”	   or	   “non-­‐papers”	   or	   “chairs’	   text”	   to	   try	   and	  reflect	   what	   they	   felt	   was	   the	   status	   of	   the	   negotiations	   and/or	   to	   present	   actual	  negotiation	   text	   to	   parties113.	   In	   addition	   to	   these	   texts	   developed	   from	  within	   the	  UNFCCC,	   parties	   and	   observer	   organisations	   would	   respond	   to	   the	   requests	   for	  submissions	  that	  might	  have	  been	  made	  by	  the	  various	  bodies	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  during	  the	  previous	  sessions	  (to	  illustrate,	  c.f.	  table	  4	  in	  chapter	  4	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  all	  such	  submission	   requests	  made	  by	   the	  AWG-­‐KP	  up	   to	   its	  Copenhagen	   session).	  All	   these	  documents	  are	  posted	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  website,	  which	  therefore	  is	  monitored	  for	  new	  text,	  which	  is	  then	  analysed	  for	  its	   implications	  to	  CAN	  policy	  and	  strategy	  develop-­‐ments.	   For	   example,	   many	   working	   groups	   maintain	   internal	   documents	   in	   which	  they	  compile	   the	  officially	   stated	  positions	  of	  parties	   relevant	   to	   the	  subject	  area	  of	  their	  working	  group.	  Further,	  working	  groups	  occasionally	  analyse	   the	   text	   in	   these	  documents	  in	  greater	  detail	  and	  submit	  their	  views	  based	  on	  this	  analysis	  formally	  to	  the	   UNFCCC.	   For	   example,	   the	   Flexible	   Mechanisms	   working	   group	   analysed	   the	  options	   that	   were	   summarised	   by	   the	   chairs	   of	   the	   AWG-­‐KP	   in	   official	   documents	  (UNFCCC	  2008b,	  2008c)	  and	  prepared	  its	  analysis	  together	  with	  a	  more	  fundamental	  critique	  of	   the	  design	  and	  performance	  of	   the	  CDM	  thus	   far	  as	  a	  CAN	  submission	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  (CAN	  2009f).	  
This	  last	  example	  represents	  an	  overlap	  with	  another	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  CAN	  activ-­‐ity	   during	   the	   intersessional	   period:	   the	   development,	   or	   updating,	   of	   CAN	   policy	  positions	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  UNFCCC.	  The	  CAN	  working	  group	  within	   whose	   subject	   area	   an	   issue	   in	   question	   falls	   generally	   undertakes	   the	  development	   of	   policy	   positions	   in	   that	   area.	   On	   occasion,	   this	   gives	   rise	   to	   new	  (permanent	  or	  temporary)	  working	  groups	  when	  there	  is	  currently	  no	  working	  group	  covering	  the	  area	  in	  question.	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  number	  of	  individuals	  within	  CAN	  realised	  that	   it	  would	  be	  beneficial	   for	  the	  network	  to	  have	  a	  agreed	  policy	  position	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  	  The	   development	   of	   text	   during	   intersessional	   periods,	   was	   a	   specific	   feature	   of	   the	   increased	  negotiation	  intensity	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  and	  does	  not	  normally	  characterise	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  text	  is	  developed	  in	  the	  regular,	  permanent	  UNFCCC	  bodies,	  COP,	  CMP,	  SBSTA	  and	  SBI.	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  on	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   mitigation114,	   individuals	   interested	   in	   working	   on	   such	   a	   policy	  position	  formed	  a	  new	  working	  group	  (aptly	  named	  “non-­‐Annex	  I	  mitigation”)	  as	  the	  issue	  was	  not	  within	  the	  area	  of	  expertise	  of	  any	  existing	  working	  groups	  (post	  field	  note,	  Bonn,	  Apr	  2009).	  	  
The	  creation	  of	  new	  policy	  positions	  or	  the	  updating	  of	  existing	  policy	  positions	  follows	  an	  established	  succession	  of	  steps,	  with	  efforts	  to	  codify	  these	  in	  a	  Terms	  of	  Reference	  document	  being	  embarked	  upon	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  period.	  Generally	   speaking	   according	   to	   these	   Terms	   as	   well	   as	   established	   practice,	   a	  number	  of	  individuals	  –	  most	  likely	  within	  a	  working	  group	  –	  would	  determine	  that	  work	  on	  a	  new	  or	  existing	  position	  is	  required,	  for	  example	  during	  a	  conference	  call	  of	  a	   working	   group	   or	   during	   a	   working	   group	   meeting	   at	   an	   UNFCCC	   session.	   This	  desire	  to	  work	  on	  a	  position	  would	  then	  be	  communicated	  to	  both	  the	  working	  group	  and	   general	   CANtalk	   email	   lists	   with	   the	   purposes	   of	   inviting	   other	   interested	  individuals	  to	  join	  or	  observe	  the	  drafting	  effort.	  This	  initial	  email	  to	  CANtalk	  would	  also	   contain	   an	   outline	   of	   the	   main	   anticipated	   positions	   to	   be	   `taken	   within	   the	  position	   paper	   as	   well	   as	   the	   planned	   timeline	   for	   completion	   and	   revision	   of	   the	  position	  paper.	  A	  small	  group	  or	  an	  individual	  from	  the	  working	  group	  is	  then	  tasked	  with	  the	  preparation	  of	  a	  first	  draft,	  often	  based	  on	  input	  by	  the	  working	  group.	  This	  draft	   is	   then	   circulated	   to	   the	   working	   group	   list	   and	   feedback,	   comments	   and	  discussions	   are	   invited	   (often	   using	   the	   “track	   changes”	   facility	   of	   word	   processor	  software)	   and	   –	   depending	   on	   the	   level	   of	   possible	   disagreement	   and	   anticipated	  friction	  –	  possible	  conference	  calls	  organised	  to	  resolve	  tensions	  in	  a	  more	  interactive	  communication	  environment.	  	  
It	   is	   then	   the	   task	  of	   the	  working	  group	  co-­‐coordinators	  and/or	   the	   individuals	  mainly	   responsible	   for	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   position	   paper	   to	   incorporate	   comments	  and	  requests	  for	  changes	  into	  the	  draft	  and	  to	  work	  on	  finding	  a	  consensus	  between	  possible	  conflicting	  views	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  topic	  in	  question	  and	  to	  re-­‐circulate	  the	  updated	  draft	  versions	  to	  the	  working	  group	  list.	  This	  can	  also	  involve	  off-­‐list	  email	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  	  Non-­‐Annex	  I	  mitigation	  refers	  to	  the	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  or	  in	  developing	  countries	  to	  limit	  the	  growth	   of	   or	   reduce	   the	   emissions	   of	   greenhouse	   gases.	   Due	   to	   the	   principles	   of	   CBDRRC,	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  mitigation	  is	  different	  from	  Annex	  I	  mitigation	  (whose	  mitigation	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  quantified	  absolute	  emission	  reduction	  and	  limitation	  objectives	  according	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol)	  and	   the	   nature,	   scope,	   size	   and	   specifics	   of	   this	   non-­‐Annex	   I	  mitigation	  was	   one	   of	   the	   central	  crunch	  issues	  of	  the	  negotiations	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  period.	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  telephone	   conversations	   with	   the	   representatives	   of	   the	   CAN	  member	   holding	   the	  main	   dissenting	   views.	   Typically,	   after	   a	   few	   such	   editing	   rounds,	   a	   final	   draft	   is	  circulated	  to	  the	  general	  CANtalk	  list	  with	  another	  period	  of	  time	  (convention	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  one	  week	  is	  deemed	  an	  acceptable	  minimum)	  for	  comments,	  change	  requests	   and	   possible	   objections.	   As	   a	   general	   rule,	   and	   as	   per	   the	   CAN	   Charter,	  consensus	   is	   the	   desired	  mode	   of	   decision	  making	  within	   CAN,	   thus	   the	   process	   of	  policy	   position	   formation	   is	   expected	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   consensual	   outcome.	   The	   CAN	  Charter	   prescribes	   the	   use	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   “sufficient	   consensus”	   as	   a	   tool	   to	  determine	   suitable	   agreement	   of	   the	   CAN	   membership	   with	   a	   decision	   and/or	  position	   paper.	   “Sufficient	   consensus”	   is	   somewhat	   (and	   arguably	   intentionally)	  imprecisely	  described	  as	  a	  situation	  where	  “the	  dissenting	  view	  represents	  less	  than	  approximately	  5%	  of	  the	  overall	  size,	  weight,	  relevance	  and	  particular	  significance	  of	  CAN	  membership	  against	  the	  issue	  put	  forward	  for	  decision	  making”	  (CAN	  2002:	  14).	  This	  vague	  formula	  is	  prescribed	  in	  recognition	  that	  “CAN	  membership	  is	  not	  equally	  representative	   of	   all	   national,	   regional	   and	   other	   constituencies,	   [and	   that]	   it	   is	  [therefore]	  recognised	  that	  voting	  by	  members	  will	  not	  promote	  fairness	  of	  decision	  making”	   (CAN	  2002:	   14).	   It	   is	   also	  worth	   noting	   how	   the	   use	   of	   an	   expectation	   for	  “consensus”	  without	  definitive	  definition	  of	  this	  concept	  mirrors	  the	  decision	  making	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  –	  as	  detailed	  earlier	   in	  this	  thesis	  –	  and	  how	  this	  provides	  some	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  of	  interpretation	  of	  that	  concept	  to	  the	  facilitator	  of	  the	  decision	  making	  process.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  CAN	  policy	  position	  formation,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  full	  consensus	   is	   not	   possible	   since,	   for	   example,	   different	   CAN	  members	   strongly	   hold	  mutually	   exclusive	   beliefs,	   “by-­‐lining”	   is	   chosen	   as	   the	   solution.	   In	   that	   case,	   a	  footnote	  is	  used	  to	  note	  that	  some	  member	  organisations	  disagree	  with	  the	  position	  paper	   and	   their	   names	   are	   listed.	   This	   option,	   however,	   is	   only	   chosen	   as	   the	   last	  resort	   and	   typically	   only	   after	   involvement	   of	   the	   CAN	   director	   or	   board	   (e.g.	   field	  note,	  Bali,	  2	  Dec	  2007;	  for	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  “by-­‐lined”	  policy	  position	  paper,	  c.f.	  CAN	  2007b).	  
A	   similar	   process	   is	   used	   for	   the	   preparation	   of	   written	   submissions	   to	   the	  UNFCCC.	  However,	  unlike	  policy	  positions,	  such	  submissions	  have	  a	  specific	  deadline	  imposed	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  body	  that	  requested	  submissions	  on	  a	  specific	  topic	  and	  as	  such	   it	   is	   generally	   accepted	   that	   the	   time	   frames	   available	   for	   CAN	   members	   to	  discuss,	   comment	   on	   and	   request	   changes	   to	   submission	   drafts	   is,	   occasionally	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  substantially,	   shortened,	  with	  on	  occasion	  only	  a	   few	  days	  of	   feedback	  between	   the	  circulation	   of	   the	   final	   draft	   on	   the	   general	  CANtalk	   list	   and	   the	   submission	   to	   the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat.	  For	  that	  reason,	  working	  groups	  generally	  attempt	  to	  limit	  their	  submission	   to	   content	   already	   agreed	   upon	   during	   policy	   position	   formulation	   or	  such	  points	  as	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  agreed	  policy	  positions.	  
As	   already	   mentioned,	   email	   communication	   enables	   the	   bulk	   of	   interaction	  between	   CAN	  members	   during	   the	   intersessional	   period,	   and	   is	   complemented	   by	  occasional	   telephone	  or	   Skype	   conferences.	  Other	   collaboration	   tools	   are	   also	  used,	  especially	   in	   the	   collaborative	   creation	   of	   documents,	   such	   as	   policy	   positions,	  submissions	  or	  the	  aforementioned	  compilation	  of	  parties’	  publicly	  stated	  positions,	  or	  in	  the	  collaborative	  maintenance	  of	  collections	  of	  various	  documents	  relevant	  to	  a	  certain	  working	  group	  or	  a	  certain	  project	  within	  a	  working	  group.	  Examples	  for	  such	  tools	   are	   Wikis,	   web	   based	   software	   designed	   for	   collaborative	   editing	   most	   well	  known	  as	  the	  platform	  on	  which	  the	  collaborative	  encyclopaedia	  Wikipedia	  is	  based,	  or	   Google	   Docs,	   which	   is	   a	   web	   based	   application	   that	   also	   allows	   collaborative	  editing	  of	   text	  documents	  and	  spread	  sheets.	  For	  example,	   the	  Flexible	  Mechanisms	  working	  group	  decided	  at	   the	  UNFCCC	  session	   in	  Poznań	   to	   set	  up	  a	  wiki	   to	  collect	  documents	   that	  were	   relevant	   for	   the	  work	   of	   the	   group,	   such	   as	   academic	   journal	  articles	  and	  reports	  relating	  to	  flexible	  mechanisms,	  presentations	  from	  side	  events,	  relevant	   negotiation	   text,	   party	   submissions	   as	   well	   as	   previous	   submissions,	  interventions	   and	   ECO	   articles	   prepared	   by	   the	   group	   itself	   as	   it	   was	   felt	   that	   a	  centralised	   document	   depository	   would	   make	   it	   easier	   for	   all	   group	   members	   to	  quickly	   find	   these	   documents	   and	   help	   new	   members	   to	   acquire	   important	   back-­‐ground	  knowledge	  easily.	  Over	  time,	  the	  wiki	  was	  also	  used	  as	  a	  place	  where	  minutes	  from	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  group	  via	  telephone	  conference	  or	  during	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  were	  collected,	  as	  well	  as	  notes	  from	  relevant	  UNFCCC	  negotiation	  sessions	  compiled	  by	  group	  members.	  Originally,	   the	  group	  wiki	  was	  also	   intended	   to	  be	  used	   for	   the	  collaborative	  drafting	  of	  policy	  positions	  and	  submission	  as	  the	  wiki	  software	  allows	  for	   easy	   tracking	   of	   changes	  made	   by	   any	   editor	   but	   it	   soon	   became	   clear	   that	   the	  previously	  used	  method	  of	  employing	  the	  “track	  changes”	  and	  commenting	  facilities	  of	  common	  standalone	  word	  processing	  software	  (e.g.	  Microsoft	  Office	  or	  OpenOffice)	  was	  more	  suitable	  to	  the	  drafting	  workflow	  of	  the	  group.	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  It	   is	  worthwhile	   noting	   that	   the	   virtual	   character	   of	   CAN	  work	  during	   the	   interses-­‐sional	  period	  also	  characterises	  the	  work	  of	  the	  full	  time	  staff	  at	  the	  CAN-­‐I	  secretariat.	  While	  CAN-­‐I	  did	  not	  have	  any	  full	  time	  staff	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  period	  (the	  CAN-­‐I	  secretariat	  in	  Bonn	  previously	  in	  operation	  with	  one	  full	  time	  staff	  person	  had	   been	   closed	   just	   before	   the	   start	   of	  my	   fieldwork),	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   fieldwork	  period,	  the	  CAN-­‐I	  secretariat	  had	  a	  staff	  of	  five.	  The	  secretariat,	  however,	  is	  virtual	  in	  its	  nature:	  while	  CAN-­‐I	  is	  a	  legal	  entity	  under	  German	  charity	  law	  (as	  per	  CAN	  Charter	  which	  stipulates	   that	   “CAN	   [is	   to]	  be	   constituted	   into	  a	   legal	   entity	   in	   the	   form	  of	  a	  non-­‐profit	   organisation,	   in	   Bonn,	   Germany”,	   CAN	   2002:	   18)	   the	   CAN-­‐I	   director	   is	  based	   in	   Washington,	   D.C.	   while	   other	   members	   of	   staff	   were	   (at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  fieldwork	   period)	   based	   in	   Ottawa,	   Sydney,	   Delhi	   and	   Copenhagen.	   Therefore,	   the	  CAN-­‐I	   secretariat	   is	   subject	   to	   similar	  problems	   in	   terms	  of	  distant	   communication,	  time	   zone	   difficulties	   etc.	   as	   the	   other	   individuals	   doing	   work	   within	   CAN-­‐I	   in	   its	  virtual	  setting.	  
However,	  a	  main	  difference	  that	  sets	  apart	  full	  time	  CAN	  staff	  versus	  staff	  of	  CAN	  member	   organisations	   as	   well	   as	   the	   work	   of	   the	   latter	   during	   UNFCCC	   sessions	  versus	   during	   intersessional	   periods	   is	   the	   individual	   work	   focus.	   International	  climate	  politics	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  as	  well	  as	  CAN’s	  work	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  politics	  is	  the	  primary	  (or	  even	  exclusive)	  focus	  of	  work	  during	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  at	   least	   for	   the	   CAN	  members	  who	   are	   participating	   in	   the	   sessions.	   For	   CAN	   staff,	  obviously,	   these	   issues	   are	   the	   focus	   of	   their	   work	   throughout	   the	   year.	   However,	  during	  the	  intersessional	  periods,	  many	  CAN	  members	  have	  to	  divide	  their	  attention	  between	  following	  UNFCCC	  related	  issues	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  their	  overall	  job	  brief,	  for	   example	   relating	   to	   national,	   regional	   or	   supra-­‐national	   (e.g.	   EU	   level)	   climate,	  environmental	  or	  development	  politics,	  with	  UNFCCC	  related	  work	  often	   taking	   the	  subordinate	  role.	  In	  extreme	  cases	  this	  can	  mean	  that	  UNFCCC	  or	  CAN	  related	  work	  is	  done	   in	   individuals’	   spare	   time	   in	   addition	   to	   their	   regular	   work	   (post	   field	   note	  Bangkok,	  Apr	  2008).	  
Clearly,	  as	  has	  been	  shown,	   the	   in-­‐session	  and	  virtual	   settings	  of	  CAN	  work	  are	  substantially	  different	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  intensity,	  character	  and	  focus	  of	  the	  work	  carried	  out	  by	  individuals	  and	  groups	  within	  CAN	  as	  well	  as	  the	  nature	  and	  frequency	  of	   communication	   between	  members.	   A	   special	   additional	   case,	   the	   hybrid	   setting,	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  combines	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   in-­‐session	   and	  virtual	   settings	   in	   these	   respects	  and	  will	  now	  be	  considered	  in	  more	  detail.	  
5.2.3 CAN	  and	  the	  Hybrid	  Fieldwork	  Setting	  
The	  hybrid	  setting	  occurs	  during	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	  where	  a	  certain	  portion	  of	  CAN	  is	  physically	  present	  at	   the	  UNFCCC	  venue	  and	   therefore	  considered	   to	  be	  working	   in	  the	   in-­‐session	   setting,	  while	   another	  portion	  of	  CAN	   is	  not	   at	   the	  venue.	  This	   latter	  portion	   is	   then	   considered	   to	   be	   doing	   its	   CAN	   related	  work	   in	   the	   hybrid	   setting,	  which	  combined	  features	  of	  both	  the	  in-­‐session	  and	  virtual	  settings.	  This	  third	  setting	  became	  first	  apparent	  when	  I	  had	  decided	  against	  attending	  the	  August	  2008	  UNFCCC	  session	   in	   Accra,	   Ghana	   for	   both	   budgetary	   and	   environmental	   reasons	   and	   was	  further	  confirmed	  when	  I	  did	  not	  attend	  a	  number	  of	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  in	  2009	  for	  the	  same	   reasons	   as	  well	   as	   through	   relevant	   observations	   during	   sessions	   I	   attended.	  During	  these	  non	  attended	  sessions	  I	  attempted	  to	  follow	  the	  negotiations	  as	  well	  as	  CAN’s	   work	   at	   the	   venue	   as	   closely	   as	   possible	   using	   the	   means	   at	   my	   disposal	   –	  which	  were,	  generally	  speaking,	   largely	  restricted	  to	  the	  communicative	  tools	  of	  the	  virtual	  setting.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  communication	  tools	  of	  the	  virtual	  settings	  –	  email,	  phone	  and	  online	   collaborative	   tools	   –	   the	   hybrid	   setting	   features	   additional	   means	   of	   access	  specific	   to	   that	  setting:	  during	   the	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	   the	  negotiations	   in	   the	  plenary	  sessions,	  official	  press	  conferences	  (by	  the	  UNFCCC,	  party	  delegations,	  and	  NGOs)	  as	  well	  as	  some	  selected	  side	  events	  are	  webcast	  as	  live	  video	  and	  audio	  streams	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  website;	  thus	  enabling	  any	  interested	  individual	  to	  follow	  the	  proceedings	  in	  these	   fora.	   However,	   as	   far	   as	   negotiation	   sessions	   are	   concerned,	   this	   access	   is	  restricted	   to	   the	   plenary	   sessions,	   which	   have	   been	   characterised	   in	   the	   previous	  chapter	  as	  the	  most	  scripted	  of	  the	  negotiation	  arenas	  and	  thus	  least	  likely	  to	  provide	  useful	  insights	  in	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  negotiations	  at	  the	  venue.	  
Access	   to	   the	   remainder	  of	   the	  activities	  and	  events	  at	   the	  conference	  centre	   is	  severely	  restricted	  and	  often	  limited	  to	  access	  to	  minutes	  of	  working	  group	  meetings,	  CAN	  daily	  meetings	  etc.	  or	  notes	  from	  contact	  groups	  and	  other	  closed	  groups	  a	  long	  time	   after	   these	   events	   have	   taken	   place,	   thus	   normally	   prohibiting	   any	   direct	  influence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  CAN	  members	  working	  in	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  on	  these	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  events.	   Even	   the	   availability	   of	   these	   documents	   is	   not	   consistently	   given	   –	   for	  example,	   the	   posting	   of	   minutes	   from	   CAN	   daily	   meetings	   and	   PCG	   meetings	   to	  
CANtalk	  was	  not	  established	  as	  a	  consistent	  practice	  until	  mid	  2009.	  Obviously,	  other	  aspects	  of	  work	  during	  the	  sessions	  that	  characterise	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting	  are	  even	  more	   restricted,	   such	   as	   direct	   lobbying	   of	   party	   delegates,	   corridor	   interactions,	  access	   to	   draft	   text	   (only	   the	   very	   final	   draft	   texts	   prepared	   by	   contact	   groups	   are	  published	   on	   the	   UNFCCC	   website)	   and	   direct	   participation	   in	   the	   discussions	   of	  working	  group	  meetings.	  
The	  specific	  challenge	  of	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  is	  that	  is	  combines	  features	  of	  both	  in-­‐session	  and	  virtual	  setting.	  On	  one	  hand,	   in	   this	  setting	   there	   is	  a	  need	   to	   follow	  an	  increased	   intensity,	   speed	  and	  output	  of	  political	  developments	  within	   the	  UNFCCC,	  interactions,	  discussions	  and	  strategising	  within	  CAN	  and	  the	  work	  of	  CAN’s	  working	  groups,	  which	  are	  all	  characteristics	  of	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  CAN	  members	  participating	  in	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  are	  largely	  limited	  to	  the	  tools	  and	  subject	   to	   the	  restrictions	  of	   the	  virtual	   setting	  which	  are	   intended	  and	  suitable	   for	  less	  intensive	  periods	  of	  work.	  
Having	   undertaken	   a	   detailed	   consideration	   of	   the	  main	   settings	   within	   which	  CAN	  work	  takes	  place,	  I	  will	  now	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  characteristics	  and	  differences	  of	   access	   to	   these	   settings	   before,	   in	   the	   second	   part	   of	   the	   chapter,	   proceeding	   to	  discuss	  barriers	  to	  this	  access	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  access	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  general.	  
5.2.4 Access	  to	  CAN’s	  In-­‐Session	  Setting	  
Quite	  obviously,	  a	  necessary	  pre-­‐condition	  for	  access	  to	  the	  work	  that	  is	  being	  carried	  out	   within	   CAN	   during	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   is	   access	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions	  themselves.	  Thus	   the	  access	   requirements	   that	   apply	   to	   the	  UNFCCC,	   and	   that	  have	  been	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  also	  apply	  to	  CAN’s	  in-­‐session	  setting.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  CAN	  as	  a	  network	  of	  member	  organisations,	  CAN	  members	  can	  actually	   circumvent	   some	   of	   the	   UNFCCC’s	   access	   requirements.	   Specifically,	   CAN	  member	   organisations	   do	   not	   necessarily	   have	   to	   acquire	   UNFCCC	   accreditation	   in	  their	  own	  right	  as	  it	  is	  established	  practice	  that	  prospective	  delegates	  of	  CAN	  member	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  organisations	  are	  registered	  as	  delegates	  of	  their	  regional	  or	  national	  CAN	  nodes,	  or	  –	  where	  that	  node	  is	  not	  UNFCCC	  accredited	  either	  –	  through	  CAN-­‐I115.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  necessary	  condition	  of	  being	  physically	  present	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  venue,	   an	   affiliation	   with	   a	   CAN	  member	   organisation	   is	   a	   general	   requirement	   to	  participate	  in	  CAN	  discussion	  during	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions.	  This	  affiliation	  is	  normally	  established	  by	  being	  employed	  as	  a	  staff	  member	  of	  a	  CAN	  member	  organisation,	  but	  other	  arrangements	  are	  also	  common,	  for	  example	  having	  a	  volunteer	  relationship	  to	  a	  member	  organisation	  or	  an	  unconventional	  relationship	  like	  my	  own	  based	  on	  my	  dual	  purpose	  as	  both	  a	  participant	  and	  an	  academic	  observer.	  As	  a	  rule,	   individuals	  who	  are	  registered	  as	  delegates	  to	  a	  UNFCCC	  session	  through	  either	  CAN-­‐I	  directly	  or	  one	  if	  its	  nodes	  or	  member	  organisations,	  will	  have	  access	  to	  CAN’s	  various	  activities	  during	  the	  session.	  	  
The	   requirements	   for	  an	  organisation	   to	  become	  a	  CAN	  member	  are	   somewhat	  different	   between	   national	   and	   regional	   CAN	   nodes,	   but	   in	   general	   applicants	   for	  membership	  are	  only	  required	  to	  declare	  that	  they	  will	  adhere	  to	  the	  CAN-­‐I	  Charter116,	  to	  the	  general	  mission	  of	  CAN	  and	  to	  its	  internal	  procedures	  and	  established	  practices.	  Further,	   the	   CAN	   Charter	   stipulates	   that	   only	   organisations	   “that	   do	   not	   represent	  industry	  and	  which	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  sustainable	  development	  and	  are	   active	   in,	   have	   a	   focus	   on,	   or	   interest	   in	   climate	   change	   issues,	   are	   eligible	   to	  become	   members	   of	   CAN”	   (CAN	   2002:	   8).	   Additional	   rules	   apply	   specifically	   for	  certain	  regional	  or	  national	  nodes,	  for	  example	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  incorporation	  or	  non-­‐profit	  status	  of	  organisation	  or	  the	  membership	  of	  natural	  persons	  in	  the	  node117.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  	  However,	   this	   practice	   is	   increasingly	   discouraged	   by	   CAN-­‐I	   due	   to	   the	   disadvantages	   that	  delegates	  so	  registered	  would	  have	  due	   to	   the	   formula	  developed	  by	   the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat	   to	  determine	  access	  quotas	  during	  and	  since	  the	  Copenhagen	  climate	  conference;	  also	  cf.	  section	  5.1	  above.	  116	  	  Organisations	   become	   members	   of	   their	   regional	   or	   national	   node,	   as	   opposed	   to	   becoming	  members	  of	  CAN	  International	  directly,	  unless	  there	  is	  no	  node	  in	  their	  country	  or	  none	  of	  CAN’s	  regional	  nodes	  includes	  their	  country	  (during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  that	  applied,	  for	  example,	  to	  all	  applicants	   from	   China,	   as	   there	   was	   no	   national	   CAN	   node	   in	   that	   country	   nor	   did	   any	   of	   the	  regional	  nodes	  in	  Asia	  cover	  China)	  or	  if	  they	  are	  considered	  an	  “international	  organisation,”	  with	  offices	  in	  20	  or	  more	  countries.	  117	  	  While	   all	   other	   CAN	  nodes	   only	   accept	   organisations	   as	  members,	   the	   French	  node	   also	   allows	  natural	   persons	   to	   become	  members	   (RAC-­‐F	   2010).	   In	   addition,	   different	   nodes	   have	   different	  requirements	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  a	  prospective	  member:	  for	  example,	  while	  CAN-­‐RAC	   Canada	   also	   allows	   unincorporated	   organisations	   to	   become	   members	   (CAN-­‐Rac	   Canada	  2005),	   other	   nodes,	   like	   CAN	   Europe	   request	   applicants	   to	   be	   organisations	   that	   are	   “legally	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  Since	  CAN’s	  membership	  base	  is	  large	  (in	  excess	  of	  several	  hundred	  organisations118)	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  impractical	  to	  determine	  whether	  an	  individual	  should	  have	  access	  to	  a	  CAN	  activity	  based	  on	   the	  name	  of	   the	   registering	  organisation	  on	   their	  badge,	  CAN	  has	  established	  a	  practice	  to	  solve	  this	  problem:	  during	  the	  first	  few	  days	  of	  an	  UNFCCC	   session,	   often	  during	   the	  pre-­‐sessional	  CAN	   strategy	   session,	  CAN	   regional	  node	  coordinators	  will	   give	  out	   stickers	  with	  CAN-­‐logos	   for	   individuals	   to	  attach	   to	  their	  UNFCCC	  conference	  access	  badges.	  Node	  coordinators	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  good	   overview	   of	   the	   organisations	   that	   are	   CAN	   members	   within	   their	   nodes	   or,	  indeed,	   likely	   to	   personally	   know	   most	   delegates	   of	   these	   organisations	   and	   can	  therefore	   easily	  determine	   a	  person’s	   relationship	   to	  CAN	  –	   and	   thus	  whether	   they	  should	  be	  given	  a	  CAN	  logo	  sticker.	  Subsequently,	  therefore,	  access	  to	  CAN	  activities	  is	  primarily	  determined	  upon	  the	  presence	  of	  such	  a	  sticker	  on	  a	  person’s	  badge	  and,	  in	  fact,	  “sticker	  check”	  is	  the	  first	  agenda	  item	  on	  all	  CAN	  daily	  meetings	  (in	  addition	  to	  being	  carried	  out	  at	  the	  door),	  is	  carried	  out	  on	  multiple	  occasions	  during	  strategy	  sessions	  and	  it	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  chairs	  of	  daily	  meetings	  to	  request	  sticker	  checks	  for	   individual	   late	   comers	   to	  meetings.	   For	   example,	   on	  one	  occasion	   the	   chair	  of	   a	  daily	  meeting	  noticed	  a	  few	  persons	  that	  had	  entered	  the	  room	  late	  and	  that	  she	  was	  not	  familiar	  with,	  so	  she	  asked	  them	  to	  show	  their	  stickers	  to	  the	  person	  sitting	  next	  to	   them,	   at	   which	   point	   it	   transpired	   that	   they	   were	   part	   of	   the	   delegation	   of	   the	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  and	  thus	  not	  supposed	  to	  be	  in	  attendance	  (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  10	  Jun	  2008).	  
In	  addition	  to	  some	  type	  of	  affiliation	  with	  a	  CAN	  member	  organisation,	  non-­‐CAN	  member	  organisations	  who	  are	  present	  at	  a	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  can	  specifically	  request	  to	  be	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  CAN	  activities,	  in	  particular	  the	  CAN	  daily	  meeting.	  This	  option	   has	   been	   established	   since	   the	   Bali	   climate	   change	   conference,	   and	   is	   in	  recognition	  of	  the	  understanding	  that	  a	  “strong	  and	  unified	  civil	  society	  movement	  [is	  advantageous	   in	   order]	   to	   build	   political	   pressure	   towards	   preventing	   dangerous	  climate	  change”	  (CAN	  2007a).	  CAN	  regional	  coordinators	  can	  grant	  access	  to	  the	  CAN	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  constituted	   pursuant	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   their	   country	   of	   origin	   and	   […]	   defined	   as	   […]	   non-­‐governmental,	  not-­‐for-­‐profit”	  (CAN	  Europe	  2005).	  118	  	  The	   statement	   of	   the	  number	   of	  member	   organisations	   in	   the	   “About	  CAN”	   section	  on	   the	  CAN	  website	  (e.g.	  CAN	  2010a)	  and	  at	  the	  top	  of	  all	  CAN	  submissions	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  (e.g.	  CAN	  2008a)	  changed	  several	  times	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	  with	  “over	  365”	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  field-­‐work	  phase	  (July	  2007),	   “over	  400”	  (about	  March	  2008),	   then	  “over	  450”	  (about	   January	  2009)	  and	  later	  “roughly	  500”	  (since	  about	  December	  2009).	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  daily	   meeting	   on	   this	   basis	   but	   any	   CAN	   member	   organisation	   can	   object	   to	   this	  invitation.	   This	   arrangement	  has	   been	  made	   in	   recognition	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	  CAN	  daily	   meeting	   for	   non-­‐CAN	   organisations	   with	   respect	   to	   information	   sharing,	  networking	   and	   discussions.	   Organisations	   thus	   invited	   are	   required	   to	   sign	   a	  declaration	   committing	   themselves	   “to	   abide	   by	   the	   general	   vision,	  mission,	   objec-­‐tives	   and	   strategies	   […]	   [as	   well	   as]	   existing	   CAN	   procedures	   and	   practices”	   in	  particular	  relating	   to	   the	  confidentiality	  of	  any	   information	  shared	  at	  CAN	  meetings	  and,	   while	   “[t]hey	   may	   participate	   in	   the	   discussions,	   […]	   they	   have	   no	   say	   on	  influencing	   policy	   positions	   being	   formulated	   by	   CAN”	   (CAN	   2007a).	   The	   organisa-­‐tions	  so	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  CAN	  daily	  meetings,	  may	  also	  request	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  CAN	  working	  groups,	  subject	  to	  non-­‐objection	  by	  the	  working	  group	  co-­‐coordinators	  and	  other	  working	  group	  members.	  
Thus,	  access	  to	  CAN	  activities	  during	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  can	  be	  considered	  very	  open	  for	  those	  who	  are	  physically	  present	  at	  the	  conference	  venue	  and	  whose	  work	  and	  general	  political	  position	  roughly	  matches	   that	  of	  CAN,	   i.e.	  generally	  speaking	  a	  desire	   to	   work	   toward	   protecting	   the	   Earth’s	   environment	   and	   people	   from	   the	  impacts	   of	   human	   induced	   climate	   change.	  Within	   this	   general	   agreement,	   a	   broad	  variety	  of	  views	  are	  acceptable,	  and	  are	  indeed	  found	  within	  CAN’s	  membership.	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   access	   to	   CAN	   activities	   during	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   is	   severely	  limited	  for	  individuals	  where	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  in	  particular	  individuals	  represent-­‐ing	   industry	   and	   business	   perspectives	   (thus	   belonging	   to	   the	   BINGO	   constituency	  within	   the	   UNFCCC)	   as	   these	   are	   generally	   considered	   directly	   antagonistic	   to	   the	  concerns	  of	  the	  environmental	  NGOs.	  
However,	   although	   physical	   access	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   and	   affiliation	   with	   a	   CAN	  member	   or	   a	   special	   invitation	   to	   participation	   as	   discussed	   above,	   are	   necessary	  conditions	  to	  participation	  in	  CAN	  activities	  in	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting,	  they	  are	  not	  the	  sole	   requirements	   for	   access	   to	   effective	   participation	   in	   these	   activities.	   Further,	  albeit	  less	  tangible,	  requirements	  do	  exist.	  These	  can,	  however,	  be	  better	  conceptual-­‐ised	   as	   barriers	   to	   access	   (or	   their	   absence)	   and	  will	   therefore	   be	   discussed	   in	   the	  section	  of	  that	  chapter	  that	  will	  concern	  itself	  with	  these	  barriers.	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5.2.5 Access	  to	  CAN’s	  Virtual	  Setting	  
Given	   that	  during	   the	   largest	  portion	  of	  any	  given	  year,	  CAN	  activities	   take	  place	   in	  the	  virtual	   setting,	  access	   to	   this	   setting	  can	  be	  considered	  an	   important	  parameter	  when	  discussing	  access	  to	  CAN.	  Generally,	  access	  to	  the	  virtual	  places	   in	  which	  CAN	  activities	  occur	  –	  its	  email	  lists,	  telephone	  or	  Skype	  conferences,	  online	  collaborative	  tools	  and	  so	  forth	  –	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  same	  rules	  as	  access	  to	  the	  physical	  meeting	  spaces	  of	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting,	  i.e.	  individuals	  need	  to	  have	  an	  affiliation	  with	  a	  CAN	  member	   organisation	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   these	   places,	   e.g.	   by	   becoming	  subscribed	   to	   CAN	   email	   lists.	   Unlike	   the	   in-­‐session	   setting,	   though,	   there	   is	   no	  provision	   for	   providing	   special	   access	   rights	   to	   representatives	   of	   non-­‐member	  organisations119.	  
Considering	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  virtual	  setting,	  certain	  technological	  requirements	  to	  access	  also	  need	  to	  be	  met	  to	  allow	  participation.	  However,	  since	  email	  is	  the	  main	  technology	   used	   by	   CAN	   to	   enable	   communication	   in	   the	   virtual	   setting,	   and	   since	  email	   has	   only	   very	   limited	   technological	   requirements	   (even	   the	   most	   basic	  computer	   with	   even	   the	   slowest	   internet	   connection	   is	   sufficient),	   access	   to	   the	  largest	   aspect	   of	   this	   space	   can	   be	   considered	   easily	   attainable.	   This	   is	   particularly	  true	  when	  considering	  that	  CAN	  members	  are	  organisations	  as	  opposed	  to	  individuals	  –	   and	   that	   (at	   least	  basic)	   computers	   and	   Internet	   access	   are	   a	   very	  basic	   asset	   for	  organisations.	  In	  addition,	  the	  International	  Telecommunications	  Union	  (ITU),	  the	  UN	  agency	   responsible	   for	   telecommunications	   technology,	   reported	   that	  by	   the	   end	  of	  2009,	  about	  one	  fifth	  of	  the	  population	  of	  developing	  countries	  (compared	  to	  nearly	  two	  thirds	  for	  developed	  countries)	  had	  access	  to	  the	  internet	  (ITU	  2010).	  Despite	  the	  still	   relatively	   low	   number	   for	   developing	   countries,	   it	   is	   safe	   to	   assume	   that	   the	  number	   is	   substantially	   higher	   for	   the	   strata	   of	   the	   populations	   that	   are	   actively	  affiliated	  with	  CAN	  member	  organisations.	  However,	   it	   is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  at	  the	   beginning	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   phase	   at	   least	   one	   CAN	  member,	   reflecting	   on	   past	  experiences	   from	   Africa,	   hinted	   in	   an	   interview	   that	   access	   to	   internet	   was	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  	  Recently,	   provisions	   have	   been	   introduced	   to	   allow	   individuals,	   who	   are	   not	   formally	   affiliated	  with	   a	   CAN	   member	   organisation,	   but	   who	   still	   consider	   themselves	   part	   of	   the	   “wider”	   CAN	  network,	  for	  example	  due	  to	  previous	  formal	  affiliation	  with	  a	  member	  organsation,	  to	  apply	  for	  subscription	   to	   CAN	   email	   lists.	   Such	   applications	  must	   be	   supported	   by	   the	   regional/national	  node	   to	  which	   the	   individual	  would	   belong	   and	   a	   CAN	  member	   organisation	   from	   outside	   that	  node.	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  substantial	   barrier	   for	   adequate	   participation	   of	   individuals	   from	   that	   continent	  (Westerlind-­‐Wigström	   2008:	   48)	   but	   later	   indicated	   that	   this	   is	   no	   longer	   a	  major	  problem	  (personal	  communication).	  
Despite	  these	  comments,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  consider	  the	  results	  of	  a	  quantitative	  anal-­‐ysis	   of	   the	   emails	   sent	   during	   the	   fieldwork	  period.	  As	  mentioned	   above,	   the	   email	  header	   data	   of	   these	   emails	  were	   parsed	   into	   a	   data	   file	   for	   the	   statistical	   package	  Stata	  and	  thus	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  this	  very	  large	  body	  of	  data	  was	  enabled.	  	  
The	  main	  finding	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  that	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  individuals	  are	  responsible	   for	  a	  very	   large	  share	  of	  all	  email	  messages	  sent	   to	   the	   list.	  For	   the	  three	   email	   lists	   covered	   in	   this	   analysis120,	   the	   five	   most	   active	   individuals	   were	  responsible	  for	  more	  than	  one	  in	  five	  (20.6%)	  of	  all	  emails	  sent	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  period	  (specifically,	  between	  August	  25,	  2007	  and	  December	  31,	  2009).	  Likewise,	  half	  of	   the	  messages	  on	   these	   lists	  were	   sent	  by	  only	  34	  different	   individuals.	  However,	  besides	  these	  few	  very	  active	  CAN	  members,	  there	  is	  another	  large	  group	  of	  persons	  who	   do	   not	   post	   as	   frequently	   but	   are	   persistently	   part	   of	   the	   conversation:	   there	  were	  nearly	  150	  individuals	  that	  posted	  at	  least	  20	  emails	  to	  the	  three	  lists	  analysed,	  which	  combined	  represent	  over	  80%	  of	  the	  overall	  email	  volume	  sent	  to	  the	  lists.	  This	  can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   indication	   that	   the	   virtual	   setting	   of	   CAN	   does	   feature	   a	   healthy	  number	   of	   interlocutors	   engaged	   in	   internal	   debate	   and	   information	   sharing.	  Moreover,	   the	   number	   of	   individuals	   that	   participated	   at	   least	   once	   in	   email	  exchanges	  during	  that	  period	  is	  many	  times	  higher,	  with	  emails	  originating	  from	  753	  different	  email	  addresses121.	  
While	  the	  large	  number	  of	  low-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐frequency	  participants	  in	  the	  email	  discussions	  on	  the	  three	   lists	   indicates	  a	  good	  involvement	  of	  CAN’s	  membership	   in	  the	  virtual	  setting	  (only	  individuals	  can	  post	  to	  the	  list	  who	  are	  also	  subscribers	  to	  the	  list),	   further	   analysis	   of	   the	   demographics	   of	   the	   high-­‐	   and	   medium-­‐frequency	  participants	  reveals	  some	  asymmetries	   in	   that	   involvement.	  For	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  	  The	   three	   lists	   covered	  are	   the	   same	  data	   that	   figure	  5	   is	  based	  upon:	   the	  general	  purpose	   list,	  
CANtalk,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  email	  list	  of	  the	  working	  groups	  working	  on	  forestry	  and	  land	  use	  issues	  as	  well	  as	  the	  list	  of	  the	  carbon	  market	  working	  group.	  121	  	  Some	  individuals	  used	  multiple,	  different	  email	  addresses	  to	  post	  to	  the	  list.	  While	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  make	  sure	  to	  capture	  all	  of	  the	  different	  addresses	  of	  the	  same	  individual	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  high-­‐frequency	  participants	   in	   the	  email	  discussions,	   this	  was	  not	   the	  case	   for	   low-­‐frequency	  partici-­‐pants.	  Thus,	  the	  number	  of	  distinct	  individuals	  represented	  by	  these	  email	  addresses	  is	  lower.	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  further	   analysis,	   gender,	   organisation	   and	   region	   were	   manually	   added	   to	   all	  individuals	  with	   at	   least	   30	   emails	   sent	   to	   the	   list122.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   demographic	  composition	   of	   the	   most	   notorious	   participants	   in	   CAN	   email	   discussions	   can	   be	  analysed	   in	   greater	   detail.	   Table	   5	   below	   summarises	   the	  main	   dimensions	   of	   that	  analysis.	  The	  units	  of	  analysis	  are	  the	   individual	  emails	  sent	   to	  the	   list	  by	  high-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐frequency	   participants	   (sending	   at	   least	   30	   emails	   during	   the	   field	   work	  period).	  Furthermore,	  as	   figure	  5	  above	  clearly	  shows,	  the	  email	  volume	  of	  the	  CAN	  email	   lists	   figuratively	  explodes	  during	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	   thus	  substantially	   increas-­‐ing	   the	   overall	   number	   of	   emails	   sent	   by	   those	   CAN	  members	   who	   are	   physically	  present	  at	  the	  sessions.	  During	  UNFCC	  sessions,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  demogra-­‐phy	   of	   the	   participants	   on	   CAN’s	   email	   lists	   reflects	  more	   on	   the	   in-­‐session	   rather	  than	   the	   virtual	   setting.	   For	   that	   reason,	   the	   demographic	   breakdown	   has	   been	  calculated	  separately	  for	  periods	  where	  the	  UNFCC	  was	  in	  session	  (“in-­‐session”),	  for	  periods	  where	  it	  was	  not	  (“not	  in-­‐session”),	  as	  well	  as	  overall	  figures.	  
As	  far	  as	  the	  differentiation	  between	  in-­‐session	  and	  other	  settings	  is	  concerned,	  the	   most	   marked	   differences	   (but	   even	   those	   are	   not	   particularly	   salient)	   are	   a	  slightly	  higher	  volume	  during	  the	  in-­‐session	  from	  both	  developing	  country	  delegates	  as	   well	   as	   delegates	   from	   Western	   Europe	   and	   non-­‐English	   speaking	   countries.	  Generally	   speaking	   and	   as	   far	   as	   the	   volume	   of	   emails	   from	   those	   most	   often	  participating	  are	  concerned,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  dominance	  of	  men	  within	  the	  discourse	  and	   a	   very	   striking	  dominance	  of	   developed	   country	  CAN	  members	   (approx.	   94%).	  Specifically,	  again	  regards	  to	  email	  volume,	  the	  conversation	  within	  the	  selected	  three	  CAN	   lists	   appears	   to	   be	   dominated	   by	   CAN	   members	   from	   the	   English	   speaking	  countries	  of	  North	  America	  and	  Western	  Europe.	  Overall,	  50%	  of	  the	  emails	  sent	  by	  medium-­‐	   and	   high-­‐volume	   participants	   are	   sent	   from	  North	   America	   (with	   quite	   a	  marked	   drop	   in	   the	   virtual	   setting)	   while	   17%	   overall	   come	   from	   the	   English	  speaking	  countries	  of	  Western	  Europe	  and	  34%	  overall	  for	  all	  of	  Western	  Europe.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  	  The	  data	  presented	  here	  must	  be	  interpreted	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  caution	  based	  on	  the	  methodologi-­‐cal	  limitations	  of	  the	  data.	  First,	  since	  manually	  matching	  individuals’	  demographic	  parameters	  to	  their	   email	   addresses	   was	   a	   very	   labour-­‐intensive	   activity,	   only	   high-­‐	   and	   medium-­‐frequency	  participants	  (as	  defined	  by	  this	  30	  emails	  threshold)	  were	  included	  in	  this	  way,	  which	  has	  obvious	  limitations	  with	  regards	   to	  capturing	   the	  overall	  demographic	  composition	  of	  all	  participants	   in	  the	  virtual	  setting	  in	  CAN.	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Table	  5:	   Demography	  of	  Medium-­‐	  and	  High-­‐Frequency	  Participants	  on	  Selected	  CAN	  Email	  Lists	  Emails	  sent	  by/from…	   Context	   	  (by	  demographic	  variable)	   In-­‐session	   Not	  In-­‐session	   Total	  
	   	   	   	  
Gender	   	   	   	  Female	   34.2%	   35.8%	   35.1%	  Male	   65.8%	   64.2%	   64.9%	  
	   	   	   	  
Origin	   	   	   	  Developed	  Country	   93.7%	   94.3%	   94.0%	  Developing	  Country	   6.3%	   5.7%	   6.0%	  	   	   	   	  
Region	   	   	   	  North	  America	   54.6%	   46.5%	   50.1%	  Western	  Europe	   28.5%	   38.5%	   34.1%	  Other	  developed	   10.5%	   9.3%	   9.8%	  Other	  developing	   6.4%	   5.7%	   6.0%	  	   	   	   	  
Country/Language	  	   	   	   	  English-­‐speaking,	  of	  which	   79.1%	   75.2%	   76.9%	  	  	  	  USA	   40.4%	   38.6%	   39.4%	  	  	  	  UK	   11.9%	   9.8%	   10.7%	  	  	  	  Canada	   14.2%	   7.9%	   10.7%	  	  	  	  Australia	   7.7%	   7.2%	   7.4%	  	  	  	  Other	  English-­‐speaking	   4.8%	   11.7%	   8.7%	  Non-­‐English	  speaking	  country	   20.9%	   24.8%	   23.1%	  	   	   	   	  N	   4,589	   5,848	   10,437	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  from	  data	  parsed	  from	  email	  header	  data	  
While	   offering	   some	   idea	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   discourse	   on	   CANtalk,	   the	   data	  presented	  here	  has	   to	  be	   interpreted	  with	   some	  caution.	  First,	   the	  data	  only	   shows	  the	  amount	  of	  emails,	  while	  not	   considering	   their	  nature	  or	  content.	  Besides	  emails	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  representing	  actual	  deliberations	  of	  CAN	  policy	  positions	  and	  the	  like,	   a	   large	   share	   of	   emails	   are	   not	   of	   this	   nature	   but	   are	   rather	   for	   information	  sharing	   or	   coordination	   purposes	   only.	   Clearly,	   then,	   the	   sender	   of	   fewer	   emails	  which	  are	  all	  directly	  geared	  towards	  contributing	  to	  the	  internal	  deliberations,	  has	  a	  different	  weight	  within	  the	  overall	  CAN	  discourse	  than	  a	  CAN	  member	  who	  exclusive-­‐ly	  writes	  to	  the	  list	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  sharing	  news	  articles	  on	  climate	  change,	  even	  if	  the	  overall	  volume	  of	  the	  latter	  might	  be	  much	  higher.	  Since	  the	  content	  analysis	  of	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  emails,	  which	  would	  have	  been	  required	  to	  overcome	  this	  data	  limitation,	   was	   far	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   research,	   this	   data	   has	   to	   be	   read	   in	  conjunction	  with	  this	  disclaimer.	  Furthermore,	  as	  described	  above,	  conversations	  on	  
CANtalk	  are	  in	  English	  only.	  Thus,	  CAN	  members	  who	  do	  not	  comfortably	  converse	  in	  English	  are	  naturally	  underrepresented	  on	  the	   list.	  However,	   this	  does	  not	  preclude	  that	  these	  members	  are	  very	  active	  participants	  on	  the	  email	  lists	  of	  their	  national	  or	  regional	  CAN	  nodes,	  which	  are	  also	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  research.	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  Besides	   the	  aforementioned	  generally	  straightforward	  access	   to	  email,	  access	   in	   the	  other	   areas	   of	   the	   virtual	   setting	  was	   equally	   easy:	   telephony	   can	   be	   considered	   a	  sufficiently	   ubiquitous	   technology123	  thus	   enabling	   easy	   access	   to	   CAN	   activities	  conducted	  via	  telephone	  conferences,	  and	  while	  Skype	  places	  higher	  requirements	  on	  computers	   and	   especially	   the	   speed	   of	   the	   internet	   connection,	   the	   established	  practice	  is	  to	  only	  use	  Skype	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  telephone	  conferencing	  if	  it	  has	  been	  determined	  beforehand	  that	  all	  participants	  can	  meet	  the	  technological	  requirements	  of	   that	   service,	   otherwise	   telephone	   will	   be	   used	   by	   default.	   Further,	   during	   the	  fieldwork	  period,	  CAN	  began	  using	  a	   telephone	  conferencing	   service	   that	  offers	   toll	  free	  access	  numbers	  in	  most	  countries	  (and	  additional	  means	  of	  getting	  access	  to	  the	  telephone	   conferences	   free	   of	   charge	   for	   the	   caller	   in	   other	   countries)	   thus	   further	  enabling	  easy	  access	  to	  this	  part	  of	  CAN’s	  virtual	  setting.	  	  
Akin	  to	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting,	  there	  are	  also	  additional,	  less	  tangible	  aspects	  that	  impact	   on	   an	   individuals’	   access	   to	   the	   virtual	   setting	   of	   CAN,	  which	   are,	   however,	  again	  better	  understood	  as	  barriers	  to	  access	  (or	  the	  lack	  thereof,	  as	  the	  case	  might	  be)	  and	  thus	  considered	  shortly	  in	  the	  relevant	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
5.2.6 Access	  to	  CAN’s	  Hybrid	  Setting	  
As	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  is	  characterised	  as	  a	  hybrid	  of	  in-­‐session	  and	  virtual	  settings,	  the	  access	  situation	  to	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  also	  closely	  resembles	  that	  described	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  virtual	  setting	  –	  some	  type	  of	  formal	  affiliation	  with	  a	  CAN	  member	  organisa-­‐tion	   and	   an	   internet	   enabled	   computer	   and	   telephone	   are	   necessary	   for	   access.	  However	   some	   of	   the	   communicative	   tools	   specific	   to	   the	   virtual	   setting	   –	   in	  particular	   live	   video	   webcasts	   of	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   and	   other	   proceedings	   at	   the	  conference	  venues	  as	  well	  as	  manifold	  increases	  in	  volume	  of	  CAN’s	  email	  lists	  –	  put	  higher	   demands	   on	   the	   speed	   of	   internet	   connection	   and	   computer	   hardware,	   thus	  potentially	   limiting	   access	   to	   some	   degree.	   Further,	   as	  mentioned	   before,	   following	  CAN	  work	   and	  UNFCCC	  procedures	  without	   being	  physically	   present	   at	   the	   confer-­‐ence	   venue	   is	   a	   very	   time	   consuming	   activity	   and	   therefore	   only	   available	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  	  In	  2009,	  according	  to	  ITU	  numbers,	  there	  were	  a	  combined	  84.8	  mobile	  and	  fixed	  line	  subscrip-­‐tions	  per	  100	  inhabitants	  globally	  (ITU	  2009)	  with	  average	  numbers	  for	  mobile	  subscriptions	  in	  developing	  countries	  rapidly	  catching	  up	  to	  average	  numbers	  in	  developed	  countries.	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  individuals	  who	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  spend	  this	  time	  in	  addition	  to	  or	  instead	  of	  their	  other	  obligations.	  	  
5.3 Addressing	  Access	  Limitations	  	  
Having	  considered	   in	  detail	  general	  aspects	  of	  access	   to	   the	  various	  settings	  of	  CAN	  work	  as	  well	  as	  the	  specific	  activities	  carried	  out	  in	  these	  settings,	  I	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  more	   in-­‐depth	   discussion	   of	   specific	   barriers	   to	   access	   to	   each	   of	   these	   arenas	   and	  will	   discuss,	  where	   applicable,	   how	   these	  barriers	   affect	   certain	   groups	   in	  different	  ways	   and	  magnitudes	   compared	   to	   other	   groups	   and	  will	   also	   discuss	   some	   of	   the	  steps	   that	   have	   been	   taken,	   attempted	   or	   are	   planned	   to	   remedy	   some	   of	   these	  barriers,	  where	  applicable.	  
As	   I	  pointed	  out	   in	   the	   introduction	  to	   this	  chapter,	  concerns	  over	  adequate	  ac-­‐cess,	  including	  the	  relative	  absence	  of	  systematic	  barriers,	  are	  an	  important	  consider-­‐ation	   in	   examining	   the	   participation	   of	   environmental	   NGOs	   in	   the	   climate	   change	  policy	   regime	   under	   the	   UNFCCC	   as	   such	   barriers	   could	   potentially	   systematically	  exclude	  certain	  views	  and	  perspectives	   from	  the	  discourse	  and	  therefore	  effectively	  undermine	   the	   ENGOs	   implicit	   and	   explicit	   claims	   to	   represent	   the	   interests	   of	  current	  and	  future	  generations	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  preservation	  and	  protection	  of	  the	  natural	  environment.	  
In	   this	   section	   I	  will	   consider	   the	  various	  barriers	   to	   access	   that	   are	  associated	  with	  each	  of	  the	  settings	  of	  CAN	  work	  and	  which	  I	  previously	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “less	  tangible”	   aspects	   of	   the	   general	   notion	   of	   access.	   Unlike	   the	   previous	   section,	   this	  section	  will	  not	  consider	  barriers	  separately	   for	  each	  of	   the	  sections	  but	  rather	  will	  consider	   the	   various	   barriers	   in	   turn	   and	   discuss	   how	   they	   apply	   to	   each	   of	   the	  settings	  differently,	  where	  applicable.	  
As	  previously	  discussed,	  barriers	  do	  exist	  to	  attendance	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  and	   –	   since	   CAN	   work	   in	   the	   in-­‐session	   setting	   is	   taking	   place	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	  conferences	  –	  these	  barriers	  also	  represent	  barriers	  to	  the	  access	  to	  CAN’s	  in-­‐session	  work.	  When	   discussing	   these	   barriers,	   I	   also	   explicated	   how	   gaps	   in	   attendance	   of	  these	  sessions	  (for	  example,	  due	  to	  the	  focus	  of	  attendance	  on	  the	  annual	  COPs	  while	  omitting	  the	  other,	  smaller	  sessions	  throughout	  the	  year)	  lead	  to	  disadvantages	  with	  
5.	  Inclusion	  and	  Exclusion,	  Influence	  and	  Resources	   223	  	  regards	   to	   access	   to	  negotiators	   (including	   relationship	  building),	   deeper	   and	  more	  detailed	   inside	   knowledge	   of	   the	   backgrounds	   associated	   with	   various	   portions	   of	  negotiating	   text	   or	   individual	   parties’	   positions	   and	   similarly	   with	   regards	   to	   the	  work	  done	  by	  CAN	  during	  these	  sessions	  (i.e.	  mainly	  with	  regards	  to	  strategising	  and	  the	  development	  of	  ideas	  within	  working	  groups).	  
While	   institutional	  parameters	  (i.e.	  an	  organisation’s	  successful	  accreditation	  as	  an	  observer	  with	  the	  UNFCCC)	  was	  considered	  as	  a	  potential	  barrier	  to	  access,	  it	  also	  became	  clear	  that	  CAN	  members	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  this	  barrier	  as	  	  the	  established	   practice	   of	   registering	   representatives	   of	   non-­‐accredited	   CAN	   member	  organisations	  through	  CAN-­‐I	  effectively	  neutralises	  this	  potential	  barrier.	  	  
5.3.1 Financial	  Barriers	  and	  the	  Southern	  Capacity	  Programme	  
However,	   the	   other	   main	   barrier	   to	   attendance	   of	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   discussed	   –	  financial	   restrictions	   to	   funding	   for	   the	   substantial	   travel	   costs	   associated	   with	  attendance	  –	  clearly	  affects	  access	  to	  CAN	  work	  during	  the	  sessions.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  this	   barrier	   largely	   affects	   individuals	   from	   developing	   countries,	   whose	   organisa-­‐tions	  have	  more	  difficulties	  accessing	  donors	  and	  other	  sources	  of	  income	  and	  whose	  domestic	   fundraising	   opportunities	   are	   limited.	   However,	   developing	   country	  participants	  who	   are	   part	   of	   large	   international	   organisations	   (for	   example,	   Green-­‐peace,	   WWF,	   Oxfam	   etc.)	   or	   who	   work	   in	   regional	   offices	   of	   organisations	   from	  developed	   countries 124 	  are	   not	   as	   strongly	   affected.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   small	  organisations	  from	  developed	  countries	  are	  often	  in	  financially	  difficult	  situations	  and	  have	  to	  limit	  their	  participation	  as	  well.	  For	  example,	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  amount	  of	  UNFCCC	   sessions	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   phase	   compared	   to	   previous	   years,	   smaller	  NGOs	  from	  developed	  organisations	  were	  unable	  to	  send	  as	  many	  representatives	  as	  they	  normally	  would	  to	  some	  of	  the	  smaller	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  or	  had	  to	  refrain	  from	  attending	   there	   altogether	   (field	   note,	   Bangkok,	   30	  Mar	   2008).	   Further,	   due	   to	   the	  2008	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   a	   number	   of	   smaller	   organisations	   from	   developed	  countries	  experienced	  shortfalls	  of	  donation	  income	  and	  had	  to	  cancel	  attendance	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  	  For	   example,	   a	   number	   of	   organisations	   maintain	   China	   offices;	   among	   others	   the	   American	  conservation	  organisations	  NRDC	  and	  EDF	  or	  the	  German	  Heinrich	  Böll	  Foundation.	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  their	   representatives	   at	   some	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   (field	   note,	   Bonn,	   7	   Apr	  2009)125.	  	  
As	  mentioned	  before,	   there	  have	  been	  attempts	   to	  secure	   funding	   for	   increased	  participation	   of	   ENGOs	   from	   developing	   countries	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions,	   with	  various	  degrees	  of	   success.	  Often,	   such	   funding	   is	  obtained	   from	  developed	  country	  governments	   and	   channelled	   to	   “Southern	   NGOs	   (SNGOs)	   through	   their	   Northern	  partners.	   Northern	   NGOs	   (NNGOs)	   then	   enter	   into	   a	   donor-­‐like	   relationship	   with	  SNGOs,	  with	   all	   potential	   strings	   attached	   –	   for	   both	   sides”	   (Duwe	   2000:	   17).	   This	  implies	   various	   administrative	   and	   decision	   making	   problems,	   such	   as	   the	   ones	  described	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter126	  as	   well	   as	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   uncertainty	   with	  respect	   to	   the	   future	   availability	   of	   that	   funding.	   As	   pointed	   out	   before,	   non-­‐attendance	  at	  the	  smaller	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  and	  the	  associated	  CAN	  work	  undertaken	  there	   puts	   individuals	   at	   a	   disadvantage	  with	   respect	   to	   specific	   knowledge	   of	   the	  developments	  at	  these	  sessions.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  affects	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  participat-­‐ing	  at	  the	  sessions	  they	  succeed	  in	  attending	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  considered	  a	  barrier	  to	  effective	   participation	   in	   the	   work	   carried	   out	   there	   and	  might	   lead	   to	   frustration	  with	  that	  participation	  and	  withdrawal.	  	  
This	  connection	  has	  long	  been	  recognised	  within	  the	  network	  –	  as	  confirmed	  by	  both	  Duwe’s	   (2000)	   and	  Westerlind-­‐Wigström’s	   (2008)	   interviewees	   as	  well	   as	  my	  own	  observations	  (especially:	  field	  notes,	  Bali,	  16	  Dec	  2007).	  Therefore,	  mandated	  by	  the	   Bali	   AGA,	   the	   CAN	   board	   and	   secretariat	   specifically	   undertook	   substantial	  fundraising	   efforts127	  to	   fund	   a	   dedicated	   program	   (named	   the	   “Southern	   Capacity	  Programme,”	  or	  SCP)	  that	  would	  provide	  longer	  term,	  stable	  funding	  for	  a	  number	  of	  participants	   from	   developing	   country	   ENGOs	   (the	   “Southern	   Capacity	   Programme	  Fellows”).	   One	   principle	   objective	   of	   this	   programme	   was	   the	   specific	   inclusion	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  	  This	  observation	  –	  that	  difference	  in	  the	  financial	  burden	  of	  attendance	  does	  not	  simply	  fall	  along	  developed	  versus	  developing	  country	  lines,	  but	  that	  an	  organisation’s	  size	  also	  affect	  the	  access	  to	  funding	  –	  is	  not	  new.	  For	  example,	  Duwe	  (2000)	  makes	  similar	  observations	  nearly	  a	  decade	  prior	  to	  my	  own	  fieldwork.	  126	  	  Through	  her	  interviews,	  Westerlind-­‐Wigström	  (2008)	  has	  uncovered	  a	  number	  of	  such	  problems	  and	  argues	  that	  this	  lead	  to	  “fatigue’	  among	  developing	  country	  ENGOs	  and	  imbalances	  of	  views	  and	  especially	  imbalances	  of	  “capacity”	  within	  CAN.	  127	  	  In	  the	  first	  year	  of	  its	  operation,	  the	  SCP	  was	  able	  to	  execute	  activities	  worth	  nearly	  $700,000	  in	  donor	   funds	   as	   a	   result	   of	   this	   fundraising	   initiative,	   including	   the	   employment	   of	   a	   full-­‐time	  coordinator	  for	  the	  programme,	  the	  funding	  of	  a	  total	  of	  27	  individuals	  to	  attend	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  and	  7	  regional	  workshops	  with	  a	  combined	  attendance	  of	  nearly	  250	   individuals	   from	  66	  coun-­‐tries	  (Shukla	  2010)	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  their	  attendance	  at	  all	  negotiation	  sessions	  (i.e.	  including	  smaller	  UNFCCC	  conference	  and	  not	  just	  limited	  to	  COPs)	  during	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  this	  problem.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  programme,	  the	  Fellows	  were	  also	  given	  specific	  training	   and	   also	   participated	   as	   trainers	   –	   sharing	   their	   new	   or	   deepened128	  expertise	   from	   attending	   the	  UNFCCC	   sessions	   –	   in	   events	   aimed	   at	   benefitting	   the	  larger	   community	   of	   developing	   country	   ENGOs.	   An	   example	   for	   the	   former	   are	  intensive	   capacity	   building	   sessions	   before	   the	   start	   of	   UNFCCC	   sessions,	   including	  detailed	   briefings	   by	   CAN	   working	   group	   coordinators	   on	   the	   specific	   politics	   and	  technical	  details	  of	  their	  area	  of	  expertise,	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  a	  maximum	  of	  effective	  participation	  in	  the	  session,	  including	  the	  work	  of	  CAN	  working	  groups.	  An	  example	  for	  the	  latter,	  is	  the	  holding	  of	  a	  series	  of	  regional	  workshops	  in	  developing	  countries	  to	   “strengthen	   South-­‐South	   coordination	   and	   South-­‐North	   interaction	   across	   the	  network	  and	  beyond	  CAN”	  and	  which	  would	  involve	  the	  SCP	  Fellow	  from	  the	  relevant	  regions	   who	   would	   “engage	   in	   dissemination	   exercises	   with	   fellow	   NGOs”	   (Shukla	  2010:	  4).	  	  
At	   least	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   active	   involvement	   of	   the	   SCP	   Fellows	   in	   the	   CAN	  work	   during	   the	   sessions,	   the	   programme’s	   objectives	   appeared	   to	   have	   led	   to	   an	  increase	   in	   visibility	   of	   developing	   country	   perspectives.	   For	   example,	   during	   the	  April	  2009	  UNFCCC	  session	  in	  Bonn	  –	  the	  first	  session	  where	  SCP	  Fellows’	  attendance	  was	   enabled	   by	   the	   SCP	   –	   two	   of	   these	   individuals	   participated	   in	   the	  work	   of	   the	  Flexible	  Mechanisms	  working	  group,	  which	  is	  otherwise	  dominated	  by	  CAN	  members	  from	   developed	   countries,	   and	   brought	   their	   distinct	   perspective	   to	   bear	   on	   the	  group’s	  work129.	   Likewise,	   at	   the	   same	  UNFCCC	   session,	   a	   new	  CAN	  working	   group	  dealing	   with	   issues	   relating	   to	   “non-­‐Annex	   I	   mitigation”	   was	   established	   on	   the	  initiative	  of	  CAN	  delegates	   from	  developing	  countries,	  due	  to	   their	  specific	  perspec-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  	  According	  to	   the	  CAN	  report	  on	  the	  SCP’s	   first	  year	  of	  operation,	  many	  (although	  not	  all)	  of	   the	  SCP	  Fellows	  had	   attended	  UNFCCC	  meetings	   before	   their	   acceptance	   into	   the	  programme,	  with	  the	  average	  number	  of	  three	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  before	  joining	  of	  the	  SCP	  (Shukla	  2010).	  129	  	  For	  example,	  during	  one	  discussion	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  “sectoral	  crediting	  approaches”	  that	  was	  being	  actively	  discussed	  during	   that	   session,	   a	   shortfall	   of	   this	   class	  of	   carbon	   trading	  proposals,	   that	  had	  not	  been	  raised	  by	  any	  other	  members,	  was	  pointed	  out:	  since	  sectoral	  crediting	  approaches	  incentivise	  (and	  pay)	  developing	  countries	  governments	  (as	  opposed	  to	  privately	  owned	  corpora-­‐tions	  operating	  in	  these	  countries),	  corruption	  concerns	  and	  concerns	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  appro-­‐priate	  use	  of	  the	  funds	  so	  generated	  were	  voiced	  (post	  field	  note,	  Bonn,	  Apr	  2009).	  
5.	  Inclusion	  and	  Exclusion,	  Influence	  and	  Resources	   226	  	  tive	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  mitigation	  of	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries.	  Since	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  does	  not	  demand	   specific	   greenhouse	   gas	  mitigation	   actions	  non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries,	   CAN	  had	   traditionally	   abstained	   from	   voicing	   any	   opinion	   regarding	   mitigation	   of	   that	  group	  of	  countries.	  This	  was	  also	  due	  to	  concerns	   that	  contributing	   to	  elevating	   the	  topic	   on	   the	   UNFCCC	   agenda	   would	   risk	   breaking	   solidarity	   within	   the	   strong	  negotiating	  bloc	  of	  the	  G77	  and	  China	  with	  potentially	  large	  (and	  from	  an	  ENGO	  point	  of	  view,	  undesirable)	  consequences	   for	  the	   internal	  power	  dynamics	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  (post	   field	  notes,	  Vienna,	  Aug	  2007;	  Bali,	  Dec	  2007).	  However,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	  these	  concerns	  were	  to	  a	  degree	  specific	  to	  CAN	  members	  from	  developed	  countries	  (who	   were	   also	   placing	   demands	   on	   their	   own	   countries	   to	   act	   before	   making	  demands	  on	  developing	  countries,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  CBDRRC)	  and	  that	  CAN	  delegates	  who	  were	   themselves	   from	  developing	   countries,	   did	  not	   share	   the	   same	  desire	   for	   self-­‐constraint	   in	   talking	   about	   greenhouse	   gas	   mitigation	   activities	   of	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries	  (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  5	  Apr	  2009;	  post	  field	  note,	  Bonn,	  Apr	  2009;	  the	  results	  of	  this	  process	  are	  available	  as	  CAN	  2008b).	  
Similarly,	  during	  a	  discussion	  as	  to	  whether	  CAN	  should	  upgrade	  its	  own	  policy	  position	  on	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  emission	  reduction	  targets	  of	  developed	  countries	  to	  a	  higher	  number	  than	  CAN’s	  previous	  demands,	  the	  increased	  presence	  of	  individuals	  from	   developing	   countries	   had	   a	   clear	   impact	   on	   the	   conversation.	   While	   one	  perspective	  within	  the	  debate	  (especially	  represented	  by	  a	  number	  of	  U.S.	  conserva-­‐tion	   organisations)	   suggested	   that	   political	   realities	   (including	   those	   in	   their	   own	  country)	  should	  inform	  CAN’s	  demand	  with	  regards	  to	  Annex	  I	  emission	  reductions,	  the	  increased	  presence	  of	  CAN	  delegates	  from	  developing	  countries	  contributed	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  their	  own	  perspective	  as	  individuals	  who	  had	  first	  hand	  experiences	  with	   the	  already	  manifest	  effects	  of	   climate	   change	   (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  5	  Apr	  2009).	  Remarks	  from	  a	  SCP	  Fellow	  from	  a	  Pacific	  Island	  had	  a	  particularly	  strong	  effect	  who	  reminded	  CAN	  that	  “politically	  realistic”	  targets	  would	  likely	  condemn	  her	  own	  country	  to	  disappearance.	  This	  was	  remarkable	  since	  arguably	  most	  (likely	  even,	  all)	   CAN	   members	   are	   aware,	   and	   accept,	   the	   climate	   science	   that	   underpins	   this	  remark.	  However,	  being	  reminded	  of	  these	  accepted	  facts	  by	  a	  person	  who	  would	  be	  directly	  affected	  by	  this,	  had	  a	  much	  stronger	  impact	  than	  yet	  another	  reminder	  of	  the	  same	  fact	  by,	   for	  example,	  one	  of	  CAN’s	  climate	  scientists	   from	  developed	  countries	  (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  5	  Apr	  2009).	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  Without	   going	   into	   too	  much	  detail,	   the	  SCP	   conducted	   its	  own	  evaluation	  which	   is	  available	  in	  the	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  programme	  (Shukla	  2010).	  This	  evaluation	  dates	  from	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   period,	   but	   suggests	   that	   while	   certain	   first	  successes	   have	   been	   accomplished,	   a	   long	   term	   commitment	   (including	   continued	  funding)	   to	   this	   programme	   is	   required	   in	   order	   to	   sustainably	   raise	   the	   profile	   of	  developing	   country	   perspectives	  within	   the	  ENGO	  participation	   in	  UNFCCC	  politics.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  factors,	  not	  least	  due	  to	  “years	  of	  resource	  deprivation	  and	  understaffing”	   (Shukla	   2010:	   41)	  which	   have	   lead	   to	   a	   certain	   disconnect	   from	   the	  current	   political	   debate	   as	   the	   technical	   and	   political	   complexity	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	  negotiations	  is	  increasing	  while	  developing	  country	  ENGOs	  more	  often	  commit	  their	  limited	  resources	  to	  local,	  regional	  or	  national	  priorities	  which	  all	  too	  often	  does	  not	  include	   international	   climate	   politics	   with	   its	   specialised	   knowledge	   and	   language.	  The	  evaluation	  also	  concludes	  that,	  while	  substantial	  financial	  resources	  are	  certainly	  a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   the	   future	   improved	   participation	   of	   developing	   country	  members,	   the	   funding	   needs	   to	   be	   accompanied	   by	   targeted	   efforts	   to	   enable	   and	  improve	   knowledge	   transfer,	   cooperation	   and	   communication	   among	   developing	  country	  ENGOs.	  
5.3.2 Language	  Related	  Barriers	  
A	   class	   of	   barriers	   that	   transcend	   all	   three	   settings	   of	   CAN	   activity,	   and	   that	   has	  significant	   implications	  on	  the	  participation	  of	   individuals	   in	  these	  activities,	  relates	  to	   the	  use	  of	   language.	  Within	   this	   class,	   there	   are	   two	  main	   categories	  of	   barriers,	  which	  will	   be	   considered	   in	   turn	   in	   this	   section.	  The	   first	   relates	   to	   the	  established	  practice	  that	  virtually	  all	  communication	  within	  CAN	  International130	  is	  in	  the	  English	  language	   and	   the	   second	   is	   associated	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	  have,	   over	   time,	   developed	   a	   highly	   specific	   and	   technical	   language	   of	   their	   own	  (including	   an	  dizzying	   array	  of	   acronyms),	  which	   is	   also	  used	   in	   and	  by	  CAN	  when	  considering	  the	  relevant	  issues.	  The	  use	  of	  English	  as	  the	  near	  exclusive	  language	  of	  CAN-­‐I	   interactions	   most	   obviously	   puts	   non-­‐native	   speakers	   of	   that	   language	   at	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  	  That	  is	  likely	  different	  in	  the	  case	  of	  regional	  and	  national	  nodes:	  in	  the	  case	  of	  national/regional	  nodes	  with	   one	   or	   few	   dominant,	   non-­‐English	   languages	   (e.g.	   RAC	   France,	   CAN	   Latin	   America,	  CAN	  China)	   it	   can	  be	   expected	   that	   communication	  within	   the	  node	   typically	   feature	   these	   lan-­‐guages	  (however,	  since	  this	  aspect	  of	  regional/national	  CAN	  activity	  was	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  research,	  this	  must	  remain	  an	  assumption).	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  certain	  disadvantage,	  which	  is	  related	  to	  their	  level	  of	  acquired	  proficiency.	  This	  issue	  impacts	  upon	  the	  different	  settings	  differently,	  thus	  requiring	  separate	  treatment.	  	  
During	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions,	   for	  example,	  CAN	  daily	  meetings	  and	  strategy	  ses-­‐sions	   are	   held	   in	   English	   only,	   which	   means	   that	   CAN	   members	   with	   difficulties	  understanding	   spoken	   English	   will	   not	   benefit	   as	   much	   as	   others	   from	   the	   infor-­‐mation	  and	  strategies	  shared	  at	  these	  meetings,	  and	  individuals	  who	  –	  regardless	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  understand	  the	  proceedings	  –	  have	  problems	  or	  reservations131	  about	  speaking	   in	  a	   foreign	   language	  cannot	  participate	   in	   the	  discussions,	   thus	  excluding	  their	  perspectives.	  Further,	   comments	  by	  non-­‐native	  speakers	  witnessed	  on	  several	  occasions	  during	  CAN	  daily	  meetings	  suggest	   that	   following	  and	  participating	   in	  the	  proceedings	  of	  such	  meetings	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  where	  the	  speaker’s	  accent	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  very	  manifest	  (e.g.	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Australian	  or	  Scottish	   individuals),	  the	  velocity	  of	  the	  speech	  high	  or	  where	  the	  ratio	  between	  the	  ambient	  noise	  in	  the	  room	  and	  the	  speaker’s	  volume	  was	  unfavourable	  (e.g.	  field	  notes,	  Bonn,	  10	  Jun	  2008;	  Poznań,	  8	  Dec	  2008).	  	  
Presumably	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  complaints,	  certain	  measures	  were	  introduced	  to	  address	   some	   of	   the	   issues:	   for	   example,	   CAN	   daily	   meeting	   co-­‐chairs	   started	  reminding	   individuals	   who	   know,	   or	   expect132,	   that	   they	   will	   speak	   during	   the	  meeting	   to	   position	   themselves	   close	   to	   any	   of	   the	   microphones	   that	   are	   typically	  available	   in	   the	   meeting	   rooms.	   Further,	   a	   practice	   of	   “live	   note	   taking”	   has	   been	  established	   where	   the	   content	   of	   the	   screen	   of	   the	   computer	   on	   which	   detailed	  meeting	  notes	  are	  being	   taken	  during	   the	  meeting	   is	  projected	  onto	   the	  wall	   of	   the	  meeting	  room	  –	  thus	  enabling	  individuals	  who	  might	  have	  missed	  a	  certain	  detail	  to	  read	   the	  notes	  near	   instantly	  on	   the	  wall.	   In	  addition,	   these	  notes	  are	  being	  sent	   to	  
CANtalk	   and	   posted	   on	   a	   dedicated	   website	   (post	   field	   notes,	   Poznań,	   Dec	   2008).	  However,	   although	   these	   practices	   remedy	   some	   of	   the	   problems	   related	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  	  My	  own	  experience	  as	  a	  non-­‐native	  speaker	  of	  English,	  as	  well	  as	  numerous	  conversations	  with	  other	  non-­‐native	  speakers,	  suggests	   that	  –	  especially	   in	   lively	  and	  fast-­‐moving	  discussions	  –	   the	  discussion	  has	  often	  already	  moved	  on	  before	  the	  non-­‐native	  speaker	  has	  had	  time	  to	  process	  the	  previous	  statements,	  formulate	  her	  own	  thoughts	  and	  make	  his	  desire	  to	  contribute	  known.	  This	  holds	  true	  even	  where	  the	  level	  of	  proficiency	  is	  sufficient	  to	  passively	  follow	  the	  ongoing	  conver-­‐sation	  without	  much	  difficulty.	  132	  	  Due	  to	  the	  relatively	  fixed	  format	  of	  the	  CAN	  daily	  meetings	  (c.f.	  section	  “Main	  CAN	  Activities	   in	  the	   In-­‐Session	   Setting”	   in	   this	   chapter)	   a	   large	   portion	   of	   individuals	   (e.g.	   working	   group	   co-­‐coordinators)	  know	  in	  advance	  that	  they	  will	  have	  to	  address	  the	  meeting.	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  exclusive	  use	  of	  English	  during	  the	  in-­‐session	  setting,	  the	  issue	  of	  active	  participation	  by	  individuals	  with	  issues	  relating	  to	  speaking	  English	  remains	  unaddressed	  as	  does	  the	   concern	   that	   non-­‐users	   of	   English	   are	   still	   fully	   excluded	   from	   the	   proceedings	  within	  CAN133.	  	  
Some	   of	   the	   difficulties	   associated	  with	   English	   as	   the	   near	   exclusive	   language	  within	   CAN-­‐I	   are	  mitigated	  within	   the	   virtual	   (and	   hybrid)	   setting	   due	   to	   the	   text-­‐mediated	  nature	  of	  the	  communication	  in	  this	  setting.	  Since	  the	  majority	  of	  communi-­‐cation	  in	  this	  setting	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  email,	  which	  is	  much	  less	  immediate	  than	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  conversations,	  non-­‐native	  users	  of	  English	  have	  more	  time	  (and	  the	  option	  of	  using	   relevant	   aids)	   to	   process	   the	  messages	   and	   compose	   their	   replies,	   if	   applica-­‐ble134.	  	  
The	   other	   language	   related	   barrier	   relates	   to	   the	   highly	   complicated	   technical	  language	   that	   has	   developed	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   regime,	   with	   a	   large	   number	   of	  concepts	  with	  very	  precise	  meanings	  and	  associated	  historical	  political	  developments.	  For	  example,	  as	  one	  CAN	  delegate	  pointed	  out:	  You	  can’t	  really	  talk	  about	  “commitments”	  when	  speaking	  about	  de-­‐veloping	   countries	   –	   you	   would	   lose	   them	   right	   there.	   “Commit-­‐ments”	   sounds	   too	   much	   like	   QELROs 135 	  and	   that’s	   just	   for	  developed	   countries.	   You	   can	   say	   “activities”	   or	   “contributions”	  maybe	   even	   refer	   to	   them	   doing	   their	   “share,”	   but	   never	   commit-­‐ments	  –	  even	  though	  you	  expect	  them	  …	  and	  they	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  –	  expect	  them	  to	  commit	  to	  these	  activities,	  actions,	  or	  whatever.	   	  	   (conversation	  with	  CAN	  delegate,	  field	  note,	  Vienna,	  20	  Aug	  2007)	  Moreover,	  the	  meaning	  of	  certain	  phrases	  can	  change	  depending	  on	  the	  current	  user	  of	  the	  phrase.	  For	  example,	  the	  phrase	  “global	  climate	  change	  regime,”	  when	  used	  by	  CAN	  refers	  to,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  –	  in	  particular	  the	  negotiation	  sessions	  –	  is	  strongly	  biased	  toward	  English,	  with	  only	  the	  plenary	  sessions	  (only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  the	  deliberations)	  and	  official	  documents	  (only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  the	  text	  output)	  being	  trans-­‐lated	  in	  the	  other	  five	  official	  UN	  languages.	  It	  can	  thus	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  individu-­‐als	   travelling	   to	   these	  sessions	  will	  have	  a	  certain	  command	  of	  English,	  and	   thus	  CAN	   is	  merely	  mirroring	   the	   language	   related	   restrictions	   of	   the	   overall	   regime	   within	   which	   its	   work	   takes	  place.	  134	  	  Similarly,	  issues	  of	  accents,	  speech	  velocity	  and	  ambient	  noise	  vs.	  volume	  play	  no	  role	  in	  written	  communication.	  135	  	  Quantified	   Emission	   Reduction	   or	   Limitation	   Objective	   –	   the	   type	   of	   greenhouse	   mitigation	  activity	  committed	  to	  by	  Annex	  I	  parties	  in	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	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   you	  know,	  CAN’s	   three-­‐track	  approach	   including	   the	  UNFCCC’s	  no-­‐tion	  of	   “common	  but	  differentiated	  responsibilities	   [and	  respective	  capabilities].”	  While	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  when	  Congress	  uses	  the	  term	  “global	  agreement”	  it	  would	  still	  have	  the	  notion	  of	  “common	  but	  differenti-­‐ated,”	   but	   not	   CAN’s	   three-­‐track	   approach,	  while	   the	  White	  House	  language…,	  when	  they	  use	  “global	  agreement”	  that	  does	  not	  tend	  to	  refer	  to	  “common	  but	  differentiated”	  so	  much.	   	  	   (conversation	  with	  CAN	  delegate,	  field	  note,	  Vienna,	  20	  Aug	  2007)	  The	   intricacies	  of	   these	   and	  other	   concepts	   can	  be	   intimidating	   to	  new	  comers	   and	  will	   create	   the	   perception	   of	   non-­‐accessibility	   and	   exclusivity	   as	   regards	   the	  conversations	  among	  those	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  meanings.136	  Individuals	  newly	  starting	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   process,	   therefore,	   have	   to	   undergo	   a	   learning	  process	  with	  regards	  to	  these	  terms	  which	  very	  substantially	   limits	  their	   full,	  active	  participation	   during	   this	   learning	   process.	   In	   addition,	   working	   groups	   often	   have	  gone	   through	   collective	   learning	   processes	   and	   have	   a	   arrived	   at	   collective	   under-­‐standing	  of	  certain	  phrases,	  words	  and	  concepts	  during	  their	  work,	  a	  shared	  history	  that	   is	   also	   not	   immediately	   accessible	   for	   new	   comers	   (conversation	   with	   “new	  comer,”	  field	  note,	  Bonn,	  7	  Apr	  2009).	  
While	   applicable	   to	   the	   whole	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   regime,	   this	   issue	   is	   addressed	  within	  CAN	  through	  “capacity	  building”	  sessions,	  typically	  scheduled	  for	  a	  few	  hours	  immediately	   before	   the	   strategy	   meeting	   that	   takes	   place	   on	   the	   day	   before	   the	  official	  start	  of	  each	  UNFCCC	  session.	  In	  addition,	  at	  some	  UNFCCC	  session,	  a	  standing	  invitation	   is	   made	   explicit	   at	   CAN	   daily	   meetings	   that	   a	   more	   experienced	   CAN	  member	  will	  be	  available	  to	  discuss	  any	  questions	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  specific	  UNFCCC	  related	  concepts	  that	  participants	  might	  have	  (post	   field	  note,	  Bali,	  Dec	  2007).	   Similarly,	  working	   group	   coordinators	   are	   encouraged	   to	  pay	  particular	  attention	   to	   new	   members,	   including	   offering	   them	   detailed	   explanations	   and	  background	  information	  where	  necessary.	  
However,	  both	  language-­‐related	  barriers	  can	  have	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  the	  partici-­‐pation	  of	  individuals	  within	  the	  deliberations	  within	  CAN	  (and	  the	  observation	  of	  the	  proceedings	  of	   the	  UNFCCC)	  and,	  especially	   in	  the	  case	  of	   the	  political-­‐technological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  	  The	  strong	  proliferation	  of	  acronyms	  and	  very	  specific	  meanings	  of	  phrases	  in	  the	  negotiations	  is	  also	   regularly	   decried	   by	   journalists	   covering	   the	   negotiations	   (e.g.	   Vidal	   2009a).	   C.f.	   also	   the	  reflections	  on	  my	  own	  experience	  in	  the	  section	  “Learning	  the	  Language”	  in	  chapter	  3.	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  jargon	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   regime,	   require	   the	   individuals	   so	   affected	   to	   acquire	   the	  necessary	  competency	  to	  improve	  participation.	  
5.3.3 Technological	  Barriers	  
As	   stated	   above,	   the	   technological	   requirements	   for	   general	   participation	   in	   CAN’s	  virtual	  setting	  are	  relatively	  low,	  and	  even	  where	  access	  to	  computer	  technology	  and	  internet	  was	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  relatively	  recent	  past,	  access	  issues	  are	  less	  problemat-­‐ic	  more	  recently	  (c.f.	  section	  “Access	  to	  CAN’s	  Virtual	  Setting”	  above).	  
However,	  technological	  considerations	  started	  to	  play	  an	  increasing	  role	  in	  the	  in-­‐session	   setting	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   phase.	   As	   figure	   5	   above	   clearly	   shows,	   the	  volume	   of	   emails	   on	   CAN’s	   email	   lists	   during	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   substantially	  increased	   during	   the	   December	   2008	   Poznań	   session	   and	   all	   subsequent	   sessions	  compared	   to	   previous	   sessions.	   Some	   of	   that	   growth	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   an	   ever	  increasing	   ubiquity	   of	   laptops	   (combined	   with	   the	   general	   availability	   of	   wireless	  internet	   at	   UNFCCC	   venues)	   as	   well	   as	   a	   advancing	   proliferation	   of	   email	   enabled	  handheld	   devices,	   such	   as	   smart	   phones,	   and	   –	   associated	   with	   these	   changes	   in	  technology	  availability	  –	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  use	  of	  email	  for	  ad-­‐hoc	  coordination	  of,	  for	  example,	   working	   group	   meetings137 .	   Of	   course,	   individuals	   who	   are	   not	   thus	  equipped	  and	  who	  rely	  on	   the	  stationary	  computers	   that	  are	  made	  available	  by	   the	  UNFCCC	  at	  its	  sessions	  for	  accessing	  CANtalk,	  will	  often	  find	  that	  they	  only	  read	  about	  a	  rescheduled	  or	  spontaneously	  convened	  meeting	  after	  it	  had	  already	  taken	  place	  (as	  evidenced	  by	  complaints	  by	  individuals	  affected	  in	  this	  way,	  post	  field	  note,	  Poznań,	  Dec	  2008).	  
5.3.4 Organisational	  Barriers	  
Certain	  organisational	  features	  of	  CAN	  member	  organisations	  can	  also	  act	  as	  barriers	  to	  effective	  participation	   in	  CAN	  activities,	   for	  example	   the	   internal	   structure	  of	   the	  organisation	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  person	  specifically	  responsible	  for	  UNFCCC	  or	  CAN	  related	   issues	  within	   the	   organisation	   and	   the	   existence	   of	   detailed	   relevant	   policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  	  For	   such	   purposes	   extremely	   short	   emails,	   often	   only	   consisting	   of	   a	   single	   line,	   or	   even	   just	   a	  subject	  line	  without	  email	  body,	  are	  used,	  containing	  text	  such	  as	  this	  fictive	  example:	  “Flex	  Mex	  group	  meet	  at	  13.00	  by	  the	  couches	  near	  the	  coffee	  bar”.	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  positions	  within	  the	  organisation.	  To	  illustrate,	  some	  CAN	  members	  are	  networks	  of	  organisations	   or	   grassroots	   groups	   in	   their	   own	   right,	   which	   in	   some	   cases	  means	  that	   they	  have	  to	  undertake	  additional	  efforts	   in	  order	   to	  provide	   their	   input	   to	   the	  CAN	   policy	   formation	   process.	   In	   one	   case,	   during	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   REDD	   policy	  position	  prior	   to	   the	  Bali	  COP,	  one	  Latin	  American	  network	  of	  organisations	  had	   to	  first	   translate	   the	   English	   draft	   of	   the	   policy	   position	   paper	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   its	  members,	  circulate	  it	  to	  these	  members	  for	  comment,	  collate	  member	  comments	  and	  translate	   them	   back	   to	   English	   before	   submitting	   them	   to	   the	   CAN	   REDD	  working	  group.	  In	  this	  case,	  this	  process	  took	  too	  long	  for	  the	  comments	  still	  to	  be	  considered	  by	   the	  working	   group,	   as	   the	   stated	   completion	   deadline	   had	   already	   passed,	   thus	  excluding	   the	   perspectives	   of	   this	   network	   and	   all	   of	   its	   member	   organisations	  (conversation	  with	  CAN	  delegate,	   field	  note,	  Bangkok,	  3	  Apr	  2008;	  field	  note,	  Bali,	  2	  Dec	  2007).	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   CAN	  member	   organisations	  who	  have	   full-­‐time	   staff	  dedicated	   to	  UNFCCC	  and	  CAN	  work	  who	  are	  authorised	   to	   represent	   the	  organisa-­‐tion	  within	  CAN	  (possibly	  within	  a	  certain	   frame	  defined	  by	   the	  organisation’s	  own	  policy	  position	  on	  a	  given	   issue)	   can	  be	   represented	  much	  more	  efficiently	   in	  CAN-­‐internal	   policy	   discussions	   as	   no	   further	   interaction	   or	   confirmation	   with	   the	  organisation’s	  membership	  is	  required.	  
To	  address	   this	   issue,	   as	  described	  above,	  CAN	  has	  developed	  a	   terms	  of	   refer-­‐ence	   document	   for	   the	   development	   of	   new	   or	   updated	   policy	   positions,	   which	  envisages	  that	  an	  intention	  to	  develop	  such	  policy	  position	  documents	  is	  announced	  very	  early	  in	  the	  development	  process	  to	  CANtalk,	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  likely	  main	  contents	  of	  the	  document	  and	  a	  time	  plan	  of	  important	  milestones	  in	  the	  development	  process.	  The	  intention	  behind	  this	  process	  is	  to	  enable	  interested	  groups	  or	  individu-­‐als	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  the	  drafting	  process	  from	  early	  stages	  or	  at	   least	  know	  well	   in	  advance	  the	  planned	  time	  line,	  thus	  enabling	  them	  to	  plan	  ahead	  with	  regards	  to	  their	  involvement.	  	  
5.3.5 Consensus	  and	  CAN	  Charter	  	  
There	   are	   a	   few	   institutional	   provisions	   in	   the	   CAN	   Charter	   that	   are	   suitable	   to	  address	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  described	  above.	  The	  Charter,	  for	  example,	  recognises	  that	  the	   diversity	   (and	   potential	   access	   problems)	   of	   CAN’s	   membership	   would	   make	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  voting	  an	  unfair	  decision	  making	  device.	  It	  therefore	  instructs	  the	  facilitators	  of	  CAN	  decision	  making	  processes	  to	  seek	  out	  “sufficient	  consensus”	  where	  the	  instructor	  is	  also	  required	  to	  make	  judgements	  about	  what	  relative	  weight	  (in	  terms	  of	  member-­‐ship,	  equity,	  or	  relevance	  to	  the	  decision	  in	  question)	  supports	  the	  different	  views138	  and	  more	   importantly,	   is	  required	  to	  ensure	   that	   “missing	  representatives	   [are]	   […]	  factored	   in”	   (CAN	   2002:	   12)	  when	   determining	   “sufficient	   consensus.”	   However,	   in	  practice	   this	   decision	   making	   process	   is	   rarely	   employed	   outside	   of	   the	   AGA;	  facilitators	   (which	   implicitly	   includes,	   for	   example,	   working	   group	   coordinators	  facilitating	  the	  drafting	  of	  a	  policy	  position)	  normally	  strive	  for	  full	  consensus	  and	  use	  the	  option	  to	  note	  dissenting	  views	  in	  by-­‐lines	  where	  full	  consensus	  is	  impossible	  (see	  above	   for	   a	   more	   detailed	   description	   of	   this	   process).	   Further,	   CAN	   strives	   for	  balance	   in	   terms	  of	  developing	  vs.	  developed	  country	  representation	   in	   the	  roles	  of	  co-­‐facilitators	  of	  its	  meetings,	  working	  groups	  etc.	  –	  most	  CAN	  daily	  meetings	  are	  co-­‐chaired	   by	   both	   a	   developed	   and	   developing	   country	   CAN	   member	   and	   working	  groups	   are	   expected	   to	   attempt	   to	   appoint	   their	   two	   co-­‐coordinators	   in	   a	   similar	  fashion.	  
5.4 Conclusions	  
This	   chapter	   has	   presented	   an	   analysis	   of	   access	   –	   including	   the	   barriers	   to	   that	  access	  –	  with	  regards	  to	  participation	  in	  the	  general	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  and	  in	  the	  work	  of	  CAN-­‐I	  in	  the	  three	  distinct	  settings	  of	  that	  work.	  These	  considerations	  were	  deemed	  important	  as	  access	  to	  the	  virtual	  and	  physical	  spaces	  where	  the	  proceedings	  of	   this	   work	   is	   taking	   place	   is	   a	   crucial	   prerequisite	   for	   effective	   participation	   of	  ENGOs	  in	  the	  global	  climate	  change	  policy	  regime.	  
To	  advance	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue,	  I	  first	  examined	  the	  issues	  of	  access	  as	  it	  related	  to	  the	  general	  access	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  observed	  that,	  in	  principle,	  the	  access	  as	   observer	   is	   relatively	   easy,	   with	   only	   few	   formal	   requirements	   of	   organisations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  	  As	  a	  hypothetical	  example,	  if	  a	  decision	  is	  to	  be	  made	  with	  regards	  to	  a	  policy	  position	  of	  CAN	  that	  mainly	   relates	   to	   developing	   countries,	   representatives	   of	   organisations	   from	   those	   countries	  would	   have	   more	   relative	   weight	   (by	   relevance)	   than	   representatives	   of	   organisations	   from	  developed	  countries.	  Likewise,	  individuals	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of,	  for	  example,	  a	  network	  of	  many	  grassroots	   groups	   representing	   thousands	   of	   individual	   activists,	   would	   have	   more	   relative	  weight	  (by	  membership)	  than	  a	  representative	  of	  a	  advocacy	  group	  with	  only	  a	  few	  dozen	  mem-­‐bers.	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  interested	  in	  becoming	  accredited	  as	  observers	  (and	  it	  was	  later	  discussed	  how	  these	  formal	   requirements	   were	   even	   less	   of	   a	   concern	   for	   CAN	  member	   organisations).	  However,	   I	   also	   pointed	   out	   that	   access	   barriers	   to	   the	  UNFCCC	   exist	   chiefly	   in	   the	  form	  of	  the	  substantial	  financial	  burden	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  participation	  and	  that	  this	  barrier	  disproportionally	  affects	  organisations	  from	  developing	  countries	  as	  well	  as	   smaller	   organisations	   from	   developed	   countries	   and	   that	   this	   barrier	   is	   more	  acutely	  felt	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  participation	  during	  the	  smaller,	  intersessional	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  compared	  to	  the	  COPs.	  In	  discussing	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  intermittent	  participa-­‐tion	   that	   might	   result	   from	   this	   financial	   barrier,	   I	   elaborated	   how	   continued	  participation	   (i.e.	   including	   the	   intersessional	   UNFCCC	   conferences)	   is	   beneficial	   in	  terms	  of	  building	  efficient	   interpersonal	   relationships	  and	   trust	  with	  party	  negotia-­‐tors	   as	  well	   as	  maintaining	   a	   detailed	   insight	  with	   regards	   to	   the	  political	   develop-­‐ments	  taking	  place	  at	  the	  sessions,	  including,	  for	  example,	  detailed	  knowledge	  of	  the	  genesis	  of	  negotiation	  text	  and	  the	  possible	  political	  motivations	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  countries	  making	  certain	  text	  suggestions.	  
Further,	  physical	  attendance	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  is	  also	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  participation	  in	  the	  work	  in	  CAN’s	  in-­‐session	  setting	  and	  thus	  crucial	  for	  having	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  work	  done	  in	  this	  setting.	  While	  elaborating	  what	  specific	  activities	  are	  undertaken	  by	  CAN	  and	   its	  working	  groups	   in	   its	   in-­‐session	  setting,	   it	  became	  clear	  that	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  CAN’s	  internal	  work,	  discussion	  and	  decision	  making	  takes	  place	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  and	  that	  therefore	  CAN	  member	  organisations	  who	  only	  intermittently	  (or	  never)	  participate	  in	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  are	  also	  very	  limited	  in	  their	  participation,	   and	   thus	   representation,	   in	   CAN-­‐internal	   work.	   This	   holds	   true	   even	  though	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  would	  theoretically	  enable	  organisations	  that	  are	  physically	  absent	  to	  participate.	  In	  practice,	  it	  fails	  to	  do	  so	  as	  the	  hybrid	  setting	  suffers	  from	  a	  clash	  between	  the	  intensity	  and	  speed	  of	  developments	  during	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  (i.e.	   the	   in-­‐session	   setting)	   and	   the	   means	   of	   communication	   available	   for	   those	  attending	  via	   the	  hybrid	   setting,	  which	  are	   the	  means	  normally	  associated	  with	   the	  virtual	  setting,	  where	  developments	  are	  less	  rapid,	  and	  where	  therefore	  participation	  is	  more	  inclusive.	  
Among	  the	  overarching	  barriers,	  which	  affect	  all	  areas	  of	  possible	  participation,	  in	   addition	   to	   the	   already	   mentioned	   financial	   barriers,	   issues	   of	   language	   were	  discussed	   including	   the	   UNFCCC’s	   and	   CAN’s	   near	   exclusive	   use	   of	   English	   as	   a	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  working	   language	   as	   well	   as	   the	   extensive	   use	   of	   complex	   political	   and	   technical	  concepts,	  often	  only	  fully	  comprehensible	  within	  their	  specific	  historical	  development,	  and	  often	  further	  obstructed	  to	  the	  not	  yet	  initiated	  by	  the	  extensive	  use	  of	  acronyms.	  CAN’s	   efforts	   to	   overcome	   some	   of	   these	   barriers,	   for	   example,	   through	   the	   estab-­‐lishment	  of	  its	  Southern	  Capacity	  Programmes,	  have	  been	  highlighted	  as	  well.	  
The	  consideration	  of	  access	  to	  the	  spaces	  of	  deliberation	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  CAN	  as	  well	   as	   the	  barriers	   to	   that	   access	  have	  been	  a	   focus	  of	   this	   chapter	   as	   this	  access	   is	   a	   crucial	   requirement	   for	   effective	   participation	   of	   ENGOs	   in	   the	   opinion	  formation	  and	  decision	  making	  in	  these	  fora.	  In	  discussing	  these	  issues	  it	  has	  become	  evident	   that	   is	   it	  more	   difficult	   for	   participants	   from	  developing	   country	   ENGOs	   to	  effectively	   play	   a	   part	   in	   these	   processes	   as	   a	   number	   of	   the	   barriers	   described	  disproportionally	  affect	  these	  organisations	  and	  individuals.	  This	  is	  important	  as	  both	  the	  political	   process	   under	   the	  UNFCCC	   as	  well	   as	   the	  decision	  making	  within	  CAN	  claim	   –	   by	  means	   of	   their	   application	   of	   “consensus”	   as	   a	   primary	   decision	  making	  device	   –	   to	   be	   equally	   representative	   of	   both	   developing	   and	   developed	   country	  perspectives.	  
Furthermore,	  within	   the	  specific	   theoretical	   focus	  of	   this	   thesis,	   it	   is	   relevant	   to	  examine	   to	   what	   degree	   the	   access	   to	   these	   spaces	   is	   generally	   available	   as	   this	  impacts	   on	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   the	  decision	  making	   arena	   in	  questions	   can	  be	  regarded	   as	   a	   public	   sphere.	   In	   his	   ideal-­‐typical	   description	   of	   a	   public	   sphere,	  Habermas	  maintains	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  “public	  sphere	  […]	  [stands	  or	  falls]	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  universal	  access.	  A	  public	  sphere	  from	  which	  specific	  groups	  would	  be	  
eo	   ipso	   excluded	   [is]	   less	   than	  merely	   incomplete;	   it	   [is]	   not	   a	   public	   sphere	   at	   all”	  (Habermas	  1989:	  85).	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  crucial	  to	  assess	  how	  this	  ideal-­‐typical	  principle	  maps	   onto	   the	   real	   world	   example	   of	   the	   deliberations	   within	   CAN	   and	   the	   wider	  UNFCCC	  regime	   in	  order	  to	  be	  able	   to	  assess	  –	  as	   I	  will	  undertake	   in	   the	  discussion	  chapter	  (chapter	  7	  of	  this	  thesis)	  when	  drawing	  together	  the	  various	  insights	  gleaned	  from	   the	   elaborations	   of	   the	   empirical	   findings	   –	   whether,	   despite	   the	   barriers	   to	  access	  as	  described	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  principle	  of	  general	  access	  and	  non-­‐exclusion	  of	  specifiable	  groups	  still	  holds.	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Publics	  and	  Counterpublics	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  –	  	  
On	  Hierarchy,	  Inequality	  and	  Discursive	  Practice	  
When	  analysing	   the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  and	   the	  activities	  of	  ENGOs	  within	   that	   regime	  under	  the	  lens	  of	  Jürgen	  Habermas’	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  an	  important	  aspect	  is	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  role	  which	  discourses	  about	  reason	  and	  rationality	  play	  in	  the	  deliberations	  of	  this	  regime	  and	  (by	  extension)	  in	  the	  internal	  deliberations	  of	  the	  NGO	  actors	  involved	  therein.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  Habermas’	  understanding,	  borrowed	  from	  Kant	   (as	   quoted	   in	   chapter	   2	   above),	   that	   in	   modern	   political	   systems,	   authority	  should	  no	  longer	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  power	  of	  the	  sovereign	  based	  on	  the	  command	  of	   force,	   nor	   primarily	   from	   established	   customs	   and	   habits,	   but	   rather	   from	   the	  power	  of	  rationality	  and	  reason,	  where	  the	  best	  argument	  determines	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  decision	  making	  process.	  
This	  aspect	  –	  Habermas’	  view	  of	  the	  prevailing	  of	  reason	  and	  rationality	  –	  has	  a	  number	  of	  facets	  that	  deserve	  separate	  treatment	  in	  this	  section.	  First,	  related	  to	  this	  notion	  of	  the	  primacy	  of	  reason	  and	  rationality,	   is	  Habermas’	  declaration	  that	  in	  the	  ideal	  typical	  public	  sphere	  deliberations	  are	  conducted	  amongst	  peers,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  status	  of	  the	  participants	  should	  not	  bear	  any	  impact	  in	  the	  discussions	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  –	  that	  the	  best	  reasoned	  argument	  would	  win,	  regardless	  of	  the	  status	  of	   its	   proponent.	   Implicitly	   acknowledging	   that	   a	   social	   situation	   with	   no	   status	  differentials	   is	   virtually	   impossible,	   his	   theory	   refrained	   from	   “presupposing	   the	  equality	  of	  status,	   [but	  rather]	  disregarded	  status	  altogether”	   (Habermas	  1989:	  36).	  In	   this	   context,	  Habermas	   also	   recognises	   that	   this	   characterisation	   is	   a	  mere	   ideal	  type,	  rather	  than	  a	  description	  of	  real	  world	  public	  spheres,	  but	  he	  maintains	  that	  the	  expectation	   that	   “alone	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   better	   argument	   could	   assert	   itself	   […]	  had	   become	   institutionalized	   and	   thereby	   stated	   as	   an	   objective	   claim”	   (Habermas	  1989:	  36).	  Nancy	  Fraser,	  of	  course,	  strongly	  rejected	  this	  notion	  of	  bracketing	  social	  inequalities	  (i.e.	  the	  notion	  of	  “disregard[ing]	  them	  altogether”)	  as	  this	  would	  obscure	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  the	  power	  differentials	  within	  the	  public	  sphere	  or	  (already	  applying	  her	  concept	  of	  multiple	  publics)	  between	  competing	  public	   spheres.	  Therefore,	   it	  will	  be	  crucial	   to	  also	  investigate	  the	  impact	  that	  “social	  inequalities”	  might	  have	  on	  the	  deliberations	  within	  CAN	  and	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  general.	  The	  notion	  of	  “social	  inequalities”	  itself	  has	  a	  specific	  meaning	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  negotiations	  which	  will	  require	  some	  consideration	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
Thus,	  keeping	  in	  mind	  Fraser’s	  critique	  regarding	  the	  undesirability	  of	  the	  disre-­‐garding	  (or	  “bracketing”)	  of	  social	  inequalities	  within	  analyses	  of	  public	  spheres,	  and	  specifically	   recalling	   her	   related	   preference	   for	   a	   theory	   of	   multiple,	   competing	  publics	  and	  counterpublics	  to	  overcome	  some	  of	   the	  effects	  of	  social	   inequalities	  on	  the	  public	  sphere	  discourse,	  another	  strand	  of	  analysis	   in	  this	  chapter	  relates	  to	  the	  
type	  and	   other	   qualitative	   characteristics	   of	   the	   arguments	   and	   claims	  made	   in	   the	  deliberations	   themselves,	   including	   competing	   interpretations	   of	   the	   concepts	   of	  “reason”	   and	   “rationality”	   themselves.	   This	   is	   an	   important	   analysis	   as	   it	   relates	   to	  possible	  differences	   in	  discursive	  style	  and	   language	  used	  within	  competing	  publics	  and	   in	   this	   sense	   it	   is	   indicated	   to	   assess	   different	   types	   of	   propositions	   made	   by	  different	   classes	   of	   actors	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	   and	   in	   relation	   to	  CAN’s	  internal	  decision	  making.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  examine	  what	  differences	  exist	  between	   the	   arguments	   of	   different	   actors,	   for	   example,	   whether	   they	   represent	  different	   degrees	   of	   “quality”	   of	   argument	   or	   whether	   they	   are	   derived	   from	  prioritising	   different	   aspects	   of	   the	   same	   problem	   or	   whether	   they	   do,	   in	   fact,	  represent	  different,	  competing	  conceptualisations	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  rationality	  itself.	  
Thus,	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  investigate	  the	  notion	  of	  relative	  status	  equality	   and	   hierarchy	   (as	   one	   specific	   incarnation	   of	   status	   inequality	   and	   an	  indicator	  of	   relationships	  of	  domination	  within	  a	  discursive	  space)	  as	   they	  relate	   to	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  CAN.	  Hierarchy	  can	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  individuals’	  participation	  in	  the	  deliberations	  of	  these	  two	  arenas	  as	  it	  can	  create	  power	  differentials	  and	  thus	  status	  inequality	  between	  individuals.	  To	  a	  degree,	  the	  notion	  of	  hierarchy	  is	  also	  related	  to	  issues	  of	  access	  (as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter),	  as	  hierarchical	  differences	  can	  exclude	   individuals	   from	   certain	   loci	   of	   deliberations.	   However,	   hierarchical	  differences	  might	  not	  only	  apply	  to	  individuals	  as	  participants	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  (or	  the	  CAN	  work	  in	  relation	  to	  that	  regime)	  but	  hierarchy	  considerations	  also	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  as	  they	  might	  apply	  to	  differences	  between	  institutional	  actors,	  such	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  as	  different	   convention	  parties,	  NGO	  networks,	   individual	  NGOs	  and	  so	   forth.	  While	  the	  notion	  of	  different	  discursive	  approaches	  to	  questions	  of	  rationality,	  reason	  and	  power	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  will	  be	  discussed	  separately	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  it	  will	  also	  become	  apparent	  that	  this	  issue	  is	  closely	  tied	  to	  notions	  of	  counterpublicity,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  has	  substantial	  links	  to	  various	  dimensions	  of	  inequality.	  Therefore,	  it	  will	  be	  unavoidable	  to	  address	  from	  the	  beginning	  some	  of	  the	  argument	  to	  be	  made	  later	   –	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   counterpublicity,	   reason	   and	   rationality	   –	   when	   discussing	  notions	  of	  equality,	  hierarchy	  and	  status	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
6.1 Hierarchy,	  Status	  and	  Inequality	  
6.1.1 UNFCCC	  
In	  chapter	  4,	  the	  different	  classes	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiation	  sessions	  were	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail.	   In	  particular,	   the	  differences	  between	  parties	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  UN	  bodies	  and	  related	  agencies,	  other	   IGOs	  and	  NGOs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	   highlighted	   and	   the	   substantial	   differences	   between	   IGOs	   (including	   UN)	   and	  NGOs	  explained.	  Clearly,	  this	  differentiation	  of	  participants	  creates	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  hierarchy	  within	  the	  regime,	  where	  generally	  speaking	  parties	  (despite	  far	  from	  being	  a	  homogenous	  group,	  have	  the	  highest	  hierarchical	  position,	  while	  NGOs	  occupy	  the	  lowest,	  with	  the	  position	  defined	  by	  their	  rights	  and	  privileges	  within	  the	  process,	  for	  example,	   relating	   to	   the	   right	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   to	   request	   textual	   changes,	   make	  verbal	  interventions,	  access	  meeting	  rooms,	  or	  request	  documents.	  
Additionally,	  as	  also	  described	   in	  chapter	  4,	  as	   far	  as	   the	  parties	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  are	  concerned,	  there	  is	  no	  formal	  hierarchy	  and	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  rule	  of	  procedure	  on	  voting	  and	  the	  subsequent	  default	  practice	  of	  decision	  making	  by	  consensus,	  every	  party	  holds,	  theoretically,	  the	  right	  to	  veto	  any	  decision	  made	  by	  the	  decision	  making	  bodies	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  However,	  as	  was	  also	  described,	  due	  to	  an	  absence	  of	  a	  formal	  definition	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “consensus”	  this	  concept	  has	  been	  interpreted	  differently	  by	  different	   chairs	   over	   the	   history	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	   regime,	   thus	   factually	   depriving	  individual	   parties	   of	   their	   veto	  powers.	  However,	   as	   this	   occurs	  only	   very	   rarely	   in	  practice,	   this	   does	   not	   constitute	   a	   hierarchical	   difference	   between	   parties.	   Yet	  despite	  this	  formal	  equality	  among	  parties,	  there	  are	  certainly	  de	  facto	  differences	  in	  the	   degree	   to	   which	   they	   are	   able	   to	   influence	   the	   decision	   making	   within	   the	  
6.	  Publics	  and	  Counterpublics	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	   239	  	  Convention.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   a	   number	   of	   reasons,	  most	   of	   which	   have	   been	   already	  elaborated	   in	  chapter	  4,	   thus	   it	   should	  suffice	  here	   to	  restate	   them	  very	  briefly	  and	  discuss	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  hierarchical	  considerations.	  
First,	   the	   differentiation	   between	   Annex	   I	   and	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries	   creates	   a	  power	   differential	   between	   the	   two	   groups:	   the	   Annex	   I	   countries	   are	   the	   parties	  expected	   to	   perform	   absolute	   cuts	   to	   their	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions,	   Annex	   I	  countries	   are	   called	   upon	   to	   raise	   substantial	   funds	   for	   financial	   transfers	   to	  non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries	   to	  assist	   the	   latter	   in	  adaptation	   to	   climate	   change	  and	   their	  own	  reduction	  of	  growth	  rates	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  output,	  Annex	  I	  countries	  are	  also	  expected	  to	  facilitate	  technological	  `and	  capacity	  transfers	  of	  climate	  friendly	  technology	  and	  knowledge	  to	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries	  –	  this	  list	  could	  be	  extended	  ad	  libitum.	  Despite	   that	   fact	   that	   there	   are	   also	   numerous	   requirements	   and	   demands	  placed	  on	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries,	   the	  emphasis	  on	  Annex	  I	  countries	  to	  perform	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  activities	  with	  regards	  to	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  and	  financing,	  at	  least	  initially,	  has	  given	  raise	  to	  a	  unbalanced	  relationship	  between	  these	  two	  groups,	  akin	  to	   a	   donor-­‐receiver	   relationship,	   whereby	   Annex	   I	   countries	   more	   or	   less	   autono-­‐mously	   decide	   how	  much	   they	   are	   going	   to	   “give”	   in	   terms	   of	   emission	   reduction	  targets	   and	   climate	   finance	   while	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries,	   as	   a	   group,	   do	   not	   have	  much	  bargaining	  power.	  	  
The	  legal	  architecture	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  provided	  a	  means	  of	  breaking	  out	  of	  this	   structure	   by	   enshrining	   the	   emission	   reductions	   of	  Annex	   I	   parties	   in	   a	   legally	  binding	   form.	   Thus,	   during	   and	   after	   the	   Kyoto	   Conference,	   the	   dynamics	   slightly	  shifted	  as	  now	  Annex	  I	  countries	  were	  asking	  their	  counterparts	  to	  agree	  to	  favoura-­‐ble	   accounting	   and	   emissions	   trading	   rules	   that	   would	   make	   it	   easier	   for	   them	   to	  meet	   their	   targets.	  However,	   during	   the	   fieldwork	  phase,	   in	   the	   negotiations	   under	  the	   AWG-­‐KP,	   there	   was	   fierce	   resistance	   by	   a	   number	   of	   Annex	  I	   parties	   –	   mainly	  Russia,	  Canada	  and	  Japan	  –	  who	  sought	  to	  soften	  this	  legal	  framework	  and	  replace	  the	  “top-­‐down”	  approach	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  protocol	  (wherein	  a	  collective	  target	  for	  all	  Annex	  I	  countries	   is	   agreed	   upon	   based	   on	   scientific	   information	   as	   well	   as	   negotiating-­‐bargaining	   and	   which	   is	   only	   thereafter	   broken	   down	   into	   individual	   countries’	  targets)	   with	   a	   “bottom-­‐up”	   or	   “pledge-­‐and-­‐review”	   approach	   where	   individual	  countries	  would	  offer	  a	  target	  for	  themselves	  without,	  generally	  speaking,	  a	  particular	  emphasis	   to	   the	   collective	   emission	   reductions	   that	   would	   result	   from	   combining	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  these	   individual	   pledges.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   period,	   the	   AWG-­‐KP	   failed	   to	  produce	   a	   collective	   target	   for	   Annex	   I	   countries	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Copenhagen	  conference,	   as	   it	   was	   mandated	   to	   do,	   while	   the	   Copenhagen	   Accords	   formally	  included	  a	   “pledge-­‐and-­‐review”,	  or	  bottom-­‐up,	   instrument	   (UNFCCC	  2010f:	  decision	  2/CP.15,	   appendix	   1).	   These	   developments	   indeed	   suggest	   that	   the	   Kyoto-­‐style	  regime	   of	   legally	   binding	   emission	   reduction	   targets,	   agreed	   upon	   through	   a	   top-­‐down	  approach,	  which	  provided	  some	  additional	  bargaining	  power,	  might	  be	  expiring	  after	  the	  Protocol’s	  first	  commitment	  period139.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  very	  way	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  was	  negotiated	  represented	  a	  sub-­‐stantial	   shift	   in	   the	   way	   aspects	   of	   hierarchy	   and	   equality	   among	   parties	   were	  practiced	   within	   the	   UNFCCC.	   As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   4,	   negotiations	   under	   the	  UNFCCC	  generally	   involve	  a	  number	  of	  negotiation	  arenas,	  with	  levels	  of	  closedness	  increasing	  as	  the	  bargaining	  character	  of	  these	  arenas	  increases.	  However,	  all	  formal	  negotiation	   arenas	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   are	   open	   to	   all	   parties	   and	   the	   informal	   ones	  (information	  consultations,	  friends	  of	  the	  chair/president	  etc),	  which	  do	  not	  include	  all	  parties,	  are	  established	  by	  the	  plenary.	  Thus	  the	  establishment	  of	  all	  arenas	  (and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  informal	  group,	  their	  composition)	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  consensus	  rules	  as	  any	  other	  plenary	  decision,	  including	  principally	  equipping	  every	  party	  with	  a	  veto.	  For	  example,	  in	  Copenhagen,	  Tuvalu	  vetoed	  the	  start	  of	  informal	  consultations,	  both	   in	   the	   COP	   and	   CMP,	   effectively	   halting	   negotiations	   under	   these	   bodies	   for	   a	  number	  of	  days,	  as	  it	  argued	  that	  only	  a	  contact	  group	  –	  not	  informal	  consultations	  –	  could	  provide	  the	  level	  of	  transparency,	  openness	  and	  inclusivity	  that	  the	  matters	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  	  Indeed,	  Appendix	  1	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  quite	  vividly	  illustrates	  all	  aspects	  that	  the	  Kyoto	  architectures	   sought	   to	   avoid:	  1.	   the	   text	  of	   the	  Accord	  was	  agreed	  upon	  without	   including	  any	  specific	  numbers	  for	  emissions	  reductions,	  i.e.	  the	  framework	  was	  agreed	  upon	  before	  the	  specific	  targets:	   the	   agreed	   upon	   version	   contains	   an	   empty	   table	   in	   its	   Appendix	   1,	   which	   was	   to	   be	  populated	   with	   industrialised	   countries’	   pledges	   later.	   This,	   2.,	   represents	   a	   bottom-­‐up	   pledge	  system,	   as	   opposed	   to	   Kyoto’s	   top-­‐down	   targets.	   The	   later	   version	   of	   the	   Appendix,	   now	   filled	  with	   the	   pledges	   of	   the	   parties	   that	   associated	   themselves	   with	   the	   Accord	   (UNFCCC	   2010g),	  further	  contains,	  3.,	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  base	  years	  used	  for	  the	  calculations	  of	  emission	  reductions,	  which	  makes	  comparison	  between	  countries’	  efforts	  difficult,	  4.	  targets	  expressed	  in	  wide	  ranges,	  e.g.	   Australia’s	   “-­‐5%	   up	   to	   -­‐15%	   or	   -­‐25%,”	   and/or,	   5.,	   associated	   with	   conditionalities	   (chiefly	  those	   referring	   to	   the	   activities/pledges	   of	   other	   parties,	   as	   the	   pledge	   system	   introduced	   sub-­‐stantial	  uncertainties	  in	  that	  respect)	  –	  all	  of	  which	  are	  in	  clear	  contradiction	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  archi-­‐tecture	  and	  make	   it	  difficult	   to	  know	  with	  any	  certainty	  what	   level	  of	  mitigation	  actions	  can	  be	  expected	  collectively	  from	  Annex	  I	  parties	  and	  thus	  present	  a	  substantial	  barrier	  to	  assessing	  the	  sufficiency	  of	  these	  actions	  in	  light	  of	  the	  levels	  suggested	  in	  the	  relevant	  scientific	  literature	  (e.g.	  IPCC	  2007b;	  den	  Elzen	  and	  Höhne	  2008).	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  question	   required140	  and	   thus	   demanded	   the	   establishment	   of	   contact	   groups,	  with	  which	  other	  parties	  did	  not	  agree	  (field	  notes,	  Copenhagen,	  9	  Dec	  2009;	  10	  Dec	  2009).	  Furthermore,	  contact	  groups,	  informal	  consultations	  and	  informal	  groups	  are	  merely	  negotiation	   arenas	   (as	   opposed	   to	   decision	  making	   bodies)	  where	   text	   is	   prepared	  based	  on	  the	  input	  of	  the	  parties	  involved	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  developing	  text	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  meet	  consensus	  when	  brought	  in	  font	  of	  the	  plenary	  for	  decision.	  Thus,	  even	  parties	   not	   involved	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   text	   can,	   and	   frequently	   do,	   still	  request	  or	  suggest	  text	  changes	  to	  the	  text	  brought	  back	  to	  the	  plenary	  or	  withhold	  their	  consensus.	  
In	   contrast,	   the	   Copenhagen	  Accord	  was	   only	   negotiated	   by	   a	   small	   number	   of	  parties	  which	  did	  not	  have	  any	  mandate	  from	  the	  COP	  or	  CMP	  for	  doing	  so,	  and	  with	  only	  five	  of	  them,	  the	  US,	  China,	  India,	  Brazil	  and	  South	  Africa141,	  spending	  much	  time	  in	   private	   consultations	   to	   reach	   an	   agreement	   among	   themselves,	   only	   to	   be	   later	  joined	   by	   other	   invited	   parties	   (in	   total,	   “some	   30	   parties”	   (European	   Commission	  2010)	  were	  said	  to	  have	  been	  part	  of	  the	  process	  at	  some	  stage)	  to	  prepare	  and	  agree	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Accord.	  The	  already	  agreed	  text	  was	  then	  presented	  to	  the	  COP,	  which	  was	  then	  presented	  with	  the	  choice	  to	  adopt	   the	  Copenhagen	  Accord,	   in	  contrast	   to	  the	  established	  practice	  and	  rules	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  where,	  as	  I	  described	  above,	  textual	  changes	   are	   possible	   until	   the	   decision	   is	   taken.	   A	   number	   of	   countries	   refusing	   to	  adopt	  the	  Accord	  on	  a	  number	  of	  grounds,	  both	  procedural	  –	  such	  as,	  among	  others,	  the	   break	   with	   established	   UNFCCC	   practices,	   the	   short	   amount	   of	   time	   between	  presentation	   of	   the	   text	   and	   decision,	   the	   disregard	   in	   the	   Accord	   of	   much	   of	   the	  previous	  two	  years’	  negotiation	  outcome	  and	  text	  –	  as	  well	  as	  substantial.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  refusal	  to	  adopt	  the	  document	  as	  a	  COP	  decision,	  the	  COP	  merely	  “took	  note”	  of	  the	  Accord	  (UNFCCC	  2010f:	  decision	  2/CP.15)	  as	  an	  external	  document	  not	  formally	  or	  legally	  associated	  with	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  (field	  notes,	  Copenhagen,	  19	  Dec	  2009;	  post	   field	  notes,	  Copenhagen,	  Dec	  2009;	   for	  a	   legal	  analysis	  of	   the	  Accord’s	  position	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  	  Under	   the	   COP,	   the	   issue	   in	   question	   was	   the	   legal	   form	   and	   content	   of	   possible	   additional	  protocols	   to	   advance	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Convention	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	  where	   a	   few	   countries	   (including	   Tuvalu	   itself)	   has	   submitted	   specific	   text	   of	   such	   a	   protocol,	  while	  under	  the	  CMP,	  the	  issue	  was	  the	  breadth	  and	  nature	  of	  possible	  amendments	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  itself	  (again,	  a	  number	  of	  countries,	  including	  Tuvalu,	  had	  made	  substantial	  and	  specific	  submissions	  on	  this	  question).	  141	  	  China,	   India,	  Brazil	   and	  South	  Africa	   continued	   to	   coordinate	   their	   international	   climate	   change	  policies	  with	   each	   other	   as	   the	   “BASIC”	   countries,	   a	  word	   composed	   of	   the	   first	   letters	   of	   their	  names,	   after	   the	   Copenhagen	   conference,	   including	   holding	   coordination	   meetings	   and	   issuing	  joint	  letters	  and	  statements.	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  relative	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   c.f.	   South	   Centre	   2010)142.	   However,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	  Accord	  was	  negotiated	  and	  decided	  upon	  behind	  closed	  doors	  by	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  parties	  and	  then	  presented	  to	  the	  plenary	  for	  adoption	  certainly	  has	  created	  a	  precedent	  of	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  insiders	  versus	  outsiders	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  process,	  whose	  impact	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  
In	   addition	   to	   this	   potential	   new	   form	   of	   hierarchy	   and	   inequality	   among	   the	  parties	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  created	  by	  this	  precedent	  and	  the	  long	  established	  differentia-­‐tion	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  dichotomy	  of	  Annex	  I	  versus	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  parties,	  two	  more	  ways	   in	   which	   parties	   have	   relative	   power	   differentials	   should	   be	   repeated	   and	  further	  discussed.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  UNFCCC	  is	  not	  situated	  in	  a	  political	  vacuum	  but	  rather	  its	  parties	  are	  also	  parties	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  multilat-­‐eral	   treaties,	   bilateral	   economic	   relationships,	   regional	   economic	   or	   defence	  organisations	  and	  the	  like;	   in	  other	  words,	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  parties	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  is	  always	  impacted	  by	  the	  general	  complex	  political-­‐economic	  relationship	  of	  the	  parties	  with	  each	  other	  and	  their	  respective	  position	  within	  the	  global	  structure	  of	   economic	   and	   geopolitical	   power.	   Furthermore,	   as	   has	   been	  hinted	   in	   chapter	   4,	  some	   countries	   have	   been	   successful	   in	   generating	   a	   position	   of	   moral	   authority	  within	  the	  negotiations	  despite	  otherwise	  being	  amongst	  the	  least	  powerful	  countries	  of	   the	   world	   in	   any	   other	   sense	   of	   the	   word.	   The	   ideal	   typical	   example	   for	   this	   is	  Tuvalu,	   a	   tiny	   pacific	   island	   state	   of	   just	   over	   10,000	   inhabitants,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  Alliance	   of	   Small	   Island	   States	   (AoSIS)	   of	   which	   Tuvalu	   is	   a	   prominent	   member.	  Tuvalu	  and	  AoSIS	  have	  succeeded	  to	  a	  substantial	  degree	  in	  generating	  a	  position	  of	  moral	  authority	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  countries	  populations	  will	  be	  among	  the	  first	   to	   be	   adversely	   affected	   by	   the	   results	   of	   climate	   change.	   Tuvalu’s	   highest	  elevation,	   for	  example,	   is	   just	  4.5	  meter	  above	  sea	   level,	  with	  most	  of	   the	   land	  area	  only	  1	   to	   2	  meters	   above	   sea	   level,	  making	   it	   very	   vulnerable	   to	   sea	   level	   rise	   as	   a	  result	  of	  climate	  change,	  which	  could	  make	  the	  whole	  country	  uninhabitable	  during	  the	  21st	  century.	  This	  situation	   is	  repeatedly	  reiterated	  by	  AoSIS	  members	  and	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  	  The	   South	  Centre’s	   legal	   analysis	   also	   concludes	   that	  while	   the	  Accord	  does	   not	   have	   any	   legal	  standing	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  per	  se,	   it	  nonetheless	  might	   substantially	   influence	   future	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  as	  parties	  associating	  themselves	  with	  the	  Accord	  might	  be	  bound	  by	  its	  provisions	  thus	  preventing	  them	  from	  making	  decisions	  under	  the	  UNFCCC	  that	  contradict	  the	  Accord	  (South	  Centre	  2010).	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  image	  of	  their	  whole	  nations’	  survival	  being	  urgently	  at	  stake	  affords	  them	  a	  unique	  position	  in	  the	  negotiations.	  	  
In	  addition,	  Tuvalu	  and	  AoSIS	  are	  supported	  by	  environmental	  NGOs	  and	  other	  external	  legal	  and	  scientific	  supporters	  and	  send	  very	  dedicated,	  skilled,	  knowledgea-­‐ble	  and	  well-­‐respected	  delegations	  to	  the	  UNFCCC,	  which	  further	  contributes	  to	  this	  position	   of	   relatively	   high	   influence.	   For	   example,	   AoSIS	   was	   the	   first	   country	  grouping	  that	  made	  an	  actual	  text	  proposal	  of	  a	  fully	  developed	  version	  of	  a	  protocol	  during	   the	  negotiations	   that	  ultimately	   led	   to	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	   thus	  providing	   an	  impulse	   for	   other	   parties	   to	  make	   their	   own	   proposals,	   as	   the	   AoSIS	   proposal	  was	  conceived	  as	  much	  too	  demanding	  on	  Annex	  I	  countries	  (Depledge	  2005).	  Likewise,	  Tuvalu	  made	  proposals	  both	  for	  amendments	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  for	  the	  emerging	  post-­‐2012	  climate	  regime	  as	  well	  as	   for	  a	  new	  additional	  protocol	   in	   the	  non-­‐Kyoto	  track	   of	   the	   negotiations	   ahead	   of	   the	   Copenhagen	   conference	   (UNFCCC	   2009e,	  2009f).	  	  
Arguably,	  AoSIS	   is	  relatively	  successful	   in	   its	  work	  since	   it	  manages	   to	  combine	  two	  complementary	  aspects	  of	  rationality	  and	  reason:	  on	  one	  hand	  it	  can	  successfully	  “speak	  UNFCCC”	  in	  that	  negotiators	  are	  very	  skilled	  in	  the	  details	  of	  the	  technical	  and	  procedural	   aspects	   of	   the	   negotiations	   as	   well	   as	   capable	   of	   providing	   substantial,	  substantive	   and	   substantiated	   formal	   input	   into	   the	   negotiations	   as	   described.	  Crucially,	  this	  also	  includes	  input	  on	  issues	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  their	  own	  country	  such	   as	   on	   the	   highly	   technical	   question	   of	   the	   accounting	   of	   emissions	   forestry	   in	  developed	  countries.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  succeed	  in	  utilising	  a	  powerful	  imagery	  associated	  with	  the	  question	  of	  survival	  of	  whole	  nations	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  discuss	  from	   a	   moral	   position	   that	   is	   hard	   to	   compete	   with,	   for	   example	   by	   contrasting	  possible	   economic	   impacts	   of	   emission	   reductions	   in	   Annex	   I	   countries	   with	   the	  submerging	  of	  their	  entire	  country	  (field	  note,	  Poznań,	  12	  Dec	  2008).	  One	  reason	  why	  their	   unfortunate	   reality	   has	   been	   translated	   into	   such	   a	   relatively143	  influential	  position	  is	  the	  problem	  it	  poses	  to	  the	  standard	  mode	  of	  rationality	  employed	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime:	  AoSIS	  successfully	  established	  the	  normative	  standard	  of	  “survival”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  	  The	  phrase	  “relatively	  influential”	  is	  used	  here	  to	  indicate	  that	  while	  the	  degree	  of	  influence	  that	  AoSIS	  countries,	  and	  in	  particular	  Tuvalu	  enjoys	  is	  surprisingly	  strong	  given	  its	  overall	  geopoliti-­‐cal	  and	  economic	  position	  in	  the	  global	  system,	  in	  absolute	  terms	  AoSIS	  influence	  on	  the	  negotia-­‐tions	  is	  still	  small	  compared	  to	  other	  negotiation	  blocs.	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  as	   a	   concept	   within	   the	   negotiations	   and	   repeatedly	   suggests	   this	   concept	   as	   the	  yardstick	   against	   which	   to	   measure	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   measures	   suggested	  (“[t]he	  survival	  of	  all	  nations,”	   for	  example,	   is	  defined	  as	   the	   “paramount	  objective”	  (UNFCCC	   2009f:	   4)	   of	   their	   proposal	   of	   an	   additional	   protocol	   for	   the	   Convention	  submitted	   for	   Copenhagen).	   Bringing	   this	   notion	   to	   prominence	   aims	   to	   utilise	  existing	   moral	   barriers	   that	   prohibit	   the	   translation	   of	   the	   extinction	   of	   whole	  sovereign	   nation-­‐states	   into,	   for	   example,	   economic	   figures.	   Therefore,	   negotiators	  cannot	   openly	   advocate	   for	   scenarios	   that	   lead	   to	   such	   outcomes144	  by	   directly	  challenging	   AoSIS’	   “survival”	   argument.	   This	   is	   illustrated	   by	   the	   success	   of	   the	  activity	   of	   Youth	   activists	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	   session	   in	   Poznań,	   who	   –	   inspired	   by	   a	  speech	   by	   an	   AoSIS	   representative	   –	   asked	   party	   delegations	   to	   sign	   pledges	   to	  “safeguard	   the	   survival	   of	   all	   peoples	   and	   nations”	   in	   choosing	   their	   negotiating	  position	   and	   succeeded	   in	   securing	   pledges	   from	   over	   80	   delegations	  within	   a	   few	  days	   (field	  note,	   Poznań,	   12	  Dec	  2008;	  Russell	   2008),	   presumably	   as	  most	  negotia-­‐tions	  would	  not	  openly	  and	  when	  directly	  pressed,	  denounce	  such	  a	  motion.	  	  
By	  contrast,	  the	  group	  of	  Least	  Developed	  Countries	  (LDCs)	  also	  have	  repeatedly	  pointed	  out	  that	  their	  countries	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  will	  be	  subjected	  to	  these	  effects	  earlier	   than	  other	  countries,	   including	  making	  already	  vulnerable	  parts	  of	  their	  population	  even	  more	  vulnerable	  through	  increases	  in	  extreme	  weather	  events	  such	  as	  droughts	  and	  floods	  as	  well	  as	  the	  climate	  change	  induced	  damage	  to	  fragile	  economic	  development	  in	  these	  countries.	  However,	  LDCs	  overall	  have	  not	  been	  as	  successful	  as	  AoSIS	  in	  translating	  a	  similar	  vulnerability	  into	  a	  position	  of	  relative	  influence	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  which	  can	  be	  explained	  using	  the	  same	  two	  parameters	   that	  clarified	  AoSIS	  success:	   first,	  LDC	  delegations,	   in	  general,	  are	   not	   as	   well	   skilled	   and	   supported	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   specific	   ways	   of	   thinking,	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  Although,	  crucially	  and	  as	  routinely	  pointed	  out	  by	  AoSIS	  delegates	  and	  ENGOs	  alike,	  virtually	  all	  scenarios	  that	  are	  under	  serious	  negotiation	  do	  in	  fact	  will	  with	  high	  or	  very	  high	  likelihood	  lead	  to	   this	   outcome.	   AoSIS	   maintains	   that	   in	   order	   to	   safeguard	   their	   and	   other	   nations	   survival,	  temperature	  increase	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  1.5˚C	  above	  preindustrial	  levels	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  21st	  century,	  a	  level	  that	  is	  only	  somewhat	  likely	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  stabilising	  CO2eq	  concentrations	  in	  the	  atmosphere	   to	  350	  ppm,	  or	  parts	  per	  million	   (c.f.,	   for	   example,	  Tuvalu’s	   submission	   for	  Co-­‐penhagen.	   The	   actual	   language	   used	   for	   both	   temperature	   and	   concentration	   target	   is	   “as	   far	  below	  ...	  as	  possible”,	  UNFCCC	  2009f:	  4).	  By	  contrast,	  the	  most	  ambitious	  stabilisation/reduction	  scenarios	  assessed	  by	  the	  IPCC	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  stabilization	  of	  445-­‐490	  ppm,	  which	  in	  turn	  would	  make	  a	  temperature	  increase	  of	  about	  2-­‐2.4˚C	  likely	  (IPCC	  2007d:	  15)	  and	  the	  emission	  reduction	  pledges	  received	  from	  countries	  as	  part	  of	   their	  association	  with	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  would	  result	  in	  an	  end-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  emissions	  increase	  of	  3˚C	  (Rogelj	  et	  al.	  2010).	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  speaking	   and	   negotiating	   and	   secondly,	   in	   their	   cases	   the	   survival	   question	   is	   not	  posed	   in	   such	   clear,	   binary	   terms	   as	   is	   the	   case	   for	   Small	   Island	   states	   and	   do	   not	  apply	  to	  whole	  nation-­‐states.	  
In	  addition,	  and	  related	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  social	   inequalities	  among	  the	  interlocu-­‐tors	  of	  a	  public	  sphere,	  developing	  countries	  in	  general	  (although	  this	  does	  not	  apply	  to	   all	   countries	   designated	   as	   developing	   countries	   under	   the	  UNFCCC	   regime),	   are	  subject	  to	  a	  number	  of	  disadvantages	  due	  to	  their	  limited	  financial	  resources.	  Some	  of	  these	   disadvantages	   have	   already	   been	   briefly	  mentioned	   in	   chapter	   4,	   such	   as	   the	  lower	  number	  of	  delegates	  in	  each	  country’s	  delegation	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  richer	  countries,	   thus	   requiring	   fewer	   delegates	   to	   cover	   more	   of	   the	   large	   number	   of	  different	   issues	   in	   the	  negotiations,	   in	   turn	   causing	   less	  detailed	   insight	   and	  under-­‐standing	  with	  regards	  to	  each	  of	   the	   issues	  covered,	  possibly	  requiring	  a	  number	  of	  issue	   areas	   to	   be	   ignored	   altogether	   and	   generally	   putting	   more	   strain	   on	   the	  individual	   negotiators145 .	   While	   some	   of	   these	   shortcomings	   are	   addressed	   by	  organising	   in	   negotiation	   blocs	   such	   as	   the	   G77	   and	   China	   or	   AoSIS,	   and	   accepting	  additional	  external	  legal	  or	  expert	  help,	  overall	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  participation	  of	   these	   countries,	   and	   therefore	   their	   chances	   of	   having	   their	   opinion	   heard	   and	  included,	  is	  limited.	  
Differentials	  between	  parties	  with	  regards	  to	  power,	  participation	  and	  success	  in	  influencing	  the	  negotiation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  represents	  their	  best	  interest	  is	  certainly	  an	  important	  area,	   about	  which	  much	  more	  could	  be	   said.	  However,	   since	   the	   focus	  of	  this	   research	   is	   the	   involvement	   of	   environmental	   NGOs	   in	   the	   climate	   change	  negotiations,	   these	   brief	   remarks	   will	   have	   to	   suffice	   for	   the	   time	   being	   and	   the	  discussion	  shall	  now	  turn	  toward	  considerations	  of	  hierarchy,	  status	  and	  inequalities	  among	  these	  actors.	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  Chapter	   4	   also	   quoted	   the	   vivid	   example	   of	   the	   three	   person	  Madagascan	   delegation	   sharing	   a	  noisy	   youth	   hostel	   with	   Chinese	   tourists	   while,	   in	   contrast,	   the	   over	   100	   members	   of	   the	   US	  delegation	   lodged	   in	   a	   luxury	   hotel	   from	  where	   they	   returned	  well	   rested	   and	   prepared	   to	   the	  negotiations.	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6.1.2 CAN	  and	  Other	  Environmental	  Observer	  Organisations	  
Formally,	  hierarchical	  structures	  within	  CAN	  are	  relatively	  flat.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  period,	  the	  only	  clear	  formal	  structure	  consisted	  of	  CAN’s	  working	  groups,	  each	  with	  one	  or	  two	  (co-­‐)coordinators,	  and	  CAN’s	  regional	  or	  national	  nodes,	  which,	  however	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  much	  hierarchically	  structur-­‐ing	   impact	   on	   the	   interactions	   within	   CAN,	   besides	   the	   fact	   that	   interactions	   of	  individuals	  within	  the	  same	  node	  were	  overall	  more	   likely,	  with	  a	  number	  of	  nodes	  holding	  regular	  meetings	  among	  themselves	  (post	  field	  note,	  Vienna,	  Aug	  2007;	  field	  note,	  Bali,	   8	  Dec	  2007).	  However,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	  was	   clear	   that	   on	   a	  different	  level,	   there	   are	   hierarchical	   differences	   between	   individuals.	   At	   the	   Bali	   climate	  change	  conference,	   for	  example,	  a	  number	  of	   individuals	  were	  speaking	  more	  often,	  appeared	  to	  have	  more	  intimate	  insights	  into	  and	  more	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  political	   developments	   and	   their	   views	   and	   contributions	   seemed	   to	   enjoy	   more	  weight	  in	  discussions	  (post	  field	  note,	  Bali,	  Dec	  2007).	  
Analysing	  the	  Bali	  field	  notes	  with	  the	  insight	  later	  gained,	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  for	   the	  most	   part	   these	   individuals	   were	   roughly	   identical	   with	   the	   individuals,	   or	  roles,	  that	  were	  later	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  formalised	  as	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  “Politicial	  Coordination	  Group”	  (PCG).	  And,	  in	  fact,	  a	  political	  coordination	  group	  had	  been	  operating	  for	  many	  years	  within	  CAN,	  however,	  its	  membership,	  role,	  modes	  of	  communication	  with	  the	  wider	  network	  and,	  to	  a	  degree,	  even	  existence	  was	  not	  very	  clear	  nor	  formally	  established.	  As	  part	  of	  a	  general	  endeavour	  to	  professionalise	  and	  codify	   the	   network	   structures	   within	   CAN	   that	   was	   initiated	   at	   the	   AGA	   in	   Bali	   in	  December	   2007,	   Terms	   of	   Reference	   (ToRs)	   were	   proposed	   and	   adopted	   for	   a	  number	  of	  internal	  CAN	  structures,	  including	  the	  political	  coordination	  group.	  In	  this	  context,	   the	   membership	   was	   decided	   to	   consist	   of	   “fixed	   spots”	   filled	   by	   CAN’s	  working	  group	  coordinators,	  the	  regional	  or	  national	  node	  coordinators,	  representa-­‐tives	  of	  the	  large	  international	  CAN	  member	  organisations	  (i.e.	  members	  with	  offices	  in	  at	   least	  20	  countries)	  as	  well	  as	  “discretionary	  spots”	   for	  “big	  picture	  experts”	  as	  well	  as	  “capacity	  building”	  spots.	  “Big	  picture	  experts”	  are	  CAN	  members	  who	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  overall	  politics	  (as	  opposed	  to	  more	  technical	  details	  of	  working	  groups)	  and	   often	   have	   a	   long	   history	   of	   involvement	   with	   the	   UNFCCC	   process	   and	   thus	  possess	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   knowledge	   about	   political	   background	   that	   can	   inform	   a	  more	  complete	  understanding	  of	  current	  political	  strategy	  (c.f.	  the	  example	  regarding	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  FiE	   in	   chapter	   5).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   “capacity	   building”	   spots	   are	   reserved	   for	  individuals,	   especially	   from	   developing	   countries,	   that	   show	   interest	   in	   becoming	  involved	   in	   the	   long	   term	   in	   CAN’s	  work	   under	   the	   UNFCCC.	   The	   creation	   of	   these	  “capacity	  building”	  spots	  acknowledges	  the	  useful	  learning	  experience	  that	  member-­‐ship	   in	   the	   political	   coordination	   group	   provided	   and	   the	   necessity	   of	   passing	   on	  some	  of	  the	  historical	  knowledge	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  to	  additional	  CAN	  members	  (post	  field	  note,	  Poznań,	  Dec	  2008).	  The	  emphasis	  on	  filling	  these	  spots	  with	  members	  from	   developing	   countries,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   acknowledges	   the	   under-­‐representation	  of	  that	  group	  in	  the	  political	  coordination	  group.	  	  
The	   function	   and	   modus	   operandi	   of	   the	   political	   coordination	   group	   sets	   the	  group	  apart	   from	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  network.	  For	  example,	   the	  group’s	   relatively	   small	  size	   is	   intended	   to	   provide	   a	   safe	   environment	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   discussion	   and	  dissemination	   of	   privileged	   and	   confidential	   information,	   such	   as	   intelligence	  acquired	   with	   regards	   to	   parties’	   confidential	   positions	   which	   –	   if	   not	   successfully	  protected	  –	  could	  damage	  sources	  of	  such	  information	  for	  the	  future,	  or	  such	  as	  the	  group’s	  own	  internal	  strategising	  whose	  disclosure	  outside	  of	  CAN	  is	  feared	  to	  impact	  negatively	  on	  its	  effectiveness.	  Thus,	  while	  notes	  from	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  group	  are	  routinely	   shared	   with	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   network	   via	   CANtalk,	   the	   content	   of	   any	  information	   perceived	   to	   be	   confidential	   is	   not	   (field	   note,	   Bonn,	   3	   Apr	   2009).	  However,	  the	  wider	  network	  knows	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  group	  and	  members	  are	  encouraged	  to	  approach	  “their”	  relevant	  PCG	  member	  (e.g.	  working	  group	  or	  regional	  node	   coordinator)	   for	   more	   background	   information	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	   infor-­‐mation	  shared	  on	  CANtalk.	  Moreover,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  PCG	  are	  intended	  to	  act	  as	  a	  bidirectional	   conduit	   of	   information,	   thus	   are	   expected	   to	   both	   share	   the	   most	  important	  aspects	  of	  their	  working	  group’s	  or	  regional	  node’s	  work	  with	  the	  PCG	  as	  well	  as	  proactively	   informing	  working	  group	  or	  node	  members,	   for	  example,	  during	  regular	   meetings,	   of	   relevant	   developments	   with	   regards	   to	   overall	   political	  coordination.	  
Besides	   the	   political	   coordination	   group,	   whose	   membership	   is	   largely	   deter-­‐mined	   by	   its	   ToRs	   and	   which	   therefore	   is	   a	   rather	   closed	   group,	   all	   other	   CAN	  working	   groups	   are	   explicitly	   open	   and	   CAN	   “newcomers”	   to	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   are	  actively	   encouraged	   to	   join	   working	   groups.	   In	   order	   to	   facilitate	   this,	   all	   working	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  group	  coordinators	  present	  introductions	  into	  the	  respective	  area	  the	  group	  focuses	  on	  at	   the	   special	   information	  sessions	  held	   for	   first	   time	  CAN	  COP	  delegates	  on	   the	  weekend	   before	   the	   start	   of	   each	   COP	   (field	   note,	   Bali,	   2	   Dec	   2007).	   Of	   course,	   as	  discussed	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   the	  degree	  of	   knowledge	  of	   specialised	   technical	  language	   and	   concepts	   within	   the	   working	   group’s	   field	   still	   provides	   variable	  degrees	   of	   barrier	   to	   participation.	   Thus,	   formally	   speaking,	   hierarchy	   is	   only	  established	   between	   the	   members	   of	   the	   political	   coordination	   group	   (which	   also	  includes	   coordinators	   of	   all	   working	   groups),	   on	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  network	  on	  the	  other.	  
However,	   during	   participation	   in	   the	   internal	   work	   of	   CAN	   it	   becomes	   quickly	  evident	   that	   there	  are	  different	   levels	  of	   status	   that	   individuals	  can	  have	  within	   the	  network,	  that	  do	  not	  stem	  from	  different	  positions	  within	  a	  formal	  hierarchy,	  and	  that	  lead	  to	  different	  weight	  being	  given	  to	  their	  contributions	  in	  discussions.	  This	  status	  is	  mainly	  related	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  relevant	  knowledge	  an	  individual	  appears	  to	  have	  relating	  to	  one	  or	  more	  specific	  areas	  of	  the	  climate	  negotiations.	  Generally	  speaking,	  this	   knowledge	   is	   expressed	   through	   two	   main	   ways,	   first,	   it	   refers	   to	   knowledge	  gained	   from	  a	   long	  personal	  history	  of	   involvement	  with	   the	  UNFCCC	  which	  allows	  those	   individuals	   to	   support	   their	   arguments	   during	   discussions	   by	   referring	   to	  examples	  from	  previous,	  similar	  situations	  within	  CAN	  or	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  or	  the	  wider	   field	   of	   climate	   politics	   thus	   enabling	   them	   to	   present	   their	   arguments	   in	  relation	   to	   a	   more	   refined,	   insightful	   understanding	   of	   the	   intricacies	   of	   climate	  diplomacy.	  This	  status	   is	   similar	   (or,	   indeed,	   in	  case	  of	  personal	  union,	   identical)	   to	  that	   which	   makes	   individuals	   eligible	   for	   the	   “big	   picture	   experts”	   spots	   in	   the	  political	  coordination	  group.	   In	  recognition	  of	   their	  specific	  status,	   these	   individuals	  are	  occasionally,	  presumably	  only	  half	  seriously,	  referred	  to	  as	  “CAN	  elders”	  (e.g.	  field	  note,	  Bonn,	  4	  Apr	  2009),	  thus	  conjuring	  associations	  of	  experienced	  members	  of	  CAN,	  with	   a	   notion	   of	   guiding	   the	   other	   members	   and	   imparting	   parts	   of	   their	   specific	  knowledge	  on	  them.	  	  
The	  other	  way	   in	  which	   individuals	   are	  distinguished	   in	   terms	  of	   knowledge	   is	  their	   characterisation	   as	   “experts”	   for	   certain	   issues,	   when	   for	   example	   they	   are	  working	  on	   the	   issue	   in	  question	   for	   academic	   institutions	   such	   as	  Universities,	   for	  think	  tank	  style	  NGOs	  or	  for	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  IPCC	  or	  since	  they	  were	  involved	  in	  or	  authored	  important	  studies	  in	  the	  issue	  area.	  Due	  to	  the	  high	  regard	  that	  scientifically	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  generated	  knowledge	  enjoys	  within	  CAN	  (a	  question	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	   later	   in	   this	   chapter),	   these	   types	   of	   backgrounds	   afford	   individuals	   specific	  status.	  For	  example,	  the	  flexible	  mechanisms	  working	  group	  that	  I	  was	  most	  involved	  in	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   period,	   had	   a	   few	   “observer	  members”	   –	   people	  who	  were	  known	  or	  assumed	  to	  follow	  the	  group’s	  discussions	  on	  its	  email	  list	  but	  who	  would	  not	  typically	  be	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  deliberations	  of,	  for	  example,	  policy	  positions	  –	   who	   would	   occasionally	   be	   called	   upon	   to	   provide	   specific	   input	   or	   background	  knowledge	   to	   further	   the	  development	  of	  policy	  positions,	   submissions	  and	   the	   like	  (virtual	  field	  note,	  Feb	  2009).	  Likewise,	  the	  ToRs	  for	  the	  political	  coordination	  group	  allow	  for	  experts	  on	  specific	  issues	  to	  be	  invited	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  to	  advise	  the	  group	  on	  relevant	  background	  information.	  	  
As	   mentioned	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   section,	   notions	   of	   inequalities	   also	  represent	  an	  important	  dimension	  to	  consider	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ENGO	  involvement	  in	  the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations.	   The	   discussion	   of	   this	   dimension,	   however,	   poses	   a	   few	  challenges	  with	   regards	   to	   typical	  markers	   of	   inequality	   in	   social	   science	   research.	  Mainly,	  this	   is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  CAN	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  UNFCCC	  and	  other	  NGO	  networks	  and	  party	  groupings,	   are	  not	  populated,	   as	   it	  were,	  merely	  by	   individuals	  acting	  on	  their	  own	  behalf.	  The	  individual	  actors	  that	  are	   involved	  in	  these	  settings,	  most	   often	   act	   as	   agents	   of	   various	   types	   of	   institutional	   actors,	   though	   certainly	   a	  number	   do	  act	   in	   their	   own	   individual	   capacity,	   or	   –	   depending	   on	   the	   situation	   –	  either	  as	  an	  agent	  or	  on	  their	  own	  behalf146.	  Thus	  any	  analysis	  of	  inequality	  between	  the	  actors	  in	  this	  context	  must	  take	  this	  specific	  situation	  into	  consideration.	  
Social	  inequality,	  then,	  has	  a	  different	  meaning	  than	  in	  situations	  where	  individu-­‐als	   are	   interacting	   with	   each	   other,	   since	   here	   it	   is	   mainly	   institutional	   actors	  interacting	   (albeit	   through	   their	   individual	   agents).	   Thus,	   while	   notions	   of,	   for	  example,	   income	  inequality	  or	  inequality	  in	  terms	  of	  access	  to	  and	  use	  of	  education,	  or	  even	  race	  and	  ethnicity	  can	  be	  relatively	  easily	  “translated”	  from	  their	  individual-­‐based	   origin	   to	   the	   case	   of	   an	   institutional	   actor,	   others,	  most	   notably	   gender,	   are	  more	   challenging	   to	   apply	   to	   organisations.	   To	   address	   the	   latter	   one	   first,	   gender	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  	  It	   is	   worth	   noting,	   thought,	   that	   both	   CAN	   as	   well	   as	   the	   UNFCCC	   assume	   that,	   formally,	  individuals	   always	   act	   as	   agents	   of	   institutional	   actors.	   However,	   within	   CAN	   it	   is	   certainly	  acknowledged	  that,	  at	   least	  at	  some	  levels	  within	  the	  network,	  some	  individuals	  are	  speaking	  in	  their	  own	  personal	  capacity.	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  does	  not	  seem	  to	  receive	  very	  much	  attention	  within	  CAN.	  There	  are,	  to	  be	  sure,	  some	  CAN	  member	  organisations	   (such	  as,	   for	   example,	  Women	   for	   a	  Common	  Future	   in	  Europe)	  that	  specifically	  highlight	  the	  particular	  challenges	  that	  women	  face	  in	  terms	  of	  adaptation	  to	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  particular	  roles	  women	  can	  play	  in	  mitigation	  efforts.	  Likewise,	  gender	  balance	  is	  expressed	  as	  desirable	  when	  appointing	  working	  group	   co-­‐coordinators,	   chairs	  of	  CAN	  daily	  meetings	   and	   so	   forth	   and	   this	  desire	   is	  also	  expressed	  in	  the	  CAN	  Charter	  (CAN	  2002:	  28).	  Further,	  Duwe,	  writing	  about	  CAN	  at	   the	   close	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   realises	   that	   more	   than	   half	   of	   the	   CAN	   node	  coordinators	  at	  the	  time	  were	  women	  and	  expresses	  hope	  that	  this	  could	  represent	  a	  “potential	   of	   internal	   bridge-­‐building”	   (2000:	   40)	  mainly	  with	   regards	   to	   asymmet-­‐rical	   exchanges	   between	   member	   organisations	   from	   developed	   and	   developing	  countries.	   However,	   as	   mentioned,	   gender	   as	   a	   marker	   of	   inequality	   that	   requires	  specific	   attention	   in	   the	   internal	  organisational	   culture,	  has	  not	  played	  a	   significant	  part	   in	   internal	   CAN	   deliberations	   and	   is	   certainly	   seen	   as	   secondary	   to	   other	  important	  dimensions	  of	  inequality,	  such	  as	  origin	  from	  a	  developing	  country.	  Further,	  as	   mentioned	   above,	   gender	   is	   not	   easily	   “translated”	   from	   a	   characteristic	   of	   an	  individual	  to	  a	  feature	  of	  an	  organisation	  and	  is	  thus	  difficult	  to	  conceptualise	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  fieldwork.	  In	  either	  case,	  due	  to	  the	  perceived	  low	  priority	  of	  gender,	  I	  did	  not	  pay	  much	  attention	   to	   this	   issue	  during	   the	   fieldwork	  and	   therefore	   cannot	  offer	  more	  empirical	  insight.	  	  
However,	   as	   mentioned,	   the	   distinction	   between	   individuals	   and	   organisations	  from	   developing	   country	   versus	   those	   from	   developed	   countries	   is	   an	   important	  marker	  for	  inequalities	  between	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  within	  CAN	  as	  well	  as	  within	   the	  wider	   group	   of	  NGO	   observers	   and	   certainly,	   as	   indicated	   above,	   is	   also	  mirrored	   in	   a	   similar	   distinction	   between	   parties.	   For	   this	   reason,	   it	   shall	   receive	  some	   focussed	   attention.	   As	   described	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   inequalities	  resulting	  from	  this	  distinction	  are	  mainly	  perceived	  to	  affect	  different	  levels	  of	  access	  to	  financial	  resources	  that	  are	  required	  to	  guarantee	  continued	  access	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	   and	   result	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   secondary	   inequalities	   such	   as	   restricted	  insight	   into	   the	   complex	  political	  dynamics	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	   that	   can	  be	  gleaned	   through	   continued	   and	   prolonged	   participation,	   limits	   to	   knowledge	   of	  specific	  terminology,	   technical	  concepts	  and	  other	  shared,	  specific	  knowledge	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	   process	   (these	   first	   two	   parameters	   are	   often	   referred	   to	   collectively	   as	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  “capacity”)	   as	  well	   as	   secondary	   inequalities	   such	  as	   the	  access	   to	  mobile	   IT	  equip-­‐ment	  such	  as	  laptops	  and	  smartphones,	  or	  limits	  in	  the	  time	  that	  can	  be	  dedicated	  to	  the	   UNFCCC	   process.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   CAN	   strives	   for	   equal	   representation	   of	  developing	  and	  developed	  country	  delegates	  in	  functions	  such	  as	  working	  group	  co-­‐coordinators,	  ECO	  editorial	  boards,	  press	  conferences,	  chairing	  of	  CAN	  daily	  meetings	  as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   overall	   composition	   of	   the	   political	   coordination	   group	   and	   with	  regards	  to	  delivery	  of	  interventions	  in	  UNFCCC	  negotiation	  sessions.	  
Consequently,	  as	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  5,	  CAN	  undertakes	  efforts	  to	  improve	  partic-­‐ipation	   of	   developing	   country	   NGO	   delegates.	   However,	   due	   to	   the	   prevailing	  perception	   of	   the	   main	   reasons	   for	   the	   problem,	   these	   efforts	   focus	   on	   what	   are	  perceived	  as	  the	  primary	  and	  the	  most	  important	  secondary	  inequality:	  first,	   lack	  of	  financial	   resources	   and,	   second,	   limits	   to	   individual	   and	   organisational	   “capacity”	  with	  regards	  to	  participation	   in	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  and	  the	  related	  CAN	  work.	  For	  example,	  as	  the	  name	  clearly	  indicates,	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  CAN’s	  Southern	  Capacity	  Building	   Programme	   is	   to	   overcome	   both	   these	   main	   results	   and	   markers	   of	  inequality	  by	  funding	  continuing	  access	  of	  a	  number	  of	  CAN	  members	  from	  develop-­‐ing	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  organising	  and	  financing	  a	  suite	  of	  complementary	  activities	  to	   build	   their	   “capacity”	   as	   well	   as	   encourage	   and	   facilitate	   capacity	   transfer	   from	  these	   few	   financially	   supported	   individuals	   to	   a	   larger	  group	  of	  developing	   country	  environmentalists.	  
However,	  while	  certainly	  an	  effort	  well	  regarded	  by	  those	  who	  directly	  benefitted	  (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  7	  Apr	  2009)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  CAN	  membership,	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  programme,	  and	  in	  general	  the	  concept	  of	  “capacity”	  as	  used	  by	  CAN	  and	  in	  the	  wider	   UNFCCC	   context,	   should	   be	   critically	   reviewed.	   This	   critical	   analysis	   is	  indicated	  based	  on	  the	  discussion	  by	  Nancy	  Fraser	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  “bracketing”	  social	  inequalities	  within	  the	  public	  sphere	  without	  addressing	  these	  inequalities.	  Fraser,	  as	  discussed	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   cautions	   that	   such	   bracketing	   might	   blind	   the	   student	   of	  public	  spheres	  from	  recognising	  patterns	  of	  domination	  within	  the	  public	  sphere.	  In	  this	   context,	   it	   is	   appropriate	   to	   examine	   the	   notion	   of	   “capacity”	   and	   “capacity	  building”	  more	  closely.	  As	   the	  use	  of	   these	   terms	  by	  CAN	   is	  another	  example	  of	   the	  application	  of	  specific	  UNFCCC	  terms	  for	  processes	  within	  the	  network,	  the	  UNFCCC	  use	  will	  be	  briefly	  examined	  first.	  Within	  the	  UNFCCC	  political	  framework,	  “capacity	  building”	  is	  always	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  process	  that	  applies	  to	  developing	  countries.	  It	  is	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  at	   least	  mentioned	   in	  all	  major	  milestones	  of	   the	  development	  of	   the	  UNFCCC,	   from	  the	  Convention	  text	  itself,	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  to	  –	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  –	  the	  conclusions	  of	   the	  Dialogue,	   to	   the	  Bali	  Action	  Plan,	  where	   it	  received	  a	  particularly	  prominent	  place147,	  and	  to	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  as	  well	  as	  an	  actual	  COP	  decision	  on	  the	  issue	  (UNFCCC	  1992,	  1997,	  2007c,	  2007b,	  2010f,	  respectively).	  	  
In	  these	  contexts,	  capacity	  building	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  of	  overcoming	  a	  lack	  of	  the	  specific	   institutional,	   technological	  and	  administrative	  knowledge	  on	  the	  part	  of	  developing	  countries	  that	  is	  needed	  to	  implement	  parts	  of	  the	  Convention,	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	   or	   related	   activities.	   Such	   activities	   include	   the	   proper	   setting	   up	   and	  running	   of	   institutions	   to	   develop,	   approve	   and	   monitor	   CDM	   projects,	   or	   the	  collection,	   analysis	   and	  preparation	   of	   data	   for	   the	   “national	   communications”.	   The	  latter	  are	  part	  of	  parties’	  obligations	  under	  the	  Convention	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  collect	  high	  quality	  data	  is	  also	  required	  for	  the	  preparation	  of	  possible	  future	  arrangements	  under	  the	  UNFCCC	  such	  as	  REDD	  or	  sectoral	  emissions	  crediting	  or	  trading	  approach-­‐es,	  both	  of	  which	  –	  without	  needing	  to	  explain	  these	  schemes	  here	  in	  detail	  –	  require	  a	  high	  level	  of	  accuracy	  and	  complexity	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  underlying	  emissions	  data.	  However,	   capacity	   building	   is	   never	  mentioned	   as	   a	   learning	   process	  where	   devel-­‐oped	   countries	   are	   the	   recipients	   of	   the	   capacity	   building	   –	   the	   possession	   of	  adequate	  capacity	  by	  these	  parties	  is	  taken	  for	  granted.	  
Likewise,	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  within	  CAN,	  the	  capacity	  building	  process	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  uni-­‐directional	  learning	  activity,	  with	  those	  possessing	  “capacity”	  (i.e.	  knowledge	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  specific	  terminology,	  technical	  concepts	  and	  political	   structures	   and	   processes	   as	   well	   as	   institutional	   history)	   building	   the	  capacity	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	  (yet)	  possess	  it	  by	  sharing	  their	  specific	  knowledge.	  To	  be	   fair,	  unlike	   the	  UNFCCC,	  CAN	  does	  not	  exclusively	  associate	   the	   recipient	   side	  of	  this	  learning	  process	  with	  organisations	  and	  individuals	  from	  developing	  countries	  –	  “newcomers”	  from	  all	  backgrounds	  are	  expected	  to	  first	  go	  through	  some	  process	  of	  learning	   before	   they	   can	   effectively	   participate	   in	   UNFCCC	   and	   CAN	   activities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  	  The	  Bali	  Action	  Plan	   list	  capacity-­‐building	  alongside	   finance	  and	  technology	  (transfer)	  as	  one	  of	  the	  three	  enabling	  dimensions	  that	  developed	  countries	  are	  expected	  to	  provide	  in	  order	  to	  assist	  developing	   countries	   in	   their	   own	   greenhouse	   gas	  mitigation	   efforts	   (at	   least	   according	   to	   one	  reading	  of	  this	  paragraph	  1.b.ii	  of	  the	  Bali	  Action	  Plan;	  c.f.	  the	  discussion	  on	  “the	  Bali	  comma”	  in	  chapter	   4	   on	   how	   the	   specific	   placement	   of	   a	   comma	   in	   this	   paragraph	   also	   allows	   competing	  interpretations).	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  Certainly,	   the	   framework	   within	   which	   CAN’s	   work	   takes	   place	   –	   the	   UNFCCC	  negotiations	   –	   dictates	   the	   need	   for	   at	   least	   some	   specific	   learning	   as	   my	   own	  experience,	   as	   described	   in	   the	   section	   “Learning	   the	   Language”	   in	   chapter	   3,	  demonstrates.	  However,	  just	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  the	  uni-­‐directionality	  and	  character	   of	   the	   capacity	   building	   process	  where	   “big-­‐picture	   experts,”	   or	   “elders,”	  and	  issue	  specific	  “experts”	  impart	  their	  expert	  knowledge,	  indicates	  that	  it	  should	  be	  examined.	   It	   is	   a	   means	   in	   which	   a	   hegemonic,	   or	   dominant,	   group	   maintains	   its	  hegemonic	   position	   by	   reproducing	   its	   specific	   communicative	   and	   discursive	  structures	  and	  practices	  as	  well	  as	  the	  values	  that	  underpin	  its	  interpretations	  of	  the	  political	  realities	  in	  question.	  	  
In	  practice,	  this	  examination	  is	  not	  straight	  forward,	  however,	  but	  some	  empirical	  indicators	   do,	   indeed,	   suggest	   that	   the	   capacity	   building	   efforts	   described	   are	   not	  merely	  an	  attempt	  to	  challenge	  both	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  certain	  inequalities	  within	  the	  process	  but	  also,	  albeit	  possibly	  unintentionally,	  maintain	  the	  mainstream	  views	  and	  interpretations	  of	  the	  salient	  themes.	  For	  example,	  capacity	  building	  sessions	  that	  are	  offered	  to	  newcomers	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  before	  the	  official	  start	  of	  the	  session	   feature	   presentation	   from	   CAN	   experts	   from	   developed	   countries	   covering	  the	   most	   important	   technical	   and	   political	   areas	   of	   the	   negotiations148 .	   These	  presentations,	  then,	  are	  given	  from	  the	  point	  of	  the	  salient	  or	  agreed	  policy	  position	  within	   the	   network.	   Meanwhile	   the	   various,	   often	   quite	   hotly	   contested	   views	   of	  individual	  CAN	  members	  and	  member	  organisations,	  and	   importantly	   the	  processes	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  agreed	  position,	  remain	  opaque	  to	  the	  newcomers.	  	  
For	  example,	  during	  the	  Poznań	  climate	  change	  conference	  I	  had	  a	  conversation	  with	   such	   a	   newcomer	   from	   a	   developing	   country	   and	   was	   asked	   why	   CAN,	   as	  opposed	   to	   other	   environmental	   NGOs	   and	   networks,	   had	   such	   an	   accommodating	  position	  with	  regard	  to	  offsets	  in	  general	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  CDM,	  whose	  environ-­‐mental	   and	   social	   record	   was	   widely	   criticised	   by	   other	   organisations,	   especially	  organisations	   from	  developing	  countries.	  My	  conversation	  partner	  was	  surprised	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  	  At	   least	   this	  was	   the	   case	   for	   the	   sessions	   that	   I	   personally	   attended,	   in	   Bali	   and	   Poznań	   (field	  notes,	  Bali,	  2	  Dec	  2007;	  Poznań,	  30	  Nov	  2008).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  schedule	  for	  the	  capacity	  session	  for	  the	  Copenhagen	  COP	  revealed	  that	  5	  out	  of	  14	  experts	  planned	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  session	  were	   from	  developing	   countries.	   Possible	   implications	   from	   this	   shift	  will	   be	   discussed	  shortly.	  
6.	  Publics	  and	  Counterpublics	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	   254	  	  hear	  that	  the	  collective	  CAN	  position	  (which	  did	  criticise	  the	  CDM,	  but	  not	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  as	  many	  other	  environmental	   groups	  who	   typically	   concluded	   that	   the	  CDM	  was	  so	  “fundamentally	  flawed”	  that	  it	  “must	  be	  scrapped”	  (e.g.	  McCully	  2008:	  2))	  was	  based	   on	   a	   contested	   internal	   negotiation	   process	   between	   CAN	  member	   organisa-­‐tions	  representing	  very	  different	  positions.	  These	  ranged	  from	  fully	  rejecting	  the	  idea	  of	  any	  carbon	  offsetting	  (including	  CDM)	  to	  wholeheartedly	  embracing	  and	  campaign-­‐ing	   for	   it	   as	   well	   as	   many	   positions	   between	   these	   extremes149.	   In	   this	   context	   it	  became	  clear	  during	  the	  conversation	  that	  the	  agreed	  policy	  position	  was	  an	  outcome	  of	  a	  process	  involving	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  contradictory	  positions	  and	  that	  the	  common	  policy	  position	  represented	  the	  “lowest	  common	  denominator”	  of	  the	  views	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  discussions	  where	  some	  were	  making	  more	  concessions	  than	  others,	  depending	  on	  their	  starting	  position.	  Furthermore,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	   this	  process	   could,	   and	   likely	  would,	   be	  different	   if	   the	   internal	   composition	  and	  thus	  the	  internal	  power	  dynamics	  of	  the	  group	  would	  change	  (field	  notes,	  Poznań,	  8	  Dec	  2008).	  However,	  the	  initial	  explanations	  during	  capacity	  building	  sessions	  did	  not	  include	   this	   background	   and	   thus	   the	   information	   presented	   there	   could	   be	   (mis-­‐)understood	  as	  a	  position	  shared	  by	  all	  network	  members.	  	  
This	  process	  then,	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  examples,	  described	  by	  Nancy	  Fraser,	  where	  the	   salient	  discourse	  of	   the	  dominant	   groups	  within	   a	  deliberative	   space,	   such	   as	   a	  public	   sphere,	   is	   taken	   for	   granted	   by	   interlocutors	   of	   subordinate	   or	  marginalised	  groups,	  who	   as	   a	   result,	   even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   formal	   exclusions,	   are	   restricted	   in	  formulating	  and	  working	  out	  their	  own	  independent	  positions,	  definitions	  and	  terms	  of	   their	   grievances.	   The	   aforementioned	   establishment	   of	   a	   second	   network	   of	  environmental	  NGOs	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime,	  CJN!,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  related	  to	  these	  processes	  as	  well	  as	  other	  dynamics	  of	   inequalities	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  process	  and	  shall	  therefore	  receive	  detailed	  discussion	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
First,	  however,	  additional	  considerations	  of	  the	  question	  of	  inequality	  within	  the	  process	  are	  indicated.	  In	  this	  context,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  point	  toward	  some	  develop-­‐ments	   in	   the	   later	   part	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   phase.	   As	   already	   mentioned,	   five	   out	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  	  As	   mentioned	   in	   chapter	   4,	   some	   CAN	  members	   are	   well	   known	   for	   running	   their	   own	   offset	  programs	   and	   act	   as	   CDM	   project	   consultants	   (e.g.	   TNC	   and	   CI),	   while	   others	   repeatedly	   and	  publicly	  denounced	  offset	  in	  any	  form	  (e.g.	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth).	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  fourteen	  of	  the	  experts	  drawn	  upon	  for	  the	  capacity	  building	  session	  in	  Copenhagen	  were	  from	  developing	  countries.	  While	  certainly	  far	  from	  representing	  parity,	  this	  is	  also	  far	  from	  earlier	  capacity	  building	  sessions	  described	  above.	  Furthermore,	  again	  at	  the	  Copenhagen	  COP,	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  political	  coordination	  group	  achieved	  near	   parity	   with	   25	   members	   from	   developing	   countries	   and	   29	   from	   developed	  countries.	   Also,	   the	   increase	   in	   working	   group	   co-­‐coordinators	   from	   developing	  countries	   and	   the	   general	   increased	   visibility	   and	   participation	   compared	   to	   the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  should	  be	  noted	  –	  for	  example	  during	  the	  discussion	  of	   an	   update	   of	   CAN’s	   policy	   position	   on	   Annex	   I	  mitigation	   targets,	   which	  will	   be	  considered	   in	  much	   greater	   detail	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	   this	   increased	  participation	  gave	  prominence	  to	  views	  that,	  arguably,	  would	  have	  otherwise	  had	  less	  weight	  in	  the	  discussion.	  Taken	  together,	  all	   these	  features	  might	  point	  toward	  a	  more	  fully	  equal	  participation	  within	  CAN	  and	  might	  be	  results	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  continued	  attendance	  of	   a	   number	   of	   individuals	   from	   developing	   countries	   through	   CAN’s	   Southern	  Capacity	  Building	  Programme	  and	  might	  therefore	  be	  indicators	  that	  the	  programme	  achieved	  important	  progress	  toward	  its	  expressed	  aim	  of	  reducing	  marginalisation	  of	  the	  voices	  of	  environmental	  organisations	  from	  developing	  countries.	  However,	  since	  these	   developments	   took	   place	   toward	   the	   end	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   phase,	   it	   seems	  premature	  and	  not	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  data	  collected	  to	  make	  strong	  conclusions	  in	  this	  regard150	  but	  this	  question	  certainly	  warrants	  further	  attention	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
As	   already	   elaborated	   in	   chapter	   3,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   negotiations	   under	   the	  UNFCCC,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   associated	   involvement	   of	   environmental	   groups,	   can	   be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  public	  sphere	  that	  is	  not	  only	  populated	  by	  individuals	  but	  also,	  crucially,	  by	  institutional	  actors	  of	  various	  types	  and	  sizes	  (albeit	  being	  represented	  by	   individual	   agents)	   provides,	   as	  has	  been	   seen,	   for	   some	   challenge	   for	  discussing	  inequalities	   among	   the	   interlocutors	   in	   this	   sphere.	   This	   is	   particularly	   true,	   when	  considering	   who	   typically	   attends	   such	   events:	   put	   simply,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   civil	  servants	   that	   represent	   their	   respective	   government,	   employees	   of	   UN	   and	   other	  international	  organisations	  as	  well	  as	  lobbyists	  for	  trade	  and	  industrial	  interests,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  since	  it	  is	  at	  least	  imaginable	  that	  this	  increased	  participation	  of	  developing	  country	  environmentalists	  merely	  represents	  a	  superficial	   improvement	  of	  structural	   inequality	  without	   resulting	   in	   a	   genuine	   improvement	  of	   the	  possibilities	   to	   include	   the	   specific	  perspec-­‐tives	  of	  developing	  country	  representatives	  in	  the	  deliberations	  but	  merely	  gloss	  over	  unchanged	  processes	  of	  marginalisation.	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  representatives	   of	   environmental	   organisations	   largely	   belong	   to	   what	   has	   been	  described	   as	   the	   “international	   activist	   elite”	   (della	   Porta	   and	   Diani	   2006:	   133)	   or,	  with	  a	  more	  critical	  connotation,	  as	  the	  “NGO-­‐jet-­‐set”	  (Altvater	  et	  al.	  1997)	  –	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  that,	  either	  through	  their	  capacity	  as	  representatives	  of	  an	  organisation	  or	   in	  their	  own	  right,	  have	  access	  to	  air	   travel,	  hotel	  accommodation,	  passports	  and	  visa,	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  considered	  part	  of	  a	  –	  globally	  speaking	  –	  social	  elite.	  Thus,	  from	   the	  perspective	  of	   thinking	   about	   social	   equality	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   –	   official	  and	   observer	   –	   participants	   in	   the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations,	   these	   participants	   appear,	  with	  Fraser’s	  critique	  of	  Habermas’	  characterisation	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  mind,	  to	  represent	   a	   privileged	   social	   strata	   of	   society	   (akin	   to	   the	   bourgeois	   public	   in	  Habermas’	  description)	  who	  conceive	  of	  themselves	  as	  the	  society	  while	  losing	  sight	  of	   the	   people	   excluded	   from	   their	   deliberations	   through	   social	   inequalities.	   Conse-­‐quently,	  the	  specific	  perspectives	  of	  the	  vast	  groups	  thus	  excluded	  are	  missing	  from	  the	  deliberations,	  which,	  as	  a	  result,	  might	  form	  policies	  designed	  without	  taking	  their	  perspectives	  into	  account.	  
This	   becomes	  particularly	   clear	   on	   the	   few	  occasions	  where	  normally	   excluded	  groups	  do	  take	  part	  in	  the	  negotiations	  and	  very	  effectively	  challenge	  the	  convention-­‐al	   wisdoms	   within	   the	   process.	   For	   example,	   during	   the	   June	   2009	   Bonn	   UNFCCC	  session	  as	  well	  as	  the	  December	  2009	  session	  in	  Copenhagen	  (with	  plans	  in	  existence	  to	   continue	   this	   project	   at	   UNFCCC	   sessions	   after	   Copenhagen),	   a	   group	   of	   waste	  pickers	   from	   India	   and	   Latin	   America	   attended	   the	   sessions	  with	   the	   financial	   and	  logistical	   help	   of	   NGOs	   from	   developed	   countries	   with	   related	   agendas.	   In	   their	  delegation’s	  information	  flyer	  at	  the	  June	  2009	  Bonn	  session,	  the	  waste	  pickers	  define	  themselves	   as	   “workers	   in	   the	   informal	   economy	  who	   recover	   recyclable	  materials	  from	   waste”	   (Wastepicker	   Delegation	   2009)	   and	   attended	   the	   UNFCCC	   with	   the	  intention	  of	  highlighting	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  relationships	  between	  their	  informal	  employment	   and	   the	   climate	   change	   regime151.	   In	   particular,	   through	   side	   events,	  press	   conferences,	   an	   information	   booth	   and	   meetings	   with	   delegates,	   including	  members	   of	   the	   Executive	   Board	   of	   the	   CDM,	   they	   sought	   to	   illuminate	   their	  important	  contributions	  to	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  threat	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  	  All	   information	   in	   this	   section,	   if	   not	   otherwise	   indicated,	   is	   taken	   from	  a	   conversation	  with	   an	  employee	  of	  one	  of	  the	  developed	  country	  organisations	  that	  supported	  this	  project	  in	  Copenha-­‐gen	  (field	  notes,	  Copenhagen,	  14	  Dec	  2009).	  
6.	  Publics	  and	  Counterpublics	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	   257	  	  that	   mitigation	   contribution	   as	   well	   as	   their	   livelihoods	   posed	   by	   some	   of	   the	  instruments	  designed	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  framework	  to	  solve	  the	  climate	  crisis.	  	  
The	  waste	  pickers’	  contribution	  to	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  is	  mainly	  character-­‐ised	   by	   the	   diversion,	   through	   their	  work,	   of	   recyclable	  material	   from	   landfill	   sites	  back	   into	   the	   resource	   cycle	   which	   consequently	   corresponds	   to	   the	   saving	   of	   the	  emission	   that	  would	  be	  associated	  with	   the	  mining	  or	  harvesting	  and	  processing	  of	  the	  virgin	  materials	  otherwise	  used	  –	  those	  emissions	  savings	  range	  from	  about	  50%	  in	   the	   case	   of	   steel,	   cardboard	   and	   glass	   to	   90%	   in	   the	   case	   of	   aluminium	   (Tellus	  Institute,	   cit.	   in	  Wastepicker	   Delegation	   2009).	   Thus,	   one	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   their	  attendance	  at	  conferences	  was	  to	  lobby	  for	  the	  design	  of	  future	  UNFCCC	  mechanisms,	  for	  example,	  those	  designated	  to	  financially	  assist	  developing	  countries	  in	  their	  own	  mitigation	  efforts,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  recognise	  and	  support	  their	  contributions.	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   they	   also	   aimed	   at	   lobbying	   against	   existing	   (and	   future)	   decisions	  within	   the	   UNFCCC	   regime	   that	   would	   imperil	   both	   their	   contribution	   to	   climate	  change	   mitigation	   as	   well	   as	   their	   employment	   and	   thus	   their	   livelihoods.	   In	   this	  context,	  current	  CDM	  methodologies,	  existing	  CDM	  projects	  and	  projects	  in	  the	  CDM	  approval	   pipeline	   represented	   their	   main	   target:	   CDM	   projects	   can	   earn	   carbon	  credits	   from	  waste	  projects	  through	  two	  main	  ways.	  First,	  “landfill	  gas”	  projects	  are	  set	  up	  to	  capture	  gas	  (predominantly	  the	  very	  potent	  greenhouse	  gas	  methane)	  that	  is	  emitted	  from	  waste	  stored	  in	  landfill	  sites	  and	  subsequently	  burn	  it,	  including	  for	  the	  generation	   of	   electricity	   or	   simply	   to	   combust	   it	   into	   the	   less	   damaging	   carbon	  dioxide.	   However,	   such	   projects	   restrict	   access	   to	   landfill	   sites	   thus	   effectively	  separating	   the	   waste	   pickers	   from	   their	   source	   of	   income.	   Secondly,	   in	   so-­‐called	  “waste-­‐to-­‐energy”	   projects,	   waste,	   including	   recyclable	   waste,	   is	   incinerated	   to	  generate	  electricity	  and	  saleable	  carbon	  credits	  earned	   for	   that	  activity.	  Again,	   such	  projects	   directly	   compete	   with	   the	   waste	   pickers	   for	   their	   source	   of	   income.	  Additionally,	  recycling,	  compared	  to	  waste-­‐to-­‐energy	  projects,	  reduces	  emissions	  up	  to	  25	  times	  more	  than	  the	  incineration	  of	  waste,	  which	  emits	  more	  greenhouse	  gases	  per	  unit	   of	   electricity	   than	   a	   coal-­‐fired	  power	  plant	   (Wastepicker	  Delegation	  2009)	  and	  might	  not	  even	  result	  in	  any	  emissions	  reductions	  at	  all,	  if	  all	  relevant	  parameters	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  are	  adequately	  considered	  (Parekh	  and	  GAIA	  2011)	  and	  furthermore	  is	  a	  considera-­‐ble	  health	  hazards	  to	  the	  hosting	  communities152.	  
From	   the	   description	   of	   the	   developed	   country	   NGO	   employee	   who	   helped	   to	  implement	   this	  participation	  project,	   it	  became	  clear	  how	   the	  participation	  of	   these	  otherwise	  excluded	  individuals	  changed	  the	  discursive	  dynamics:	  first,	  the	  organisa-­‐tion	  is	  a	  network	  of	  mainly	  community-­‐based	  groups	  from	  both	  developing	  as	  well	  as	  developed	   countries	   who	   are	   affected	   by	   waste	   issues,	   often	   incinerators,	   in	   their	  communities.	  Thus,	  enabling	  the	  waste	  pickers	  to	  represent	  themselves,	  even	  though	  their	  inability	  to	  speak	  English	  made	  this	  representation	  very	  challenging,	  rather	  than	  being	  represented	  by	  an	  English	  speaking	  and	  experienced	  NGO	  staff,	  was	  a	  principle	  based	  decision	  anchored	  in	  the	  organisational	  culture	  of	  that	  network153.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  worthwhile	  stressing	  the	  different	  characteristics	  of	  argument	  that	  the	  organisa-­‐tions	   can	   put	   forward.	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   developed	   country	   NGO	  would	   be	   perfectly	  capable	   of,	   and	   is	   indeed	   engaged	   in,	   communicating	   the	   considerable	   climate	  benefits	  that	  adequate	  waste	  management	  solutions,	  for	  example,	  through	  improved	  recycling	  schemes,	  can	  provide	  in	  comparison	  to	  incineration	  or	  landfilling.	  However,	  the	  waste	  pickers’	  perspective	  that	  they	  need	  access	  to	  the	  waste	  stream	  in	  order	  to	  feed	   themselves	   and	   their	   families	   (in	   addition	   the	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	   global	  climate	  and	  their	  local	  health	  situation	  that,	  for	  example,	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  CDM	  project	   in	  their	  communities	  would	  have)	  adds	  a	  whole	  other,	  human,	  dimension	  to	  the	   discussion	   that	   would	   otherwise	   remain	   excluded.	   The	   effectiveness	   of	   this	  approach	  can	  be	  illustrated,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  comments	  made	  to	  one	  another	  in	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  	  The	  situation	  of	  the	  waste	  pickers	  is	  not	  an	  isolated	  case.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  its	  implementation,	   as	   well	   as	   non-­‐UNFCCC	   related	   climate	   change	   programmes,	   such	   as	   private	  offsetting	   schemes,	   there	   are	   many	   examples	   were	   seemingly	   well	   intended	   projects	   aimed	   at	  reducing	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   severely	   adversely	   affected	   communities	   in	   developing	   and	  developed	  countries	  alike.	  The	  movie	  “The	  Carbon	  Connection”	  (Carbon	  Trade	  Watch	  2007),	   for	  example,	  addresses	  how	  two	  communities	  –	  one	  in	  Brazil,	   the	  other	  in	  Grangemouth,	  Scotland	  –	  are	  impacted	  by	  a	  carbon	  offsetting	  forestry	  project,	  whose	  reliance	  on	  fast	  growing	  monoculture	  eucalyptus	  plantation	  severely	  restricted	  the	  traditional	  agricultural	  practices	  and	  access	  to	  water	  of	  the	  former,	  while	  the	  carbon	  credits	  so	  generated	  allowed	  BP	  to	  continue	  and	  expand	  it	  refin-­‐ery	  activities	  thus	  creating	  pollution	  and	  health	  hazards	  in	  the	  latter	  (Johnston	  2007).	  153	  	  Likewise,	  the	  programme	  passes	  much	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  on	  to	  the	  communities	  involved	  in	  the	   project.	   For	   example,	  while	   providing	  more	   logistical	   challenges	   for	   the	   developed	   country	  partners,	  the	  waste	  pickers	  have	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  it	  is,	  overall,	  in	  their	  interest	  to	  send	  more	  different	  people	  to	  the	  UNFCCC,	  to	  achieve	  a	  wider	  distribution	  of	  first	  hand	  insights	  into	  the	  process	   as	   opposed	   to	   delegating	   the	   same	   few	   individuals	   to	   multiple	   UNFCCC	   sessions,	   like	  other	  projects	  that	  aim	  to	  bring	  delegates	  from	  developing	  countries	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations,	  for	   example	   CAN’s	   Southern	   Capacity	   Building	   Programme,	   do	   to	   maximise	   the	   specific	  knowledge	  of	  these	  delegates.	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  group	   of	   European	   party	   delegates,	   while	   passing	   by	   the	   waste	   pickers’	   exhibition	  boot	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  ground:	  “Oh,	   look	  –	   that	   is	  what	   I	  have	  been	  telling	  you	  about:	  about	   how	   the	   CDM	  projects	   are	   displacing	   these	   poor	   people…”	   or	   by	   the	   encour-­‐agement	   to	   provide	   written	   critique	   of	   the	   relevant	   CDM	   methodologies	   after	   a	  meeting	  with	  CDM	  Executive	  Board	  members.	  
The	   waste	   pickers’	   message	   was	   powerful	   and	   unique	   partially	   because	   they	  provided	  a	  human	  face	  to	  the	  adverse	  social	  impacts	  of	  projects	  that	  are,	  by	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations,	  generally	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  solution,	  rather	   than	   the	   problem.	   It	   was	   also	   powerful	   as	   the	  waste	   pickers’	   background	   –	  being	  objectively	  very	  poor	  and	  making	   their	   first	   international	   trip	   (in	  many	  cases	  even	   the	   first	   time	   outside	   their	   immediate	   environment)	   –	   created	   a	   strong	   sense	  that	   decisions	  made	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	   did	   not	   just	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   some	   abstract	  “vulnerable	  populations”	  and	  “future	  generations”	  but	  actual	  vulnerable	  people	  made	  of	   flesh	   and	   bones.	   It	   also	   created	   a	   sense	   that	   seemingly	   small	   and	   unimportant	  decisions	  within	   the	  highly	   complex	  and	   interdependent	  processes	   created	   through	  the	  climate	  regime	  can	  have	   fundamental	   impacts	  on	  the	   life	  of	   individuals,	   families	  and	  their	  communities.	  This	  understanding	  was	  even	  more	  powerful	  given	  the	  size	  of	  the	  sector	  of	   the	   informal	  economy	  that	   the	  waste	  pickers	  are	  occupied	   in	  and	  thus	  the	   number	   of	   people	   potentially	   affected	   by	   the	   problems	   discussed:	   “Recycling	  provides	   productive	   work	   for	   an	   estimated	   1%	   of	   the	   population	   in	   developing	  countries,	  in	  processes	  such	  as	  collection,	  recovery,	  sorting,	  grading,	  cleaning,	  baling,	  processing	   and	   manufacturing	   into	   new	   products”	   (Wastepicker	   Delegation	   2009).	  The	  waste	  pickers’	  presence	  also	   lent	  a	  more	  concrete	   face	  to	   the	   issue	  of	   justice	   in	  the	   context	   of	   climate	   change	   regime,	  which	   is	   also	   the	   focus	  of	   the	  Climate	   Justice	  Now!	   (CJN!)	   network	   of	   environmental	   groups	  which	  will	   be	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   next	  section.	  
6.1.3 Counterpublics	  and	  Environmental	  NGOs	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  Regime	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	  other	  NGO	  network	  –	  Climate	   Justice	  Now!	  (CJN!)	  –	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  constituency	  of	  environmental	  organisations	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  related	  (if	  not	  indirectly	  caused)	  by	  processes	  described	  above.	  It	  is,	  however,	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  discussions	  offered	  here	  are	  not	  based,	  as	  in	  the	  case	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  of	  CAN,	  on	  long	  term	  intensive	  involvement	  in	  the	  internal	  work	  of	  the	  network	  but	  rather	   on	  more	   isolated	   interactions	   with	   individuals	   who	  were	   active	   within	   that	  network	  as	  well	  as	  my	  own	  participation	  in	  some	  of	  the	  networks’	  activities154.	  	  
The	   initial	   emerging	   of	   CJN!,	   so	   it	   appears,	   is	   closely	   related	  with	   internal	   pro-­‐cesses	  within	  Friends	  of	   the	  Earth	  International	  (FoE-­‐I).	  Other	  elements	  of	  CJN!	  had	  already	  existed	  for	  a	  while,	  for	  example	  the	  Durban	  Group	  that	  had	  met	  in	  2004	  and	  developed	   the	  Durban	  Declaration	   on	   Carbon	  Trading	   (Durban	  Group	  2004)	  which	  already	  used	  “Climate	  Justice	  Now!”	  as	  the	  headline	  for	  the	  Declaration	  and	  a	  “loose	  coalition	   of	   climate	   justice	   NGOs”	   (Pulver	   2004b:	   25)	   was	   already	   identified	   as	   an	  actor	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  However,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  involvement	  of	  FoE-­‐I	  was	  the	  catalyst	   that,	  as	   it	  were,	   turned	  the	  previously	   largely	  dormant	  components	  into	  a	  functional	  and	  increasingly	  visible	  network.	  During	  2007,	  FoE-­‐I	   revised	   its	   position	   about	   the	   use	   of	   carbon	   offsetting	   with	   the	   result	   that	  offsetting,	   while	   previously	   not	   explicitly	   condemned,	   was	   now	   denounced	   and	  (especially	  later	  in	  the	  context	  of	  CJN!)	  branded	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “false	  solutions”	  to	  the	  climate	   crisis.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note,	   that	   FoE-­‐I	   is,	   unlike	   other	   large	   international	  environmental	   organisations	   like	   Greenpeace	   or	  WWF,	   a	   decentralised	   network	   of	  autonomous	  national	  organisations	   in	  69	   countries	   that	   come	   together	   in	  bi-­‐annual	  meetings	   to	   discuss	   and	   decide	   the	   overall	   strategic	   vision	   for	   the	   larger	   network.	  Given	  the	  membership	  composition	  of	  FoE-­‐I,	  with	  more	  national	  organisations	  from	  developing	  countries	  compared	  to	  developed	  countries,	  developing	  country	  concerns	  have	  a	  much	  more	  prominent	  position	  in	  the	  internal	  strategising	  (conversation	  with	  FoE	  campaigner,	  field	  notes,	  Bonn,	  8	  Jun	  2008).	  	  
Adopting	  a	  position	  that	  categorically	  denounced	  carbon	  trading,	  demanded	  the	  current	   CDM	   to	   be	   scrapped	   and	   rejected	   the	   use	   of	   carbon	   credits	   for	   any	   other	  future	  purpose,	  put	  FoE-­‐I	  clearly	   in	  conflict	  with	  the	  policy	  positions	  of	  CAN,	  where	  FoE-­‐I	  was	  a	  member.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  as	  regards	  CAN’s	  positions	  on	  the	  CDM	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  	  During	   the	   Poznań	   climate	   change	   conference,	  when	   CJN!	   first	   prominently	   appeared	   as	   a	   new	  grouping	   that	  would	   likely	  keep	  being	   involved	   in	   the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	   for	   the	   foreseeable	  future,	  I	  attempted	  to	  expand	  my	  participant	  observation	  to	  that	  network	  as	  well,	  by	  also	  joining	  the	  working	  group	  of	  CJN!	  that	  focused	  on	  carbon	  market	  related	  issues.	  However,	  it	  became	  clear	  virtually	  instantly	  that	  full	  involvement	  in	  both	  networks	  to	  the	  degree	  desirable	  in	  ethnography-­‐inspired	   research	   was	   beyond	   the	   level	   that	   a	   single	   researcher	   could	   achieve.	   Nonetheless,	   I	  continued	  to	  participate	  in	  some	  activities	  of	  CJN!	  and	  associated	  organisations	  and	  groups	  both	  in	  Poznań	  and	  in	  Copenhagen.	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  other	  Flexible	  Mechanisms,	  which,	  while	   overall	   critical,	   focussed	  on	   improving	   the	  CDM,	  rather	  than	  scrapping	  it,	  and	  remained	  generally	  speaking	  supportive	  of	  carbon	  trading.	   Likewise,	   this	   was	   also	   the	   case	   for	   the	   emerging	   CAN	   position	   on	   REDD,	  where	  disagreements	  about	  whether	  REDD	  activities	  should	  generate	  carbon	  credits	  were	  hotly	  contested	  within	  the	  CAN	  REDD	  working	  group.	  In	  addition,	  in	  an	  example	  already	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  REDD	  policy	  position	  was	  also	  fraught	  with	  procedural	  problems	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  de-­‐facto	  exclusion	  of	  the	  views	  of	  one	  Latin	  American	  network	  of	  organisations	  due	  to	  language	  and	  translation	  issues.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  both	  these	  developments,	  FoE-­‐I	  publicly	  distanced	  itself	  from	  the	  policy	  position	   (c.f.	   the	   “byline”	   in	   CAN	   2007b)	   and	   defended	   that	   decision	   to	   by-­‐line	   by	  insisting	  that,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  REDD	  –	  an	  initiative	  directly	  impacting	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  already	  disadvantaged	  people	  in	  developing	  countries	  –	  the	  views	  of	  members	  from	  developing	  countries	  need	  to	  take	  priority	  and	  any	  process	  that	  excludes	  these	  voices	  loses	  credibility	  (field	  note,	  Bali,	  2	  Dec	  2007;	  conversation	  with	  CAN	  delegate,	  field	  note,	  Bangkok,	  3	  Apr	  2008).	  
At	  the	  same	  Bali	  COP,	  then,	  CJN!	  was	  launched	  by	  means	  of	  a	  joint	  final	  statement	  of	  its	  founding	  “members”155	  and	  subsequently	  FoE-­‐I	  left	  CAN	  later	  in	  2008.	  Both	  this	  background	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  CJN!	  network,	  where	  one	  of	  the	  major	  founding	  members	   was	   increasingly	   disillusioned	   with	   the	   internal	   deliberative	   processes	  within	  CAN,	   and	   some	  of	   its	   organisational	   features,	   support	   the	  notion	   that	   it	  was	  founded	   specifically	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   counterpublic	   in	   the	   sense	   described	   by	   Nancy	  Fraser.	  Specifically,	  it	  was	  created	  to	  practice	  a	  discursive	  culture	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  public,	  and	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  development	  of	  terminology,	  language,	  definitions	   of	   problems	   and	   potential	   solutions	   in	   (temporary)	   discursive	   isolation	  from	   the	   dominating	   influences	   of	   the	   hegemonic	   public.	   With	   regards	   to	   the	   first	  aspect	  –	   the	   cultivation	  of	  distinct	  discursive	  practices	   –	  CJN!	  has	  established	  a	   few	  processes	  that	  are	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  “parallel”	  processes	  in	  CAN	  and	  the	  wider	  UNFCCC	  regime.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  	  The	   word	   members	   is	   placed	   in	   quotation	   marks	   since	   CJN!,	   at	   least	   initially,	   insisted	   that	  cooperation	  in	  the	  network	  does	  not	  establish	  any	  membership	  relationship	  and	  that	  CJN!	  merely	  is	  a	  loose	  coalition	  of	  groups	  who	  share	  common	  values	  and	  objectives	  (field	  notes,	  Poznań,	  4	  Dec	  2008).	  However,	  meanwhile,	  CJN!’s	  website	  has	  started	  to	  maintain	  a	  “member	  directory”	  (CJN!	  2010b),	   thus	   hinting	   the	   possibility	   that	   this	   has	   changed	   since	   the	   fieldwork	  was	   carried	   out.	  However,	  CJN!	  still	  is	  no	  incorporated	  organisation	  with	  its	  own	  legal	  persona.	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  For	   example,	  while	   both	   CAN	   and	   the	  UNFCCC	   embrace	   the	   principle	   of	   consensus	  based	   decision-­‐making	   and	   define,	   in	   simplified	   terms,	   consensus	   as	   reached	  when	  there	  are	  no	  dissenting	  views	  voiced	  (in	  other	  words,	  agreement	  with	  any	  position	  is	  assumed	  as	  the	  default),	  CJN!	  policy	  positions	  are	  always	  so-­‐called	  sign-­‐on	  positions,	  where	   only	   organisations	   that	   explicitly	   state	   their	   support	   for	   a	   policy	   relevant	  output	  such	  as	  position	  papers	  and	  submissions	  are	  listed	  on	  the	  relevant	  document	  (disagreement	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  default).	  While	  this	  clearly	  is	  a	  more	  cumbersome	  approach,	   it	  ensures	   that	  drafting	  of	  policy	  positions	  does	  not	  have	   to	  be	   limited	   to	  the	  lowest	  common	  denominator	  as	  it	  accepts	  that	  individual	  statements	  might	  only	  be	   supported	   by	   a	   subset	   of	   the	   CJN!	  membership.	   In	   CAN	   and	   the	  UNFCCC	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  deliberations	  with	  the	  view	  of	  reaching	  consensus	  are	  continued	  until	  a	  text	  version	  has	  no	  objectors	  anymore,	  which	  either	  might	  be	  due	  to	  consensus	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  genuine	  breakthrough	  or	  simply	  due	  to	  an	  example	  of	  “negotiation	  fatigue	  syndrome”	   (Weiss	   2005),	   where	   interlocutors’	   interest	   in	   concluding	   negotiations	  outweighs	  their	  desire	  to	  achieve	  an	  outcome	  that	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interest.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  this	  important	  difference	  in	  the	  discursive	  practice,	  there	  are	  other	  aspects	  where	  the	  discourse	  within	  CJN!	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  CAN.	  For	  example,	  CJN!	  understands	   itself	   explicitly	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   social	   justice	   movement	   and	   thus	  engages	  its	  climate	  justice	  agenda	  with	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  allies	  both	  inside	  as	  well	  as	  outside	   “the	   process”	   of	   the	   formal	   UNFCCC	   negotiations.	   To	   illustrate	   this,	   my	  cursory	  involvement	  with	  CJN!	  and	  CJN!-­‐associated	  activities	  in	  Poznań	  and	  Copenha-­‐gen	   did	   not	   only	   involve	   meetings	   and	   discussion	   in	   various	   spaces	   within	   the	  UNFCCC	   conference	   venue	   (already	   familiar	   to	   me	   from	   my	   involvement	   in	   the	  climate	  change	  work	  of	  environmental	  NGOs),	  but	  also	  brought	  me	  to	  discussion	  and	  planning	  meetings	   in	  an	  old	   factory	   squatted	  by	  Polish	  anarchists	   in	  Poznań,	   to	   the	  alternative	   summit	   “Klimaforum”	   in	   Copenhagen	   and	   to	   a	   demonstration	   violently	  being	  broken	  up	  with	  batons	  and	  pepper	  spray	  by	  Danish	  Police.	  At	  least	  partially	  due	  to	  this	  strong	  connection	  with	  groups	  and	  movements	  “outside,”	  parts	  of	  which	  reject	  any	  involvement	  with	  the	  UNFCCC	  as	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  rather	  than	  the	  solution,	   CJN!	   does	   not	   shy	   away	   from	   very	   strong	   criticism	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   –	   for	  example	  accusing	  it	  of	  being	  the	  “WTO	  of	  the	  skies”	  (CJN!	  2010b)	  –	  which	  would	  be	  unlikely	   to	   come	   from	  CAN	   as	   among	   the	   latter’s	  membership	   the	   concern	   is	   often	  voiced	  that	  too	  strong	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  could	  play	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  countries	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  who	  would	  prefer	  to	  discuss	  climate	  change	  policy	  among	  a	  much	  smaller	  grouping,	  for	   example	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	  G20,	   the	  Major	  Economies	  Forum,	  or	   such	  ad-­‐hoc	  arrangements	  like	  the	  one	  that	  negotiated	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord.	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  substantial	  overlap	  between	  CJN!	  and	  CAN;	  especially	  on	   the	   “left”	   edge	   of	   the	   political	   spectrum	   of	   CAN156.	   A	   number	   of	   organisations,	  including	   several	   national	   Friends	   of	   the	   Earth	   organisations,	   and	   consequently	   a	  number	   of	   individuals	   (for	   example	   the	   agents	   of	   these	   organisations)	   contribute	  actively	  both	  to	  CAN	  and	  CJN!	  discussions,	  including,	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	  one	  of	   the	   co-­‐coordinators	   of	   CAN’s	   Flexible	   Mechanisms	   working	   group	   and	   other	  prominent	  members	  of	  that	  group.	  Incidentally,	  during	  the	  time	  between	  the	  Poznań	  climate	   change	   conference	   (where	   CJN!	   started	   to	   fully	   consolidate	   itself)	   and	   the	  Copenhagen	   COP,	   CAN’s	   position	   papers	   on	   Flexible	  Mechanisms	   began	   to	   become	  increasingly	  critical	  of	  the	  CDM	  and	  other	  mechanisms	  that	  were	  under	  consideration	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  for	  the	  post-­‐2012	  framework.	  While	  previously	  these	  had	  mainly	   focussed	   on	   specific	   critique	   regarding	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   CDM,	  criticism	  voiced	  in	  policy	  positions	  prepared	  for	  the	  Copenhagen	  COP	  began	  to	  reject	  offsets	   altogether	   given	   the	  political	   situation	  of	   the	   time	   (CAN	  2009g).	  This,	   again,	  echoes	  well	  Nancy	  Fraser’s	  description	  of	  the	  role	  of	  counterpublics	  with	  regards	  to	  dominant	   or	   hegemonic	   publics:	   on	   one	   hand,	   by	   providing	   a	   commentary	   and	  critique	   of	   UNFCCC	   politics,	   including	   on	   flexible	   mechanisms,	   from	   a	   different	  political	  vantage	  point,	   the	  sheer	  existence	  of	  CJN!	  as	  a	  counterpublic	  expanded	   the	  political-­‐discursive	   space	  within	  which	   the	   policy	   positions	   of	   environmental	  NGOs	  are	  established.	  	  
More	  specifically,	  however,	  Fraser	  points	  out	  another	  function	  of	  counter	  publics	  that	  can	  be	  observed	  here:	  by	  (at	  least	  temporarily)	  isolating	  itself	  from	  the	  dominant	  public,	  the	  counterpublic	  can	  develop	  its	  own	  positions,	  definitions	  and	  terminology	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  	  As	  the	  “left”	  edge	  of	  CAN,	  I	  understand,	  simplified,	  CAN	  member	  organisations	  who	  among	  other	  aspects	   are	   generally	   critical	   of	   market	   based	   approaches	   to	   solve	   the	   climate	   crisis	   and	   see	  climate	  change	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  systemic	  problem	  associated	  with	  neoliberal,	  capitalist	  globali-­‐sation,	  and	  identifies	  with	  notions	  like	  “ecological	  debt,”	  while	  the	  “right”	  edge	  of	  the	  CAN	  political	  spectrum	  quite	  comfortably	  relies	  on	  market	  based	  solutions	  to	  many	  aspects	  of	  climate	  change	  politics	   and	   thus	   is	  more	   concerned	  with	   providing	   the	   correct	   incentives	   and	   frameworks	   for	  these	  markets	  to	  unleash	  their	  problem	  solving	  potential.	  “Left”	  and	  “right”	  are	  placed	  in	  quota-­‐tion	   marks	   to	   indicate	   that,	   with	   environmental	   protection	   typically	   more	   of	   an	   item	   on	   left	  agendas,	  the	  “left”	  and	  “right”	  of	  the	  internal	  political	  spectrum	  within	  CAN	  does	  not	  even	  approx-­‐imately	  map	  onto	  the	  left/right	  distinction	  in	  most	  other	  political	  systems.	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  as	   well	   as	   refine	   (and	   rehearse)	   the	   arguments	   that	   support	   these	   without	   being	  restricted	  in	  this	  process	  by	  the	  salient	  opinion	  of	  the	  dominant	  public.	  Keeping	  this	  function	   of	   counterpublics	   in	  mind,	   the	   empirical	   case	   can	   be	   discussed	   under	   this	  light:	   throughout	   the	   fieldwork	  period,	   it	  was	   generally	   speaking	   taken	   for	   granted	  that	  a	  policy	  position	  on	  flexible	  mechanisms	  within	  CAN	  could	  never	  outright	  reject	  market	  based	  or	  carbon	  trading	  based	  solutions	  to	  the	  climate	  crisis,	  at	  least	  as	  long	  as	  the	  desire	  was	  to	  produce	  a	  policy	  position	  that	  reflected	  a	  consensus	  within	  CAN	  as	  defined	  above	  (e.g.	  field	  note,	  Poznań,	  8	  Dec	  2008;	  virtual	  field	  note,	  Mar	  2009).	  In	  fact,	  on	  one	  occasion	  a	  delegate	  from	  a	  developed	  country	  party	  remarked	  to	  me	  that	  he	   was	   puzzled	   why	   CAN	   had	   maintained	   such	   a	   “tame	   critique”	   of	   the	   flexible	  mechanisms	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  4	  Apr	  2009).	  Thus,	   it	  was	  known	   a	   priori	   that	   any	   critique	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   flexible	   mechanisms	   within	   the	  UNFCCC	   regime	   had	   to	   be	   restricted	   to	   criticism	   of	   the	   actual	   specific	   flexible	  mechanisms	   or	   planned	   extensions	   of	   the	   scheme,	   as	   opposed	   to	   fundamental	  rejection	   of	   the	   concept	   itself.	   Therefore,	   a	   whole	   class	   of	   possible	   criticisms	   was	  practically	   not	   considered	   and	   therefore	   the	   arguments	   that	   would	   support	   such	  criticism	  were	  not	  systematically	  developed	  within	  the	  discussions.	  In	  this	  sense,	  CJN!	  provided	  those	  CAN	  members	  who	  constitute	  the	  overlap	  between	  the	  two	  networks	  a	  place	  where	  these	  discursive	  processes	  could	  take	  place	  in	  temporary	  and	  relative	  isolation	  and	  in	  an	  environment	  that	  is	  generally	  supportive	  of	  very	  critical	  analyses	  of	   carbon	  market	   arrangements,	   where	   carbon	   trading	   of	   any	   kind	   is,	   as	   has	   been	  mentioned,	  generally	  branded	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “false	  solutions.”	  These	  more	  developed	  analyses	   and	  arguments	   could	   then	  be	  brought	  back	   into	   the	  CAN	  discourse	  on	   the	  same	  subject	  and,	  being	  now	  more	  refined	  than	  before,	  could	  (and	  arguably	  did)	  have	  more	  influence	  on	  that	  discourse	  as	  well.	  
6.2 Competing	  Discourses	  –	  Scientific	  Reality,	  Realpolitik,	  Social	  Justice	  	  
As	  has	  just	  been	  discussed,	  within	  the	  wider	  ENGO	  constituency	  as	  well	  as	  within	  CAN	  itself,	   different	   discourses	   receive	   different	   degrees	   of	   traction	   when	   deliberating	  common	  policy	  positions.	  In	  the	  examples	  used	  above,	  it	  has	  been	  illustrated	  how	  the	  arguments	   based	   on	   justice	   concerns	   would	   be	   further	   developed	   once	   CJN!	   had	  established	  itself	  as	  a	  counterpublic	  within	  the	  ENGO	  constituency.	  	  
6.	  Publics	  and	  Counterpublics	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	   265	  	  However,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   only	   example	  wherein	   different	   approaches	   to	   and	   under-­‐standings	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   rationality	   itself	   can	   be	   observed	   as	   competing	   against	  each	   other.	   In	   particular,	   within	   CAN	   deliberations	   during	   most	   of	   the	   fieldwork	  phase,	   the	   streams	   of	   what	   can	   be	   called	   “political	   realism”	   and	   “scientific”	   or	  “physical	   realism”	   were	   observed	   as	   the	   main	   conceptualisations	   of	   rationality.	   In	  addition,	  a	  “moral”	  or	  “justice”	  component	  was	  also	   frequently	  evoked	  and	  received	  more	  traction	  during	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  phase.	  In	  brief,	  “political	  realism”	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	   limitations	  of	  Realpolitik,	   in	  other	  words	  with	  (albeit	  often	  an	  optimistic	  interpretation	  of)	  the	  politically	  feasible.	  An	  argument	  based	  on	  “scientific”	  or	   “physical	   realism”	   or	   rationality	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   refers	   to	   the	   “scientific	  necessities”	  supported	  by	  the	  relevant	  scientific	  literature,	  in	  particular	  as	  collated	  in	  the	  IPCC’s	  Fourth	  Assessment	  Report	  (IPCC	  2007a,	  2007b,	  2007c)	  and	  relevant	  work	  carried	  out	  since	  (e.g.	  den	  Elzen	  and	  Höhne	  2008;	  Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Finally,	  “moral”	  or	  “justice”	  based	  rationality	   is	  one	  that	  derives	  the	  power	  of	   its	  arguments	  from	  moral	  norms,	  in	  particular	  the	  moral	  norms	  of	  justice	  and	  equity.	  
At	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  what	  is	  described	  here	  as	  different	  conceptualisations,	   or	   types,	   of	   rationality	   and	   reason,	   it	   is	   equally	   possible	   to	  conceive	   of	   the	   same	   phenomena	   as	   fundamentally	   different	   epistemologies	   –	   in	  particular	   the	   distinction	   of	   the	   “justice-­‐based”	   arguments	   versus	   those	   based	   on	  political	   and	   scientific	   arguments,	   respectively.	   However,	   a	   full	   philosophical	  treatment	  of	   these	   issues	   is	  beyond	   the	   scope	   (and,	   indeed,	   the	   topic)	  of	   this	   thesis	  and	  thus	  it	  shall	  suffice	  to	  point	  out	  here	  that,	  while	  possibly	  not	  fully	  accurate157,	  the	  concept	  of	  rationality	  and	  reason	  employed	  here	  is	  one	  which	  Habermas,	  who	  in	  turn	  explicitly	  borrows	  it	  from	  Kant,	  refers	  to	  when	  discussing	  the	  dialectic	  foundation	  of	  rational-­‐critical	   debate	   in	   the	   public	   sphere.	   There,	   he	   contrasts	   the	   reason	   and	  rationality	  employed	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  (and	  employed	  there	  partially	  to	  justify	  its	  own	   legitimacy)	   with	   the	   foundations	   of	   authority	   in	   pre-­‐18th	   century	   societies,	  where	  authority	  was	  based	  on	  “force,	   […]	  habit	  and	  custom”	  (Kant	  cit.	   in	  Habermas	  1989:	  117)158.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  	  Again,	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  the	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  proposed	  approach	  is	  appropriate	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  158	  	  Incidentally,	  this	  dichotomy	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  that	  Max	  Weber	  (1922:	  124)	  draws	  between	  the	   characters	   of	   legitimate	   authority,	   which	   can	   have	   a	   rational	   character	   (resulting	   in	   “legal	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  Thus,	   reason	   and	   rationality	   is	   here	   understood	   to	   be	   concerned	   with	   seeking	  agreement	   through	   convincing	   and	  persuasion	  by	   argument	   (regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  argument	  would	  be	  deemed	  strictly	  “rational”	  in	  all	  interpretations	  of	  the	  word).	  
It	  has	  already	  been	  argued	  elsewhere,	   for	  example	  by	  Peter	  Newell	   (2000)	  and	  Simone	   Pulver	   (2004a),	   that	   scientific	   knowledge	   enjoys	   a	   preferential	   role	   in	   the	  UNFCCC	   regime,	   which	   Newell	   explains	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   history	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	  which	   evolved	   from	  more	   scientifically	   oriented	   conferences,	  while	   Pulver	  specifically	  credits	   the	   influence	  of	   the	  ENGOs	  during	  this	  evolution	  with	  the	  strong	  emphasis	   on	   science	   based	   policy	   making	   within	   the	   UNFCCC.	   The	   continuing	  emphasis	  on	  science	  based	  policy	  making	  is,	  for	  example,	  evidenced	  by	  references	  to	  IPCC	  reports	  in	  official	  UNFCCC	  conclusions	  (e.g.,	  UNFCCC	  2007d,	  2007e).	  Especially	  considering	   Pulver’s	   argument,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   science	   based	   arguments	  enjoy	   a	   particular	   emphasis	   within	   CAN.	   Consequently,	   many	   CAN	   position	   papers	  contain	   specific	   references	   to	   the	   relevant	   numbers	   of	   the	   IPCC	   reports	   and	   often	  other	  relevant	  scientific	  work	  is	  referenced	  as	  well	  (e.g.	  CAN	  2009f),	  and	  references	  to	  these	   scientific	   studies	   are	   often	   evoked	   in	   internal	   CAN	   debates	   to	   support	   the	  argument	  in	  question.	  	  
In	   addition,	   CAN	   occasionally	   goes	   to	   further	   lengths	   in	   ensuring	   the	   science	  based	  character	  of	  its	  arguments	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  debate.	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  negotiations,	  WWF	  and	  other	  ENGOs	  had	  assembled	  a	   team	   of	   analysts	   who	   were	   able	   to	   quickly	   analyse	   any	   new	   emission	   reduction	  numbers	   that	  were	  coming	  out	  of	   the	  closed	  negotiations	   in	  order	   to	  be	  able	   to	  use	  that	   information	   to	   brief	   party	   delegations	   and	   media	   (conversation,	   field	   note,	  Bangkok,	  2	  Apr	  2008).	  Likewise,	   in	  Copenhagen,	   the	  CAN	  working	  group	  concerned	  with	  accounting	  of	   forestry	  emissions	   in	  Annex	   I	   countries	  –	  one	  of	   the	   “loopholes”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  authority	  or	  rule”	  (legale	  Herrschaft))	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  a	  traditional	  or	  charismatic	  character	  on	  the	   other	   (resulting	   in	   “traditional	   authority	   or	   rule”	   (traditionelle	   Herrschaft)	   or	   “charismatic	  authority	  of	  rule”	  (charismatische	  Herrschaft),	  respectively).	  	   Incidentally,	   it	   is	   also	   appropriate	   to	   recall	   that,	   earlier	   in	   the	   same	   book,	   Weber	   explicitly	  distinguished	  different	  types	  of	  social	  action,	  one	  of	  them,	  value-­‐rational	  (social)	  action	  (wertra-­‐
tionales	  Handeln)	   is	  explicitly	  concerned	  with	  social	  action	  based	  on	  “the	  conscious	  belief	   in	   the	  unconditional	  value	  inherent	  in	  a	  certain	  behavioral	  act	  itself	  […]	  regardless	  whether	  this	  value	  is	  based	  on	  ethical,	  aesthetical,	  religious,	  or	  whatever	  other	  considerations”	  (Weber	  1922:	  12,	  own	  translation);	   thus	   actions	   or	   arguments	   based	   on	  moral	   norms	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   rational	   in	   this	  sense.	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  discussed	   earlier	   –	   set	   up	   a	   “sub	   working	   group	   on	   reference	   levels”	   whose	   task	  before	  the	  conference	  involved	  equipping	  itself	  with	  the	  necessary	  data	  and	  analytical	  tools	  to	  then	  be	  able,	  at	  the	  conference,	  to	  quickly	  analyse	  any	  new	  proposals	  in	  real-­‐time	  as	   they	   came	  out	  of	   the	  negotiations	  on	   this	   agenda	   item.	  This	   analysis	  would	  then	  be	   concerned	  about	   the	  question	  of	  what	   these	  new	  proposals	  would	  mean	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  size	  of	  an	  emissions	  loophole	  they	  would	  create	  and	  this	  information	  was	  then	   intended	   to	  be	  used	   for	  media	  briefings,	   lobbying	  work	   and	  briefings	  of	   other	  delegations	  (field	  notes,	  Copenhagen,	  9	  Dec	  2009).	  Both	  these	  cases	  are	  examples	  of	  how	  CAN	  employs	  specific	  tactics	  based	  on	  the	  privileged	  role	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  discourse.	  
Before	   considering	   how	   arguments	   based	   on	   “scientific	   realism”	   are	   used	   in	  relation	   to	  other	   types	  of	   rationality	  mentioned,	  a	  brief	   (and	  necessarily	  simplified)	  review	   of	   some	   of	   the	   processes	   considered	   in	   the	   relevant	   climate	   science	   is	  necessary.	  With	  regards	  to	  the	  scientific	  work	  of	  the	  IPCC,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recall	  that	  the	   IPCC	   reports	   themselves,	   as	   well	   as	   much	   of	   the	   related	   literature,	   are	   not	  prescriptive	   in	   their	   presentation	   of	   the	   science.	   For	   example,	   as	   far	   as	   emission	  reduction	  scenarios	  are	  concerned,	  the	  IPCC,	  in	  its	  widely-­‐cited	  box	  13.7	  (IPCC	  2007b:	  776;	   referenced,	   for	   example,	   in	   UNFCCC	   2007d)	   collated	   a	   number	   of	   emission	  scenarios	   from	   the	   relevant	   peer-­‐reviewed	   published	   literature	   to	   illustrate	   which	  ranges	  of	   levels	  of	  emission	  reductions	  are	  required	   to	  achieve	  a	  given	  stabilisation	  level	   in	  GHG	  concentrations.	  However,	  the	  report	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  suggest	  which	  of	  these	  scenarios	  should	  be	  considered	  the	  most	  desirable.	  In	  this	  sense	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	   a	   success	   of	   both	   the	   ENGOs	   and	   the	   more	   progressive	   amongst	   the	   UNFCCC	  parties	   that	   only	   direct	   references	   to	   the	   most	   ambitious	   group	   of	   stabilisation	  scenarios	   were	   ever	   used	   in	   official	   UNFCCC	   documents	   and	   that	   official	   UNFCCC	  resolutions	   called	   upon	   the	   IPCC	   to	   further	   study	   even	   more	   ambitious	   scenarios.	  Furthermore,	   the	   link	   between	   the	   GHG	   concentration	   stabilisation	   scenarios	   and	  future	   temperature	   increases	   are	   expressed	   as	   probabilities,	   not	   deterministically	  (IPCC	   2007b),	   and	   likewise,	   the	   link	   between	   temperature	   change	   and	   associated	  impacts	   on	   the	   human	   and	   biological	   systems	   are	   equally	   expressed	   in	   non-­‐deterministic	   terms	   (IPCC	  2007a:	   16).	   This	   is	   relevant	   since	   it	   illustrates	  how	  even	  arguments	  that	  claim	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  IPCC,	  which	  is	  generally	  viewed	  as	  the	  most	   authoritative	   scientific	   body	   concerned	   with	   climate	   science,	   contain	   value-­‐
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  based	   decisions	   concerning	   at	   least	   three	   stages	   of	   connecting	   emission	   reductions	  targets	  and	  impacts	  on	  humanity	  and	  the	  Earth’s	  ecosystems.	  In	  addition,	  due	  to	  the	  dichotomous	  separation	  of	   the	  parties	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  into	  Annex	  I	  and	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries,	  emission	  reduction	  targets	  are	  normally	  expressed	  separately159.	  However,	  since	  many	  expressions	  of	  political	  commitments	  (e.g.	  those	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  G8	  or	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  as	  described	  below)	  contain	  both	  values	  for	  global	  targets	  as	  well	  as	  for	  Annex	  I	  countries,	  they	  are	  also	  implicitly	  stating	  (by	  subtraction)	  what	  effort	  to	  the	  global	  targets	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries	  are	  expected	  to	  contribute.	  
To	  illustrate,	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  committed	  itself	  to	  limiting	  global	  tempera-­‐ture	   increase	   to	   “not	  more	   than	   2°C	   above	   pre-­‐industrial	   levels”	   and	   further	   states	  that	  “this	  will	  require	  a	  reduction	  in	  global	  emissions	  of	  at	  least	  50%	  from	  1990	  levels	  by	  2050”	  (Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  2008:	  2).	  This	  same	  commitment	  has	  been	  reiterated	  by	  the	  G8	  summit	  in	  2009	  (McMahon	  and	  Moncel	  2009)	  and	  was	  further-­‐more	  contained	  in	  late	  drafts	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accords	  (Lynas	  2009),	  although	  the	  final	  text	  of	  the	  Accords	  merely	  “recogniz[ed]	  the	  scientific	  view	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  global	   temperature	   should	  be	  below	  2	  degrees	  Celsius”	   (UNFCCC	  2010f:	  5)	  without	  committing	   its	   signatories	   to	   this	   goal.	   Interpreting	   these	   statements	   and	   commit-­‐ments	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  IPCC	  reports,	  however,	  reveals	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  actually	  meeting	   the	   temperature	   target	   stated	   (2°C)	   is	   only	   about	   50:50	   if	   the	   emissions	  reduction	  target	  (50%	  globally)	  that	  is	  envisioned	  is,	  in	  fact,	  met	  (Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Baer	  et	  al.	  2009)160.	  Thus,	  the	  scenario	  of	  emission	  reductions	  and	  temperature	  target	  expressed	  in	  these	  commitments	  has	  been	  described	  as	  highly	  dishonest:	  Calling	  this	  a	  “two	  degree	  pathway”	  is	   like	  calling	  a	  promise	  to	  pay	  you	  a	  dollar,	  if	  a	  tossed	  coin	  lands	  heads,	  “a	  dollar.”	   	  	   (CAN	  member,	  virtual	  field	  note,	  Jan	  2010)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  	  For	   example,	   in	   the	   aforementioned	   box	   13.7,	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   GHG	   concentrations	  associated	   with	   the	   most	   ambitious	   category	   of	   scenarios,	   the	   studies	   reviewed	   by	   the	   IPCC	  conclude	  that,	  by	  2020,	  Annex	  I	  countries	  have	  to	  reduce	  their	  emissions	  by	  absolute	  25%-­‐40%	  below	  1990	  levels	  while	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries	  have	  to	  ensure	  “substantial	  deviation	  from	  [their	  emissions]	   baseline	   in	   Latin	  America,	  Middle	   East,	   East	   Asia	   and	   Centrally-­‐Planned	  Asia”	   (IPCC	  2007b:	   776),	   which	   was	   later	   clarified	   to	   likely	   mean	   15-­‐30%	   below	   what	   would	   otherwise	  happen	  (the	  baseline)	  by	  some	  of	  the	  IPCC	  reports	  authors	  (den	  Elzen	  and	  Höhne	  2008).	  160	  	  In	   addition,	   as	   pointed	   out	   in	   footnote	   144	   above,	   the	   emission	   reduction	   pledges	   actually	  submitted	  under	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  not	  sufficient	  to	  even	  achieve	  a	  50:50	  chance	   to	   limit	  warming	   to	  2°C,	  but	   “mean	  a	  greater	   than	  50%	  chance	   that	  warming	  will	  exceed	  3°C”	  (Rogelj	  et	  al.	  2010:	  1126).	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   when	   expressing	   demands	   in	   terms	   of	   temperature	   targets,	   ENGOs	  typically	  add	  further	  qualifiers	  to	  their	  demands	  to	  avoid	  the	  same	  issue,	  for	  example,	  the	  environmental	   justice	   think	   tank	  Ecoequity	   fully	  qualifies	  one	  of	   their	  modelled	  emission	   pathways	   as	   a	   “2°C	   pathway	   consistent	   [with]	   a	   75%	   chance	   of	   keeping	  warming	  below	  2°C”	  (Baer	  et	  al.	  2009:	  3)	  and	  CAN’s	  expectations	  paper	  for	  Copenha-­‐gen	  specifies	  that	  any	  outcome	  of	  the	  COP	  should	  ensure	  a	  “high	  probability	  of	  staying	  well	  below	  2.0°C”	  (CAN	  2009a:	  6).	  
This	  brief	  excursus	  into	  a	  simplified	  description	  of	  the	  probabilistic	  links	  between	  emissions	   reductions	   targets	   and	   temperature	   goals	   has	   been	  necessary	   to	   support	  the	  following	  discussion.	  In	  order	  to	  illustrate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  aforementioned	  different	   types	   of	   discourses	  have	   influenced	   internal	   deliberations	  with	   regards	   to	  the	   formulation	   and	   amendment	   of	   policy	   positions	  within	   CAN,	   the	   case	   of	   CAN’s	  policy	   position	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   emission	   reductions	   demanded	   from	   Annex	   I	  countries	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  detail.	  
6.2.1 Science,	  Realpolitik	  and	  Justice:	  CAN’s	  policy	  on	  Annex	  I	  emissions	  
At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	  CAN’s	  policy	  position	  was	  that	  any	  post-­‐2012	  climate	  policy	   framework	  should	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  overarching	  aim	  of	  keeping	  warming	  “as	  far	  below	  2°C	  as	  possible”	  which	  in	  CAN’s	  view	  necessitated	  target	  of	  “at	  least	   -­‐30%	   by	   developed	   countries	   by	   2020”	   and	   a	   2050	   long-­‐term	   goal	   of	   -­‐50%	  globally	   with	   -­‐80%	   for	   developed	   countries,	   all	   compared	   to	   1990	   levels161	  (CAN	  2007c,	   2007d).	   The	   relevant	  CAN	   submission	   to	   the	  UNFCCC	   from	   June	  2007	   (CAN	  2007d)	  is	  furthermore	  a	  vivid	  example	  of	  the	  privileged	  role	  that	  arguments	  based	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  	  Note	   the	   difference	   between	   this	   position	   and	   those	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   G8	   as	   described	   above:	  although	   both	   call	   for	   a	   50%	   global	   reduction	   by	   2020,	   the	   EU	   and	   G8	   positions	   describe	   this	  reduction	   in	   relation	   to	  emissions	   levels	   in	   the	  year	  2000	  which	  were	  substantially	  higher	   than	  those	   in	  1990,	   on	  which	  CAN’s	  position	   is	   based	   since	  1990	   is	   the	   emission	  base	   year	   typically	  used	   under	   the	   Convention	   and	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol.	   This	   practice	   of	   referencing	   different	   base	  years	  is	  common	  in	  political	  declarations	  of	  emission	  reductions	  and,	  for	  the	  uninitiated	  or	  inat-­‐tentive,	   can	   make	   reduction	   commitments	   or	   pledges	   appear	   much	   more	   ambitious	   than	   they	  really	   are:	   “Canada’s	   intervention	   earned	   a	   relatively	   loud	   ‘Wow!’	   from	   an	   NGO	   person	   sitting	  behind	  me	  when	   they	  said	   they	  would	  commit	   themselves	   to	  20%	  emission	  reduction	  by	  2030.	  However,	   the	   Canadian	   delegate	   used	   (although	   very	   well	   hidden)	   a	   2006	   base	   year	   for	   this	  commitment.	  […]	  [A]	  20%	  reduction	  below	  2006	  levels	  actually	  means	  an	  increase	  compared	  to	  the	  usual	  1990	  base	  year	  since	  according	  to	  Canada’s	  own	  estimate	  it	  increased	  emissions	  by	  24%	  between	  1990	  and	  2005	  (despite	  its	  Kyoto	  target	  of	  -­‐6%	  by	  2012).	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  every-­‐body	  else	  is	  talking	  about	  how	  much	  they	  plan	  to	  reduce	  their	  emissions,	  Canada	  is	  talking	  about	  its	  planned	  increase”	  (field	  note,	  Vienna,	  27	  Aug	  2007).	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  scientific	  knowledge	  enjoy	  within	  CAN	  and	  the	  wider	  UNFCCC:	  the	  submission,	  at	  just	  4	  pages	   long,	   features	  11	  references	  to	  scientific	  articles	  and	  reports	  and	  includes	  4	  charts	  or	   tables,	   and,	   in	   general,	   rather	  displays	   the	   characteristics	  of	   an	  annotated	  review	   of	   the	   latest	   climate	   science	   on	   the	   topic	   in	   question	   (Annex	   I	   emission	  reduction	  targets)	   than	  a	  mere	  policy	  position	  document;	  even	  though	   it	  provides	  a	  running	  commentary	  from	  a	  particular	  political	  vantage	  point.	  
This	  position,	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  target	  for	  Annex	  I	  countries,	  changed	  slightly	  in	  2008.	  The	  conclusions	  of	  both	  the	  Vienna	  and	  Bali	  UNFCCC	  meetings,	  referring	  to	  the	  relevant	  range	  from	  the	  IPCC,	  indicated,	  as	  reported	  above,	  that	  the	  range	  of	  emission	  reduction	   targets	   for	   Annex	   I	   countries	   should	   fall	   within	   the	   range	   of	   25-­‐40%	   by	  2020,	  compared	  to	  1990	   levels.	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  reduction	  target	  previously	  used	  by	  CAN	  (-­‐30%)	  represented	  a	  figure	  in	  the	  lower	  half	  of	  this	  indicative	  range,	  since	  it	  was	  still	  based	  on	  scientific	   information	   from	  before	   the	  2007	  IPCC	  reports,	  which	  were	  only	  published	  after	  CAN’s	   submission.	  Furthermore,	   some	  developing	   countries,	   in	  particular	  the	  members	  of	  AoSIS,	  have	  demanded	  higher	  emission	  reduction	  targets	  of	   over	   40%.	   Thus,	   CAN	   strengthened	   its	   own	   policy	   position	   to	   demand	   more	  ambitious	  actions	  than	  it	  had	  previously	  called	  for	  and	  to	  take	  up	  the	  “25-­‐40%”	  range,	  including	  however,	  further	  specifying	  that	  in	  CAN’s	  view	  ultimately	  the	  targets	  should	  be	   “at	   least	   in	   the	   top	   end”	   (CAN	   2008c:	   1,	   original	   emphasis)	   of	   that	   range.	   The	  updated	   position	   thus	   also	   embraced	   views	   of	   member	   organisations	   calling	   for	  emission	   reductions	   higher	   than	   40%	   as	   well	   as	   those	   that	   consider	   values	   in	   the	  lower	  part	  of	  the	  range	  more	  realistic.	  
This	  language	  (“at	  least	  in	  the	  top	  end	  of	  the	  25-­‐40%	  range”)	  was	  chosen	  since	  it	  incorporated	  the	  exact	  phrasing	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  reports	  and	  thus	  was	  seen	  to	  have	  the	  support	   of	   the	   most	   credible	   science	   available.	   Scientific	   work	   on	   more	   ambitious	  reduction	   targets,	   while	   already	   available,	   was	   –	   due	   to	   the	   delay	   inherent	   in	   the	  process	  –	  not	  yet	  available	  in	  peer-­‐reviewed	  publications	  and	  thus	  did	  not	  possess	  the	  same	  level	  of	  credibility	  for	  some	  CAN	  members	  and	  other	  UNFCCC	  participants,	  both	  parties	  and	  observers	  (field	  note,	  Bangkok,	  2	  Apr	  2008).	  Consequently,	  CAN	  did	  not	  change	  the	  formula	  of	  its	  requested	  reduction	  range	  for	  Annex	  I	  countries	  throughout	  2008	  and	  it	  was	  still	  used	  in	  submissions	  during	  early	  2009	  (e.g.	  CAN	  2009h).	  During	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  this	  period,	  and	  especially	  toward	  its	  end,	  more	  and	  more	  countries,	  including	  AoSIS	  and	  the	  LDCs	  but	  also	  larger	  developing	  countries	  like	  China	  and	  India162,	  joined	  a	  call	  to	   limit	  warming	   to	   1.5°C	   (under	   the	   theme	   of	   “survival”	   as	   discussed	   earlier)	   and	  were	   pointing	   out	   that	   this	   goal	  would	   require	   returning	   to	   GHG	   concentrations	   of	  350ppm163	  CO2,	  a	  level	  which	  had	  already	  been	  exceeded	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  which	  is	   lower	   than	   the	   lowest	   class	   of	   scenarios	   considered	   by	   the	   IPCC.	   In	   addition,	   as	  discussed	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   the	   establishment	   of	   CJN!	   during	   2008	  meant	   the	  rise	   of	   an	   additional	   voice	   from	   the	   ENGO	   community.	   Furthermore,	   scientific	  publications	  made	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  the	  work	  that	  the	  IPCC	  reports	  were	  based	  upon	   had	   generally	   underestimated	   the	   severity	   of	   the	   threat	   that	   climate	   change	  posed,	   the	   speed	   with	   which	   climate	   change	   was	   already	   occurring	   as	   well	   as	   the	  degree	   of	   climate	   change	   mitigation	   that	   would	   be	   required	   (the	   submission	   of	  Grenada,	   on	   behalf	   of	   AoSIS,	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   from	   early	   2009	   reviews	   these	   trends	  (UNFCCC	  2009g:	  3–9)).	  
Consequently,	   calls	   within	   CAN	   increased	   to	   update	   this	   policy	   position	   (field	  notes,	   Poznań,	   5	  Dec	  2008;	  Bonn	  30	  Mar	  2009).	  At	   the	  UNFCCC	   session	   in	  Bonn	   in	  April	  2009	  a	  group	  of	  CAN	  delegates	  started	  drafting	  a	  policy	  position	  paper	  to	  state	  an	   updated	   demand	   for	   an	   emissions	   reduction	   target	   for	   Annex	   I	   countries	   and	  embed	   this	   target	   in	   a	   general	   narrative	   about	   CAN’s	   visions	   for	   the	   Copenhagen	  agreement.	  The	  issue	  of	  whether	  to	  update	  CAN’s	  position	  had	  been	  very	  controver-­‐sial	  within	  CAN	  and	  therefore	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  draft	  position	  paper	  was	  given	  a	  privileged	   treatment	   at	   CAN’s	   half-­‐day	   strategy	   meeting	   in	   the	   Bonn	   session.	   The	  issue	   was	   particularly	   controversial	   since	   it	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   substantial	   differ-­‐ences	   within	   the	   network	   over	   whether	   arguments	   based	   on	   scientific	   reality,	   as	  outlined	  by	  the	  IPCC	  and	  complemented	  by	  research	  published	  since,	  or	  those	  based	  on	   judgements	   about	   the	   politically	   feasible,	   should	   be	   given	   the	   dominant	   role	   in	  determining	  the	  public	  demands	  CAN	  should	  be	  voicing	  (post	   field	  notes,	  Bonn,	  Apr	  2009).	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  At	   the	  UNFCCC	  meeting	   in	  Bonn	   in	  April	  2009,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   the	  G77	  and	  China	  collectively	  demanded	  a	  40%	  reduction	  target	  for	  Annex	  I	  countries	  (Doyle	  2009),	  while	  	  163	  	  The	  unit	  of	  measurement	   for	  CO2	   (and	  other	  GHG)	  concentrations	   is	  ppm,	  or	  parts	  per	  million,	  which	  indicates	  how	  many	  out	  of	  one	  million	  air	  molecules	  are	  CO2	  molecules.	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  The	  arguments	  from	  the	  “scientific	  realism”	  perspective	  mainly	  focus	  on	  the	  warnings	  from	  the	  climate	  science	  community	  as	  outlined	  above,	   stressing,	   in	  a	  nutshell,	   that	  the	  probability	  of	  catastrophic	   interference	  with	   the	  climate	  system	  is	  unacceptably	  high	  if	  Annex	  I	  reductions	  are	  anything	  less	  than	  the	  favoured	  40%	  reduction	  target	  and	  therefore	  this	  position	  is	  the	  only	  position	  that	  CAN	  can	  possibly	  take.	  Arguments	  from	   the	   “Realpolitik”	   perspective,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   would	   argue	   that	   given	   the	  emission	   reduction	   that	   Annex	   I	   countries	  were	   discussing	   as	   possible	   targets,	   any	  demands	   that	  went	   beyond	   the	   25-­‐40%	   range	   already	   included	   in	   official	   UNFCCC	  documents	  would	  be	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  political	  realities.	  To	  specify,	  among	  the	  largest	  emitters	  of	  the	  Annex	  I	  parties,	  the	  EU	  had	  long	  been	  offering	  a	  30%	  reduction	  target	  for	  itself	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  international	  agreement	  (European	  Commission	  2009),	  placing	  it	  at	  the	  more	  ambitious	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  among	  Annex	  I	  parties,	  while	  in	  the	   United	   States,	   which	   had	   recently	   changed	   administrations,	   the	   new	   president,	  Barack	  Obama,	  suggested	  that	  his	  country	  should	  return	  to	  1990	  levels,	  i.e.	  offer	  a	  0%	  reduction	  (Stern	  2009b).	  Combined,	  at	   the	  time,	   the	  reduction	  figures	  of	  all	  Annex	  I	  countries	  would	   fall	  substantially	  short	  of	  even	  the	   lower	  end	  of	   the	  25-­‐40%	  range.	  Thus,	   for	   the	   “political	   realism”	  argument,	   the	   reduction	  numbers	  under	   considera-­‐tion	  at	  the	  time	  were	  already	  lower	  than	  the	  previous	  CAN	  position	  and	  therefore	  an	  increase	   in	   CAN’s	   demand	   would	   clearly	   indicate	   a	   degree	   of	   disconnect	   from	   or	  ignorance	  of	  the	  political	  realities	  (post	  field	  notes,	  Bonn,	  Apr	  2009).	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  main	  streams	  of	  argument,	  there	  was	  also,	  as	  indicated	  above,	  a	   third	   interpretation	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   rationality	   present	   –	   one	   that	   drew	   its	  arguments	   from	   a	   normative-­‐moral	   perspective.	   This	   perspective	   was	   somewhat	  supported	  by	  the	  “scientific	  realism”	  perspective,	  from	  which	  it	  drew	  the	  support	  of	  its	  arguments,	  which	  broadly	  fell	  into	  two	  categories.	  First,	  if	  one	  argues	  for	  a	  certain	  temperature	  or	  GHG	  concentration	  target,	   this	   implies	  a	  certain	  (range	  of)	  emission	  reduction	  targets	  globally.	  If	  one	  then	  suggests	  a	  specific	  target	  for	  Annex	  I	  countries,	  this	  always	  also	  implies	  how	  much	  emission	  space	  remains	  for	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries	  (i.e.	   the	   difference	   between	   global	   and	   Annex	   I).	   Thus	   the	   first	   type	   of	   moral	  arguments	  would,	   in	   support	   of	   CAN	   advocating	   a	   higher	   Annex	   I	   target,	   point	   out	  that	  low	  ambitions	  of	  Annex	  I	  countries	  would	  have	  to	  be	  matched	  by	  much	  increased	  reductions	  in	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries	  (if	  the	  temperature	  or	  concentration	  targets	  are	  being	  taken	  seriously).	  This,	   in	   turn,	  would	  represent	  a	  grave	  violation	  of	   the	  moral	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  principles	   of	   the	   Convention,	   including	   CBDRRC;	   it	   would	   severely	   restrict	   the	  chances	  of	  developing	  countries	  for	  development	  in	  order	  to	  lift	  their	  populations	  out	  of	   poverty	   and	   would	   further	   solidify	   continuation	   of	   much	   higher	   per-­‐capita	  emissions	  in	  Annex	  I	  countries	  compared	  to	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries,	  and	  therefore,	  in	  conclusion,	   represents	   a	   deeply	   unjust	   approach164.	   Secondly,	   a	   class	   of	   morality	  based	   arguments	   that	   were	   observable	   in	   the	   discussion,	   again	   using	   scientific	  information	   as	   support,	   principally	   mirrored	   the	   “survival”	   based	   arguments	   that	  have	   been	   introduced	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter	   when	   discussing	   AoSIS’	   success	   in	  employing	  its	  particularly	  vulnerable	  situation	  into	  a	  position	  of	  moral	  authority.	  This	  argument	  then,	  quoting	  results	  of	   the	  IPCC	  reports	  with	  regards	  to	  sea	   level	  rise,	  or	  worsening	   of	   droughts	   as	   well	   as	   newer	   research	   suggesting	   that	   the	   IPCC	   report	  underestimated	   both	   the	   severity	   and	   speed	   of	   those	   changes,	   insists	   that	   only	   an	  emission	  reduction	  target	  that	  is	  suitable	  for	  guaranteeing	  the	  survival	  of	  small	  island	  states	  and	  other	  vulnerable	  populations	  should	  be	  deemed	  a	  sufficient	  demand	  from	  CAN.	  
During	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   new,	   proposed	   CAN	   position	   paper	   on	   emissions	  reduction	  targets	  for	  Annex	  I	  parties,	  these	  main	  positions	  were	  taken	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  organisations.	   However,	   for	   the	   arguments	   based	   on	   “political	   realism”	   and	   moral	  considerations,	   respectively,	   specific	   types	   of	   organisations	   appeared	   to	   be	   more	  involved	  than	  others.	  Specifically,	  the	  Realpolitik	  position	  was	  principally	  represented	  by	   American	   NGOs	   who	   were	   cautious	   of	   jeopardising	   the	   progress	   that	   had	   been	  made	  recently	  in	  their	  domestic	  climate	  change	  politics	  under	  the	  new	  administration.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  discussion,	  the	  new	  president,	  Obama,	  who	  was	  then	  generally	  seen	  as	   an	   important	   champion	   of	   climate	   change	   –	   a	   major	   element	   of	   his	   election	  platform	   –	   had	   been	   in	   office	   for	   just	   over	   2	   months	   and	   US	   ENGOs	   still	   clearly	  remembered	  the	  sidelining	  of	  climate	  change	  during	  the	  preceding	  eight	  years	  under	  the	   Bush	   administration.	   In	   addition,	   during	   the	   Bonn	   meeting,	   a	   draft	   bill	   for	  comprehensive	  climate	  change	  and	  energy	  legislation	  was	  tabled	  in	  the	  U.S.	  congress	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  	  Paul	  Baer	   and	  his	   colleagues,	   for	   example,	   calculate	   that,	   for	   their	   chosen	   stabilisation	   scenario	  (which	  aims	  at	  350ppm	  CO2eq	  stabilisation),	  even	   for	  very	  substantial	  efforts	  by	  Annex	   I	  coun-­‐tries	   (exceeding	   40%	   reductions),	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries	  would	   be	   left	  with	   only	   slightly	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  overall	  emission	  budget,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  being	  home	  to	  about	  80%	  of	  the	  world	  population.	   In	   other	  words,	   even	   in	   a	   scenario	  where	  Annex	   I	   countries	   embark	  on	   very	  ambitious	  mitigation	  activity,	  their	  population	  occupies,	  on	  a	  per	  capita	  basis,	  still	  about	  4	  times	  as	  much	  “emission	  space”	  throughout	  the	  21st	  century	  as	  the	  populations	  of	  developing	  countries	  (Baer	  et	  al.	  2009).	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  (Waxman	  and	  Markey	  2009),	  which	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  breakthrough	  by	  US	  ENGOs	  and	   which	   advocated	   a	   20%	   reduction	   limit	   by	   2020	   compared	   to	   2005	   levels	  (corresponding	   to	  a	   single	  digit	  number	  when	  compared	   to	  1990	   levels)	   for	   the	  US	  (field	   notes,	   Bonn,	   2	   Apr	   2009).	   In	   their	   view,	   especially	   given	   that	   even	   the	   new	  administration’s	  envisioned	  U.S.	  commitments	  would	  fall	  far	  short	  of	  even	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  original	  CAN	  demand,	  any	  higher	  demands	  could	  result	  in	  their	  marginali-­‐sation	  both	  when	  engaging	  members	  of	  the	  US	  delegation	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  as	  well	  as	  at	  home	  when	  seeking	  to	  influence	  domestic	  climate	  change	  politics:	  “If	  we	  start	  talking	  about	  40%	  in	  Washington,	  we’ll	   just	  get	   laughed	  out	  of	  the	  door”	  (field	  notes,	  5	  Apr	  2009).	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  arguments	  from	  the	  moral	  positions,	  in	  particular	  those	  of	  the	   second	   class	   described	   above,	   were	   mainly	   produced	   by	   CAN	   members	   from	  developing	  countries	  –	  as	  discussed	  above,	   the	  April	  2009	  UNFCCC	  session	  was	   the	  first	  session	  at	  which	  a	  relatively	   large	  number	  of	  Fellows	  of	   the	  Southern	  Capacity	  Programme	  attended	  –	  some	  of	  which	  hailed	  from	  Pacific	  island	  states	  and	  thus	  quite	  strongly	   evoked	   the	   survival	   argument.	   As	   discussed	   above	   in	   the	   similar	   case	   of	  AoSIS,	  the	  presence	  of	   individuals	  from	  the	  affected	  countries	  had	  a	  powerful	  effect,	  as	  my	  reflections	  in	  the	  field	  suggest:	  It	  was	  very	   interesting	  to	  see	  the	  effect	  of	   the	  capacity	  programme	  people	  on	  the	  discussion.	  Having	  somebody	  in	  the	  room	  who	  could	  actually	   ask	   questions	   like	   “do	   you	   really	   think	   that	   the	   domestic	  Realpolitik	   in	   your	   country	   is	  more	   important	   than	  preventing	  my	  country	  from	  disappearing	  entirely?”	  and	  put	  a	  face	  to	  that	  question	  had	  quite	  a	  powerful	  impact	  since	  obviously	  nobody	  would	  tell	  them	  in	  their	  face	  that	  the	  disappearing	  of	  their	  islands	  might	  be	  unavoid-­‐able	  given	  political	  realities.	  I	  had	  the	  impression	  that	  this	  was	  sort	  of	   a	   “killer	   argument”	   that	   people	   couldn’t	   really	   disagree	   with	  without	   associating	   themselves	   with	   a	   morally	   very	   questionable	  (and,	  quite	  rightly	  so,	  stigmatised)	  position.165	   	  	   (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  5	  Apr	  2009,	  original	  emphasis)166	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   though,	   that	   I	   did	   not	   believe	   that	   the	   “killer”	   quality	   of	   the	   argument	  actually	   changed	  many	  privately	  held	  opinions	  or	  positions	  of	  organisations.	  Rather,	  due	   to	   the	  moral	   stigma	   created	   in	   the	   way	   described,	   opinions	   were	   withheld	   or	   their	   publicly	   stated	  variant	  was	  altered	  to	  avoid	  such	  stigmatization.	  166	  	  Although	  the	  case	  of	  low	  lying	  island	  nations	  is	  used	  here	  as	  an	  example,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  other	  examples	  from	  developing	  countries	  also	  played	  a	  part	  in	  the	  discussions.	  As	  earlier	  in	   this	   chapter,	   this	   example	   has	   been	   used	   since	   it	   characterizes	   quite	   clearly	   and	   vividly	   the	  	  
6.	  Publics	  and	  Counterpublics	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	   275	  	  In	   contrast,	   the	   other	   class	   of	   arguments	   based	   on	   moral	   considerations	   –	   those	  concerned	  that	  an	  insufficient	  Annex	  I	  target	  would	  (when	  combined	  with	  a	  stringent	  temperature	  or	  GHG	  concentration	  goal)	   result	   in	  an	   inequitable	  and	  unjust	  mitiga-­‐tion	   burden	   for	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries	   –	   was	   most	   vocally	   represented	   by	   CAN	  members	   from	  developed	   countries,	  mainly	   those	   from	  organisations	  with	   a	   strong	  climate	  justice	  or	  development	  focus	  (post	  field	  note,	  Bonn,	  Apr	  2009).	  
At	  the	  discussions	  within	  CAN	  in	  Bonn,	  the	  balance	  of	  views	  was	  clearly	  stacked	  against	   the	   “political	   realism”	   perspective	   with	   both	   science	   and	   justice	   based	  arguments	   indicating	   that	   an	   update	   of	   CAN’s	   position	  was,	   indeed,	   appropriate.	   In	  particular,	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  weight	  of	  the	  “survival”	  type	  of	  arguments	  in	  the	   discussions	   with	   concrete	   examples	   from	   the	   home	   countries	   of	   developing	  country	   members	   of	   CAN,	   might	   have	   tipped	   the	   balance	   (own	   reflections	   and	  conversations	  with	  CAN	  members,	   post	   field	   note,	   Bonn,	  Apr	   2009).	   In	   addition,	   as	  discussed	   above,	   the	   consolidation	   of	   CJN!	   as	   a	   second	   voice	   within	   the	   ENGO	  community,	   conceptualised	   as	   a	   counterpublic	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   which	  consistently	   demanded	   more	   ambitious	   actions	   from	   Annex	   I	   countries167 ,	   can	  arguably	   be	   understood,	   as	   suggested	   above,	   as	   having	   broadened	   the	   deliberative	  space	  within	   the	   ENGO	   community.	   Failing	   CAN’s	   updating	   of	   its	   own	   position,	   the	  increasing	  visibility	  of	  this	  additional	  voice	  combined	  with	  an	  ever	  increasing	  number	  of	  developing	  country	  parties	  supporting	  the	  “at	  least	  40%”	  language,	  could	  have	  led	  to	  CAN	  quite	  transparently	  being	  placed	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  progressive	  sections	  of	  both	  civil	  society	  and	  government	  delegations.	  	  
Ultimately,	  the	  updated	  position	  paper	  (CAN	  2009i)	  calls	  for	  an	  Annex	  I	  target	  of	  “more	  than	  40%”	  and	  embeds	  this	  target	  number	  in	  a	  description	  of	  CAN’s	  vision	  of	  the	  overall	  mitigation	  regime	  established	  at	  the	  Copenhagen	  COP.	  Ultimately,	  also,	  a	  small	   number	   of	   American	   NGOs,	   all	   of	   which	   are	   intensely	   engaged	   in	   lobbying	  activity	  in	  Washington,	  rejected	  the	  new	  policy	  position	  and	  had	  their	  dissent	  noted	  in	   a	   byline	   (CAN	   2009i).	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note,	   that	   this	   process	   represented	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  general	  nature	  of	  the	  class	  of	  examples	  that	  is	  could	  be	  considered	  the	  most	  representative,	  if	  not	  ideal	  typical,	  member	  of.	  167	  	  The	  “at	  least	  40%”	  demand	  has,	  for	  example,	  been	  used	  in	  the	  intervention	  of	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International	  at	  the	  April	  2009	  UNFCCC	  session	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  “in-­‐session	  workshop”	  on	  the	  Bali	  Action	  Plan	  (field	  note,	  Bonn,	  1	  Apr	  2009).	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  departure	  from	  CAN’s	  normal	  interpretation	  of	  the	  consensus	  rule	  described	  above	  as	  a	   “lowest	   common	   denominator”	   approach,	   which	   would	   have	   sought	   to	   find	   a	  compromise	   that	  would	  have	   allowed	   these	  dissident	   views	   to	   be	   included	   as	  well.	  This	  was	  partially	  due	  to	  statements	  made	   in	  the	  discussions	   in	  Bonn,	  where	   it	  was	  suggested	   that,	   as	   a	   network	   of	   400	   or	   more	   organisations,	   CAN	   accept	   that	   an	  agreement	  of	  all	  but	  a	  handful	  of	  organisations	  whose	  views	  on	  the	  matter	  in	  question	  are	   in	  direct	   irreconcilable	  opposition	   to	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  network,	   should	  be	  consid-­‐ered	  a	  sufficiently	  strong	  consensus	  (field	  note,	  5	  Apr	  2009).	  
6.2.2 Political	  Strategy	  –	  The	  Unifying	  Conceptualisation	  of	  Rationality	  
In	   the	   preceding	   discussion,	   I	   suggested	   that	   the	   arguments	   that	   were	   used	   in	   the	  discussion	   of	   the	   CAN	  policy	   position	   on	  Annex	   I	  mitigation	   targets	  were	   based	   on	  concepts	  of	  reasoning	  that	  emphasised	  one	  particular	  understanding	  over	  another,	  i.e.	  that	  focussed	  on	  scientific,	  Realpolitik	  or	  moral	  considerations.	  I	  thus	  suggested	  that	  discussants	   employed	   different	   conceptualisations	   of	   what	   constitutes	   reason	   and	  rationality	  itself.	  However,	  further	  engagement	  with	  the	  debate	  also	  allows	  a	  different	  interpretation.	  As	   I	  will	   argue	   in	   the	  discussion	  section	  of	   chapter	  7,	  CAN’s	   internal	  deliberations	   can	   best	   be	   understood	   as	   those	   of	   a	   separate	   public	   sphere	   whose	  public	   opinion	   formation	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	   question	   of	  which	   collective	   policy	  positions	  and	  political	  strategies	  CAN	  should	  employ	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  arena.	  In	  this	  context,	   the	   different	   classes	   of	   arguments	   do	   not	   necessarily	   appear	   as	   distinct	  conceptualisations	  of	  reason	  and	  rationality	  but	  rather	  all	  of	  them	  are	  concerned	  with	  a	  question	  of	  political	  strategy,	  i.e.	  employ	  their	  particular	  arguments	  in	  the	  discourse	  about	  the	  question	  which	  political	  strategy	  is	  more	  suitable	  and	  promising	  for	  CAN	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  its	  advocacy	  objectives.	  
To	   illustrate,	   as	   already	  mentioned	   above,	   advocates	   of	   the	  Realpolitik	   position	  were,	   for	   example,	   referring	   to	   a	   specific	   concern	   that	   a	   CAN	   demand	   for	   a	   more	  stringent	  emission	  reductions	  target	  would	  marginalise	  US	  ENGOs	  in	  their	  domestic	  climate	   policy	   debate.	   This	   is	   an	   example	   of	   a	   wider	   concern	   of	   this	   group	   of	  discussants	  that	  adopting	  a	  policy	  position	  which	  is	  feared	  to	  be	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  political	   realities	   of	   both	   the	   UNFCCC	   process	   as	   well	   as	   domestic	   policies	   in	   all	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  individual	  Annex	  I	  countries,	  would	  risk	  impeding	  CAN’s	  influence	  on	  both	  levels	  and	  thus	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  ill-­‐advised	  strategic	  choice.	  	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   individuals	   using	  morality	   or	   justice	   based	   arguments,	   were	  also	  largely	  using	  these	  arguments	  to	  support	  their	  view	  of	  the	  strategic	  direction	  that	  CAN	   should	   take.	   In	   this	   instance,	   concerns	   included	   the	   view	   that	   it	   would	   be	  strategically	   unwise	   if	   CAN	   were	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   being	   co-­‐opted	   by	   the	   interests	   of	  developed	   country	   governments	   –	   due	   to	   too	   lenient	   a	   demand	   regarding	   their	  mitigation	  commitments	  –,	  or	  that	  it	  would	  not	  represent	  sound	  political	  strategy	  to	  advocate	   policy	   positions	   that	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   contradicting,	   and	   thus	   undermining,	  important	  convention	  principles	  such	  as	  CBDRRC,	  the	  clear	  division	  between	  Annex	  I	  and	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  parties,	  or	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  G77	  and	  China	  negotiation	  bloc.	  Related	  to	  this	  latter	  point,	  it	  has	  repeatedly	  been	  argued	  (e.g.	  field	  notes,	  Poznań,	  4	  Dec	  2008;	  Bonn,	   5	   Apr	   2009)	   that	   CAN,	   and,	   in	   fact	   the	   entire	   ENGO	   community,	   should	   in	  principle	  always	  support	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  populations	  and	  thus	  generally	  support	  positions	  advanced	  by	  AoSIS	  and	  the	  LDCs	  since	  part	  of	   the	   function	  of	  civil	  society	  representation	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   process	   is	   to	   be	   the	   voice	   of	   those	   who	   would	  otherwise	  not	  have	  any	  representation	  within	  this	  process.	  Therefore,	  if	  CAN	  chose	  to	  advocate	   for	   policy	   positions	   that	   contradicted	   the	   presumed	   interests	   of	   these	  groups,	   the	   implied	   strategy	   consideration	   was	   that	   the	   legitimacy	   acquired	   by	  advocating	  their	  interests	  would	  be	  lost.	  
Finally,	  arguments	  based	  on	  a	  “scientific	  realism”	  perspective	  can	  also	  be	  under-­‐stood	   as	   generally	   arguing	   for	   a	   particular	   political	   strategy	   using	   the	   arguments	  offered	   by	   that	   perspective	   as	   their	   support.	   In	   this	   particular	   case,	   the	   political	  strategy	  advocated	  for	  is	  one	  that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle	  always	  bases	  its	  demands	  on	  the	  best	  available	  science	  –	  and	  therefore	  updates	  those	  demands	  accordingly	  as	  scientific	  knowledge	  evolves	  –	  and,	  due	  to	  the	  non-­‐deterministic	  nature	  of	  the	  causal	  chain	  of	  climate	  science	  as	  described	  above,	  specifically	  uses	  a	  conservative	  approach	  in	   interpreting	   this	   science,	   based	   on	   the	   precautionary	   principle.	   The	   emission	  reduction	   scenario	  described	  by	  Paul	  Baer	   and	  his	   colleagues	   is	   an	   example	   of	   this	  approach	  to	  interpreting	  science:	  their	  scenario	  work	  describes	  a	  pathway	  which	  has	  a	  high	  likelihood	  of	  limiting	  warming	  to	  2°C	  (and	  a	  fair	  chance	  of	  1.5°C)	  and	  which	  is	  “robust	  to	  bad	  news”	  (Baer	  et	  al.	  2009:	  5),	  i.e.	  is	  specifically	  modelled	  so	  it	  can	  still	  be	  further	   tightened	   if	   evolving	   climate	   science	  were	   to	   reveal	   that	   the	   corresponding	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  mitigation	  efforts	  are	   insufficient.	  Proponents	  of	  a	  political	  strategy	  strongly	  backed	  by	   climate	   science	  maintain	   that	   this	   political	   strategy	   is	   superior	   to	   one	   based	   on	  
Realpolitik:	  Some	  requests	  we	  put	  forward	  to	  some	  parties	  we	  just	  get	  laughed	  at	   and	   told	   to	   be	   realistic	   because	   it’s	   not	   politically	   feasible.	   But	  then	  we	  say	  but	  look	  at	  the	  science,	  which	  is	  really	  a	  very	  powerful	  tool	  for	  us	  because	  it	  gives	  us	  credibility	  and	  actually	  there’re	  a	  lot	  of	  natural	  scientists	  within	  the	  NGO	  movement,	  including,	  for	  example,	  IPCC	   authors	   that	   have	  been	  working	   for	   environmental	  NGOs	  be-­‐fore.	   	  	   (field	  note,	  Vienna,	  30	  Aug	  2007)	  It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  both	  scientific	  and	  morality	  based	  arguments	  for	  certain	  political	  strategies	  have	  in	  common	  their	  focus	  on	  a	  strategy	  that	  is	  based	  by	  matter	  of	   principle	   on	   “what	   is	   right”	   –	   in	   one	   case	   according	   to	   the	   insights	   of	   climate	  science,	   in	   the	   other	   according	   to	   the	   moral	   norms	   employed.	   In	   this	   sense,	   these	  classes	   of	   arguments	   complement	   each	   other.	   However,	   there	   were	   also	   specific	  arguments	   that	   dealt	   with	   strategy	   as	   it	   related	   to	   the	   discursive	   space	  within	   the	  climate	   negotiations.	   Such	   concerns	   are,	   for	   example,	   expressed	   in	   the	   question	   “If	  NGOs	  stop	  asking	   for	  what	   is	   right	  and	  necessary	  –	  who	  will	  ask	   for	   it	   then?”	   (field	  note,	   Bonn,	   5	   Apr	   2009)	   which	   confronts	   the	   concern	   that	   certain	   views	   might	  disappear	  from	  the	  discourse	  if	  not	  held	  by	  ENGOs.	  Other	  political	  strategy	  concerns	  centred	   around	   the	   discursive	   space	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   relating	   to	   the	   counterpublic	  discussion	   that	  was	   a	   focus	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   of	   this	   chapter:	  with	   the	   estab-­‐lishment	   of	   a	   second	   voice	   in	   the	   ENGO	   constituency	   already	   advocating	   for	  more	  stringent	   targets	   and	   a	   large	   number	   of	   UNFCCC	   parties	   also	   demanding	   the	   same	  target	   from	  Annex	   I	   countries,	   not	   also	   updating	   the	   CAN	  position	   accordingly	  was	  seen	   as	   vacating	   these	   positions	   on	   the	   more	   progressive	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum	   of	  political	  views	  and	  thus	  losing	  relevance	  and	  credibility	  in	  the	  negotiations	  (field	  note,	  2	  Apr	  2009).	  
This	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  debate	  as	  one	  that	  is	  concerned	  with	  rational	  argu-­‐ments	  about	  which	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  possible	  strategic	  approaches	  CAN	  should	  select	  shows	  that	  the	  internal	  debate	  within	  CAN	  does,	  indeed,	  favour	  rational	  discussion	  (in	  a	   very	   broad	   understanding	   of	   that	   concept).	   This	   holds	   true	   even	   though,	   at	   first	  glance,	  the	  arguments	  employed	  in	  this	  discussion	  –	  emphasising	  scientific,	  Realpoli-­‐
tik,	   and	   moral	   perspectives,	   respectively	   –	   appear	   to	   employ	   different	   concepts	   of	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  rationality	  itself.	  However,	  since,	  as	  discussed,	  generally	  none	  of	  the	  interlocutors	  in	  these	  deliberations	  disagrees	  in	  principle	  with	  the	  content	  of	  the	  arguments,	  the	  main	  difference	   in	   the	  discussion	   is	  about	   the	  relative	  weight	   that	   the	  various	  arguments	  should	   have	   in	   determining	   strategic	   decisions	   and,	   indeed,	   the	   desirability	   of	   a	  certain	  strategic	  approach	  itself.	  For	  example,	  supporters	  of	  a	  scientifically	   focussed	  argument	   would	   hold	   that	   the	   scientifically	   backed	   demands	   should	   always	   take	  precedence	  over	  other	  considerations	  when	  deciding	  a	  political	  strategy,	  for	  example,	  due	   to	   the	   high	   credibility	   that	   such	   an	   approach	   entails.	   Likewise,	   proponents	   of	  
Realpolitik	  based	  strategy,	  while	  not	  denying	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  scientific	  arguments,	  hold	  that	  a	  political	  strategy	  that	  is	  too	  demanding	  in	  the	  prevailing	  political	  climate	  represents	  a	   strategy	  of	   self-­‐marginalisation	  and	   thus	  diminishes	   chances	  of	  having	  influence	   over	   the	   political	   negotiations	   and	   therefore	   political	   strategy	   should	  always	  take	  into	  account	  what	  is	  politically	  feasible.	  
6.3 Conclusions	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  examined	  notions	  of	  inequalities,	  hierarchy	  and	  status	  as	  they	  relate	  to	   the	   deliberations	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   and	   CAN	   as	   well	   as	   examining	   how	   different	  notions	  of	  rational	  argument	  play	  a	  role	  in	  CAN’s	  internal	  discussions.	  
The	   analysis	   of	   these	   issues	   has	   been	   undertaken	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   public	  sphere	   theory	   as	   employed	   in	   this	   thesis.	   In	   Habermas’	   early	   formulation	   of	   the	  characteristics	  of	  public	   spheres	   status	   inequalities	  and	  hierarchy	  were	   conceptual-­‐ised	  as	  factotrs	  that	  ought	  not	  have	  any	  impact	  on	  the	  deliberations	  within	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Habermas	  suggested	  that	  interlocutors	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  should	  disregard	  (or	  “bracket”)	  inequalities	  in	  social	  status	  in	  their	  deliberations	  and	  would	  discuss	  as	  if	  they	  were	  equals.	  This	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  his	  understanding	  that	  the	  use	  of	  reason	  and	   rationality	   in	   public	   sphere	   discussion	   means	   that	   only	   the	   quality	   of	   an	  argument	   and	   not	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   status	   of	   its	   proponent	   should	   have	   an	  impact	  on	   the	  outcome	  of	   the	  discussion.	   In	  contrast,	  Nancy	  Fraser’s	   critique	  of	   the	  public	   sphere,	   showed	   that	   bracketing	   social	   inequalities	   is,	   at	   least	   as	   long	   as	  societies	  feature	  social	  stratification,	  highly	  undesirable	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  assumption,	  as	  it	  would	  prevent	  the	  empirical	  and	  normative	  examination	  of	  this	  issue.	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  Based	  on	  these	  considerations,	  I	  proceeded	  to	  discuss	  the	  relative	  status	  inequalities	  between	  parties	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  and	  particularly	  focussed	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  differentiation	  between	  Annex	  I	  and	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  countries	  and	  the	  different	  demands	  that	  are	  placed	  on	  these	  groups	  of	  countries	  impacts	  on	  the	  power	  dynamics	  within	  the	  negotiations.	  I	  also	  briefly	  discussed	  how	  the	  embeddedness	  of	  the	  climate	  negotiations	   in	   a	   wider	   configuration	   of	   multi-­‐lateral	   political	   and	   economic	  processes	   bestows	   different	   levels	   of	   actual	   power	   on	   particular	   parties,	   which,	   in	  turn,	   clearly	   impacts	   on	   their	   ability	   to	   influence	   the	   negotiations	   in	   their	   favour.	   I	  also	  discussed	  how	  the	  particular	  configuration	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime,	  which	  is	  based	  in	   principle	   on	   full	   transparency,	   equal	   participation	   and	   consensus	   based	   decision	  making	   (at	   least	   as	   far	   as	   the	   parties	   to	   the	   convention	   are	   concerned)	   can	   be	  understood	   as	   an	   institutional	   setup	   that	   favours	   a	   Habermasian	   bracketing	   of	  inequalities	   between	   parties	   and	   how	   this	   institutional	   set-­‐up	   was	   effectively	  undermined	  in	  the	  negotiations	  that	  led	  to	  the	  2009	  Copenhagen	  Accord.	  
In	  discussing	  the	  case	  of	  AoSIS,	  I	  also	  considered	  an	  example	  of	  a	  group	  of	  parties	  which,	   despite	   a	   very	   disadvantaged	   position	   with	   regards	   to	   geo-­‐political	   and	  economic	  power,	  succeeded	  in	  establishing	  a	  position	  of	  moral	  authority	  that	  placed	  it	  in	  a	  position	  of	  relative	  power	  (relative	  to	  its	  power	  outside	  the	  UNFCCC)	  within	  the	  negotiations.	   This	   success	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   transformation	   of	   AoSIS’	   particular	  situation	   as	   a	   group	   of	   nation	   states	   that	   are	   likely	   to	   bear	   early	   and	   very	   severe	  impacts	   from	   climate	   change	   (including	   the	   possible	   loss	   of	   their	   entire	   national	  territory	   to	   sea	   level	   rise)	   into	   a	   position	   of	   moral	   authority.	   Despite	   this	   relative	  success,	   I	   showed	   that	   AoSIS	   nonetheless	   remained	   in	   an	   overall	   disadvantaged	  position	  compared	  to	  other	  parties	  as	  it	  shared	  some	  of	  the	  structural	  disadvantages	  of	  most	  developing	  country	  delegations	  with	  regards,	  for	  example,	  to	  delegation	  size	  and	  technical	  capacity.	  
Turning	  to	  Environmental	  NGO	  participation	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  process,	  I	  described	  how	   the	   hierarchical	   structure	   within	   CAN	   is	   relatively	   flat,	   with	   the	   notable	  exception	  of	   the	   “Political	  Coordination	  Group”	   (PCG)	  which	   I	  described	  as	  a	  closed	  group	  of	   individuals	  with	  a	  relative	  position	  of	  power	  and	  status	  within	  CAN.	  While	  much	  of	  this	  position	  stems	  from	  the	  PCG’s	  membership	  as	  comprised	  of	  coordinators	  of	   working	   groups	   and	   regional	   and	   national	   nodes,	   some	   members	   of	   the	   group	  enjoyed	   this	   status	   due	   to	   their	   role	   as	   “elders”	   within	   CAN	   or	   experts	   on	   certain	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  issues.	   Thus,	   I	   argue,	   different	   levels	   of	   specific	   knowledge	   of	   the	   political	   and	  technical	  details	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  process	  correspond	  to	  different	   levels	  of	  status	  and	  influence	   within	   CAN.	   In	   this	   context	   it	   was	   important	   to	   recall	   insights	   from	   the	  previous	  chapter	  that	  discussed	  how	  some	  of	  this	  knowledge	  can	  only	  be	  effectively	  gained	  by	   continuing	   and	   long-­‐term	  attendance	   at	  UNFCCC	  meetings	   and	   thus	  puts	  individuals	   and	   organisations	   at	   a	   disadvantage	   whose	   financial	   resources	   do	   not	  allow	  for	  such	  attendance.	  
In	  this	  context,	  CAN’s	  efforts	  to	  increase	  long-­‐term	  participation	  from	  developing	  country	  member	  organisations	  has	  been	  described	  and	  critically	  analysed,	  especially	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   uni-­‐directional	   perception	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   “capacity	   building”	  which	  is	  –	  in	  line	  with	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  in	  the	  wider	  UNFCCC	  context	  –	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  learning	  process	  of	  individual	  and	  collective	  actors	  from	  developing	  countries	  which	  is	  facilitated	  and	  enabled	  by	  actors	  from	  developed	  countries.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  reproduces	   perceptions	   of	   capacity	   as	   specific	   knowledge	   that	   individuals	   from	  developing	   countries	  possess	   and	   those	   from	  developing	   countries	   lack.	   It	  was	  also	  pointed	  out,	  however,	  that	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  phase,	  there	  was	  evidence	  of	  some	  changes,	  with	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  individuals	  from	  developing	  countries	  taking	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  “teacher”	  in	  the	  capacity	  building	  sessions.	  
While	  the	  interlocutors	  within	  CAN	  and	  the	  wider	  UNFCCC	  regime	  can	  generally	  be	  understood	  as	  collective	  actors	  and	  therefore	  notions	  of	  social	   inequality	  have	  to	  be	   “translated”	   from	  a	   individual	   frame	  of	   reference	   to	  one	  of	  groups	  and	  organisa-­‐tions,	   individual	   inequalities	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   important,	   yet	   often	   hidden,	  feature	  in	  the	  climate	  change	  negotiations.	  Arguing	  that	  most	  regular	  participants	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  stem	  from,	  at	  least	  globally	  speaking,	  privileged	  classes	  –	  in	  the	  case	   of	   NGO	   participants	   I	   evoked	   the	   image	   of	   the	   “NGO-­‐jet-­‐set”	   –	   the	   occasional	  attendance	   of	   individuals	   that	   are	   not	   from	   these	   privileged	   strata	   can	   powerfully	  show	   how	   different	   perspectives	   can	   impact	   on	   the	   negotiations.	   Describing	   the	  attendance	  of	  a	  delegation	  of	  Latin	  American	  and	  Indian	  wastepickers,	  I	  showed	  how	  their	   specific	   perspectives	   –	   in	   particular	   the	   negative	   impact	   that	   programmes	  designed	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  climate	  crisis	  have	  on	  their	  livelihoods	  as	  well	  as,	  ironically,	  on	  the	  global	  climate	  –	  can	  crucially	  complement	  the	  perspectives	  within	  the	  UNFCCC.	  This	  example	  also	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  systematic	  exclusion	   of	   certain	   perspectives	   can	   lead	   to	   outcomes	   that	   would,	   arguably,	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  otherwise	  not	  have	  occurred;	  i.e.	  the	  unexpected	  result	  that	  a	  programme	  designed	  to	  help	  solving	  the	  climate	  crisis	  actually,	  when	  considering	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  experiences,	  worsened	  it	  and	  in	  the	  process	  put	  the	  livelihood	  of	  already	  disadvantaged	  individu-­‐als,	  families	  and	  communities	  at	  risk.	  
Further	  elaborating	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  inequalities,	  the	  establishment	  and	  consoli-­‐dation	  of	  CJN!	  as	  a	  second	  voice	  (in	  addition	  to	  CAN)	  within	  the	  environmental	  NGO	  constituency	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  has	  been	  discussed.	  CJN!	  has	  been	  described	  using	  Nancy	   Fraser’s	   notion	   of	   a	   counterpublic	   because	   it	   can	   be	   understood	   to	   have	  developed	  out	  of	  a	  marginalised	  fringe	  of	  CAN	  (the	  climate	  justice	  perspective)	  which	  established	   its	   own,	   at	   least	   temporarily,	   separate,	   discursive	   arena	   in	   order	   to	   be	  able	  to	  refine	  and	  define	  the	  concepts	  relevant	  to	  its	  core	  beliefs	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  dominant	   or	   hegemonic	   discourse	   within	   CAN.	   This	   allowed	   CJN!	   to	   establish	  positions	  that	  would	  have	  been	  unlikely	  to	   find	  consensus	  within	  CAN	  and	  to	  refine	  and	  rehearse	  the	  relevant	  arguments	  to	  support	  these	  positions.	  In	  this	  discussion,	  I	  also	  considered	  the	  different	  discursive	  practices	  that	  CJN!	  established	  for	  its	  internal	  deliberations	  compared	  to	  CAN.	  For	  example	  that,	  instead	  of	  what	  I	  had	  characterised	  as	  a	  “lowest	  common	  denominator”	  approach	  to	  consensus	  in	  CAN	  and	  the	  “assumed	  agreement”	  of	  the	  whole	  membership,	  CJN!’s	  policy	  positions	  and	  statements	  were	  all	  organised	   as	   sign-­‐on	   statements	   which	   specifically	   allowed	   for	   non-­‐consensual	  statements	   to	   go	   ahead	   with	   only	   a	   partial	   membership	   of	   CJN!	   supporting.	   In	  concluding	   the	   discussion	   of	   CJN!	   as	   a	   counterpublic	   to	   CAN,	   I	   highlighted	   how	  overlapping	  memberships	   and	   both	   networks’	   relationship	   to	   the	  wider	  movement	  makes	   this	   example	   an	   interesting	   case	   study	   of	   the	   dynamics	   between	   hegemonic	  publics	   and	   counterpublics.	   But	   given	   that	  much	   of	   these	   developments	   took	   place	  toward	   the	  end	  of	   the	   fieldwork	  phase	  and	  were	   still	   ongoing,	   it	   remained	  an	  open	  question	   whether	   CJN!	   would	   further	   consolidate	   itself	   as	   a	   separate	   public	   or	  whether	   CAN’s	   and	   CJN!’s	   somewhat	   distinct	   views	   would,	   indeed,	   overtime	   re-­‐integrate	   into	   a	   single	   public	   sphere	   of	   the	   environmental	   NGOs	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	  negotiations.	  	  
The	   theory	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	  also	   suggests	   that	   the	  arguments	   that	  are	  used	  within	   the	   deliberations	   to	   form	   a	   collective	   public	   opinion	   have	   to	   be	   based	   on	  reason	  and	  rationality.	   In	  considering	  one	  example	   in	  great	  detail	  –	   the	  background	  and	   the	   discussions	   on	   updating	   CAN’s	   policy	   position	   on	   the	   Annex	   I	   emission	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  reduction	   target	  –	   it	  was	   shown	  how	  different,	   competing	   conceptualisations	  of	   the	  notion	  of	  rationality	  itself	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  deliberations.	  In	  particular,	  notions	   were	   based	   on	   scientific,	   Realpolitik,	   and	   moral	   conceptualisations	   of	  rationality.	  I	  also	  suggested	  that	  due	  to	  the	  privileged	  position	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  within	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations,	   arguments	   founded	   on	   science-­‐based	   notions	   of	  rationality	  enjoy	  more	  gravitas	  in	  CAN’s	  discussions	  as	  well.	  In	  mapping	  the	  different	  arguments	   within	   the	   specific	   discussion	   on	   Annex	   I	   targets	   and	   referring	   back	   to	  notions	  of	  inequalities	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  I	  also	  showed	  that	  an	  increase	  in	   the	   numbers	   of	   CAN	  members	   from	   developing	   countries	   during	   that	   particular	  UNFCCC	   session	   brought	   perspectives	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   discussions	   that	   would	   have	  otherwise	   been	   absent.	   These	   perspectives	   appeared	   to	   have	   tipped	   the	   balance	   of	  moral-­‐based	   over	   Realpolitik	   arguments,	   including	   by	   insisting	   on	   an	   (at	   least	  temporary)	  departure	   from	  CAN’s	   regular	   “lowest	   common	  denominator”	   approach	  to	  consensus	  and	  including	  by	  “giving	  a	  face”	  to	  these	  arguments.	  	  
While	   conceptualising	   these	  different	   classes	   of	   arguments	   as	   representing	  dis-­‐tinct	   conceptualisations	   of	   the	   notions	   of	   rationality	   and	   reason	   themselves,	   I	   also	  showed	   that	   another	   possible	   way	   of	   interpreting	   the	   discussion	   is	   as	   a	   rational	  discussion	  about	  the	  political	  strategy	  of	  CAN.	  Referring	  to	  a	  notion	  that	  will	  be	  more	  fully	   developed	   in	   the	   following	   chapter	   –	   that	   of	   CAN	   as	   a	   separate	   public	   sphere	  where	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  public	  opinion	  formation	  processes	  is	  on	  the	  collective	  political	  strategy	   and	   collective	   positioning	   in	   the	   wider	   UNFCCC	   context	   –	   I	   argued	   that,	  examining	   the	   discussion	   in	   this	   light,	   what	   previously	   appeared	   to	   be	   different	  conceptualisations	  of	  rationality	  itself	  can	  now	  be	  understood	  as	  rational	  arguments	  about	  which	   of	   these	   three	   notions	   (science,	  Realpolitik	  and	  morality)	   promise	   the	  best	  position	  for	  CAN	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  influence	  on	  the	  climate	  negotiations	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  in	  other	  fora.	  
It	   has	   thus	   been	   shown	   in	   this	   chapter	   that	   the	   negotiations	   within	   CAN,	   the	  wider	   ENGO	   community	   at	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions,	   and	   the	   UNFCCC	   itself,	   can	   be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  public	  sphere,	  or	  rather,	  as	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  much	  more	  detail	  in	   the	   following	   chapter,	   as	   a	   configuration	   of	   different	   public	   spheres,	   including	  counterpublics	  and	  nested	  public	  spheres	  directing	   their	  activities	   toward	   the	  same	  centre	  of	  authority.	  This	  chapter	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  to	   lend	  support	  to	  Nancy	  Fraser’s	  critique	  and	  expansion	  of	   Jürgen	  Habermas’	  original	  public	  sphere	  concept	  as	   it	  has	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  been	   clearly	   shown	   that	   a	   bracketing	   of	   status	   inequalities	   is	   not	   taking	   place	   and	  therefore	   inequalities	   have	   to	   be	   given	   greater	   attention	   in	   studies	   of	   such	   publics.	  Further,	   Fraser’s	   notion	   of	   the	   counterpublic	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   very	   useful	   tool	   to	  investigate	  and	  think	  about	  observed	  dynamics	  within	  the	  ENGO	  community.	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Chapter	  7 	  
	  
Discussion	  and	  Conclusions:	  Re-­‐Imagining	  a	  	  
Transnational	  Public	  Sphere	  of	  Climate	  Change	  Politics	  
7.1 Introduction	  
The	   overall	   aim	   of	   this	   research	   is	   to	   investigate	   the	   role	   of	   transnational	   climate	  change	   advocacy	   networks	   and	   their	   internal	   power	   dynamics	   within	   multilateral	  treaty	  processes.	  The	  dual	  objectives	  that	  were	  identified	  as	  appropriate	  to	  advance	  toward	  that	  goal	  were,	  first,	  the	  production	  of	  an	  ethnographic	  account	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  environmental	  NGOs,	  especially	  those	  organised	  in	  the	  NGO	  network	  CAN,	  within	  the	   global	   climate	   change	   politics	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   and,	   second,	   the	   analysis	   of	   this	  ethnography	  through	  the	  analytical	  lens	  offered	  by	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  as	  first	   formulated	  by	   Jürgen	  Habermas	  and	  very	  constructively	  expanded	  through	  the	  critique	  of	  Nancy	  Fraser	  and	  others.	  Having	  discussed	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  that	  of	  related	  topics,	  through	  a	  review	  of	  relevant	  literature	  in	  chapter	  2	  of	  the	  thesis,	  I	  have	  then	  presented	  a	  preliminary	  theoretical	  model	  as	  it	  emerged	  during	  the	  fieldwork	   and	   the	   data	   analysis	   process	   at	   the	   end	   of	   chapter	   3.	   With	   a	   view	   to	  fulfilling	  the	  dual	  objectives	  of	  my	  research	  programme,	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  4,	  5	   and	  6,	   I	   have	  presented	   a	  detailed	   ethnographic	   account	  which	  provided	   insights	  into	  some	  of	  the	  political	  processes	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  advocacy	  work	   that	   CAN	   and	   other	   ENGOs	   engage	   in	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   influencing	   these	  processes.	  Throughout	  these	  chapters	  I	  have,	  with	  view	  to	  the	  second	  objective	  of	  the	  research	   programme,	   advanced	   in	   parallel	   a	   theoretical	   analysis	   of	   these	   processes	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  public	  sphere	  theory.	  Based	  on	  these	  foundations,	  the	  present	  chapter	  will	  provide	  some	  additional	  discussion	  of	  the	  research	  theme.	  
Nancy	  Fraser	  invites	  and	  challenges	  us	  to	  rethink	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  on	  the	  transnational	  level	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  project	  to	  “reimagin[e]	  political	  space	  in	  a	  globalizing	  world”	  –	  the	  subtitle	  of	  her	  book	  –	  since	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  public	  sphere	  in	  
7.	  Discussion	  and	  Conclusion	   286	  	  thinking	   about	   this	   globalising	   world	   is	   “indispensible	   […]	   to	   those	   who	   aim	   to	  reconstruct	   critical	   theory	   in	   the	   current	   ‘postnational	   constellation’”	   (Fraser	  2008:	  77).	  Her	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “postnational”	  is	  unfortunate	  as	  it	  implies	  a	  constellation	  in	  which	   the	  national	   state	  has	   lost	  much,	   if	  not	  all,	  of	   its	  power.	  To	   the	  contrary,	   as	   I	  have	   been	   showing	   throughout	   this	   thesis,	   nation	   states	   are	   still	   very	  much	   at	   the	  centre	   of	   political	   power	   in	   the	   globalising	   world,	   albeit	   with	   changing	   roles.	  “Transnational,”	  also	  extensively	  used	  by	  Fraser,	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  preferable	  term,	  as	  it	  captures	  not	  only	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  power	  is	  exercised	  (and	  to	   a	   degree,	   shared)	   by	   nation	   states,	   but	   also	   parallel	   processes	   wherein	   the	  problems	  that	  require	  addressing	  transcend	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  as	  do	  the	   discourses	   that	   occupy	   themselves	   with	   finding	   solutions	   for	   these	   problems.	  Despite	  this	  unfortunate	  word	  choice,	  her	  challenge	  remains	  the	  same:	  to	  adapt	  both	  the	  empirical	  as	  well	  as	  the	  normative	  dimensions	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  to	  the	  increasingly	  transnational	  reality	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  face	  humanity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  attempts	  made	  to	  the	  solution	  of	  those	  problems,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  public	  sphere	  as	  an	  important	  tool	  for	  the	  critique	  of	  democratic	  practices	  (or	  their	  lack,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be)	  on	  this	  transnational	  level.	  	  
To	  be	  sure,	  her	  challenge	  has	  two	  aspects	  –	  one	  theoretical	  and	  one	  normative	  –	  which	   clearly	   relate	   to	   the	   dual	   objectives	   of	   this	   research.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   further	  theoretical	  development	  of	  a	  critical	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  and,	  in	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	   challenge	   then,	   my	   discussion	   throughout	   the	   thesis	   –	   beginning	   with	   the	  theoretical	  model	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  3	  –	  aimed	  to	  contribute	  by	  helping	  answer	  some	  of	  the	  questions	  that	  Fraser’s	  work	  poses.	  Secondly,	  critical	  theory	  only	  contributes	  to	  the	   critique,	   development	   and,	   possibly,	   improvement	   of	   democratic	   practices	  inasmuch	  it	  is	  applied	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  empirical	  realities	  of	  actually	  existing	  phenomena.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  application	  of	  a	  theoretical	  lens	  which	  is	  grounded	  in	  a	   theory	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   throughout	   this	   thesis,	   helped	   to	   inform	   a	   critical	  analysis	   of	   the	   discursive	   practices	   employed	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   context	   by	   the	  environmental	   NGOs	   under	   investigation.	   Based	   on	   these	   considerations,	   the	  remainder	   of	   this	   chapter	  will	   be	   in	   two	  parts:	   first,	   after	   briefly	   recapitulating	   the	  theoretical	  model	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  3,	  I	  will	  provide	  some	  additional	  discussion	  on	  how	   this	  model	   combined	  with	   the	   ethnographic	   account	   is	   suitable	   to	   address	   the	  dual	  objectives	  of	  this	  research	  and	  thus	  fulfil	  its	  overall	  aim.	  In	  the	  last	  part,	  which	  is	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  dedicated	   to	  presenting	   the	  overall	   conclusion	  of	   this	   thesis,	   I	  will	   restate	   the	  main	  insights	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  will	  briefly	  address	  some	  potential	  caveats	  and	  areas	  where	  this	  work	  might	  be	  taken	  further	  in	  future.	  
7.2 The	  Multi-­‐Dimensional	  Publics	  of	  Climate	  Change	  	  
In	   chapter	   3	   I	   presented	   a	   preliminary	   theoretical	   model	   that	   suggested	   a	   further	  development	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   theory,	   especially	   with	   regards	   to	   a	   model	   of	   a	  multiple	  public	  sphere	  where	  interdependent,	  overlapping	  and	  nested	  public	  spheres	  can	   be	   observed.	   In	   particular,	   I	   have	   suggested	   that	   it	   is	   prudent	   to	   conceptualise	  such	   a	   multiple	   public	   sphere	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   it	   is	   not	   a	   priori	   assumed	   what	  specific	   outcomes	   the	   public	   opinion	   generated	   in	   a	   public	   sphere	   should	   be	  translated	  into	  and	  which	  specifically	  allows	  for	  a	  configuration	  where	  the	  delibera-­‐tive	  stance	  of	  a	  given	  interlocutor	  within	  one	  public	  can	  be	  the	  target	  of	  the	  discursive	  processes	   within	   another,	   nested,	   public	   sphere.	   I	   have	   also	   pointed	   out	   that,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  application	  of	  public	  sphere	  theory	  in	  the	  transnation-­‐al	  context,	  public	  should	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  not	  only	  populated	  by	   individuals	  but	  also,	   crucially,	   by	   collective	   actors	   that	   act	   through	   their	   agents	   as	   interlocutors	  within	   the	   public	   sphere.	   In	   addition	   to	   its	   application	   in	   the	   theoretical	   analyses	  within	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	   I	  will	  now	  use	  this	  concept	  once	  more	  to	  discuss	  how	  different	  levels	  of	  deliberations	  within	  the	  climate	  change	  regime	  can	  be	  conceptual-­‐ised	  and	  how	  the	  concept	  allows	  us	  to	  examine	  these	  public	  spheres	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  normative	  legitimacy	  (expressed	  through	  inclusiveness	  and	  discursive	  equity)	  as	  well	  as	  their	  political	  efficacy.	  
First,	   in	   the	  example	   that	  was	  already	  used	  above,	   the	   internal	  deliberations	  of	  CAN	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   public	   sphere,	  with	   the	   external,	   unified	   behaviour	   of	  CAN	  as	  the	  main	  objective	  of	  the	  public	  opinion	  formation	  within	  this	  public	  sphere.	  Of	  course,	  the	  interlocutors	  of	  this	  public	  sphere	  –	  the	  CAN	  member	  organisations	  –	  and	  their	  agents	  are,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  also	  members	  of	  other	  public	  spheres	  relating	  to	  climate	  change,	  most	  notably	  the	  maximum	  imaginable	  public	  with	  regards	  to	  this	  issue,	  the	  entire	  global	  populace	  which	  must	  (per	  both	  all-­‐subjected	  and	  all-­‐affected	  principles)	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   hypothetical,	   largest	   possible,	   thus	   most	   inclusive	   and	  therefore	   –	   given	   at	   least	   approximate	   discursive	   equity	   –	   most	   legitimate	   public	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  related	  to	  the	  climate	  change	  crisis	  due	  to	  its	  nature	  as	  a	  truly	  global	  problem.	  In	  fact,	  their	   membership	   in	   this	   hypothetical	   public	   sphere	   combined	   with	   the	   relative	  irrelevance	  of	  this	  larger	  public	  in	  practice,	  arguably	  provides	  an	  important	  personal	  motivation	  for	  engaging	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  of	  CAN	  as	  is	  evidenced	  by	  references	  to	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	  have	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  international	  negotiations,	  such	   as	   disadvantages	   peoples,	   future	   generations	   and	   non-­‐human	   species.	   Having	  the	   internal	   deliberations	   within	   CAN	   so	   characterised	   as	   a	   public	   sphere,	   now	  enables	   the	   evaluation	   of	   its	   internal	   dynamic	   using	   the	   normative	   aspects	   of	   the	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
In	  this	  sense	  then,	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  some	  CAN	  members,	  particularly	  those	  from	   developing	   countries,	   in	   seeking	   to	   participate	   as	   full	   equals	   in	   the	   internal	  deliberations	  of	  CAN,	  must	  be	   seen	  as	  negatively	   impacting	  on	   the	  equity	   condition	  and	  thus	  on	  CAN’s	  overall	   legitimacy.	  An	  example	  of	  this	   inequality,	  which	  has	  been	  extensively	   discussed,	   are	   the	   effects	   of	   an	   asymmetrical	   command	   over	   resources,	  for	  example,	  financial	  resources,	  on	  the	  participation	  of	  CAN	  members.	  Likewise,	  and,	  as	  shown,	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  related	  to	  financial	  resources,	  it	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  great	  detail	  how	  CAN	  members	  who	  only	  intermittently	  attend	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  will	  have	   a	   certain	   disadvantage	   in	   terms	   of	   detailed	   insights	   into	   the	   background	   of	  specific	  political	  developments.	  This	  mechanism,	  then,	  also	  greatly	  contributes	  to	  an	  unequal	  position	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  deliberations	  within	  CAN	  as	  these	  interlocutors	  are	   not	   able	   to	  make	   as	   convincing	   an	   argument	   (ceteris	  paribus)	   as	   their	   counter-­‐parts	  who	  have,	  through	  continued	  participation,	  developed	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	   the	   political	   intricacies.	   Both	   quoted	   examples	   are	   also	   good	   illustrations	   for	  Fraser’s	   reminder	   that	   even	   where	   participation	   is	   formally	   equal	   (as	   there	   is	   no	  hierarchy	  between	  CAN	  members),	  de	  facto	   inequalities	  nonetheless	  bear	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  deliberation	  within	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  
Turning	   to	   political	   efficacy	   further	   explains	   why	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   public	  sphere	  theory	  is	  useful.	  The	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  internal	  discussions	  of	  CAN,	  for	  example,	   on	   the	   occasion	   of	   formulating	   a	   joint	   policy	   position,	   as	   public	   sphere	  deliberations	  allows	  us	  to	  assess	  its	  overall	  political	  efficacy	  using	  the	  tools	  of	  public	  sphere	   theory.	   First,	   assessing	   the	   translation	   condition	   in	   its	   expanded	   form	   as	  suggested	  above,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  conceptualise	  what	  the	  public	  opinion	  within	  CAN	  suggests	  that	  it	  should	  be	  translated	  into.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  CAN,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	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  membership	   expects	   their	   collective	   opinion	   to	   be	   translated	   into	   effective	   policy	  positions	  and	  an	  effective	  negotiation	  stance	  and	  strategy	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations.	  Judging	  political	  efficacy	  by	  assessing	   the	   translation	  condition,	   then,	   requires	  us	   to	  examine	   how	   successfully	   this	   translation	   takes	   place.	   Note,	   however,	   that	   this	   is	  crucially	   different	   from	   judging	   how	   successful	   the	   result	   of	   the	   translation	   –	   the	  political	  positions	  and	  strategies	  of	  CAN	  –	  were	  in	  their	  application	  within	  the	  wider	  UNFCCC	  framework.	  	  
Thus,	   it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  translation	  was	  sufficiently	  successful	  when	  there	  is,	   in	  fact,	   a	   common	   CAN	   policy	   position	  which	   adequately	   captures	   the	   internal	   public	  opinion	  within	  the	  network.	  As	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapters,	  this	  has	  been	  somewhat	  mixed:	  while	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  CAN	  manages	  to	  have	  policy	  position	  papers	  that	  reflect	  the	  collective	  opinion	  of	  the	  network,	  I	  have	  also	  discussed	  some	  limitations	  to	  this.	  For	  example,	  I	  mentioned	  (in	  chapter	  4	  and	  again	  referred	  to	  the	  example	   in	   chapter	  5)	  how,	  prior	   to	   the	  Bali	   COP,	   the	   views	  of	   one	  Latin	  American	  network	   were	   not	   included	   in	   the	   final	   version	   of	   the	   position	   paper	   as	   language	  issues	  internal	  to	  that	  network	  resulted	  in	  their	  contribution	  missing	  the	  deadline	  for	  comments	   to	   the	   position	   paper.	   Without	   providing	   any	   judgment	   regarding	   the	  decision	  to	  disallow	  the	  comments	  due	  to	  their	  missing	  of	  the	  deadline,	  this	  nonethe-­‐less	  clearly	  shows	  an	  example	  where	  views	  within	  the	  network	  were	  not	  effectively	  translated	  into	  policy	  position	  and	  thus	  this	  example	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  one	  where	  the	  political	   efficacy	  of	   the	  CAN-­‐internal	  public	  opinion	  was	  compromised.	  Further-­‐more,	   the	   general	   discursive	   practice	   of	   CAN	   to	   continue	   deliberations	   on	   policy	  positions	  until	   a	   position	   gains	   sufficient	   consensus	   and	   especially	   the	  definition	  of	  “consensus”	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  specifically	  articulated	  disagreement	  with	  the	  position,	  can	   be	   seen	   as	   negatively	   impacting	   the	   translation	   of	   public	   opinion	   within	   the	  network	  (and	  thus	  the	  political	  efficacy	  of	  that	  opinion)	  as	  it	  encourages	  a	  domination	  of	   the	   process	   of	   agreeing	   policy	   positions	   by	   a	   culture	   of	   the	   “lowest	   common	  denominator,”	   thus	   limiting	   the	   breadth	   of	   views	   effectively	   expressed	   in	   joint	  positioning.	  
Considering	  the	  other	  aspect	  of	  political	  efficacy,	  the	  capacity	  condition,	  we	  again	  need	   to	   define	   how	   this	   condition	   can	   be	   used	   in	   practical	   application	   to	   a	   public	  sphere	  where	  the	  centre	  of	  authority	  is	  not	  a	  state	  or	  state-­‐like	  entity	  -­‐	  where	  capacity	  can	  be	  judged	  by	  examining	  whether	  the	  entity	  is	  in	  principle	  equipped	  to	  implement	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  the	  will	  expressed	  in	  the	  public	  opinion	  by	  “organizing	  common	  life	  in	  accord	  with	  its	  wishes”	   (Fraser	   2008:	   97).	   It	   turns	   out	   that	   Fraser’s	   way	   of	   characterising	   the	  capacity	   condition	   is	  already	  sufficiently	  abstract	   to	  be	  used	  here:	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  expectation	  of	  the	  CAN-­‐internal	  public	  opinion	  is	  the	  translation	  of	  its	  views	  into	  effective	   policy	   positions,	   political	   strategy	   and	   an	   appropriate	   negotiation	   stance	  with	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   and	   to	   communicate	   with	   a	   unified	   voice	   in	   that	  context.	   Thus,	   assessing	   capacity	  would	   require	   looking	   at	   how	   the	   structures	   and	  practices	  of	  CAN	  enable	  it	  to	  fulfill	  this	  expectation.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context,	  then,	  that	  we	  should	  think	  of	   the	  expectations	   for	  CAN	  and	   its	  members,	  as	  expressed	   in	   the	  CAN	  Charter	   and	   in	   established	   practices	   and	   norms	   (the	   latter	   even	   stronger	   than	   the	  Charter	  which	   allows	   for	   exceptions),	   that	  CAN	  generally	   speaking	   acts	   in	   a	  unified	  manner.	  Member	  organisations	  and	  their	  agents,	  at	  least	  when	  speaking	  in	  a	  context	  where	  other	  interlocutors	  might	  assume	  they	  are	  representing	  CAN,	  limit	  themselves	  to	   statements	   that	   are	   compatible	   with	   CAN	   positions.	   In	   thinking	   about	   CAN’s	  capacity,	   then,	   to	   adequately	   translate	   internal	   public	   opinion,	   examples	   where	  member	   organisations	   do,	   indeed,	   express	   contradictory	   opinions	  must	   be	   seen	   as	  diminishing	  the	  overall	  political	  efficacy	  of	  CAN.	  
The	   second	   case	   in	   which	   I	   want	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   empirical	   and	   normative	  relevance	   of	   expanding	   our	   understanding	   of	   a	   public	   sphere,	   expands	   the	   public	  sphere	   of	   the	   previous	   example.	   As	   has	   been	   explained	   in	   chapter	   4,	   under	   the	  UNFCCC’s	   constituency	   system	   for	   observers,	   Environmental	   NGOs	   are	   one	   of	   a	  number	   of	   formally	   acknowledged	   constituencies.	   A	   number	   of	   features	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	   illustrate	   the	   expectation	   that	   observers	   within	   the	   same	   constituency	  feature	   a	   certain	  unity:	   until	   very	   recently	   this	   has	  been	   expressed	  by	   the	   arrange-­‐ment	   that	   each	   constituency	   is	   represented	   by	   one	   single	   focal	   point,	   is	   given	   one	  office	   and	   one	   meeting	   room	   and	   is	   allowed	   to	   give	   one	   intervention	   in	   plenary	  sessions.	   While	   this	   situation	   changed	   when	   CJN!	   was	   recognised	   as	   an	   additional	  focal	  point	   for	   the	  environmental	  NGOs	  toward	  the	  end	  of	   the	   fieldwork	  period,	   the	  expectation	   nonetheless	   existed	   within	   the	   wider	   UNFCCC	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   the	  fieldwork	  period	  (and	  certainly	  the	  time	  before	  my	  own	  fieldwork)	  that	  the	  environ-­‐mental	   NGOs	   would	   speak	   with	   one	   unified	   voice.	   In	   this	   context,	   then,	   the	   entire	  ENGO	  constituency	  can	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  public	  sphere.	  This	  allows	  interesting	  insights	  into	  the	  developments	  that	  were	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  that	  led	  to	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  the	   emergence	  of	  CJN!	   as	   an	  additional	  network	  of	   environmental	  NGOs	  and	   it	   also	  allows	  us	  to	  think	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  CAN	  and	  CJN!	  using	  public	  sphere	  theory.	  In	  this	  exercise,	  then,	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  environmental	  organisations	  involved	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  are	  conceptualised	  as	  one	  public	  sphere.	  
As	   has	   been	   argued	   above,	   the	   emergence	   of	   CJN!	   was	   closely	   related	  with	   an	  increase	   of	   prominence	   of	   climate	   justice	   related	   views	   within	   the	   environmental	  groups	   and	   in	   particular	   with	   a	   change	   of	   policy	   position	   and	   political	   priorities	  within	  Friends	  of	   the	  Earth	   International	  which	  would	  render	   that	  network’s	  policy	  positions	   in	   large	   parts	   incompatible	  with	   those	   of	   CAN	   and	   furthermore	   assumed	  disillusionment	  with	  the	  internal	  processes	  leading	  to	  CAN	  policy	  positions.	  Hence,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  these	  processes	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  growing	  deficit	  in	  normative	  legitimacy,	  especially	  as	  expressed	  through	  the	  equity	  condition.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  counterpublic	  emerged	  where	  FoE-­‐I	  and	  organisations	  that	  shared	  these	  concerns	  discussed	  and	  developed	  in	  relative	  isolation	  from	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  within	  CAN,	  common	  understanding,	   related	  definitions,	  policy	  positions	  and	  media	  material	  that	  resonated	  with	  their	  particular	  position	  regarding	  the	  causes	  of	  and	  the	  type	  of	  solutions	  required	  to	  solve	  the	  climate	  change	  crisis.	  As	  Fraser	  has	  pointed	  out,	  the	   role	   and	   function	   of	   counterpublics	   is	   to	   provide	   temporary	   shelters	   from	   the	  hegemonic	   influences	   of	   dominant	   publics	   and	   spaces	   for	   refining	   and	   rehearsing	  counterpublic	  specific	  arguments	  and	  definitions	  of	  the	  specific	  terms	  of	  the	  specific	  worldview	  of	  the	  counterpublic.	  In	  agreement	  with	  that	  argument	  and	  as	  described	  in	  detail	   above,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   CJN!	   this	   process	   expanded	   and	   shifted	   over	   time	   the	  discursive	  space	  within	  CAN	  and	  within	  the	  wider	  UNFCCC	  discussions.	  
The	  later	  consolidation	  of	  CJN!	  as	  its	  own	  network	  including	  the	  eventual	  recogni-­‐tion	  of	  the	  network	  as	  a	  second	  focal	  point	  within	  the	  constituency	  of	  environmental	  NGOs	  is	  certainly	  an	  interesting	  development	  that	  cannot	  be	  fully	  evaluated	  given	  its	  relatively	  recent	  occurrence	  within	  the	  fieldwork	  phase	  and	  also	  given	  that	  CJN!	  was,	  as	  explained,	  not	  a	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  itself.	  However,	  this	  consolidation	  can	  be	   conceptualised	   in	   two	   possible	   ways	   within	   the	   expanded	   theory	   of	   the	   public	  sphere,	   both	  with	   their	   own	   set	   of	   interesting	   implications.	   First,	   further	   empirical	  engagement	  with	  the	  matter	  could	  suggest	  that	  CJN!	  continued	  to	  act	  as	  a	  counterpub-­‐lic	  to	  CAN,	  which	  is	  particularly	  likely	  if	  there	  continues	  to	  be	  substantial	  overlap	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  member	  organisations	  as	  well	  as	  individual	  agents	  of	  these	  organisations	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  In	   that	   case,	   as	   Fraser’s	   arguments	   of	   the	   functions	   of	   counterpublics	   suggest,	   it	   is	  likely	   that	   the	   relative	   isolation	   of	   CJN!	   allows	   its	  members	   to	   further	   advance	   the	  development	   of	   its	   own	   internal	   public	   opinion	   including	   the	   development	   and	  rehearsal	  of	  concepts	  and	  arguments	  necessary	  to	  successfully	  argue	  its	  position,	  thus	  further	   broadening	   the	   political-­‐discursive	   space	   within	   the	   wider	   environmental	  NGO	  constituency.	  However,	  with	  a	  view	  on	  what	  has	  been	  said	  about	  the	  assessment	  of	  political	  efficacy	  within	  CAN,	  the	  prominence	  of	  the	  “lowest	  common	  denominator”	  approach	  to	  consensus	  within	  CAN	  could	  result	  in	  a	  further	  diminishment	  of	  political	  efficacy	   within	   CAN	   as	   a	   result	   of	   this	   broadening.	   Secondly,	   it	   is	   imaginable	   that	  CJN!’s	   move	   to	   establish	   a	   separate	   network	   and	   toward	   recognition	   as	   a	   second	  environmental	   NGO	   focal	   point	   is	   the	   first	   part	   of	   a	   continued	   trajectory	   toward	  separation	   of	   the	   two	   networks,	   for	   example	   by	   moving	   toward	   establishing	   a	  separate	   “climate	   justice”	   NGO	   constituency	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   (as	   indicated	   as	   a	  possible	  future	  development	  in	  Chapter	  4).	  
Furthermore,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	  consider	   the	  different	  modes	  of	  achieving	   joint	  policy	   positions,	   statements	   etc.	   of	   both	   networks:	  while,	   as	   discussed,	   the	   “lowest	  common	  denominator”	   culture	  of	  CAN	  represents	  certain	   limits	  with	   regards	   to	   the	  translation	  of	  the	  internal	  public	  opinion	  to	  a	  collective	  posture,	  the	  practice	  of	  CJN!	  to	  open	  each	  proposed	  joint	  statement	  for	  sign-­‐on	  by	  organisations	  and	  to	  only	  present	  those	  CJN!	  member	  organisations	  as	  in	  agreement	  with	  a	  position	  that	  have	  explicitly	  endorsed	  that	  position	  avoids	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  a	  “lowest	  common	  denominator”	  approach.	   However,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   capacity	   of	   thus	   communicating	  with	   a	   unified	  voice,	  CAN’s	  approach	  to	  consensus	  allows	  the	  network	  to	  virtually	  always	  claim	  that	  all	  members	  have	  endorsed	  a	  particular	  position	  while	  CJN!’s	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  approach	  is	  to	  be	  judged	  weaker	  in	  that	  respect.	  
Finally,	  I	  will	  consider	  the	  example	  of	  the	  whole	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  to	  illustrate	  another	  application	  of	  my	  proposed	  expansion	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	  concept.	   In	   this	  case	   I	   shall	   propose	   that	   the	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   themselves	   constitute	   a	   public	  sphere	   that	   is	   populated	   by	   institutional	   actors	   of	   various	   kinds:	   nation	   states,	   UN	  bodies,	   “specialised	   agencies”	   such	   as	   the	   World	   Bank,	   various	   intergovernmental	  organisations,	  and,	  crucially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  my	  own	  work,	  a	  larger	  variety	  of	  NGOs	  from	   contexts	   such	   as	   environmental,	   business,	   research,	   local	   government,	   trade	  union,	   Indigenous	  Peoples,	  women	  and	  gender.	  These	   institutional	   actors,	   then,	   are	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  represented	  at	  the	  UNFCCC	  by	  their	  respective	  agents.	  This	  example	  has	  been	  chosen	  because	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  vividly	  show	  the	  interconnectedness,	  interdependence	  and	  various	  other	  relationships	  public	  spheres	  at	  different	  levels	  have	  with	  each	  other.	  It	  is	  probably	  controversial	  to	  conceive	  nation	  states	  as	  interlocutors	  of	  a	  public	  sphere,	  especially	  since	   the	  nation	  state	   itself	   is,	   in	   the	  classical,	  Westphalian	  version	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	   theory,	   the	   centre	   of	   authority	   to	  which	   the	   public	   sphere	   directs	   its	  expressions	  of	  the	  public	  opinion.	  
However,	   this	   example	  nonetheless	   serves	   two	  purposes:	   first,	   it	   is	   to	   illustrate	  that	   the	   interlocutors	   in	  a	  public	   sphere	   can	   indeed	  be	  of	   extremely	  different	   types	  and	   to	   show	   that	   exactly	   by	   considering	   them	   as	   forming	   a	   public	   sphere,	   the	  normative	  dimensions	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  theory	  can	  be	  very	  usefully	  employed	  to	  examine	  interactions	  between	  these	  and	  other	  interlocutors	  within	  a	  common	  public.	  Secondly,	  this	  example	  can	  vividly	  show	  how	  the	  same	  entity	  (e.g.	  a	  nation	  state)	  can	  be	  the	  discursive	  target	  of	  one	  public	  sphere	  in	  its	  own	  right	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  being	  an	  interlocutor	  among	  others	  on	  a	  different	  level	  in	  a	  different	  public	  sphere.	  In	  addition	  we	  can	  examine	  whether	   there	  might	  be,	   in	   fact,	  discursive	   flows	  of	  public	  opinion	   from	   the	   largest	   imaginable	   public	   with	   regards	   to	   climate	   change	   –	   the	  global	   populace	   –	   to	   the	   relevant	   centre	   of	   authority	   –	   arguably,	   the	  UNFCCC	   –	   via	  intermediary	  publics	  of,	   for	  example,	  nation	  states	  and	  social	  movements.	  However,	  since	   the	   empirical	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis	   was	   on	   the	   ENGO	   involvement	   within	   the	  UNFCCC,	  these	  considerations	  are	  inevitably	  largely	  theoretical	  in	  nature.	  	  
Suggesting	  that	  the	  UNFCCC	  is	  a	  public	  sphere	  is	  not	  new.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Chap-­‐ter	  2,	   Simone	  Pulver	  has	   conceptualised	   it	   this	  way	  and	   shown	  how	  environmental	  NGOs,	   as	   compared	   to	   the	   oil	   industry	   front	   groups,	  were	  more	   successful	   in	   using	  public	   sphere	   features	   such	   as	   advancing	   the	   common	   good	   and	   focusing	   on	   the	  rationality	   of	   an	   argument	   to	   advance	   their	   cause,	   or,	   as	   she	   calls	   it,	   “leverage	   the	  power	  in	  the	  public	  sphere”	  (Pulver	  2004a:	  38).	  She	  does,	  however,	  conceptualise	  the	  public	   sphere	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   as	   consisting	   only	   of	   the	   observer	   organisations,	  focussing	  especially	  on	  ENGOs	  and	  the	  oil	  industry	  lobby,	  who	  target	  the	  collective	  of	  nation	  states	  that	  are	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  However,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  not	  only	  observer	   organisations	   but	   also	   parties	   do	   engage	   in	   a	   discourse	   that	   bears	   all	   the	  marks	  of	   a	  public	   sphere	  discourse:	  parties	  attempt	   to	   convince	  each	  other	  of	   their	  respective	   positions	   through	   intensive	   and	   detailed	   discussions	   in	   contact	   groups,	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  through	   specific	   workshops	   that	   are	   from	   time	   to	   time	   organised	   on	   specific	   sub-­‐issues	  within	   the	  UNFCCC,	   through	  written	  submissions	   that	   lay	  out	   their	  preferred	  policy	  options	  with	  a	  clear	  understanding	  that	  parties	  do	  these	  things	  in	  order	  to	  see	  their	  preferred	  policies	   implemented.	  By	  employing	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  this	   can	   be	   conceptualised	   by	   thinking	   of	   the	   negotiations	   under	   the	   UNFCCC	   as	   a	  public	  sphere	  thrashing	  out	  a	  public	  opinion	  with	  a	  view	  to	  its	  being	  implemented	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  with	  the	  latter	  conceptualised	  as	  the	  appropriate	  centre	  of	  authority.	  	  
This	  explicitly	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  considering	  the	  UNFCCC	  as	  an	  entity	  in	  its	   own	   right,	   rather	   than	   merely	   being	   the	   sum	   of	   its	   parties.	   This	   view,	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	   as	   an	   entity	   separate	   to	   a	   degree	   from	   its	   parties,	   appears	   to	   be	   rather	  appropriate	  given	  that	  parties	  are	  ultimately	  liable	  to	  account	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  for	  their	  activities	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   that	   the	  UNFCCC	  mandates	   to	   them.	   Thus,	   recalling	   that	  according	  to	  the	  all-­‐subjected	  principle	  public	  spheres	  were	  defined	  as	  those	  who	  are	  involved	   being	   subject	   to	   a	   definable	   authority	   and	   given	   that	   the	   parties	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	   are	   the	   entities	   immediately	   subject	   to	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   UNFCCC,	   it	  appears	   suitable	   to	   conceptualise	   them	   as	   its	   public	   sphere.	   To	   be	   sure,	   through	  ratification,	  which	  makes	  the	  UNFCCC	  legally	  binding	  law	  for	  its	  parties,	  ultimately	  all	  citizens	   of	   all	   parties	   –	   and,	   therefore,	   given	   universal	   ratification,	   ultimately	   the	  global	   populace	   –	   also	   represent	   a	   possible	   interpretation	   of	   a	   public	   sphere	   that	  matched	  unto	  the	  UNFCCC,	  but	  one	  with	  an	  empirically	  questionable	  status.	  	  
As	  mentioned,	  once	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  are	  understood	  as	  a	  public	  sphere	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  climate	  change	  politics	  undertaken	  in	  that	  context,	  the	  normative	  dimensions	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   theory	   can	   be	   used	   to	   very	   usefully	   discuss	   and	  evaluate	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   efficacy	   of	   this	   sphere.	   Having	   already	   discussed	   these	  issues	  in	  some	  detail	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  chapter	  6,	  it	  shall	  suffice	  here	  to	  refer	  back	  to	  that	  discussion,	  especially	  the	  details	  that	  deal	  with	  equity	  concerns	  between	  parties.	  Furthermore,	  by	  expanding	  that	  notion	  of	  a	  public	  sphere	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  to	  also	  include	  observer	  organisations,	  the	  various	  relationships	  between	  these	  actors	  can	  be	   illuminated,	  which,	   as	  mentioned,	  does	  however	  go	  beyond	   the	   scope	  of	   the	  empirical	  work	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
Secondly,	  understanding	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  as	  a	  public	  sphere	  of	  a	  variety	  of	   institutional	   actors	   can	   help	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   complex	   interactions	   and	   intercon-­‐
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  nectedness	  of	  public	  spheres	  on	  different	  levels.	  For	  example,	  CAN’s	  double	  role	  as	  a	  public	  sphere	  in	  its	  own	  right	  and	  interlocutor	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  has	  already	   been	   indicated	   earlier	   in	   this	   section:	   it	   was	   suggested	   that	   the	   internal	  deliberations	   within	   CAN	   can	   be	   understood	   to	   represent	   a	   public	   sphere	   whose	  collective	  opinion	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  questions	  as	  to	  which	  position	  and	  strategy	  CAN	  should	  employ	  when	  acting	  as	   an	   interlocutor	   among	  others	  within	   the	  public	  sphere	  of	  the	  wider	  UNFCCC	  negotiations.	  This	  is	  already	  one	  example	  of	  one	  of	  these	  complex	  relationships	  and	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  for	  many	  of	  the	  nation	  states	  that	  are	  parties	  to	  the	  UNFCCC:	  in	  many	  nation	  states	  there	  are	  national	  public	  spheres	  (or	  in	  some	   cases,	   embryonic	   transnational	   ones,	   for	   example	   in	   the	   European	   case)	   that	  discuss	  the	  negotiation	  position	  that	  “their”	  nation	  state	  ought	  to	  take	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  This	  can	  be,	  to	  use	  Fraser’s	  distinction,	  weak	  publics	  of	  civil	  society	  or	  strong	  publics-­‐cum-­‐decision-­‐making-­‐bodies	   such	  as	  national	  parliaments	  discussing	  the	  mandate	  of	  their	  country’s	  negotiators,	  or	  a	  mix	  of	  both.	  As	  mentioned,	  this	  step	  is	  important	   as	   it	   connects	   the	   largest	   imaginable	   public	   of	   the	   UNFCCC,	   the	   global	  populace,	  via	  their	  national,	  regional	  or	  supranational	  public	  spheres	  in	  multiple	  ways	  to	   the	   public	   sphere	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	   (through	   the	   official	   delegation	   of	  their	  government	  as	  well	  as,	  where	  applicable,	  through	  the	  involvement	  of	  their	  local	  or	  national	  civil	  society	  organisations	  in	  networks	  such	  as	  CAN,	  CJN!,	  the	  International	  Trade	  Union	  Confederation	  and	  so	  on).	  
7.3 Conclusions	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  set	  out	  to	  investigate	  the	  role	  of	  transnational	  climate	  change	  advocacy	  networks	   and	   their	   internal	   power	   dynamics	   within	   multilateral	   treaty	   processes.	  This	   subject	   of	   study	  was	   chosen	   for	   two	  main	   reasons	   both	   of	  which	   relate	   to	   an	  overarching	  theme:	  transnationalisation.	  First,	  the	  issue	  area	  of	  climate	  change	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  truly	  global	  problem:	  no	  matter	  who,	  where	  in	  the	  world	  is	  responsible	  for	  greenhouse	  gases	  emissions	  into	  the	  atmosphere	  –	  the	  resulting	  greenhouse	  effect	  and	  subsequent	  global	  climate	  change	  will	  impact	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  this	  planet	  (including,	   crucially,	   non-­‐human	   species)	   if	   not	   averted.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   virtually	  any	   possible	   solution	   will	   require	   transnational	   cooperation	   on	   an	   unprecedented	  scale,	  thus	  calling	  for	  a	  transnational	  approach	  to	  finding	  such	  a	  solution.	  Therefore,	  while	   climate	   change	   certainly	   does	   not	   represent	   the	   only	   modern	   problem	   that	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  transcends	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  nation	  state,	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  best	  issues	  to	  select	  for	  study,	   in	   part	   also	   due	   to	   the	   interconnectedness	   of	   its	   underlying	   causes	   to	  many	  other	  policy	   areas	   (energy,	   trade,	   industry,	   transportation,	   agriculture	   and	   forestry,	  development	  etc.)	  and	  possibly	  even	  the	  very	  core	  of	  the	  capitalist	  model	  of	  economy	  –	  all	  of	  which	  gives	  it	  a	  certain	  gravitas	  in	  international	  politics.	  	  
Second,	   the	   transnationalisation	   of	   debate	   among	   individuals,	   associated	   with	  phenomena	  variably	  described	  as	  global	  or	   transnational	  civil	   society,	   transnational	  public	   sphere,	   transnational	   social	   movements	   and	   the	   like,	   can	   be	   considered	   an	  important	   area	   of	   study.	   Given	   the	   increasingly	   transnational	   nature	   of	   important	  problems	   –	   such	   as	   just	   described	   in	   the	   case	   of	   climate	   change	   –	   associations	   of	  individuals	  concerned	  about	  such	  problems	  also	  increasingly	  transcend	  the	  bounda-­‐ries	   of	   the	  nation	   state	   thus	   giving	   rise	   to	   the	  phenomena	   listed.	  Third,	   responding	  from	   another	   angle	   to	   this	   increasing	   transnationalisation	   of	   important	   problems,	  there	  is	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  proliferation	  of	  transnational	  political	  institutions	  that	  are	  tasked	  with	  addressing	  these	  problems,	  such	  as	   the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  that	  was	  placed	  at	   the	  centre	  of	  this	  research.	  
Before	  this	  backdrop,	  the	  overall	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  was	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  role	   of	   transnational	   climate	   change	   advocacy	   networks	   and	   their	   internal	   power	  dynamics	  within	  multilateral	  treaty	  processes.	  This	  aim	  has	  been	  addressed	  through	  the	  parallel	  treatment	  of	  two	  interlinked	  objectives	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  which	  also	  introduced	   an	   element	   of	   hybridity	   to	   this	   endeavour.	   First,	   an	   ethnography	   of	  Climate	  Action	  Network	   International	   (CAN)	   and	   related	   actors	  within	   the	   negotia-­‐tions	   of	   the	   United	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change	   (UNFCCC)	   has	   been	  produced.	  This	  ethnographic	  account	  was	  used	   to	  describe	  and	  analyse	   the	   internal	  dynamics	   and	   structures	  of	  CAN	  as	  well	   as	   its	   embeddedness	   in	   the	   larger	  political	  configuration	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  treaty	  process.	  Secondly,	  this	  ethnographic	  account	  was	  analysed	   utilising	   a	   critical	   theory	   of	   the	   public	   sphere,	   including	   contemporary	  conceptualisations	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  which	  embrace	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  public	   spheres,	   and	   are	   used	   as	   they	   allow	   a	   more	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   the	  constellation	   of	   public	   sphere	   deliberations.	   The	  mentioned	   hybridity	   of	   this	   thesis	  results	   from	   the	   simultaneous	   treatment	   of	   these	   two	   objectives	   which	   creates	   a	  thesis	  that	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  an	  empirical	  thesis,	  primarily	  focussed	  on	  producing	  an	  ethnographic	  account	  of	  the	  environmental	  advocacy	  organisations,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  thesis	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  centrally	  concerned	  with	  the	  further	  development	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  in	  particular	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  transnational	  level.	  	  
After	  a	  short	  introduction	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  after	  presenting	  the	  over-­‐all	   aim	   as	   well	   as	   the	   immediate	   objectives	   of	   the	   research	   programme,	   chapter	   2	  began	  to	  advance	  this	  research	  programme	  by	  undertaking	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  relevant	   for	   this	   thesis.	   In	   particular,	   the	   chapter	   discussed	   the	   literature	   of	   the	  concept	  of	   “Global	  Civil	  Society”	   including	   its	  historical	   foundations	   in	   the	  notion	  of	  domestic	  civil	  societies	  and	  considered	  how	  the	  constituting	  aspects	  of	  a	  civil	  society	  might	  be	  translated	  onto	  the	  transnational,	  or	  global,	  level.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  section	  I	  offered,	   by	   expanding	   on	   the	   work	   of	   Cohen	   and	   Arato,	   a	   definition	   of	   global	   or	  transnational	   civil	   society	   by	   stressing	   five	   features:	   plurality,	   publicity,	   privacy,	  legality	   and	   transboundary	   connectedness.	   The	   literature	   review	   further	   dealt	  with	  work	   on	   public	   sphere	   theory,	   thus	   critically	   advancing	   on	   the	   second	   research	  objective	   of	   this	   thesis	   by	   providing	   the	   necessary	   foundation	   for	   that	   theoretical	  work.	  In	  this	  context,	   the	  original	   formulation	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  theory	  by	  Jürgen	  Habermas	   was	   presented	   and	   contrasted	   with	   Nancy	   Fraser’s	   early	   critique.	  Particularly	   relevant	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   research	   programme	   was	   the	  introduction	  of	  literature	  that	  further	  developed	  public	  sphere	  theory	  by	  introducing	  various	   operationalisations	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   multiple	   public	   sphere	   such	   as	  counterpublics	   or	   nested	   publics.	   Further,	   again,	   with	   crucial	   importance	   to	   the	  research	  programme,	  Nancy	  Fraser’s	  work	  developing	  a	  critical	   theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	   for	   the	   transnational	   realm	   was	   discussed.	   Critically,	   the	   literature	   review	  provided	  the	  framework	  for	  applying	  the	  relevant	  concepts	  in	  the	  theoretical	  analysis	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  
Chapter	   3	   was	   centrally	   concerned	   with	   the	   methodological	   aspects	   of	   the	   re-­‐search.	   In	   that	   chapter,	   I	   presented	   the	   research	   design	   of	   this	   study	   wherein	   I	  became	  a	  delegate	  of	  a	  member	  organisation	  of	  the	  environmental	  advocacy	  network,	  CAN,	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   the	   level	   of	   insight	   required	   to	   fulfil	   the	   first	   objective	   of	   the	  research	   programme:	   to	   produce	   a	   detailed	   ethnography	   of	   that	   network.	   I	   also	  showed	   how	   this	   methodological	   approach	   overcomes	   some	   of	   the	   limitations	   of	  previous	  research,	  which	  was	  primarily	  based	  on	  interviews	  and	  document	  analysis.	  In	   the	   chapter,	   I	   described	   how	   I	   negotiated	   initial	   access	   to	   the	   field	   as	   well	   as	  continued	  consent	  and	  how,	  over	   time,	  my	   involvement	   in	   the	  work	  of	   the	  network	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  increased	  to	  the	  point	  of	  being	  a	  fully	  participating	  member.	  I	  also	  outlined	  how	  my	  own	  political	   identity	  enabled	  this	  approach	  while	  minimising	  conflicts	  between	  my	  various	  roles	  during	  the	  fieldwork.	  I	  also	  presented	  the	  notion	  of	  “going	  native”	  and	  considered	  how	  this	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  over	  time	  and	  made	  the	  case	  that	  “being”	  native	  is	  a	  desirable	  position	  for	  an	  ethnographer	  if	  the	  potential	  conflict	  between	   genuine	   involvement	   with	   the	   group	   under	   examination	   and	   a	   necessary	  critical	   position	   as	   researcher	   can	  be	   resolved.	  After	  describing	   the	  method	  of	   data	  organisation	   and	   analysis	   employed	   in	   the	   research,	   I	   proceeded	   to	   describe	   the	  preliminary	  theoretical	  model	  that	  emerged	  during	  fieldwork	  and	  data	  analysis.	  The	  model	  emphasises	  the	  character	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  as	  a	  multiple	  public	  sphere	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	  interdependent,	  interconnected	  and	  nested	  public	  spheres.	  This	  model	  is	   crucially	   important	   for	   fulfilling	   the	   dual	   objective	   as	   it	   is,	   on	   one	   hand,	   used	   to	  structure	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   ethnographic	   account	   throughout	   the	   following	  chapters,	  while	   it	   also,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   represents	   a	   further	   development	   of	   the	  theory	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	  which	   is	   then	  used	   to	   inform	  the	   theoretical	  analysis	  of	  the	  empirical	  material.	  
The	   fourth	   chapter	   was	   dedicated	   to	   contextualising	   the	   participation	   of	   envi-­‐ronmental	   NGOs	   within	   the	   climate	   change	   treaty	   negotiations	   by	   providing	   an	  account	  of	  the	  history	  and	  the	  institutional	  make-­‐up	  of	  these	  negotiations	  while	  also	  detailing	   the	  political	   developments	  within	   these	  negotiations	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   the	  fieldwork	  period	  as	  well	   as	  during	   the	   fieldwork.	   It	   also	  provided	  background	  with	  regards	   to	   carbon	   market	   instruments	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   regime	   which	   was	  important	   in	   order	   to	   appreciate	   the	   meanings	   and	   importance	   of	   some	   of	   the	  processes	   contained	   in	   the	   ethnographic	   account.	   The	   chapter	   also	   helped	   advance	  this	   account	   by	   discussing	   in	   detail	   the	   institutional	   framework	   as	   well	   as	   the	  development	  over	  time	  of	  the	  participation	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  observers.	  	  
Chapter	  5	  further	  advanced	  the	  ethnographic	  account	  by	  discussing	  the	  access	  to	  the	   various	   levels	   of	   the	   multiple	   public	   sphere	   of,	   inter	   alia,	   CAN-­‐internal	   and	  UNFCCC	  deliberations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  potential	  barriers	  that	  could	  restrict	  or	  limit	  that	  access	   or	   impact	   negatively	   on	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   participation	   as	   well	   as	  resources	  employed	  to	  enable	  more	  effective	  participation.	  In	  this	  context	  I	  differen-­‐tiated	  between	  the	  three	  main	  settings	  of	  CAN	  activity	  (in-­‐session,	  virtual	  and	  hybrid)	  and	   discussed	   the	   specific	   activities	   that	   occur	   in	   these	   settings	   as	   well	   as	   issues	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  related	  to	  these	  three	  settings.	  Here,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  continued	  physical	  access	  to	  the	   in-­‐session	   setting	   (crucially	   including	   both	   COPs	   as	   well	   as	   intersessionals)	  provides	   CAN	  members	  with	   valuable	   resources	   that	   can	   be	   leveraged	   to	   influence	  the	   negotiations	   at	   later	   stages.	   These	   resources	   refer	   amongst	   other	   things	   to	   the	  establishment	   of	   personal	   trust	   and	   rapport	   with	   individual	   negotiators	   (including	  being	  seen	  as	  a	   resource	   to	  draw	  upon)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  deeper	   insight	   into	   the	  hidden	  politics	  and	  meanings	   that	  are	  associated	  with	   the	  development	  of	   the	  negotiations	  and	  which	  are	  not	   readily	  available	   to	  CAN	  members	  who	  do	  not	  participate	   in	   the	  same	  manner	   or	   to	   other	   outsiders.	  With	   regards	   to	   the	   analytical	   objective	   of	   the	  thesis,	  this	  chapter	  provided	  relevant	  contributions	  insofar	  as	  the	  themes	  developed	  therein	   relate	   strongly	   to	   the	   aspect	   of	   normative	   legitimacy	   as	   put	   forward	   by	  Fraser’s	  critical	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
In	   the	  sixth	  chapter	   I	   further	  developed	  both	   the	  ethnographic	  account	  and	   the	  theoretical	  analysis	  by	  considering	  how	  hierarchy	  and	  inequalities	  as	  well	  as	  various	  discursive	  practices	  of	  arguments	  impact	  upon	  the	  internal	  deliberations	  of	  CAN.	  The	  chapter	   also	   advanced	   the	   theme	   of	   multiple	   public	   spheres	   by	   discussing	   various	  constellations	   of	   counterpublicity	   observed.	   In	   particular,	   I	   consider	   how	   the	  hierarchical	  order	  of	  parties	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	   impacts	  on	  consensus	  formation	  within	  the	  process	  and	  how	  hierarchies	  within	  CAN	  play	  out	  in	  the	  internal	  deliberations	   of	   the	   network,	   especially	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   the	   different	   levels	   of	  participation	   of	   CAN	  members	   from	   developing	   countries	   compared	   to	   those	   from	  developed	   countries.	   The	   chapter	   also	   makes	   the	   case	   that	   in	   general	   the	   climate	  negotiations	  are	  a	  gathering	  of	  members	  of,	  globally	  speaking,	  privileged	  classes	  and	  illustrates	  with	  the	  example	  of	  a	  Wastepicker	  delegation	  how	  delegates	  from	  different	  backgrounds	   can	   bring	   unique	   perspectives	   to	   the	   negotiations	   with	   great	   effect.	  Further,	   considering	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   climate	   justice	  network	  CJN!	  within	   the	   climate	  change	   negotiations	   helped	   further	   advance	   the	   theoretical	   analysis	   of	   a	   multiple	  public	   sphere	   by	   exploring	   which	   theoretical	   constellations	   best	   describe	   the	  relationship	  between	   the	  CAN	  and	  CJN!	  publics.	  The	   analysis	  was	   also	   advanced	  by	  considering	  in	  detail	  the	  tensions	  between	  different	  discursive	  approaches	  within	  the	  internal	  deliberations	  of	  CAN,	  variously	  focussing	  on	  scientific	  rationality,	  Realpolitik	  considerations	  and	  justice	  principles,	  respectively.	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  Overall,	   partially	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   empirical	  work	   and	  partially	   in	   order	   to	   further	  develop	   a	   framework	   in	   which	   the	   empirical	   account	   could	   be	   analysed	   more	  systematically	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  empirical	  and	  normative	  considerations	  relating	  to	  the	  public	   sphere,	   further	  development	  of	   the	   theory	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	  has	  been	  proposed.	  This	  allows	  us,	   in	  a	  nutshell,	   to	  conceptualise	  multi-­‐dimensional	  delibera-­‐tive	  spaces	  with	  are	   interrelated	  with	  each	  other	   in	  complex	  ways	  as	  a	  multitude	  of	  variously	  overlapping	  public	   spheres	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	   corresponding	   “centres	  of	  authority.”	   This	   theoretical	   expansion,	   combined	   with	   the	   ethnographic	   account	   of	  this	   thesis,	   allowed	   for	   specific	   conclusions	   to	   be	   drawn,	   for	   example,	   how	   the	  political	   efficacy	   of	   CAN	   –	   understood	   as	   a	   public	   sphere	   –	   is	   impacted	   on	   by	   its	  internal	  deliberation	  culture	  including	  its	  use	  and	  definition	  of	  “consensus”	  as	  well	  as	  organisational	   norms	   regarding	   the	   unity	   of	   its	   voice.	   Similarly,	   it	   was	   possible	   to	  discuss	  the	  normative	  implications	  of	  an	  asymmetrical	  command	  of	  resources,	  chiefly	  among	  them	  financial	  resources	  and	  knowledge	  related	  resources.	  
Admittedly,	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  further	  abstraction	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  theo-­‐ry	   and	   the	   related	   empirical	   discussions	   above	   might	   be	   read	   as	   suggesting	   that	  climate	  change	  politics,	  or	  indeed	  any	  other	  area	  where	  public	  sphere	  like	  discussions	  can	  be	  located,	  can	  be	  examined	  as	  independent	  of	  other	  policy	  areas	  or,	  indeed	  other	  dynamics	   that	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   climate	   change	   politics.	   There	   are	   indeed	   many	  different	  policy	  areas	   that	  do	  have	  a	  considerable	   impact	  on	  climate	  change	  politics	  ranging,	   for	   example,	   from	   international	   trade	   and	   economic	   politics,	   to	   issues	  concerning	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	   to	   questions	   of	   the	   desirability	   and	   type	   of	  economic	  development	  for	  developing	  countries,	  to	  other	  environmental	  issues	  such	  as	  deforestation,	  bio-­‐diversity	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  ozone	  layer.	  In	  addition,	  the	  international	   climate	   change	   policy	   arena	   is	   certainly	   not	   independent	   from	   the	  various	   national	   or	   supranational	   (e.g.	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EU)	   politics,	   in	   fact	   these	  politics	  have	  a	  very	  strong	  impact	  as	  can	  be	  most	  clearly	  seen	  in	  the	  way	  US	  domestic	  politics	   impact	  on	   the	   international	  climate	  change	  politics.	  Nor	  can	   the	  UNFCCC	  be	  seen	  as	  separate	   from	  the	  politics	  of	  other	   international	  bodies	   that	  discuss	  climate	  change,	  such	  as	  the	  within	  the	  wider	  UN	  system	  or	  outside,	  for	  example	  fora	  such	  as	  the	  MEM/MEF	  or	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  G20	  or	  the	  BASIC	  ministerial	  level	  meetings.	  
To	  be	  sure,	  examining	  the	  politics	  of	  a	  specific	  regime,	  such	  as	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  its	  internal	   processes	   of	   deliberation	   in	   relative	   isolation	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	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  regime	  is	  in	  fact	  isolated.	  However,	  analyses	  based	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	   theory	  as	  presented	  here	   are	   intended	   to	  be	   able	   to	   “zoom	   in”	  on	  a	   specific	  element	   or	   area	   of	   the	   extremely	   complex	   and	  multi-­‐dimensional	   structure	   that	   is	  transnational	   politics.	  During	   such	   analyses,	   the	   researcher	  must	   always	   remember	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  under	  investigation	  is,	  in	  fact,	  embedded	  in	  a	  complex	  system	  of	  interdependent	  relationship	  and	  should	  occasionally	  “zoom	  out”	  to	  assess	  at	  least	  to	  some	   degree	   the	   possible	   impacts	   that	   developments	   in	   other	   related	   areas	   might	  have	   on	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   study.	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   in	   a	  studying	  a	  complex	  system,	   there	   is	  always	  a	   trade-­‐off	  between	   investigation	  of	   the	  entire	   system	   and	   losing	   sight	   of	   details	   within	   or	   (by	   “zooming	   in”)	   focussing	   on	  details	  within	   the	  system	  while	  accepting	   that	   the	   larger	  picture	  might	  become	   less	  focussed.	  	  
This	   thesis	   then,	   focused	  on	   the	  deliberative	  processes	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	   and	  even	   more	   specifically	   those	   among	   environmental	   NGOs	   with	   an	   even	   more	  particular	  focus	  on	  a	  specific	  network	  of	  ENGOs	  –	  CAN.	  As	  the	  empirical	  work	  and	  the	  theoretical	  analysis	  demonstrated,	  the	  descriptions	  and	  examples	  from	  the	  fieldwork	  became	   richer	   and	  more	   infused	  with	   explanatory	   value	   the	   deeper	   the	   discussion	  was	  “zoomed	  in”	  along	  the	  UNFCCC	  –	  ENGOs	  –	  CAN	  line.	  Thus,	  while	  being	  able	  to	  give	  very	   specific	   discussions	   of	   CAN,	   insights	   from	   fieldwork	  were	   less	   detailed	   in	   the	  case	  of	  the	  ENGOs	  in	  general	  and	  even	  less	  so	  for	  the	  entire	  UNFCCC.	  “Zooming”	  even	  further	   out	   and	   providing	   meaningful	   analyses	   of	   the	   processes	   outside	   of	   the	  UNFCCC,	   beyond	   some	  very	  basic	   remarks	   that	  were	   occasionally	   offered,	   certainly	  would	  have	  gone	  well	  beyond	  the	  scope	  (and	  feasibility)	  of	  this	  research.	  
However,	  this	  infeasibility	  points	  at	  an	  important	  area	  of	  further	  research.	  Given	  that	   it	  has	  been	  stated	   that	   the	  global	  populace	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  ultimately	   the	  largest	   possible	   public	   with	   regards	   to	   climate	   change,	   and	   further	   given	   that	   this	  public	   is	   in	   various	   ways	   directly	   and	   indirectly	   linked	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   itself	   as	   a	  corresponding	   centre	   of	   authority,	   the	   potential	   benefits	   of	   further	   research	   are	  indicated	  into	  the	  specific	  communicative	  flows	  between	  this	  public	  and	  the	  UNFCCC.	  Crucially,	   such	   research	   would	   consider	   the	   role	   that	   various	   intermediate	   publics	  (such	   as	   national	   parliaments)	   perform	   in	   the	   process	   and,	   crucially,	   whether	   the	  global	   populace	   can	   even	   be	   reasonably	   be	   considered	   a	  public.	   Further,	   research	  more	   specifically	   related	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   could	   continue	   to	   examine	   the	   further	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  development	   of	   CJN!	   within	   the	   negotiations.	   This	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   useful	  undertaking	  as	  this	  current	  research	  has	   indicated	  that	  –	  given	  the	  relatively	  recent	  nature	  of	  the	  developments	  –	  it	  cannot	  be	  currently	  said	  with	  authority	  whether	  CJN!	  will	  continue	  to	  perform	  a	  function	  as	  a	  counter	  public	  or	  whether	  it	  will	  eventually	  further	   consolidate	   a	   separate	   position.	   This	   promises	   to	   be	   a	   rewarding	   research	  project	  due	  to	  the	  different	  organisational	  and	  deliberative	  cultures	  of	  CJN!	  and	  CAN	  and	   also	  due	   to	   the	   large	  overlap	  of	  membership.	   Further,	   the	   close	   cooperation	  of	  CJN!	   with	   groups	   “outside”	   the	   UNFCCC	   process	   that	   fundamentally	   reject	   the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  itself	  provides	  for	  yet	  another	  public/counterpublic	  dynamic	  that	  might	  prove	  very	  insightful	  for	  the	  further	  development	  of	  the	  theory.	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Glossary	  
Adaptation 
 Adaptation refers to the sum of activities that are intended to reduce the impacts of the 
adverse effects of climate change that are already happening and that are expected to 
occur in the future. Along with mitigation, adaptation is one of the main areas of 
negotiation under the UNFCCC. 
Annex I Party 
 Annex I parties are parties to the climate change convention (UNFCCC) which are 
listed in Annex I of the convention. The term is roughly equivalent with “industrialised 
countries” or “developed country” (all three terms are used roughly interchangeably 
within the UNFCCC). Annex I countries are countries who were members of the OECD 
in 1992 and the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The latter are 
also known as “countries with economies in transition to a market economy” (EIT 
countries) and have a slightly different set of rights and responsibilities under the 
convention than the other Annex I parties. 
Anthropogenic greenhouse emissions 
 Greenhouse-gas emissions resulting from human activities including the use of fossil 
fuels like oil, gas and coal as well as deforestation and other land uses. 
AoSIS 
 The Alliance of Small Island States is a negotiation bloc of developing country parties in 
the UNFCCC negotiations whose members are nation states whose territory consists 
exclusively of small islands. Often much (or even all) of the inhabitable land of these 
islands is characterised by very low elevation making it vulnerable to sea level rise, one 
of the projected results of climate change. 
AWG-KP 
 The Ad-Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments of Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol is a working group of the UNFCCC which is mandated with determin-
ing the commitments of Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the Protocol’s second 
commitment period after 2012. The group was tasked to finish its deliberations by time 
of the Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009, however, since this 
conference did not conclude on the further commitments of Annex I parties, the mandate 
of the AWG-KP was extended. 
AWG-LCA 
 Ad-Hoc Working Group on Longterm Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(UNFCCC). The AWG-LCA was established at the 2007 COP in Bali, Indonesia, to 
advance negotiations toward a comprehensive agreement under the Convention with a 
view of enhancing mitigation and adaptation. With regards to mitigation, the main 
objective was to provide for mitigation of all developed countries, including those not 
parties to the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. the USA) as well as establishing an encouraging and 
enabling framework for mitigation in developing countries. The AWG-LCA missed the 
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deadline for completion of its work, the 2009 COP in Copenhagen, Denmark, and was 
mandated to continue negotiating. 
A/R 
 Afforestation/Reforestation is described the human activity of establishing forest on land 
that was recently deforested (Reforestation) or has not been forested land in the recent 
past (Afforestation). Specifically, A/R is a CDM project type, where emission 
reduction credits are issued to reflect the carbon dioxide absorbed by the growing trees. 
BAP 
 The Bali Action Plan was established through decision 1.CP13 (UNFCCC 2007b) at the 
2007 COP in Bali, Indonesia, and provided for a programme of work and a general 
vision of an outcome of the negotiations for the following 2 years, leading up to the 
2009 COP in Copenhagen, Denmark. The BAP included references to the major 
“building blocs” of a future climate regime (in its paragraph 1), including the establish-
ment of a shared vision for long-term goal under the Convention, enhanced mitigation 
of emissions (both in developed and developing countries and including reduction of 
emissions from deforestation), enhanced action on climate change adaptation, enhanced 
technology transfer and provision of financing to support mitigation and adaptation. The 
negotiations under the Bali Action Plan took mainly place under the AWG-LCA but 
missed their 2009 deadline. 
CAN / CAN-I 
 Climate Action Network International is a network of over 500 (in 2010) NGOs 
worldwide which are working on climate change policy and primarily originate form the 
environmental and more recently developmental movements. CAN is the main focus of 
this research. 
The acronyms CAN and CAN-I are used interchangeably in this thesis. Unless otherwise 
stated (e.g. CAN Europe), the acronym CAN always refers to CAN International. 
CBDRRC 
 Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities is one of the main 
principles of the UNFCCC, established in its Article 3, which acknowledges the larger 
historic contribution, and thus responsibility, of developed countries to climate change, 
and further acknowledges that the different degrees of economic development equip 
countries with different levels of resources (capabilities) to contribute toward the 
mitigation of climate change. CBDRRC is the main reason why the developed countries 
are required to take the lead in combating climate change and its adverse effects. 
CDM 
 The Clean Development Mechanism is established through article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. It is one of the Flexible Mechanisms of the Protocol. Under the CDM, 
emission reduction projects in developing countries are rewarded by being issued 
reduction certificates (CERs, or Certified Emission Reductions) which can then be 
bought by developed countries and used toward the fulfilment of their emission 
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. The main criteria for the registration of 
a CDM project is the establishment of its additionality, that is, that the project would not 
have been able to go forward without the additional funding provided by the sale of the 
CERs. This is to ensure that only projects that would not have happened even without 
that funding are supported through the scheme. 
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CDM EB 
 The Executive Board of the CDM is responsible for the day-to-day running as well as 
general decision making with regards to the CDM, including registration of CDM 
projects, issuance of emission reduction certificates, approval of CDM methodologies 
and conflict resolution. 
CJN! 
 Climate Justice Now! is a network of environmental NGOs active at the UNFCCC 
negotiations that was established at the 2007 COP in Bali, Indonesia. CJN! emphasises 
a climate-justice perspective in the negotiations. 
Climate Change 
 In the sense used in this thesis, the terms is used interchangeably with “anthropogenic 
climate change” which refers to a set of changes in the climate of the Earth, as a result 
of change in the composition of the global atmosphere due to human activity. Anthropo-
genic climate change is in addition to the natural variation in climate, which is also 
sometimes called climate change.  
CMP 
 The Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties of the Kyoto 
Protocol is the main decision making body with respect to the Kyoto Protocol. As the 
name suggests, it meets in parallel to the meetings of the COP. 
CO2eq 
 Carbon Dioxide (CO2) equivalents are the main unit of measurement of greenhouse 
gases under the UNFCCC, especially under the Kyoto Protocol. Although the Kyoto 
Protocol covers a “basket” of six different greenhouse gases, all emissions of the 
non-CO2 gases are converted into CO2 equivalents, based on their global warming 
potential, when calculating countries’ emissions. For example, 1kg of Methane has been 
calculated to have the same warming effect as 25kg of CO2 over a 100 year period. 
Thus, 1kg Methane is 25kg CO2eq. 
Convention 
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC 
COP 
 The Conference of the Parties is the highest decision making body of the UNFCCC. 
All parties to the UNFCCC have a vote in the decisions of the COP, however, due to an 
on-going inability of the Parties to agree on voting procedures, the COP does not have 
agreed Rules of Procedure and thus decision making is by consensus.  
COP/MOP 
 COP/MOP is a different way of abbreviating “Conference of the Parties Serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.” The preferred acronym is CMP 
Earth 
 The third planet of the planetary system of the Sun (or Sol), Earth (or Terra) is at the 
time of writing the only habitable planet in that system, a status that is currently 
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potentially threatened by human-induced (or anthropogenic) climate change. It is both 
the home and by far most favourite planet of the author of this thesis. 
EIT country 
 A country with an Economy In Transition, i.e. the formerly socialist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. These countries form a special sub-set of Annex I Parties. 
FiE 
 Acronym for Forests in Exhaustion 
Flexible Mechanisms 
 Flexible Mechanisms of the Protocol is a collective term for Emissions Trading, JI and 
CDM. Under all three types, Annex I country parties that have an emission reduction 
obligation under the Kyoto Protocol, have the flexibility to either fulfil this obligation 
through domestic measure or by purchasing emission certificates from other countries 
and use those toward the fulfilment of their emission reduction obligations. 
FoE-I 
 Frieds of the Earth International is a network of Environmental grassroots NGOs with 
headquarters in Amserdam. 
Forests in Exhaustion 
 A proposed CDM A/R methodology wherein land that was a forest on December 31, 
1989 (the relevant date normally establishing eligibility for A/R projects) would qualify 
for the CDM if a forest plantation subsequently established on such land is expected to 
revert to non-forest land, for example through final harvesting (which would the forest a 
“forest in exhaustion”), unless specific targeted steps were undertaken to avert that 
reversion. These steps would then constitute the CDM project and general offset credits. 
GHG 
 Greenhouse gas.  
Gt CO2eq 
 Gigatons (i.e. billion metric tons) of CO2eq 
Greenhouse gas 
 Greenhouse gases are trace gases in the Earth’s atmosphere which reflect sunlight that 
is being reflected to space from the Earth’s surface back to Earth, thus causing the 
greenhouse effect. The greenhouse effect is generally speaking beneficial, even 
necessary for life on Earth, however human-induced emissions for additional green-
house gases in recent centuries have amplified the greenhouse effect to a point where the 
resulting climate change becomes disruptive to the planetary systems with severe 
potential impact to life on Earth. 
INC 
 The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate 
Change was a body established by the UN GA in 1990 to prepare the text of the 
UNFCCC. 
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Intersessionals 
 Intersessional are UNFCCC negotiation sessions that take place during the period 
between the annual COPs. During intersessionals, the work of the Subsidiary Bodies 
or Ad-Hoc Groups (AWG-KP, AWG-LAC) is advanced. 
IPCC 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is a large body of scientists established 
in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorological Organisation and the UN Environment 
Programme for the purpose of assessing the state of knowledge on climate change as it 
develops. The periodically published Assessment Reports represent a synthesis of the 
published and peer-reviewed scientific literature on climate change and are widely used 
as reference works on the topic. In 2007 the IPCC, together with Al Gore, won the 
Nobel Peace Prize for its work in raising public awareness of climate change. 
CMP 
 The Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol is the 
annual negotiation session that deals with matters concerning the implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol which is held in parallel to the COP. 
LULUCF 
 The issue area of Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry within the negotiations of 
the UNFCCC deals with changes of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere caused by 
the various ways in which land is used (eg. agriculture), this land use is changed and 
through forestry as a specific type of land use (including forest uses such as logging). 
Unlike other issue areas, LULUCF deals not only with emissions from these activities 
but also with removals of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through land use 
activities, for example as carbon dioxide is absorbed by growing trees. “LULUCF” as 
used in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations specifically refers to the treatment of 
land use activities of Annex I countries in the Kyoto Protocol. Another land use 
related issue area is REDD which is concerned with forest related topics in non-Annex 
I countries. 
Major Economies Meeting/Major Economies Forum 
 The Major Economies Meetings (MEM) were a series of meetings initiated by the US 
government under president George W. Bush which met separately from any 
UNFCCC negotiations and which were limited to the countries with the largest total 
amount of greenhouse gas emissions. The declared intention was to provide an 
“informal” forum in which these key countries could attempt to establish broad 
principles of agreements independently of the UNFCCC process, which would then be 
used to advance negotiations there. The MEMs were criticised for their limited scope 
and so excluding the majority of the world’s countries, in particular those most 
vulnerable to climate change. After the end of the Bush presidency, president Obama 
initially continued convening the meetings as the Major Economies Forum (MEF) but 
since membership largely equated the G20 membership which had meanwhile 
established itself as a permanent group also regularly taking up climate change, MEF 
were not convened anymore. 
MEM/MEF 
 Acronym for Major Economies Meeting/Major Economies Forum 
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Mitigation 
 Mitigation refers the sum of activities undertaken by parties to reduce the amount of 
emissions of greenhouse gases into the Earth’s atmosphere or the removal of these 
gases from the atmosphere. Along with adaptation, mitigation is one of the main areas 
of negotiation under the UNFCCC. 
non-Annex I Party 
 Non-Annex I Parties are those parties to the UNFCCC which are not listed in its 
Annex I. Annex I Parties. 
ODA 
 Official Development Assistance refers to the “amount that a nation expends through 
grants and other developmental assistance programs calculated as a present of GNP 
[Gross National Product]. A net ODA target of 0.7 percent of GNP for developed 
nations was agreed to at the 1990 UN General Assembly and reiterated at various 
summits such as the […] UNCED in 1992” (Saunier and Meganuck 2007: 201) 
Party 
 The countries that ratified the UNFCCC or both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol are called Parties to the Convention (or Parties to the Convention and the 
Protocol) 
Pink badge 
 Participants at UNFCCC sessions are issued with personal access badges to the 
conference venue. These badges are colour coded with pink badges indicating the 
wearer to belong to an official party delegation. These badges grant the widest access, 
e.g. to request any documents from the document centre, or access meeting rooms that 
are closed to observers or media. 
REDD 
 Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (in developing 
countries). Since these emissions represent approximately 20% of all anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions, REDD has become an important part of the UN system’s 
response to climate change. 
SBI 
 The Subsidiary Body on Implementation assists the COP in reviewing and assessing 
technical and practical specifics related to the implementation of the UNFCCC. 
SBSTA 
 The Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice assists the COP by 
thoroughly reviewing technical and scientific questions referred to it by the COP as well 
as other relevant scientific and technological developments. 
Subsidiary Bodies 
 Collective term referring to the SBI and the SBSTA.  
Glossary	   309	  	  
UNCED 
 The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, also know as the “Earth Summit,” is mainly known for the “Agenda 21” 
declaration as well as the adoption of the UNFCCC, and its “sister conventions, the 
Convention on Biodiversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification. 
UNFCCC 
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has been adopted at the 
UNCED in 1992 and since then grown to virtually universal membership. The 
convention’s ultimate objective is to limit anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to 
a level where dangerous interference with the Earth’s climate system can be avoided. 
The acronym UNFCCC also refers to the on-going treaty negotiations concerning the 
implementation of that objective as well as the institutional system of subsidiary bodies, 
conferences, bureaus and the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn, Germany. 
UN GA 
 United Nations General Assembly. 
Umbrella Group 
 A loose negotiating coalition Annex I countries within the UNFCCC negotiations 
which typically comprises of Canada, the USA, Iceland, Norway, the Ukraine, the 
Russian Federation, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
WWF 
 The Worldwide Fund for Nature (formerly known as the World Wildlife Fund) is an 
independent international environmental and conservation organisation. Funded in 1961, 
the WWF consists of 28 national organisations and claims a membership of over 5 
million worldwide. 	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